

DEFLECTIONS AND DEMOCRACY: EXPLAINING MILITARY LOYALTY SHIFTS  
AND THEIR IMPACTS ON POST-PROTEST POLITICAL CHANGE

---

A Dissertation

Presented to

the Faculty of the Josef Korbel School of International Studies

University of Denver

---

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree

Doctor of Philosophy

---

by

Kara Leigh Kingma Neu

June 2018

Advisor: Deborah Avant

ProQuest Number:10825374

All rights reserved

INFORMATION TO ALL USERS

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.



ProQuest 10825374

Published by ProQuest LLC (2018). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.

All rights reserved.

This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code  
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.

ProQuest LLC.  
789 East Eisenhower Parkway  
P.O. Box 1346  
Ann Arbor, MI 48106 – 1346

©Copyright by Kara Leigh Kingma Neu 2018

All Rights Reserved

Author: Kara Leigh Kingma Neu

Title: DEFECTIONS AND DEMOCRACY: EXPLAINING MILITARY LOYALTY SHIFTS AND THEIR IMPACTS ON POST-PROTEST POLITICAL CHANGE

Advisor: Deborah Avant

Degree Date: June 2018

### **Abstract**

Why do militaries shift their loyalty from authoritarian regimes in some instances of anti-regime protests and not others, and why do these shifts sometimes lead to democratic change? These questions are crucial for understanding the role of the military in democratization, given competing expectations in the literatures on civil-military relations, pacted transitions, and civil resistance. They are also important for understanding the outcomes of protests and other nonviolent campaigns for regime change, a topic of increased attention in recent years. To answer them, I propose an argument rooted in the bases of military authority. Militaries are delegated authority by regimes and gain authority by virtue of their functional role in providing societal security and stability. However, regimes often structure delegation to protect themselves at the expense of military functional capacity. Their use of some coup-proofing strategies introduces tensions between a military's delegated and functional authority. When mass anti-regime protests challenge regime legitimacy, I argue that the military is more likely to choose to preserve its functional authority (rather than rely on the regime's delegated authority) by shifting loyalty. The likelihood of loyalty shifts is also affected by the protest movement and whether it is committed to nonviolence and widely supported and a better source of military authority. Using this argument, I explain military loyalty shifts and their types, defined according to the extent and quality of the military organization's involvement. I then explain the relationship between types of shifts and democratization,

arguing that democratic change is more likely when military loyalty shifts are fragmented. In these cases, the military acts in favor of regime change, but is less able to exercise influence over the transition compared to militaries that defect as unified organizations. To test this argument, I use new data on military responses to all major anti-regime protest movements from 1946 to 2015. I undertake a large-n, statistical analysis, use methods of qualitative comparative analysis (QCA), and examine three cases to assess support for my argument and its observable implications.

## Acknowledgements

Many people supported me during my time as a graduate student and in the process of completing this dissertation. With their help, I have reached the end of an experience that was at times intense and challenging but ultimately fulfilling.

I must first thank my committee, which I feel incredibly fortunate to have had. Erica's work is foundational for this dissertation and was key in motivating it. Her contribution to the field of civil resistance and commitment to it every day is inspiring. Rachel was enthusiastic about the dissertation from the start, and her sharp comments at various stages forced me to clarify my thinking and writing. Debbi has been the source of invaluable advice over these years – on both the dissertation and life in general. Her advice was critical but never discouraging. I will always appreciate in particular that she pushed me to say something bigger and bolder. These three are incomparable scholars and women. I aspire to make them proud.

Over the course of my time at DU, I learned from and worked alongside many professors and students. My experiences with them were uplifting, at times humorous, and always intellectually stimulating. I am especially appreciative of my fellow PhD students who are simply the best colleagues and people.

A special thanks to the International Center on Nonviolent Conflict for its financial support of my research. Its broader sponsorship of the study of civil resistance is admirable and important.

Finally, I thank those people who matter the most – my family. To the Neus: thank you for your encouragement through this very long process, all the way back to my undergraduate years. To Mom and Dad: thank you for believing in me and my dreams.

You continue to remind me that regardless of what happens next, this is an accomplishment, of which you're very proud. To Jamie (and Tyler): I cannot imagine going through this without having you as a constant text partner – to complain to, and to celebrate with. You always being there meant so much. To Todd: you were by my side every step of this journey, and you kept me afloat with great patience and only the fewest of complaints. You cheered my hard work but showed me that life shouldn't just be about that. With you, I can both care deeply about the world and appreciate the joy in every day.

To Grandma Mouw: I finally got my paper done!

## Table of Contents

Chapter One: Introduction to the Dissertation .....	1
The Military's Political Impact and Democratization .....	4
Existing Explanations of Military Loyalty Shifts .....	10
Military Authority and Defections .....	14
Empirical Strategy and Justification .....	17
Introduction to the Case Studies .....	19
Theoretical and Methodological Contributions .....	23
Policy Implications .....	25
Roadmap for the Dissertation .....	27
Chapter Two: Authority Threats and Military Defections .....	27
General Argument.....	28
Competing Expectations for the Effects of Coup-Proofing .....	45
Alternate Explanations of Defections .....	48
Conceptualizing Military Disloyalty.....	51
Explaining Types of Military Loyalty Shifts .....	53
Conclusions and Introduction to the Quantitative Analysis .....	58
Chapter Three: Quantitative Research Design and Analysis .....	60
Universe of Cases, Unit of Analysis, and Operationalization of Variables .....	61
Reviewing the Hypotheses.....	65
Explanatory Variables.....	68
Control Variables .....	73
Methods.....	77
Results.....	80
Conclusions.....	103
Chapter Four: Qualitative Comparative Analysis .....	108
Brief Introduction to QCA as a Method .....	110
This Chapter's QCA Strategy .....	111
Empirical Propositions .....	113
Findings: Defections .....	115
Findings: No Defections .....	119
Findings: Low Level Loyalty Shifts .....	120
Findings: No Low Level Loyalty Shifts .....	123
Findings: Fragmented High Level Shifts .....	124
Findings: No Fragmented High Level Shifts .....	128
Findings: United Defections .....	129
Findings: No United Defections .....	132
Conclusions.....	133
Chapter Five: Analyzing the Impact of Military Loyalty Shifts on Democratization ....	136
Understanding the Military's Role in Democratization.....	138



Military Political Roles in the Context of Anti-Regime Protest Movements .....	143
Authoritarian Regime Control and the Quality of Military Loyalty Shifts .....	144
Empirical Strategy .....	148
Exogenous Methods and Results .....	153
Endogenous Methods and Results .....	157
Conclusions.....	163
Chapter Six: Mali – Authority Threats, United Defections, and Military-Led Democratization.....	165
Traore’s Regime and Control of the Military .....	166
Anti-Traore Protests and the Military’s Response.....	172
Military Authority and Democratization Outcomes .....	178
Conclusions.....	181
Chapter Seven: Bangladesh – Authority Threats, Fragmented Shifts, and Civilian-Led Democratization.....	174
Ershad’s Regime and Control of the Military.....	175
Anti-Ershad Protests and the Military’s Response .....	178
Military Authority and Democratization Outcomes .....	187
Conclusions.....	190
Chapter Eight: Peru – Functional Authority, Low Level Discontent and Shifts, and Civilian-Led Democratization .....	191
Fujimori’s Regime and Control of the Military.....	192
Anti-Fujimori Protests and the Military’s Response .....	199
Military Authority and Democratization Outcomes .....	210
Conclusions.....	212
Chapter Nine: Conclusion.....	214
Theoretical Contributions .....	219
Methodological Contributions .....	220
Policy Implications .....	222
Future Research Program.....	225
Conclusion .....	226
References.....	228
Appendix A: Military Response Narratives.....	249
Appendix B: Codebook for Updated and Expanded GWF.....	343
Appendix C: Chapter Three .....	348
Appendix D: QCA .....	378
Appendix E: Chapter Five .....	381

## List of Tables

### Chapter One

Table 1. Summary of case study arguments and findings .....	22
---	----

### Chapter Three

Table 1. Summary of main concepts in quantitative analysis 1 .....	67
Table 2. Summary statistics: binary independent and control variables .....	77
Table 3. Summary statistics: continuous independent and control variables .....	77
Table 4. Summary statistics for ICP across outcomes .....	78
Table 5. Variation in outcomes across regime types .....	79
Table 6. Summary statistics for size across outcomes .....	79
Table 7. Variation in outcomes across nonviolence measure .....	79
Table 8. Models of coup-proofing and defections .....	81
Table 9. Models of other regime types and defections .....	84
Table 10. Models of protester characteristics and defections, controlling for and conditional on coup-proofing.....	86
Table 11. Models of loss and defections, controlling for and conditional on coup proofing.....	90
Table 12. Predicted probability of defections in coup-proofed militaries, by whether or not have recently been defeated in conflict .....	91
Table 13. Models of ongoing conflict and defections.....	92
Table 14. Model of coup-proofing and loyalty shift types .....	94
Table 15. Model of loss by coup-proofed militaries and loyalty shift types .....	95
Table 16. Model of protester characteristics and loyalty shift types, controlling for coup-proofing.....	98
Table 17. Model of protester characteristics and loyalty shift types, conditional on ICP .....	100

### Chapter Four

Table 1. Sufficiency and necessity matrix for defections outcome .....	116
Table 2. Sufficient configurations for defections outcome (full dataset) .....	116
Table 3. Sufficient configurations for defections outcome (reduced dataset) .....	117
Table 4. Sufficient configurations for defections outcome (reduced dataset with additional conditions).....	118
Table 5. Sufficient configurations for no defections outcome (reduced dataset) .....	120
Table 6. Sufficiency and necessity matrix for low level loyalty shifts outcome .....	121
Table 7. Sufficient configurations for low level loyalty shifts outcome (full dataset) .....	122
Table 8. Sufficient configurations for low level loyalty shifts outcome (reduced dataset) .....	123
Table 9. Sufficient configurations for no low level loyalty shifts outcome (reduced dataset) .....	124

Table 10. Sufficiency and necessity matrix for fragmented high level loyalty shifts outcome .....	125
Table 11. Sufficient configurations for fragmented high level loyalty shifts outcome (full dataset) .....	126
Table 12. Sufficient configurations for fragmented high level loyalty shifts outcome (reduced dataset) .....	126
Table 13. Sufficient configurations for fragmented high level loyalty shifts outcome (reduced dataset with additional condition) .....	127
Table 14. Sufficient configurations for no fragmented high level loyalty shifts outcome (reduced dataset) .....	129
Table 15. Sufficiency and necessity matrix for united defections outcome .....	130
Table 16. Sufficient configurations for united defections outcome (full dataset) .....	130
Table 17. Sufficient configurations for united defections outcome (reduced dataset) .....	131
Table 18. Sufficient configurations for united defections outcome (reduced dataset with additional conditions) .....	132
Table 19. Sufficient configurations for no united defections outcome (reduced dataset) .....	133

#### Chapter Five

Table 1. Anti-regime campaign success .....	148
Table 2. Frequency of campaign outcomes per <i>type shift</i> .....	150
Table 3. Summary statistics: continuous dependent and control variables .....	152
Table 4. Summary statistics: binary dependent and control variables .....	153
Table 5. <i>type shift</i> and democratization measured as <i>politypost5</i> .....	154
Table 6. <i>type shift</i> and democratization measured as <i>politychange5</i> .....	156
Table 7. <i>type shift</i> and democratization, with determinants of <i>type shift</i> .....	159
Table 8. <i>type shift</i> and democratization, with determinants of <i>type shift</i> and no success.....	160
Table 9. First stage model, for Fragmented High Level instrument .....	161
Table 10. Second stage model, instrument and democratization ( <i>politychange5</i> ) .....	162

## List of Figures

### Chapter Two

Figure 1. General argument for military defections.....	45
Figure 2. Types of military loyalty shifts.....	52
Figure 3. Argument for types of military loyalty shifts .....	54

### Chapter Three

Figure 1. Spectrum of security force responses to civil resistance .....	63
Figure 2. Types of loyalty shifts across the universe of cases .....	65
Figure 3. Marginal effects of coup-proofing on the probability of defections .....	82
Figure 4. Marginal effects of ICP and size on defections in non-personalist regimes .....	88
Figure 5. Marginal effects of ICP and size on defections in personalist regimes .....	88
Figure 6. Marginal effects of PCP and military loss on united defections .....	96
Figure 7. Marginal effects of ICP and size on united defections .....	101
Figure 8. Marginal effects of PCP on types of loyalty shifts .....	102

### Chapter Five

Figure 1. Frequencies of categories of <i>type shift</i> .....	149
Figure 2. Predicted values of <i>politychange5</i> at different categories of <i>type shift</i> .....	157

## CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION TO THE DISSERTATION

Militaries have important effects on political change. What effects they have, though, is contested. The civil-military relations literature has generally held that military involvement in politics has a deleterious impact on democracy. The literature on pacted democracy, however, claims that military involvement can be key to democratization. Recent findings in analyses of civil resistance also suggest that military loyalty shifts are key to successful anti-authoritarian protests. Is military politicization a topic and hazard that should be avoided at all costs? Or can it sometimes lead to successful democratization? How can we best understand military defections and their impact on post-protest political change?

The civil resistance literature has provided several examples where military loyalty shifts accompanied successful anti-authoritarian regime protest movements. For instance, military defections from President Suharto during protests in Indonesia in 1998<sup>1</sup> and President Khan in Pakistan in 1969<sup>2</sup> both achieved regime change followed by democratic elections. Research on these and other civil resistance campaigns suggests that unarmed civilians can overthrow autocrats in part because of regime security force

---

<sup>1</sup> Mary P. Callahan, "Civil-Military Relations in Indonesia: Reformasi and Beyond," *Naval Postgraduate School Occasional Paper 4* (1999): 15.

<sup>2</sup> Arshad Javed Rizvi, "Civil-Military Relations: A Comparative Study of Pakistan," *International Research Journal of Interdisciplinary and Multidisciplinary Studies* 1 no. 8 (2015): 37.

loyalty shifts.<sup>3</sup> Sometimes, though, protest movements do not gain military support and that often leads to less successful results. The Chinese military was largely loyal during the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989, for instance, and the regime remained secure.<sup>4</sup> The long term impact of military support on democratization is also uncertain. In Pakistan, the military declared martial law prior to elections and launched a coup less than a decade after.<sup>5</sup>

This empirical variation raises a number of questions that existing literatures on the military in politics have a hard time answering. The civil-military relations literature cannot explain why a military acting outside the authority delegated it by civilians sometimes leads to democracy. The early pacted transitions scholarship and the recent work on civil resistance show through their analyses of military involvement in democratization that this understanding of militaries in politics is missing something. However, while the importance of the military to civil resistance outcomes has been well established, only recently have scholars begun to focus on explaining the military

---

<sup>3</sup> Anika Locke Binnendijk and Ivan Marovic, "Power and Persuasion: Nonviolent Strategies to Influence State Security Forces in Serbia (2000) and Ukraine (2004)," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 39, no. 3 (2006): 411-429; Zoltan Barany, "The Role of the Military," *Journal of Democracy* 22, no. 4 (2011): 24-35; Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011).

<sup>4</sup> B. Shelley, "Protest and Globalization: Media, Symbols, and Audience in the Drama of Democratization," *Democratization* 8, no. 4 (2001): 160.

<sup>5</sup> Naghman Chaudhry, "Pakistan's First Military Coup," Naval Postgraduate School thesis (2012), 74; Steven I. Wilkinson, "Democratic Consolidation and Failure: Lessons from Bangladesh and Pakistan," *Democratization* 7, no. 3 (2000): 208.

responses.<sup>6</sup> Further, there has been little effort to understand the implications of military loyalty shifts for a country's civil-military relations and democratization prospects.

In this dissertation, I provide a new framework for understanding military involvement in political change that addresses these questions. I focus on two key sources of military authority, that delegated by the regime and that produced by its functional capacity. I argue that militaries are more likely to shift loyalty from authoritarian regimes to anti-regime protesters when regimes have threatened them. Regime failure to maintain popular support threatens delegated authority, and if the regime has used coup-proofing that threatens functional authority, the military may defect. The likelihood of military loyalty shifts is also affected by characteristics of the protest movement. If the movement is nonviolent and widely supported, it is more likely to be seen as a better partner than the regime for maintaining military authority. Finally, the type of military loyalty shift – in particular, whether the military shifts loyalty as a united or fragmented organization – impacts democratic outcomes. A fragmented military response is less likely to challenge the new civilian regime.

The conflicting expectations of different literatures about the military's role in democratization motivated this study. I set out to understand the conditions under which a military is more likely to use its leverage as guardian of the state to support protester-led

---

<sup>6</sup> Holger Albrecht, "Does Coup-Proofing Work? Political-Military Relations in Authoritarian Regimes amid the Arab Uprisings," *Mediterranean Politics* 20, no. 1 (2015): 36-54; Terence Lee, *Defect or Defend: Military Responses to Popular Protests in Authoritarian Asia* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014); Michael Makara, "Rethinking Military Behavior during the Arab Spring," *Defense and Security Analysis* 32, no. 3 (2016): 209-23; Julien Morency-Laflamme, "A Question of Trust: Military Defection During Regime Crises in Benin and Togo," *Democratization* 25, no. 3 (2018): 464-80; Philipp M. Lutscher, "The More Fragmented the Better? The Impact of Armed Forces Structure on Defection during Nonviolent Popular Uprisings," *International Interactions* 42, no. 2 (2016): 350-75; Sharon Erickson Nepstad, "Mutiny and Nonviolence in the Arab Spring," *Journal of Peace Research* 50, no. 3 (2013): 337-349.

regime change that results in democratization. I focus on two specific questions: 1) Why do militaries shift their loyalty from non-democratic regimes in some instances of anti-regime protests and not others? 2) Why do these shifts sometimes lead to democratic change?

My findings improve our understandings of the military in politics in two ways. First, they spell out a novel logic for why the military (or parts of it) may shift loyalty from a regime during some nonviolent regime challenges. Second, they demonstrate reason to question the civil-military relations literature's starting point that democracy requires civilian control of the military regardless of the quality of civilians. Kohn, for instance, argues that the normative goal is "...to make the military establishment politically neutral, and to prevent or preclude any possibility of military intervention in political life."<sup>7</sup> But I show that when a regime behaves in such a way as to lose popular support and diminish functional capacities, political judgment by the military can, under some circumstances, set the country on a more democratic path. I use the rest of this chapter to establish this study's place in existing work, briefly introduce my argument, and preview the types of evidence I have collected in support of it.

### **The Military's Political Impact and Democratization**

Research on the role of the military in political change spans a number of fields, including civil-military relations, democratization, and civil resistance. From above, this scholarly work is in agreement that the military is an important political actor, but in tension over whether the military can be supportive of democratic change. Civil-military relations scholars view the civilian control of the military necessary for democratic

---

<sup>7</sup> Richard H. Kohn, "How Democracies Control the Military," *Journal of Democracy* 8, no. 4 (1997): 141.



political systems as “...absolute and all-encompassing.”<sup>8</sup> The pacted democracy literature acknowledges a military may pose challenges to democratization, but points to cases where the military and other elites supported democratic transitions to preserve their interests. Research on civil resistance demonstrates the importance of nonelites in political change, and that the response of militaries is often crucial for movements’ outcomes. Here, I further develop this theoretical puzzle. How might we understand military support for peaceful political change given the harmful effects military intervention in politics can have on democracy?

The civil-military relations literature’s principle concern with the military in politics is whether or not the military is under civilian control, or the military acts within the authority delegated it by civilians. Civilian control of the military is defined and measured in a number of ways, from an absence of coups to military compliance with civilian orders and civilian policymaking free from military influence.<sup>9</sup> A key claim of the literature is that democratic governance requires civilian control of the military, a hierarchical and bureaucratic organization with coercive capabilities.<sup>10</sup> As Croissant and Kuehn state, “The very idea of democratic rule, understood as political participation and control by the governed, presupposes that democratically-elected governments and parliaments have the ability to decide policies without undue influence by nondemocratic

---

<sup>8</sup> Kohn, “How Democracies Control the Military,” 142.

<sup>9</sup> Peter D. Feaver, “Civil-Military Relations,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 2 (1999): 211-41.

<sup>10</sup> Felipe Aguero, “Legacies of Transitions: Institutionalization, the Military, and Democracy in South America,” *International Studies Review* 42, no. 2 (1998): 383-404.

veto players such as the military.”<sup>11</sup> Lack of civilian control threatens all aspects of democracy, including elections, political rights, civil rights, and horizontal accountability.<sup>12</sup>

Following this, democratization requires civilians control the military. Much research centers on how transitioning democracies establish civilian control, especially when militaries have exercised substantial political power in the authoritarian regimes.<sup>13</sup> Militaries in these contexts are accustomed to acting politically and gaining or claiming institutional and individual benefits.<sup>14</sup> As powerful actors, militaries can exercise significant influence over transitions from authoritarianism, making it difficult for civilians in new democracies to establish control.<sup>15</sup> In turn, new democracies that are unable to establish civilian control suffer “...stagnation and regress in democratic consolidation and sometimes even...democratic breakdown.”<sup>16</sup>

Overall, the literature concludes that military involvement in politics and particularly the transition from authoritarianism threatens democratization. Even if the military does not seize power, concerns remain regarding the role of the military in

---

<sup>11</sup> Aurel Croissant and David Kuehn, “Patterns of Civilian Control of the Military in East Asia’s New Democracies,” *Journal of East Asian Studies* 9, no. 2 (2009): 189.

<sup>12</sup> Paul Chambers et al., “Beyond the Fallacy of Coup-ism: Conceptualizing Civilian Control of the Military in Emerging Democracies,” *Democratization* 17, no. 5 (2010): 960.

<sup>13</sup> Elizabeth P. Coughlan, “Democratizing Civilian Control: The Polish Case,” *Armed Forces and Society* 24, no. 4 (1998): 519-33.

<sup>14</sup> Kohn, “How Democracies Control the Military,” 141; Chambers et al., “Beyond the Fallacy of Coup-ism: Conceptualizing Civilian Control of the Military in Emerging Democracies,” 935.

<sup>15</sup> Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds., *Civil-Military Relations and Democracy* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); Alfred Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone* (Princeton University Press, 1988).

<sup>16</sup> Chambers et al., “Beyond the Fallacy of Coup-ism: Conceptualizing Civilian Control of the Military in Emerging Democracies,” 960.

democracy and its consolidation: "...will [the military] obey its civilian masters or will it use its considerable coercive power to resist civilian direction and pursue its own interests?"<sup>17</sup> The field is skeptical that the military may help to bring about regime change that is democratic, in contrast to the pacted transitions and civil resistance literatures. It is thus a foil to my research because I seek to better understand the conditions under which a military can support democratic change by supporting anti-regime protesters.

The literature on pacted transitions to democracy also demonstrates the military has impacts on political change. However, one of its major insights is that this impact is potentially positive. Scholarly analyses of third wave transitions in Latin American and Southern Europe conclude that splits between authoritarian regime hardliners and softliners can lead to negotiations between regime and opposition elites, results in strategic agreements, or pacts, for political change.<sup>18</sup> In many cases, it is crucial that among the softliners are military officers to support liberalization against potential coup attempts by other regime elites.<sup>19</sup> A military may believe its interest in a stable state with a functioning government is best served by a new democratic regime; "[p]aradoxically but predictably, democratic elections are thus often part of the extrication strategy of military institutions that feel threatened by their prominent role in nondemocratic

---

<sup>17</sup> Feaver, "Civil-Military Relations," 215.

<sup>18</sup> Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, 16-22.

regimes.”<sup>20</sup> Pacts can increase a military’s willingness to support democratization and facilitate transitions by allowing the military to preserve its political, economic, or other interests during the transition and under the new regime.<sup>21</sup>

As a powerful elite, the military can exercise great influence over pacts and the transition from authoritarianism.<sup>22</sup> Yet it can also facilitate the transition, in part because it is an actor with a permanent institutional role, separate from any role in politics. In some Latin American military regimes, for example, the military gave up power and democratized so that it could return to the barracks.<sup>23</sup> Militaries in those and other transitions came to believe democratization was acceptable, especially when the opposition was largely moderate and nonviolent and holding on to power would be costly to the institution.<sup>24</sup> On the basis of this research, the military may be supportive of democratic transitions.

The civil resistance literature recognizes the role of the military in political change through different means. Democratization in these analyses occurs not through elite-led negotiations, but mobilized citizens pressuring authoritarian regimes and elites

---

<sup>20</sup> Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 67.

<sup>21</sup> Bruce W. Farcau, *The Transition to Democracy in Latin America: The Role of the Military* (Praeger, 1996); Terry Lynn Karl, “Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America,” *Comparative Politics* 23, no. 1 (1990): 1-21; Donald Share and Scott Mainwaring, “Transitions through Transaction: Democratization in Brazil and Spain,” in *Political Liberalization in Brazil: Dynamics, Dilemmas, and Future* edited by Wayne Seclher (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1986): 175-215.

<sup>22</sup> Guillermo O’Donnell, “Transitions, Continuities, and Paradoxes,” *Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective* (1992): 17-56.

<sup>23</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, “How Countries Democratize,” *Political Science Quarterly* 106, no. 4 (1991): 584.

<sup>24</sup> John Crabtree and Laurence Whitehead. *Towards Democratic Viability: The Bolivian Experience* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001); J. Samuel Valenzuela, “Labor Movements in Transitions to Democracy: A Framework for Analysis,” *Comparative Politics* 21, no. 4 (1989): 445-72.

toward change. The military has long been recognized as an important elite in this regard. According to Sharp, protesters should seek to remove the authoritarian regime's pillars of support, including the military, to increase their likelihood of success.<sup>25</sup> Analyses of successful cases demonstrate that the military's decision to shift support to the protesters is often significant to these movements' outcomes.<sup>26</sup> Compared to violent campaigns, civil resistance is more likely to achieve its aims in part because it is more likely to generate military loyalty shifts.<sup>27</sup> Nonviolent campaigns are 46 times more likely to succeed when security force defections occur.<sup>28</sup> This scholarship demonstrates the military may support democratization when it chooses to support protest movements for regime change.

In sum, these literatures address the military's role in political change but reach different conclusions about whether a role outside of civilian delegated authority can be supportive of democracy. For the civil-military relations literature, the military must be put under civilian control so it does not threaten the democratic transition or prevent democratic consolidation. Yet civilian control may not be a necessary precursor to democratic change, given the findings of the pact and civilian resistance literatures. Recognizing militaries have sources of authority other than delegated challenges the civil-military relations' claim and is key to understanding why militaries sometimes

---

<sup>25</sup> Gene Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action* (Porter Sargent Publishers, 1973).

<sup>26</sup> Barany, "The Role of the Military"; Paul J. D'Anieri, "Explaining the Success and Failure of Post-Communist Revolutions," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 39, no. 3 (2006): 331-50; Rizal Sukma "Explaining the Success and Failure of Post-Communist Revolutions," in *Military Engagement: Influencing Armed Forces Worldwide to Support Democratic Transitions* edited by Dennis Blair (Brookings Institution Press, 2013): 113-38.

<sup>27</sup> Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, 22.

support anti-regime protests, and when this support is more likely to lead to democratization.

### **Existing Explanations of Military Loyalty Shifts**

Though relatively nascent, a body of scholarship is developing in response to the findings of Chenoweth and Stephan<sup>29</sup> and others to explain military loyalty shifts during popular challenges to authoritarian regimes. Here I briefly organize and summarize the existing work, some of which I deal with in more detail in later chapters. The analyses all focus to some extent on the impact of regime-military relations on military loyalty. However, the cases they select for analysis lead to different accounts of how various factors explain their outcomes of interest. I draw on some of this scholarship in making my argument, but expand on its efforts in two ways: 1) I propose a more general argument for the impact of regime control of the military, based in the sources of military authority, and 2) I consider both the regime and the protest movement for their impacts on these sources of authority.<sup>30</sup> My argument applies to and is explanatory of a wider range of cases and outcomes as a consequence.

Some analyses focus on a regime's provision of financial and political benefits that become uncertain during challenges to its rule to explain military loyalty shifts at the individual level. Regimes can incentivize loyalty, but individual soldiers will defect if they believe the regime is at risk of falling. Nepstad makes this argument for military

---

<sup>29</sup> Ibid.

<sup>30</sup> This aligns with Morency-Laflamme's recent call to consider both military and opposition characteristics instead of one or the other in explaining military defections. Morency-Laflamme, "A Question of Trust: Military Defection During Regime Crises in Benin and Togo," 2.

defections across the Arab Spring cases of Egypt, Bahrain, and Syria.<sup>31</sup> The regime-military relationship here primarily affects individual soldiers' motivations for disloyalty, and defections occur as a series of individual loyalty shifts. However, it is unclear from this explanation how such defections spread and to whom, and what might explain variation across individual soldiers' decisions.

Other explanations analyze defections as loyalty shifts by particular groups within the military. These accounts are based largely on the Arab Spring or MENA cases, where regimes structure the military in ways that incentivize loyalty on the basis of identity group membership.<sup>32</sup> In the face of mass protests, these militaries should exhibit in-group loyalty and out-group defection, especially if the uprising is along ethnic lines. Even if in-groups are motivated to be disloyal, they will remain committed to regime strength because they do not have a future apart from the regime.<sup>33</sup> This is not always the case, though, as demonstrated by the recent experience of Burundi. In the spring 2015 protests against President Pierre Nkurunziza, it was his ally and fellow Hutu, Major General Godefroid Niyombare, that spearheaded an attempt by dissident soldiers to prevent him from attempting an unconstitutional third term.<sup>34</sup>

In some analyses, militaries (or parts of them) shift loyalty because the regimes have used divide and rule tactics to create incentives for loyalty among the winners. These regimes create loyalty ties rather than exploit existing identity links, and focus

---

<sup>31</sup> Nepstad, "Mutiny and Nonviolence in the Arab Spring."

<sup>32</sup> Theodore McLauchlin, "Loyalty Strategies and Military Defection in Rebellion," *Comparative Politics* 42, no. 3 (2010): 333-50.

<sup>33</sup> Makara, "Rethinking Military Behavior during the Arab Spring."

<sup>34</sup> Tomas Van Acker, "Understanding Burundi's Predicament," *Africa Policy Brief* 11 (2015).

their efforts on the relatively small groups in the upper ranks that could most easily pose a challenge to them – generating discontent in the rest of the military. Lee argues that use of such strategies by President Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines and President Suharto in Indonesia led the losing factions to defect in hopes of improving their professional prospects and the military institution’s overall standing.<sup>35</sup> In these explanations, a military shifts loyalty because of how the regime has structured the military organization rather than individual concerns or group identities. Defections take the form of significant, though often disunited, loyalty shifts.

Finally, some analyses explain loyalty shifts by the full military, such as observed in Egypt 2011. Here, the focus tends to be on regime-military relations that provide for military autonomy. The causal mechanism is not incentives to remain loyal, but institutional capacity to defect. Albrecht points to segregation of the regime and military in explaining Egyptian defections versus Syrian loyalty (though not acknowledging that sections of the Syrian military did shift loyalty).<sup>36</sup> Lutscher makes a similar ability-based argument, claiming that levels of force fragmentation make it easier for some militaries to defect.<sup>37</sup> These accounts give little attention to military motivations for disloyalty, focusing instead on the ability of full militaries to defect. Such full defections, though

---

<sup>35</sup> Terence Lee, “The Armed Forces and Transitions from Authoritarian Rule,” *Comparative Political Studies* 42, no. 5 (2009): 640-69; *Defect or Defend: Military Responses to Popular Protests in Authoritarian Asia*.

<sup>36</sup> Albrecht, “Does Coup-Proofing Work? Political-Military Relations in Authoritarian Regimes amid the Arab Uprisings.”

<sup>37</sup> Lutscher, “The More Fragmented the Better? The Impact of Armed Forces Structure on Defection during Nonviolent Popular Uprisings.”



highly consequential, are relatively uncommon; a military or parts of it may shift loyalty in other ways.

Overall, existing explanations for military loyalty shifts in response to anti-regime protests center on regime-military relations. Depending on the structure of these relations and the incentives they generate, the military or parts of it will be motivated and/or able to defect. The analyses' specific arguments, though, depend in large part on case selection. This limits their explanations to particular types, and perhaps instances, of military loyalty shifts. Additionally, they mostly fail to address variation across protest movements as a potential explanatory factor. This gap is in fact the motivation for Morency-Laflamme's recent study.<sup>38</sup> In it, he argues that the decision of a military to defect is determined by both the regime's control policies (in particular, its use of counterforces) and the opposition's ability to provide credible promises regarding future military interests. Empirically, it is a comparative case study limited to loyalty in Togo 1990-1993 and defections in Benin 1989-1990. Morency-Laflamme concludes that future research should apply a framework of military and opposition characteristics to additional cases.<sup>39</sup>

I propose an argument that brings together the existing explanations to understand how the structure of regime-military relations and the characteristics of protest movements impact the motivations and ability of the military to shift loyalty. I start by recognizing that militaries respond to anti-regime protests in ways besides loyalty or defection, with types of loyalty shifts that involve the military organization differently.

---

<sup>38</sup> Morency-Laflamme, "A Question of Trust: Military Defection During Regime Crises in Benin and Togo."

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., 11.

As concerns strategies of regime control, I do not focus on one means of coup-proofing over another (e.g. ethnic stacking versus counterbalancing), but consider them as a whole for their effects on the military's core interests and authority claims. Finally, I bring in the protest movement by considering it as an alternative to the regime in the context of challenges to the regime's legitimacy and threats to the military's sources of authority.

### **Military Authority and Defections**

My argument follows the extant scholarship's focus on regime-military relations, but is rooted in the bases of military authority as affected by the regime and protesters. Militaries gain authority in many ways, but two are especially consequential. First, militaries are delegated authority by civilian leaders, and by extension, the population. Second, militaries gain authority by virtue of their functional role in society, or their involvement in the provision of order and stability. A military has maximum authority when legitimate civilian leaders delegate it authority, and a secure state confirms its functional capabilities.

However, civilian leaders, particularly autocrats, often structure delegation to protect the regime at the expense of military functional capabilities. Personnel decisions that reward loyalty over merit, counterbalancing using other security forces, and other forms of coup-proofing compromise the military's functional capacity and introduce tensions between its delegated and functional authority. In other words, the military is delegated authority by a regime that has hurt its capabilities and threatened its functional authority. In these circumstances, the military's delegated authority becomes especially important, yet depends on the regime's ability to maintain its power. When the regime faces challenges culminating in mass protests against its rule, I argue that the military is

more likely to opt to preserve its functional authority by removing loyalty from the regime or shifting loyalty to the protesters.

This logic follows existing work in arguing that regime-military relations impact military responses to anti-regime protests. I go further by contending that particular forms of regime control (such as coup-proofing) matter most because their impacts on functional capacity affect the military's authority. Militaries gain authority by virtue of their capacity to create and maintain societal order, and thus both value and have institutional interests in the conditions necessary for this.<sup>40</sup> Mass protests against the regime challenge its legitimacy, and thus the legitimacy of the military's delegated authority. They also further call into question the regime's support for military functional capacity in providing for a secure society. The military has less delegated and functional authority as a result of these regime-military relations in the context of mass protests, and is more likely to shift loyalty.

My argument also gives special attention to the protesters, as the individuals and groups to which the military may shift its loyalty. Because militaries are concerned with both their delegated and functional sources of authority, it matters whether the protesters are likely to be more legitimate (and thus a different source of delegated authority) and better partners in providing for stability and security (and thus supportive of rather than a threat to functional authority). The military is most likely to defect if the protesters are committed to nonviolence and widely supported.

These factors may make overall loyalty shifts more likely. However, it is clear from the cases noted at the beginning and of interest in the extant scholarship that

---

<sup>40</sup> Martin C. Needler, "Military Motivations in the Seizure of Power," *Latin American Research Review* 10, no. 3 (1975): 63-79.

militaries often do not fully defect or fully remain loyal. Existing research tends to broadly conceptualize both defections and loyalty, lumping together all significant shifts and low level shifts with loyalty. The analyses of regime-military relations and defections thus explain a limited amount of variation in military responses to anti-regime protests. In this work, I leverage my argument's various implications for military sources of authority and the military as an organization to explain types of military loyalty shifts.

While military loyalty shifts are often crucial to the success of anti-regime protest movements, their impacts on democratization are uncertain. Specifying the possible military responses also helps me to explain when military shifts of support are more likely to lead to democratic change. For this secondary outcome of interest, I argue that democratization is more likely when military loyalty shifts are significant but fragmented. In these cases, the military acts in favor of regime change, but is less able to exercise influence over the transition compared to militaries that defect as unified organizations.

My argument generates the following general hypotheses:

Militaries will be more likely to shift loyalty from the regime when the regime has threatened military functional and delegated authority.

Military loyalty shifts are more likely to lead to democratic outcomes when they are significant but fragmented.

In later chapters, I further detail these hypotheses and their observable implications and test them through regression analysis, qualitative comparative analysis, and case studies.

## Empirical Strategy and Justification

My primary method of empirically evaluating this argument is a large-N cross-national statistical analysis. I collected quantitative data for my independent and dependent variables for 154 cases of major anti-regime protests and use various regression techniques to test my hypotheses while controlling for potential alternative explanations or confounding factors.<sup>41</sup> The 154 cases that constitute my universe of analysis are campaigns included in the Major Episodes of Contention (MEC) Data Project.<sup>42</sup> They are the dataset's Category 4 episodes, defined as coordinated campaigns with more than 1,000 observed participants and the goal of removing the incumbent regime, from 1946-2015. Using MEC's standards as a strategy for selecting my cases ensures I test my argument on a wide range of anti-regime protest movements. It also preempts the charge that I am only considering the sorts of protests where my argument might be most likely to hold. I address possible problems with this strategy in Chapter Three, but for now it is sufficient to note that the cases are comparable episodes of anti-regime campaigns that vary across space and time. Further, their maximalist categorization means they are the type of protests to which the military is likely to respond, with important consequences.

I limit my study to nonviolent campaigns, for several reasons. First, nonviolent and violent campaigns differ on many of the attributes I wish to hold more or less constant in my analysis: the nature of the challenge they pose to the regime;<sup>43</sup> their types

---

<sup>41</sup> The main analyses include only non-democratic cases, which number 112.

<sup>42</sup> "Major Episodes of Contention Data Project."

<sup>43</sup> Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*, 42.

and levels of participation;<sup>44</sup> and their participants' strategies.<sup>45</sup> Including violent campaigns would therefore complicate my analysis and conclusions. Second, my argument applies to nonviolent campaigns, as the sorts of regime challenges likely to offer the military an alternative in terms of authority. Violent campaigns by definition threaten societal stability and security and thus military functional authority, and so I would not expect loyalty shifts. In fact, Chenoweth and Stephan find that violent campaigns are unlikely to generate security force defections.<sup>46</sup> While it would be interesting to interrogate variation in military responses across such cases, I bracket that research question for another study. Chenoweth and Stephan also find that defections have less of an impact on the success of violent compared to nonviolent campaigns;<sup>47</sup> consequently they are less inherently interesting in this context.

The results of the regression analyses suggest support for my argument and its empirical expectations. Measures of coup-proofing increase the likelihood of defections, as do measures related to the protest movement. The effects of these variables are greater when I interact them, with each other (to assess conditional effects) and with other factors that make the regime's threats to military functional capacity more evident, such as recent military defeat. The results also support my hypotheses related to types of military loyalty shifts: greater threats to military functional authority are associated with higher level loyalty shifts, mediated by the effects of coup-proofing on the military organization and the role of the protest movement. Lastly, though military loyalty shifts have only small

---

<sup>44</sup> Ibid., 32-4.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid., 55.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., 59.

effects on democratization outcomes independent of campaign outcomes, fragmented shifts consistently have a more positive impact than others.

I also use qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) to test my argument for military loyalty shifts. Regression analyses of my full set of cases allows me to establish relationships between my independent and dependent variables and compare their strengths to standards of statistical significance. As I detail in Chapter Two, however, my hypotheses imply that contingent combinations of variables produce loyalty shifts. Basically, I argue that regime control strategies combine with protester characteristics to produce threats to military authority, and these relationships are context-specific in their effects on loyalty shifts. QCA uses Boolean algebra to assess such combinations and determine conditions' necessity and sufficiency for the outcomes. The results are in line with my theoretical expectations, and make clear the strengths of a conjunctural approach to analyzing causation. QCA is also appropriate for small- to medium- numbers of observations. I use QCA after applying additional scope conditions to my universe of cases, resulting in an especially comparable subset.

Lastly, I evaluate evidence for my arguments for loyalty shift and their impacts on democratization through three case studies that I introduce below.

#### Introduction to the Case Studies

Chapters Six through Eight are case studies of major anti-regime protests in Mali 1990-1991, Bangladesh 1987-1990, and Peru 2000. They are tests of my theory because I focus on the independent variables' causal relationships with the dependent variables, while identifying and examining mechanisms.<sup>48</sup> I selected the three cases because they

---

<sup>48</sup> Ibid., 301.

exhibit diverse values on the main explanatory variable of threats to military functional authority. Through them, I test my argument across the range of variation in these threats.<sup>49</sup> The outcomes in the first stage of analysis – types of military loyalty shifts – become diverse values on the explanatory variable for democratization outcomes. Case studies involve in-depth research that leverages a variety of descriptive evidence for causal inference.<sup>50</sup> My observations for each case demonstrate the effects of regime control and protester characteristics on military authority, and the military organization on democracy, in ways I cannot measure or infer using probabilistic statistics or Boolean analysis.

I summarize the main explanatory variable's values, or the levels of threat, as well as other relevant information across the cases in Table 1. In brief, threats to military functional authority were greatest in Mali, where President Moussa Traore's coup-proofing compromised military capacities as evident in its loss to the Tuareg rebels. This case therefore demonstrates how this level of threat can bring about united defections in response to large protests. The Malian military leadership was then able to influence the democratic transition through its role in the interim government.

The nature of threats to military functional authority were similar in Bangladesh under President Hussain Muhammad Ershad and Peru under President Alberto Fujimori. Both regimes exhibited personalist control, valuing regime security through personal loyalty over military institutional concerns. This coup-proofing strategy weakened the

---

<sup>49</sup> Seawright and Gerring, "Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research," 300.

<sup>50</sup> John Gerring and Lee Cojocaru, "Case-Selection: A Diversity of Methods and Criteria," *Sociological Methods and Research* (2016): 3.



military organizations and generated discontent among the non-favored factions. In response to anti-Ershad protests, the Bangladesh military fragmented, with mostly junior officers shifting loyalty against some senior generals. It remained disunited and out of politics in the years after the regime's fall. In Peru, Fujimori's control did not extend into the military's efforts in the rural conflict against the Shining Path. Threats to military functional authority were least in this case because the Peruvian military was functionally effective. It had some authority on which to draw during the anti-Fujimori protests, and only a small section of low-ranking officers and the rank and file shifted loyalty. The military overall had little role in Fujimori's overthrow and the subsequent political transition.

The protest movements in the three cases do not have much independent effect on the types of loyalty shifts. This in line with the findings of the other methods, protest size in particular moderates the impact of levels of threat to military functional authority. Large protests likely helped to bring about united defections in Mali, and might have influenced the military responses in Bangladesh and Peru. However, the key factor for the outcomes is functional threat level. In the course of research, I also uncovered potential confounding variables. I note them here but ultimately conclude they do not challenge the relationship between the explanatory factors and outcomes.

Table 1. Summary of case study arguments and findings

	Mali	Bangladesh	Peru
Value on IV	Great threats to military functional authority (ICP, PCP, recent loss)	Medium threats to military functional authority (PCP)	Low threats to military functional authority (PCP but support in ongoing conflict)
Role of protest movement	Large, diverse, organized	Large, but major divisions	Large, but less sustained
Potential confounds	Excessive repression of protesters	Pre-existing military factionalism; senior military officials' corruption	Long-term conflict; Montesino's scandal and senior military officials' involvement
Outcome 1	United defections	Fragmented high level shifts	Low level shifts
Outcome 2	Military-led transition, democratization	Military uninvolved transition, democratization	Military uninvolved transition, democratization

Other cases besides these three might also have qualified as diverse types, according to Seawright and Gerring's standards. I selected these three according to criteria for influential cases as well. Within influential cases, they are crucial and least likely because I use them to test whether "...the hypothesized relationship between X and Y holds even though background factors (Z) predict otherwise."<sup>51</sup> The cases involve powerful militaries outside of civilian control that might not at first glance be expected to support popular and nonviolent political change and democratization. They are also cases for which there is sufficient information for research, but less has been written on military responses and their importance for protest movements and political change.<sup>52</sup>

<sup>51</sup> Gerring and Cojocaru, "Case-Selection: A Diversity of Methods and Criteria," 404.

<sup>52</sup> This is in contrast to, for example, the anti-Suharto campaign in Indonesia, the People Power Revolution in the Philippines, the Color Revolutions, and the Arab Spring cases.

## Theoretical and Methodological Contributions

This work brings together the literature on civil-military relations, democratization, and civil resistance. It seeks to further our understanding of when a military is more likely to support anti-authoritarian regime protesters and support democratization. The military's role in political change and democratic transitions has long been considered by the democratization literature, but not in the context of anti-regime protests, and in a mostly indirect way by the civil resistance literature. Further, recent interest in military involvement in the Arab Spring and military intervention in a number of Third Wave democracies has generated a new wave of civil-military relations research.<sup>53</sup> I look to contribute to this large and growing body of work.

I particularly look to challenge some of the civil-military relations field's major claims. Unlike the democratization and civil resistance literatures, which acknowledge the military's potential in supporting political change, the civil-military relations literature holds that a politically active military undermines civilian control and the prospects for democracy. The field is unable to explain why a military acting outside its delegated authority can be supportive of democracy, given that the principle of civilian control is "...civilians have a right to be wrong."<sup>54</sup> My research demonstrates that in the context of major protests against an illegitimate authoritarian regime, some forms of military action can increase the likelihood of democratization. Further, the nature of authoritarian regime control varies and impacts military responses to protests. Militaries

---

<sup>53</sup> David Kuehn, "Midwives or Gravediggers of Democracy? The Military's Impact on Democratic Development," *Democratization* 24, no. 5 (2017): 783-800.

<sup>54</sup> Peter D. Feaver, "The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control," *Armed Forces and Society* 23, no. 2 (1996): 154.

that remove support from such regimes are acting politically, yet may also be supporting democracy.

I argue that the authority delegated to a military from the regime is ultimately rooted in the population, and that there is a distinction between this delegated authority and a military's functional authority. This distinction opens up the possibility that a military acting outside its delegated authority and in favor of its functional authority can lead to democratic political change. Through this argument, I develop and defend a more nuanced view of the various impacts militaries have on politics – following evidence from work on elite-and mass-led democratization that the military's role can be crucial. In doing so, I answer why a military might shift support from the regime to a protest movement, and when these shifts might lead to democracy, against the expectations that a military acting against regime control is consistently problematic for democratization.

I test my primary argument against three forms of evidence: large-N statistical analysis; medium-N qualitative comparative analysis; and case studies. This combination is valuable, given the relatively small number of observations in my universe of cases and the need to both establish correlations and trace causality. They are also appropriate for my argument. The statistical analysis allows me to assess the overall strength of my explanatory variables' relationship to the dependent variables. The qualitative comparative analysis is fitting for the combinatorial nature of the causal conditions and the outcomes. Finally, the case studies support the large-N and mid-range findings by examining in more detail how variation in the regime's threat to military functional authority explains the extent of the military's shift of support to the protest movement, as well as how its response impacted post-campaign democracy.

As part my research, I developed a new dataset that collects and codes military responses to all cases of mass anti-regime protests from 1946 to 2015. I describe the categories of the response variable and my coding rules later in the dissertation. This approach to understanding military loyalty shifts greatly expands the available data on military defections, broadly conceptualized, and was necessary for the empirical evaluation of my argument.

### **Policy Implications**

Over the last decade, observers of democracy such as Freedom House have expressed concern with a global decline in democratic rights and pace of democratic expansion.<sup>55</sup> At the same time, nonviolent campaigns for political change, though more common, have been less likely to succeed.<sup>56</sup> Given the finding that successful campaigns are more likely than other forms of contention to lead to peaceful and stable democratization, and the positive relationship between military loyalty shifts and campaign success, this work has important implications for popular demands for democracy. Understanding why some militaries may be more likely to shift their loyalty from authoritarian regimes and how the form this shift takes impacts campaign success and democratization is valuable knowledge for those engaged in civil resistance and those who seek to support them.

---

<sup>55</sup> Freedom House, “2017 Freedom in the World”, 2017, <https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world>.

<sup>56</sup> Erica Chenoweth, “Trends in Nonviolent Resistance and State Response: Is Violence Towards Civilian-based Movements on the Rise?,” *Global Responsibility to Protect* 9, no. 1 (2017): 86-100.

A related trend also of interest to policymakers is the decline in the number of military coups.<sup>57</sup> This development is viewed positively by observers of democracy and civil-military relations. Coups are the clearest and most dramatic indicator of an absence of civilian control of the military, and can be especially threatening to liberalizing or newly democratic regimes. However, these observers may fail to recognize that a military choosing to remain loyal to a civilian, authoritarian regime, in the context of major anti-regime protests, is also a form of military political action. A military in this situation may remain under civilian control, but in doing so support the regime's efforts to repress and frustrate the protesters' demands for democratic change. My research's theoretical contributions challenge this narrow understanding.

National governments and regional and international organizations have been deliberate in their efforts to reduce the likelihood of coups, by refusing to recognize governments put in power by coups or halting aid or other benefits to militaries involved in coups.<sup>58</sup> Perhaps a better understanding of defections, as another form of military political action, can provide an additional point of leverage for these actors over the military with the goal of promoting democracy. My empirical findings show that military action in this form – military support of protesters, through particular types of military loyalty shifts – is important to democratization.

---

<sup>57</sup> Duncan McCargo, "Are Military Coups Going Out of Style?", *Institute for Advanced Study*, <https://www.ias.edu/ideas/2016/mccargo-coups>.

<sup>58</sup> Nikolay Marinov and Hein Goemans, "Coups and Democracy," *British Journal of Political Science* 44, no. 4 (2014): 799-825; Jonathan Powell et al., "Combating Coups d'état in Africa, 1950-2014," *Studies in Comparative International Development* 51, no. 4 (2016): 482-502.

## **Roadmap for the Dissertation**

In Chapter Two, I develop my argument for military defections. I also describe the main outcome of interest, types of military loyalty shifts, and explain how my argument for general defections applies to shifts as they vary in terms of the military organization's involvement. I test the resulting hypotheses using statistical analyses of quantitative data in Chapter Three. I test the argument as one of necessary and sufficient conditions through qualitative comparative analysis in Chapter Four. In Chapter Five, I present the argument for the impact of types of military loyalty shifts on democratization outcomes, and then assess the empirical evidence for it with quantitative analyses. Chapter Six through Eight are the case studies of Mali, Bangladesh, and Peru. I conclude the dissertation with Chapter Nine.

## CHAPTER TWO: AUTHORITY THREATS AND MILITARY DEFECTIONS

In this chapter, I provide an argument for why some militaries shift their loyalty from authoritarian regimes to anti-regime protest movements. The argument also attempts to explain the type of military shifts of support. In other words, it provides answers to two questions: overall, why does a military shift support from the regime; and why do shifts vary in the extent and quality of the military organization's involvement? As introduced in the previous chapter, I will make the case that militaries are more likely to respond to protests with loyalty shifts, or defections, when a regime has threatened the sources of military authority (which link to societal stability and security) and anti-regime protesters are a more promising partner in restoring this authority.

This argument applies to a range of military loyalty shifts. Scholarly attempts at understanding military defections generally are important and relatively underdeveloped. However, observers have described a variety of behaviors as defection-like in analyses of military responses to anti-regime protests: military defections in the form of neutrality during the anti-Milosevic campaign in Serbia,<sup>59</sup> soldiers' rebellion and then a coup by

---

<sup>59</sup> Mark R. Thompson, "Stolen Elections: The Case of the Serbian October," *Journal of Democracy* 15 no. 4 (2004): 159-172.



junior officers as part of the Carnation Revolution,<sup>60</sup> and a military that was active in persuading the king to give up power in Nepal in 2006.<sup>61</sup> I contend that it is necessary to re-conceptualize military defections on the basis of the extent and quality of the military organization's disloyalty. My argument's focus on military sources of authority has a number of implications that I leverage to explain different types of military loyalty shifts.

I develop the argument in the following sections. First, I explain my overall argument for why a military will be more likely to shift its loyalty from the authoritarian regime in response to anti-regime protests. Second, I define the main outcome of interest in this study – types of military loyalty shifts – including the concept's theoretical and empirical underpinnings. I also compare this outcome to those in the existing defections scholarship. Lastly, I draw on my general argument to explain the types of military loyalty shifts.

### **General Argument**

Militaries, as guardians of the state, have two primary sources of authority – the authority delegated to them by civilian leaders (and by extension, the population) and the authority tied to their functional role in providing for societal security. Military delegated authority is the authority allowed them by civilians to carry out their missions as specialists in violence.<sup>62</sup> Civilians delegate militaries both the coercive power and

---

<sup>60</sup> Jose Javier Olivas Osuna, "The Deep Roots of the Carnation Revolution: 150 years of Military Interventionism in Portugal," *Portuguese Journal of Social Science* 13, no. 2 (2014): 225.

<sup>61</sup> David N. Gellner, "Nepal and Bhutan in 2006: A Year in Revolution," *Asian Survey* 47, no. 1 (2007): 83.

<sup>62</sup> Deborah Avant, "Conflicting Indicators of 'Crisis' in American Civil-Military Relations," *Armed Forces and Society* 24, no. 3 (1998): 375-388; Feaver, "The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control," 149-178.

responsibility to provide security. Military functional authority is the authority that is produced when militaries carry out their missions competently.<sup>63</sup> Civil-military relations involves the delegation of authority to a military organization that gains functional authority when it uses its expertise efficiently.<sup>64</sup>

Militaries have maximum authority when they are delegated authority by a legitimate government and that authority provides them the capacity to protect society. The military's primary missions (for which civilians delegate it authority) are national defense and internal order, but national security may come to involve defense of the broader public interest, as well.<sup>65</sup> The outcomes of a military's two sources of authority working in the same direction – a legitimate government and effective military – is therefore a stable and secure society, which is the military's ultimate interest.

Militaries' interest in their capacity to create order holds regardless of level of military "professionalism", or whether or not the military is grounded in the Western civil-military experience.<sup>66</sup> Non-Western militaries have long been an area of attention

---

<sup>63</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957); Robert L. Peabody, "Perceptions of Organizational Authority: A Comparative Analysis," *Administrative Science Quarterly* 6, no. 4 (1962): 425-426.

<sup>64</sup> Avant, "Conflicting Indicators of 'Crisis' in American Civil-Military Relations," 375-388.

<sup>65</sup> Martin C. Needler, "Military Motivations in the Seizure of Power," *Latin American Research Review* 10, no. 3 (1975): 67-72.

<sup>66</sup> "Military professionalism" is a difficult concept to define and its meaning and relation to civilian control is the subject of a longstanding debate within the civil-military relations literature (see for example Huntington and Janowitz's conflicting understandings). A "professional" military need not remain politically neutral. Rather, "professionalism" can refer to "...the appointment of more competent commanding officers, the widespread emergence of spirit de corps, and the development of much greater cohesion among the ranks of officers and soldiers" (Mehran Kamrava, "Military Professionalization and Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East," *Political Science Quarterly* 115, no. 1 (2000): 81). Importantly, I do not assume all militaries have these characteristics. I do assume (drawing on existing scholarship) that professional militaries in this sense will be more effective at carrying out their functional roles.

for their involvement in the political and economic development of their respective countries.<sup>67</sup> Analyses of them generally start with the claim that militaries want societal stability. Needler, for example, posits an “institutional interest” argument to explain military behavior in Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East.<sup>68</sup> A military’s purpose is to produce external and internal security, and fulfilling it can motivate support for, or overthrow, of the civilian regime.<sup>69</sup>

The creation of order by militaries may involve them playing a functional role in society that goes beyond professionalism in external defense.<sup>70</sup> From Stepan, militaries sometimes also use their expertise to provide for “...internal security and national development.” This “new professionalism” role and the authority it generates is common in developing countries and present even in developed countries during periods of instability. Militaries thus gain functional authority by playing a functional role that involves a variety of missions to keep the state secure. Sometimes they fight wars against external enemies; other times they engage in domestic development to reform society.

Because militaries are concerned with stability and security, as organizations they seek the delegated authority necessary to perform their functional roles. Their corporate

---

<sup>67</sup> This scholarship can be divided into first and second generations. The first viewed the military as a modernizing force for these societies, and possibly as “part of the solution” (Arturo Valenzuela, “A Note on the Military and Social Science Theory,” *Third World Quarterly* 7, no. 1 (1985): 135). The second was more circumspect about the military’s abilities to govern and acknowledged the importance of politics in even military rule (p. 142).

<sup>68</sup> Needler, “Military Motivations in the Seizure of Power,” 63-79. See also Eric A. Nordlinger, “Soldiers in Mufti: The Impact of Military Rule Upon Economic and Social Change in Non-Western States,” *American Political Science Review* 64, no. 4 (1970): 1131-1148. He also focuses on militaries in non-Western states and argues that of a military’s corporate interests, political stability is the most important.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*, 71.

<sup>70</sup> Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*.

interests involve power, resources, and autonomy. Their specific interests tie to these general ones and include the integrity of the military organization; control over military rules, education, and personnel decisions; and sufficient military budgets and reasonable defense policies.<sup>71</sup> As Geddes claims, these interests allow militaries to maintain their status, by providing for military effectiveness in their core duties.<sup>72</sup> They create the conditions for security from internal and external threats and positively impact military standing in society.<sup>73</sup> In other words, their fulfillment supports military capacity which generate military functional authority.

Military organizational interests maintain their capacity to provide stability and gain functional authority, and are shared by all members. Though some individual soldiers may have different, additional interests – like material enrichment – these are secondary because they depend on the military’s survival as an organization. Soldiers, as part of the military profession, value the military’s organizational interests at least as much as other, more narrow concerns.<sup>74</sup> Military hierarchy, discipline, and cohesiveness, professional autonomy, and sufficient resources matter not because they are fully realized in every military but because they are closely tied to a military’s interests and authority.

---

<sup>71</sup> David Pion-Berlin, “Military Autonomy and Emerging Democracies in South America,” *Comparative Politics* 25, no. 1 (1992): 83-102; William R. Thompson, *The Grievances of Military Coup-Makers* (Sage Publications, 1973).

<sup>72</sup> Barbara Geddes, “What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years?,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 2, no. 1 (1999): 115-144.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*, 126.

<sup>74</sup> Samuel E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics* (Transaction Publishers, 2002); Geddes, “What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years?”; Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier* (Simon and Schuster, 1960); Eric A. Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments* (Prentice Hall, 1977); Alfred Stepan, *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971).

Yet, a military relies in large part on civilians for its interests. Civilian authorities delegate authority to militaries to carry out their functions and guard against threats. Some forms of authority delegation support military capacity and functional authority; others hurt them. Authoritarian regimes are likely to employ forms that have mixed effects because they face two major threats to their rule: control over non-elites and power-sharing with other elites. Power-sharing, which involves delegating authority to the military, is especially difficult, and historically, authoritarian leaders are most at risk of being ousted by military coups.<sup>75</sup> Regimes need militaries with enough authority to guard against outside threats but not so much that they threaten their rule. This, often termed the civil-military problematique,<sup>76</sup> applies particularly to authoritarian regimes because of the nature of the threats to their rule.

As a result of this trade off, some regimes seek to structure this delegation and overall regime-military relations in ways that the military is less threatening to them. These sorts of strategies are often termed “coup-proofing”. They take various forms, all with the goal of protecting the regime from military coups. Regimes could provide the military additional resources, in hopes of discouraging military disloyalty.<sup>77</sup> However, resources may increase military coercive capabilities and the likelihood of a successful coup, if attempted.<sup>78</sup> Regimes consequently tend to concentrate on decreasing military

---

<sup>75</sup> Milan W. Svobik, *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule* (Cambridge University Press, 2012).

<sup>76</sup> Feaver, “The Civil-Military Problematic: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control,” 149-178.

<sup>77</sup> Huntington, “How Countries Democratize,” 579-616.

<sup>78</sup> Jonathan Powell, “Determinants of the Attempting and Outcome of Coups d’etat,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 56, no. 6 (2012): 1017-40.

coup propensity by ensuring the loyalty of key personnel and/or obstructing their ability to seize power.

Strategies that establish personal ties of loyalty between the leader and the military aim to link the military's fate to the leader's security. They primarily involve the regime making personnel decisions on the basis of loyalty rather than merit or other institutional considerations.<sup>79</sup> Accordingly, the regime may stack with military with coethnics<sup>80</sup> or other loyalists; frequently rotate those in positions of command; purge officers, especially those who are competent;<sup>81</sup> or divide the military into competing factions.<sup>82</sup>

Some regimes form new security forces to counter the military, a strategy known as institutional coup-proofing.<sup>83</sup> Regimes seek to prevent coups using these "...numerous, mutually suspicious rival forces that check and balance one another."<sup>84</sup> The new forces, or counterforces, are often primarily composed of loyalists, identity or otherwise.<sup>85</sup> In the institutional coup-proofing research the particular mechanism through which

---

<sup>79</sup> James T. Quinleaven, "Coup-proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East," *International Security* 24, no. 2 (1999): 131-165.

<sup>80</sup> Cynthia H. Enloe, *Ethnic Soldiers: State Security in Divided Societies* (University of Georgia Press, 1980).

<sup>81</sup> Aaron Belkin and Evan Schofer, "Toward a Structural Understanding of Coup Risk," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 47, no. 5 (2003): 594-620; Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*; Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (University of California Press, 1985).

<sup>82</sup> Quinleaven, "Coup-proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East."

<sup>83</sup> Ibid., Tobias Bohmelt and Ulrich Pilster, "The Impact of Institutional Coup-Proofing on Coup Attempts and Coup Outcomes," *International Interactions* 41, no. 1 (2015): 158-62.

<sup>84</sup> Belkin and Schofer, "Toward a Structural Understanding of Coup Risk," 596.

<sup>85</sup> Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, 547; Kristen A. Harkness, "The Ethnic Army and the State," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 60, no. 4 (2016): 587-616.

counterforces prevent coups varies by case and analysis; they generally center on their competing interests, which the military must overcome to seize power,<sup>86</sup> and the coordination problems they create, making plotting and carrying out coups more difficult.<sup>87</sup> In sum, coup-proofing strategies aim to generate loyalty on the part of sections of the military or other security forces and to reduce the threat of disloyalty by other sections.

Regimes that coup-proof thus attempt to balance between delegating the military enough authority to fulfill its duties, which may enhance military functional authority, and not so much that the military threatens the regime. This is a tough balance to strike, and further, research demonstrates that delegating authority through some forms of coup-proofing has damaging effects on military capabilities and functional authority. Coup-proofing that involves personal control aimed at guaranteeing loyalty weakens the military organization, reducing military effectiveness.<sup>90</sup> It puts loyal rather than capable personnel in positions of authority, compromises the military hierarchy, and divides the military institution. Regimes therefore reduce the risk of coups by reducing military

---

<sup>86</sup> Erica De Bruin, "Preventing Coups d'état: How Counterbalancing Works," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (2017).

<sup>87</sup> Powell, "Determinants of the Attempting and Outcome of Coups d'état"; Bohmelt and Pilster, "The Impact of Institutional Coup-Proofing on Coup Attempts and Coup Outcomes."

<sup>90</sup> Timothy D. Hoyt, "Social Structure, Ethnicity, and Military Effectiveness: Iraq, 1980-2004," *Creating Military Power* (2007): 55-79; Caitlin Talmadge, *The Dictator's Army: Battlefield Effectiveness in Authoritarian Regimes* (Cornell University Press, 2015).

autonomy, strength, and unity – corporate military interests that impact a military’s ability to provide for stability and security or play its functional role in society.<sup>91</sup>

Institutional coup-proofing undermines military effectiveness, first by producing coordination problems. Scholars have found that having a higher number of counterforces both makes military coordination more difficult and hurts military performance in civil and interstate conflicts.<sup>92</sup> Institutional coup-proofing also redirects resources from the military to the counterforces, jeopardizing force quality. This “infuriate[s] regular military officers”<sup>93</sup> and may actually lead to coup attempts.<sup>94</sup> Even in the absence of conflict, and in addition to causing coordination problems, institutional coup-proofing challenges a key interest of the military: its monopoly on the use of force within the state.<sup>95</sup> In sum, by delegating authority in ways that hurt military institutional interests, coup-proofing strategies hurt military capacity and functional authority.

When military corporate interests (and by extension, military capabilities and claims to functional authority) are threatened, militaries often act to protect or enhance them. This claim is supported by classic civil-military relations analyses, including

---

<sup>91</sup> Florence Gaub, “The Libyan Armed Forces between Coup-Proofing and Repression,” *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 36, no. 2 (2013): 221-244.

<sup>92</sup> Stephen Biddle and Robert Zirkle, “Technology, Civil-Military Relations, and Warfare in the Developing World,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 19, no. 2 (1996): 171-212; Ulrich Pilster and Tobias Bohmelt, “Coup-Proofing and Military Effectiveness in Interstate Wars, 1969-99,” *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 28, no. 4 (2011): 331-350; Jonathan Powell, “Regime Vulnerability and the Diversionary Threat of Force,” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 58, no. 1 (2014): 169-196.

<sup>93</sup> Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, 547.

<sup>94</sup> De Bruin, “Preventing Coups d’etat: How Counterbalancing Works.”

<sup>95</sup> Needler, “Military Motivations in the Seizure of Power”; Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments*.



Nordlinger<sup>97</sup> and Finer.<sup>98</sup> According to Needler, explanations of coups must look to the “...collective and institutional interests of members of the armed forces themselves.”<sup>99</sup>

It is also borne out by recent research that argues coup-proofing is difficult because militaries will recognize such regime efforts to diminish their power and move against them.<sup>100</sup> In terms of the above logic, coup-proofing strategies are regime power grabs of a particular kind – through them, the regime attempts to control the military in ways that serve the regime’s concerns yet have damaging effects on military functional authority. These effects will be more visible following military defeat, and more serious when societal stability and security is at risk – such as during challenges to the regime.

As the source of military delegated authority, regimes also rely on claims to authority to justify their positions of power. Authoritarian regimes are not put in power through free and fair elections but claim the right to rule based on lineage, religion, or a particular political ideology.<sup>101</sup> Often these claims take the form of “consequentialist arguments”, where autocrats focus on the benefits their rule produces in terms of

---

<sup>97</sup> Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Government*.

<sup>98</sup> Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*.

<sup>99</sup> Needler, “Military Motivations in the Seizure of Power,” 64.

<sup>100</sup> Beatriz Magaloni, “Credible Power-Sharing and the Longevity of Authoritarian Rule,” *Comparative Political Studies* 41, no. 4-5 (2008): 715-741; Jun Koga Sudduth, “Coup Risk, Coup-Proofing, and Leader Survival,” *Journal of Peace Research* 54, no. 1 (2017): 3-15; Milan W. Svobik, “Power Sharing and Leadership Dynamics in Authoritarian Regimes,” *American Journal of Political Science* 53, no. 2 (2009): 477-494; Jessica L. Weeks, “Strongmen and Straw Men: Authoritarian Regimes and the Initiation of International Conflict,” *American Political Science Review* 106, no. 2 (2012): 326-347.

<sup>101</sup> Peter Burnell, “Autocratic Opening to Democracy: Why Legitimacy Matters,” *Third World Quarterly* 27, no. 4 (2006): 545-562.

prosperity and wellbeing.<sup>102</sup> The degree of regime authority impacts what a regime has available to delegate to the military. The regime's delegation of authority using coup-proofing strategies introduces tensions between the military's delegated and functional authority. When the military's functional authority has been diminished – as a result of regime-military relations, and perhaps evident in the military's failure to maintain stability and security – its delegated authority becomes particularly important.

Yet, delegated authority depends on continued support for the regime from the population. Mass protests against the regime challenge its legitimacy and reduce its authority. Mass protests are societal unrest of a particular, popular kind that further call into question the regime's support for military functional authority in providing for a secure society. The regime is at least partly at fault for the instability, and has already threatened military functional capabilities. As the regime fails to maintain its claims to authority, the military has less delegated and functional authority.

Research on military regimes in Latin America supports the claim that a military will respond when regime illegitimacy threatens military authority. O'Donnell contends that militaries intervened in politics in Cuba, Argentina, and other countries when popular discontent with the regime threatened societal security.<sup>103</sup> The Argentinian military, for example, took power in 1966 to restore social order after the civilian government failed to address popular unrest resulting from economic crisis.<sup>104</sup> In similar instances of

---

<sup>102</sup> Robert Mayer, "Strategies of Justification in Authoritarian Ideology," *Journal of Political Ideologies* 6, no. 2 (2001): 147-168.

<sup>103</sup> Guillermo O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics*. No. 9. Berkeley: Institution of International Studies, University of California, 1973.

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid.*, 115.

popular discontent due to governance failures, militaries have felt justified in seizing power.<sup>105</sup> Other classic analyses of military coups make related points, arguing that militaries are more likely to attempt coups when regimes are ineffective and illegitimate,<sup>106</sup> when military organizational interests are at risk,<sup>107</sup> and during periods of social instability.<sup>108</sup>

In response to protests, a regime may attempt to delegate some of its remaining authority to the military in hopes of ending the popular challenge. If the regime first uses other security forces, it will expect the military to remain loyal and be ready to support it when needed.<sup>109</sup> This support often comes in the form of repression of the protesters. However, as DeMerrit points out, leaders and their agents of repression can have different incentives.<sup>110</sup> A similar logic follows from a military's two sources of authority. While protests challenge the regime and the military, military loyalty may further compromise both its sources of authority. Support of the regime will not restore the functional authority the military has lost due to coup-proofing. Support of the regime may

---

<sup>105</sup> Alfred Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988): 123-4.

<sup>106</sup> Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*; Robert W. Jackman, "The Predictability of Coups d'etat: A Model with African Data," *American Political Science Review* 72, no. 4 (1978): 1262-1275; Edward Luttack, *Coup d'Etat* (Penguin Press, 1968); Martin C. Needler, "Political Development and Socioeconomic Development: The Case of Latin America," *American Political Science Review* 62, no. 3 (1968): 889-97.

<sup>107</sup> Thompson, *The Grievances of Military Coup-Makers*.

<sup>108</sup> Aaron Belkin and Evan Schofer, "Toward a Structural Understanding of Coup Risk," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 47, no. 5 (2003): 594-620; John B. Londregan and Keith T. Poole, "Poverty, the Coup Trap, and the Seizure of Executive Power," *World Politics* 42, no. 4 (1990): 151-83.

<sup>109</sup> Milan W. Svobik, "Moral Hazard in Authoritarian Repression and the Fate of Dictators," *Political Economist* 53, no. 2 (2011): 7.

<sup>110</sup> Jacqueline H.R. DeMerrit, "Delegating Death," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59, no. 3 (2015): 428-54.

be within its delegated authority, but will ultimately be costly as its source is the population.

The military is more likely to opt to preserve its functional authority – rather than rely on the regime’s delegated authority – in these circumstances. This decision can lead to loyalty shifts, from the regime to the protesters. Challenges to the regime’s authority that confront a military whose functional authority is already diminished and that are popular and nonviolent put the military’s delegated authority further in tension with the authority derived from its key functional role. This tension opens up the possibility that the military may support the protesters as an alternative.

While military loyalty shifts may be more likely when regimes threaten military functional authority, they also depend on whether protest movements are supportive of military authority. Protest movements are a better source of delegated authority and less threatening to functional authority if they are committed to nonviolence, moderate, organized, and have broad membership. Regime challengers that use violence threaten societal security and the military’s functional authority. Conversely, research has found that nonviolent movements are more likely than other forms of regime contention to encourage defection by regime supporters because they are less threatening.<sup>111</sup>

---

<sup>111</sup> Mauricio Rivera Celestino and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, “Fresh Carnations or All Thorn, No Rose? Nonviolent Campaigns and Transitions in Autocracies,” *Journal of Peace Research* 50, no. 3 (2013): 385-400; see also Anika Locke Binnendijk and Ivan Marovic, “Power and Persuasion: Nonviolent Strategies to Influence State Security Forces in Serbia (2000) and Ukraine (2004),” *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 39, no. 3 (2006): 411-429; Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011); Sharon Erickson Nepstad, “Mutiny and Nonviolence in the Arab Spring,” *Journal of Peace Research* 50, no. 3 (2013): 337-349.

Protest movements also vary in size, with important implications for military authority. Larger protests indicate that the regime is highly illegitimate, the movement has popular support, and the support comes from diverse social groups and interests.<sup>112</sup> Large protests also signal that the movement is more likely to succeed and the regime is at risk of falling. This helps to motivate and coordinate military shifts of support to protesters. In research on coups, large protests increase the likelihood of coup attempts by helping a military determine the level of societal support for regime change, a key determinant of success.<sup>113</sup> Further, ending the challenge when protests are large will require greater military support of the regime, and put military sources of authority more in tension. The above discussion and this logic brings me to my two general hypotheses:

*Hypothesis 1:* Defections will be more likely if the regime has used coup-proofing strategies that threaten military functional authority.

*Hypothesis 2:* Defections will be more likely if the protest movement is committed to nonviolence and large in size.

It follows from the first hypothesis that the more the regime has threatened military functional authority, the more likely are military loyalty shifts. Authoritarian regimes vary in how they structure their authority, including relations with the military, and one way of understanding this variation is through regime type. The regime type literature classifies regimes according to how regimes get support and exercise authority, and on the basis of these differences, explains a number of political outcomes. As

---

<sup>112</sup> Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*.

<sup>113</sup> Brett Alan Casper and Scott A. Tyson, "Popular Protest and Elite Coordination in a Coup d'etat," *The Journal of Politics* 76, no. 2 (2014): 548-64.

concerns military relations, the types of regimes vary in their control of political appointments through which they can promote those they trust and security organs with which they can punish dissent.<sup>114</sup> Regimes whose leaders have higher levels of more personal control use it to support their own security. According to the above logic, they do so at the expense of military functional authority.

Personalist regime leaders are likely to employ a form of coup-proofing that weakens the military by prioritizing loyalty when delegating authority. They rely on smaller coalitions and exercise power as individuals, through personal bonds. Smaller coalitions mean the leader is better able to monitor those close to him or her, and to ensure their fate is linked to the leader's survival.<sup>115</sup> This sort of control of the military is likely to involve non-meritocratic personnel decisions and divide and rule tactics. As a result, the military organization is weak and factionalized, with parts of it tied to the leader personally and others excluded from the regime coalition and its benefits.

*Hypothesis 1a:* Defections will be more likely in personalist regimes, because their forms of control threaten military functional authority.

Single-party regimes are less likely to coup-proof through personal loyalty ties. In these regimes, the leader shares authority with the party and exercises power through its organization. Elites are promoted as they rise through the ranks of the party. The regime tends to co-opt dissenting factions within the ruling party because the leader cannot rely

---

<sup>114</sup> Weeks, "Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve," *International Organization* 62, no. 1 (2008): 35-64.

<sup>115</sup> *Ibid.*, 46.

on his or her own authority to rule.<sup>116</sup> This structure of authority relations is paralleled in the regime's control of the military. The leader does not tie the military to himself personally; instead using standardized, mostly meritocratic promotion systems.<sup>117</sup> Leaders also do not create intra-military competition by relying on core factions of loyalists. Consequently, militaries in single-party regimes are stronger organizationally and have some autonomy from the regime and its leader.

*Hypothesis 1b:* Defections will be less likely in single-party regimes, because their forms of control do not threaten military functional authority.

Military regimes are by definition headed by military officers, yet they too face threats to their security from the rest of the military. Their ubiquity during the 1970s and 1980s resulted in a wealth of research on the relations between militaries as governments and militaries as institutions. Like personalist regimes, military regimes and their leaders exercise power through small coalitions.<sup>118</sup> However, because these coalitions are made up of military officers, coup-proofing is less likely. Leaders will not structure the military in ways that damage it as an institution because officers in the coalition can hold them accountable.<sup>119</sup> Leaders are themselves part of the military, and so coup-proofing will

---

<sup>116</sup> Geddes, "What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years?," 7.

<sup>117</sup> Weeks, "Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve," 46.

<sup>118</sup> Abel Escriba-Folch and Joseph Wright, "Dealing with Tyranny: International Sanctions and the Survival of Authoritarian Rulers," *International Studies Quarterly* 54, no. 2 (2010): 335-59; Joseph Wright, "How Foreign Aid Can Foster Democratization in Authoritarian Regimes," *American Journal of Political Science* 53, no. 3 (2009): 552-71.

<sup>119</sup> Weeks, "Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve," 48.

ultimately hurt their interests, too. Military regimes are also less invested in holding on to power,<sup>120</sup> and will likely be in line with the military in response to a popular challenge.

*Hypothesis 1c:* Defections will be less likely in military regimes, because their forms of control do not threaten military functional authority.

Given its focus on military capabilities, this argument generates additional observable implications and hypotheses for testing. The impacts of regime-military relations on military functional authority and military loyalty shifts are especially clear when a military has recently been involved in conflict. If the conflict ended in military defeat, or another outcome short of military victory, the military's functional authority will be in question. In these circumstances, militaries are more likely to link their poor performance in conflict to coup-proofing, given the organizational problems those strategies create. Defeat also increases coalition members' incentives to reevaluate the leader's competence.<sup>121</sup>

*Hypothesis 3:* In regimes that coup-proof, defections will be more likely if the military was recently defeated in conflict.

Ongoing violent conflict may also bring the damaging effects of coup-proofing on the military organization into light. However, though conflict could strain regime-military relations, the threat will focus the military and it will be less likely to consider or

---

<sup>120</sup> Geddes, "What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years?"

<sup>121</sup> Giacomo Chiozza and H.E. Goemans, "International Conflict and the Tenure of Leaders: Is War Still Ex Post Inefficient?", *American Journal of Political Science* 48, no. 3 (2004): 604-19; Alexandre Debs and H.E. Goemans, "Regime Type, the Fate of Leaders, and War," *American Political Science Review* 104, no. 3 (2010): 430-445.



coordinate political change.<sup>122</sup> Defeating an enemy requires concentration of state power and support for the regime and status quo.<sup>123</sup> A specifically domestic violent conflict threatens the state and is unambiguously threatening to military functional authority because of the instability it generates. The military will focus on deploying its capabilities to defeat it, reducing the likelihood of loyalty shifts. Anti-regime campaigns that are primarily violent will similarly lead militaries to unite with regimes to counter them.<sup>124</sup>

*Hypothesis 4:* Defections will be less likely if the military is involved in an ongoing conflict or the regime is facing a violent challenge.

I graphically summarize the preceding discussion and logic of my hypotheses regarding general military loyalty shifts below, in Figure 1. Next, I address competing expectations for the effects of coup-proofing on militaries. Then I consider alternate explanations of defections which helps to motivate my discussion of this study's outcomes of interest.


---

<sup>122</sup> Varun Piplani and Caitlin Talmadge, "When War Helps Civil-Military Relations," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 60, no. 8 (2015): 1368-1394.

<sup>123</sup> William R. Thompson, "Democracy and Peace: Putting the Cart Before the Horse?," *International Organization* 50 (1996): 141-74.

<sup>124</sup> Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*, 44.

Figure 1. General argument for military defections



#### Competing Expectations for the Effects of Coup-Proofing

Above, I argued that the regime's use of coup-proofing strategies increases the likelihood of military disloyalty during anti-regime protests by threatening military functional authority. Protest movements that are supportive of military authority will further increase the likelihood of loyalty shifts. According to the scholarship on military coups, however, military loyalty shifts in the forms of coups involve both disposition and ability, and coup-proofing is supposed to reduce both.<sup>125</sup> This general claim raises a question for my argument: if coup-proofing prevents coups, why does it not prevent defections? Key to answering this question is accounting for the context of mass protests. Before doing that, I more directly address the literature's claims.

The coup scholarship contends some coup-proofing strategies reduce military disposition for disloyalty. These involve control over military personnel decisions to

<sup>125</sup> Jonathan Powell, "Determinants of the Attempting and Outcome of Coups d'etat."

structure the military in ways that loyalists with incentives to support the regime are in key positions.<sup>126</sup> Other strategies aim at reducing the military's ability. Soldiers need to coordinate to launch coups, so regimes establish barriers to communication and commitment. They use divide and rule tactics to play military factions off of each other. They develop counterforces with competing incentives, so that some soldiers will resist a coup attempt.<sup>127</sup> These counterforces also help to monitor and punish coup plots. In sum, regimes attempt to reduce military disposition and ability to coup by tightly controlling the military while delegating it less authority with which it could pose a challenge.<sup>128</sup>

Research on the actual effectiveness of coup-proofing is inconclusive. Marcum and Brown find that personalist regimes, though more likely to coup-proof, are not less likely to experience coup attempts relative to other regime types.<sup>129</sup> Some analyses of counterbalancing show it reduces the ability of coup plotters and lessens the risk of coup attempts.<sup>130</sup> Bohmelt and Pilster modify this conclusion slightly, finding a curvilinear

---

<sup>126</sup> Cameron S. Brown, Christopher J. Fariss, and Blake McMahon, "Recouping after Coup- Proofing: Compromised Military Effectiveness and Strategic Substitution," *International Interactions* 42, no. 1 (2016): 1-30; see also Peter D. Feaver, "Civil-Military Relations," *Annual Review of Political Science* 2 (1999): 211-41; Pilster and Bohmelt, "Coup-Proofing and Military Effectiveness in Interstate Wars, 1969-99"; Ulrich Pilster and Tobias Bohmelt, "Do Democracies Engage Less in Coup-Proofing? On the Relationship between Regime Type and Civil-Military Relations," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 8, no. 4 (2012): 355-72; Powell, "Determinants of the Attempting and Outcome of Coups d'etat"; Quinleven, "Coup-proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East."

<sup>127</sup> De Bruin, "Preventing Coups d'etat: How Counterbalancing Works."

<sup>128</sup> Brown, Fariss, and McMahon, "Recouping after Coup- Proofing: Compromised Military Effectiveness and Strategic Substitution," 4.

<sup>129</sup> Anthony S. Marcum and Jonathan N. Brown, "Overthrowing the 'Loyalty Norm': The Prevalence and Success of Coups in Small-Coalition Systems, 1950 to 1999," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 60, no. 2 (2016): 256-82.

<sup>130</sup> Powell, "Determinants of the Attempting and Outcome of Coups d'etat"; Quinleven, "Coup-proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East."

relationship between the number of counterforces and coup attempts.<sup>131</sup> In this analysis, the most effective regime strategy is to have two armed organizations, because coup launchers would have to challenge the coercive capacities of another security organization before seeking power. Others, however, challenge this relationship and support a linear, more-counterforces-is-better view, though admitting the overall quantitative research has produced inconsistent findings.<sup>132</sup>

In contrast to the scholarship's expectations, my logic suggests coup-proofing strategies should generate military disloyalty. Coup-proofing, as a form of delegated authority, creates discontent and motivates defections because of its impacts on military capabilities and functional authority. Coup-proofing that relies on personal loyalty weakens the military organization's autonomy and hierarchy. Coup-proofing through counterforces challenges coordination but does not necessarily reduce military loyalty shifts because they are unlikely to require the same level of coordination as military seizures of power. Further, these threats to military functional authority occur in the context of threats to regime legitimacy and military delegated authority. The military may be more likely to shift loyalty in response to protest movements as a result. The particular forms of coup-proofing the regime uses and the character of the protests might affect the type of military loyalty shifts, though, and I take up this point next.

---

<sup>131</sup> Tobias Bohmelt and Ulrich Pilster, "The Impact of Institutional Coup-Proofing on Coup Attempts and Coup Outcomes," *International Interactions* 41, no. 1 (2015): 158-62.

<sup>132</sup> Anthony S. Marcum and Jonathan N. Brown, "Is More Institutional Coup-Proofing Better or Worse for Regime Protection? Evidence from the Philippines, 1986-1987," *Asian Journal of Political Science* 25, no. 1 (2017), 110, citing Deniz Askoy, David B. Carter, and Joseph Wright, "Terrorism and the Fate of Dictators," *World Politics* 67, no. 3 (2015): 423-68; Curtis Bell and Jun Koga Sudduth, "The Cases and Outcomes of Coup during Civil War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61, no. 7 (2015): 1432-55; Marcum and Brown, "Overthrowing the 'Loyalty Norm': The Prevalence and Success of Coups in Small-Coalition Systems, 1950 to 1999."

## Alternate Explanations of Defections

Military defections from the regime in response to mass anti-regime protest movements are different than military seizures of power through coups, which means arguments that apply to coups may apply differently to defections. But observers and scholars often use the term defections for military responses that are quite dissimilar. This point has not been sufficiently acknowledged by the extant scholarship, and so many of the competing explanations of military loyalty shifts are actually explanations of different military behaviors. In the following section I detail what I view as the main source of disagreement and offer my argument for types of military loyalty shifts as one way to deal with it.

Though much research on the topic remains to be done, existing studies seem to divide between arguments that defections are more likely when the military is institutionalized (i.e. less coup-proofed, with the key mechanism being autonomy from the regime), and that they are more likely when the military is more coup-proofed (the key mechanism being divide and rule tactics and the intra-military competition they generate). In the first set, militaries defect because they have a future apart from the regime, as an independent institution.<sup>133</sup> In the second, militaries, specifically “losing”

---

<sup>133</sup> Eva Bellin, “The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective,” *Comparative Politics* 36, no. 2 (2004): 139-57; Eva Bellin, “Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons from the Arab Spring,” *Comparative Politics* 44, no. 2 (2012): 127-149; Risa Brooks, “Abandoned at the Palace: Why the Tunisian Military Defected from the Ben Ali Regime in January 2011,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 36, no. 2 (2013): 205-220; Derek Lutterbeck, “Arab Uprisings, Armed Forces, and Civil-Military Relations,” *Armed Forces and Society* 39, no. 1 (2013): 28-52.

factions, defect because removing the regime also removes their rivals within the military.<sup>134</sup>

The two arguments' competing logics put them at odds. While the first can explain why, for example, the full Egyptian military defected from Mubarak in 2011, it has difficulty explaining how the split between junior and senior officers in the Philippines helped to bring about defections by the junior officers from Marcos during the 1986 People Power revolution. The second is useful for understanding why marginalized Indonesian officers acted against Suharto in 1998, but cannot explain the same behavior against Ben Ali by the full Tunisian military in the Arab Spring. Both note the role of the regime's structuring of the military in explaining disloyalty, but their interests in different strategies of control leads them to partial explanations of only some outcomes.

Makara goes some ways in bringing the two logics together by specifying the military institutionalization argument and making the case that some control strategies affect military motivations while others affect military opportunities.<sup>135</sup> This distinction parallels that made in the coup scholarship. According to Makara, a military is more likely to defect when it is both motivated by intra-security apparatus competition and autonomous from the regime. Though this research is an important contribution, it too has limitations, starting with its limited case selection of the Arab Spring militaries. Its outcome of interest is defections, broadly defined, which are present in Egypt and Tunisia

---

<sup>134</sup> Terence Lee, "The Armed Forces and Transitions from Authoritarian Rule," *Comparative Political Studies* 42, no. 5 (2009): 640-69.

<sup>135</sup> Michael Makara, "Rethinking Military Behavior during the Arab Spring," *Defense and Security Analysis* 32, no. 3 (2016): 209-23.

but not in Bahrain and Syria – though loyalty shifts by non-Alawite officers and other soldiers in Syria numbered in the thousands and came to significantly impact the course of the anti-Assad campaign.<sup>136</sup> More generally, this argument has trouble explaining loyalty shifts by significant parts of militaries that are not autonomous from the regime.

I follow Makara that some regime structures of control and coup-proofing strategies make loyalty shifts more likely, but go further by arguing different forms of regime control make some types of loyalty shifts more likely than other types. These effects depend in large part on the impacts of regime control on military authority and organization, with protest movements playing an important moderating, and at times independent, role. In other words, the military response depends on the form of regime coup-proofing and the characteristics of the protest movement challenging the regime – because of their impacts on military authority and the military organization.<sup>137</sup>

A recent contribution that accounts for the role of both coup-proofing and protester characteristics in explaining defections is Morency-Laflamme.<sup>138</sup> He argues that campaigns will be more likely to generate defections when they can offer credible promises about respecting future military interests. Such promises only matter when the military has been coup-proofed – specifically, when the regime has created

---

<sup>136</sup> Sharon Erickson Nepstad, “Nonviolent Resistance in the Arab Spring: The Critical Role of Military-Opposition Alliances,” *Swiss Political Science Review* 17, no. 4 (2011): 485-91.

<sup>137</sup> This latter point is similar to the argument of Bou Nasif, where coup-proofing impacts the military’s will and capacity for defections through its effects on the linkages between the regime, the military elite, and middle-ranking and junior officers. Hicham Bou Nassif, “Generals and Autocrats: How Coup-Proofing Predetermined the Military Elite’s Behavior in the Arab Spring,” *Political Science Quarterly* 130, no. 2 (2015): 245-275.

<sup>138</sup> Julien Morency-Laflamme, “A Question of Trust: Military Defection During Regime Crises in Benin and Togo,” *Democratization* 25, no. 3 (2018): 464-80.

counterweights to it. Then, factions that trust the campaign's offers will defect. I follow Morency-Laflamme's call to bring these two strands of arguments together, especially given the almost complete lack of attention to the protesters in existing work. I also extend his effort significantly, beyond a comparison of two cases (Benin 1989-1990 and Togo 1990-1993). This allows me to look at the effects of various forms of coup-proofing, and to explain other types of loyalty shifts.

In the next section, I introduce my "type of loyalty shift" dependent variable. Conceptualizing and measuring types of military loyalty shifts helps me adjudicate between alternate explanations for military defections during protests. The defections outcome the existing scholarship attempts to explain is in fact often different types of military disloyalty. These types have different explanations, and I present my argument for them in the final section of this chapter.

### **Conceptualizing Military Disloyalty**


The above hypotheses are expectations about when militaries are more likely to defect versus remain loyal. One contribution of this dissertation is my re-thinking defections as a binary outcome to better account for the variety of observed military responses to major anti-regime protest movements. These responses are observably different and thus empirically interesting, but also likely explained by different logics and to have different implications for post-protest political change (the focus of Chapter Five). Thus, I use two outcomes of interest in this dissertation.

The first outcome, *defections*, refers to significant loyalty shifts by most of the military. This conceptualization lines up with most scholarly and popular understandings



of defections.<sup>139</sup> The second outcome, *type of loyalty shift*, disaggregates military defections and classifies them according to the extent of the military organization's involvement, in terms of number and rank. In addition to significant shifts of support, it captures low level shifts by small groups of the rank and file or lower-ranking officers. When a significant portion of upper-ranking officers shift loyalty, I differentiate categories based on whether the shift was fragmented or united, and in this sense, the quality of support shifted to the protest movement.

Below, I display the types as a continuum. I detail these categories and their coding rules in Chapter Three.




In sum, *type shift* captures military responses to protests that span from loyalty to low level shifts to high level defections. Disaggregating defections into various categories allows me to explain, using my argument and new cross-national data, why some militaries remain loyal, parts of some militaries are disloyal, divided upper ranks shift loyalty, or the full military defects and offers its support to the protesters. The defections variable aggregates this range into two categories - mostly loyal and significant shifts of loyalty - and is an outcome that reflects my general logic for the impact of threats to military authority on disloyalty.

<sup>139</sup> This conceptualization and measurement of defections has only rarely been applied cross nationally for the purposes of large-N analysis, and has relied on the NAVCO data nearly exclusively.

### **Explaining Types of Military Loyalty Shifts**

The above, general argument about defections is useful for explaining types of military loyalty shifts because of the implications that the forms of regime control have for military authority as well as the military organization. While coup-proofing generally threatens military functional authority and thus generates military discontent, some forms compromise the military organization by weakening and dividing it. In the context of different protest movements, then, some strategies will make loyalty shifts by the rank and file more likely than the upper ranks. Others will affect the loyalty of a faction of high ranking officers but not that of the senior leadership closest to the regime. The type of loyalty shift depends on the forms threats to military functional authority take, combined with the characteristics of the protest movement. I preview the logic of this argument graphically below, in Figure 3.

Figure 3. Argument for types of military loyalty shifts



Most simply, the greater the threats to military functional authority, the more likely are high level loyalty shifts. These threats can take the form of large amounts of regime coup-proofing, or moderate coup-proofing in the presence of recent military defeat. A regime coup-proofs to reduce military motivations and abilities for coups. However, no regime can completely guard itself against disloyalty, even by members of the ruling coalition.<sup>140</sup> That is, military factions closest to the regime benefit from their loyalty. But they and the rest of the military will recognize when forms of regime delegated authority hurt military functional authority. Their power and positions ultimately depend on the military as an organization and its capacity and effectiveness. In

<sup>140</sup> Svobik, "Power Sharing and Leadership Dynamics in Authoritarian Regimes," 477-8.

the context of major anti-regime protests, the military organization's interests and authority are at stake – especially if the military leadership fears loyalty shifts at lower levels. Even militaries with divided upper ranks may defect because of the threats to military authority.

*Hypothesis 5:* Greater levels of threat to military functional authority will increase the likelihood of higher level loyalty shifts.

When threats to military functional authority come primarily in the form of institutional coup-proofing by the regime, united defections will be more likely. Institutional coup-proofing negatively impacts military performance in conflict.<sup>141</sup> When it involves the regime's creation of forces like presidential guards and paramilitaries, it also challenges the military's monopoly on the use of force, a key military interest.<sup>142</sup> Institutional coup-proofing thus threatens military functional authority and generates military discontent.

Importantly, institutional coup-proofing does not necessarily prevent the coordination necessary for united defections. Lutscher<sup>143</sup> extends Bohmelt and Pilster's<sup>144</sup> argument regarding counterbalancing and coups to explain defections. He claims that defections are more likely when the security apparatus is either minimally or highly

---

<sup>141</sup> Biddle and Zirkle, "Technology, Civil-Military Relations, and Warfare in the Developing World"; Pilster and Bohmelt, "Coup-Proofing and Military Effectiveness in Interstate Wars, 1969-99"; Powell, "Regime Vulnerability and the Diversionary Threat of Force".

<sup>142</sup> Needler, "Military Motivations in the Seizure of Power"; Nordlinger, "Soldiers in Mufti: The Impact of Military Rule Upon Economic and Social Change in Non-Western States."

<sup>143</sup> Philipp M. Lutscher, "The More Fragmented the Better? The Impact of Armed Forces Structure on Defection during Nonviolent Popular Uprisings," *International Interactions* 42, no. 2 (2016): 350-75.

<sup>144</sup> Bohmelt and Pilster, "The Impact of Institutional Coup-Proofing on Coup Attempts and Coup Outcomes".

divided, because of the effect of counterforces on a military's ability to shift loyalty. Though Lutscher's logic is different, his finding that more counterforces make defections more likely is consistent with my argument's expectations. However, he does not disaggregate defections such that he can analyze the effects of institutional coup-proofing on types of loyalty shifts.

Institutional coup-proofing motivates disloyalty but does not compromise the military organization or damage the military hierarchy. The upper ranks will be able to direct the rank and file in shifting the full military's loyalty. Low level shifts alone will be unlikely, though, even if low ranking officers and the rank and file are discontent.<sup>145</sup> These ranks run the risk of being sanctioned by their superiors in the military hierarchy, or the counterforces that presumably have capabilities for monitoring and punishment. *Hypothesis 5a:* Institutional coup-proofing will increase the likelihood of high level loyalty shifts (and especially united defections), but not low level loyalty shifts.

Personalist coup-proofing has different implications for types of military loyalty shifts. Because these strategies threaten military functional authority, they increase the military's motivations for disloyalty. But when regimes prioritize personal ties and divide and rule by strengthening some factions and weakening others, the military organization is more likely to be disunited. Regimes may achieve loyalty from the upper ranks or a faction of it while increasing discontent and thus the likelihood of loyalty shifts among the lower ranks or other factions. The military hierarchy has been compromised, so high ranking officers are less able to monitor and direct the rank and file, allowing for more

---

<sup>145</sup> Holger Albrecht and Dorothy Ohl, "Exit, Resistance, Loyalty: Military Behavior during Unrest in Authoritarian Regimes," *Perspective on Politics* 14, no. 1 (2016): 38-52.

low- level loyalty shifts. The upper ranks may also shift loyalty, but their response will be less coordinated.

*Hypothesis 5b:* Personalist coup-proofing will increase the likelihood of all loyalty shifts, but low level and fragmented high level more than united defections.

Finally, large and nonviolent protest movements are an alternative source of authority for coup-proofed militaries and so might be expected to increase the likelihood of high level loyalty shifts. Threats to military functional authority do not have to be as great in these cases, because such protests have positive implications for order and stability, and the legitimacy of military delegated authority. A compromised military organization may also not be as consequential, as the protests will provide further motivation for disloyalty and help to coordinate the military factions – for shifts to the protesters as an alternative.

*Hypothesis 6:* If the regime has used coup-proofing, protest movement size and nonviolence will increase the likelihood of high level loyalty shifts.

This discussion provides theoretical expectations for types of loyalty shifts and helps to clarify some of the confusion generated by the existing scholarship and summarized earlier. In the context of threats to military functional authority, military loyalty shifts can occur whether the military is institutionalized and autonomous or factionalized and weak. The loyalty shifts will just involve the military differently. Regime coup-proofing has implications for military authority and the military organization, with some forms making low level, fragmented high level, or united

defections more likely. The protest movement's characteristics further impact the likelihood of higher level loyalty shifts.

### **Conclusions and Introduction to the Quantitative Analysis**

This chapter argues that militaries are more likely to respond to protests with loyalty shifts when a regime has threatened the sources of military authority and anti-regime protesters are a more promising partner in restoring this authority. Specifically, authoritarian regimes that control their militaries using coup-proofing strategies hurt military capabilities and threaten military functional authority. Major anti-regime protests challenge regime legitimacy and the legitimacy of military delegated authority, putting these sources of authority in tension. The military may choose to protect its functional authority by shifting loyalty from the regime. This is more likely when the protest movement is large and nonviolent and thus more supportive of military authority.

Unlike existing arguments, my argument's logic explicitly applies to types of military loyalty shifts via its implications for military authority and the military organization. Higher level loyalty shifts are more likely when the military's functional authority has been more threatened. Yet some forms of coup-proofing compromise the military organization, increasing military discontent but making full and united defections less likely. Even in those instances, though, challenges to regime legitimacy that are especially large and nonviolent can bring about significant loyalty shifts.

The next chapter assesses support for my argument by testing its hypotheses against a new dataset of military responses to anti-regime protest movements. To preview, I find preliminary evidence for my expectations of the effects of the regime and

protest movement on military loyalty shifts. In later chapters, I use qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) to more directly assess my argument as a combination of causal factors leading to various outcomes. I also examine three cases – Bangladesh 1990, Mali 1991, and Peru 2000 – that vary along the levels of threat to military functional authority and as a consequence the extent of military loyalty shifts.



### **CHAPTER THREE: QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH DESIGN AND ANALYSIS**

The argument I have introduced suggests that a military will shift loyalty away from the regime and to protesters when military sources of authority are in tension and the protesters are a better partner in restoring both. The type of military loyalty shift depends on the degree to which the regime threatens the military's functional authority and its effects on the military organization. It also depends on the protest movement's size and commitment to nonviolence. The logic of this argument generated a number of hypotheses.

I test these hypotheses through large-N statistical analysis, using new quantitative data, in this chapter. This method provides preliminary support for the relationships my hypotheses propose. The coup-proofing and protester characteristics variables' independent and conditional effects are in the direction I expect, and as potential threats to military authority, they have meaningful impacts on the likelihood of defections and military loyalty shifts. My number of observations is fairly small for probabilistic regression techniques, though. This reduces the statistical power of my study, potentially weakening the statistical significance of my findings. I focus largely on the findings in substantive terms as a result. I also end the chapter with a discussion of limitations to introduce the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) of the following chapter.

I start by describing the cases and units of analysis and defining the main variables, including the military response dependent variable, *type shift*. Then, I describe the research strategy. I display and discuss the results for my tests related to defections, followed by those for types of loyalty shifts, and conclude by summarizing my findings, pointing to this analytical technique's strengths and weaknesses, and introducing the QCA.

### **Universe of Cases, Unit of Analysis, and Operationalization of Variables**

My universe of cases for the quantitative analysis is major episodes of nonviolent anti-regime campaigns from 1946 to 2015 as identified by the Major Episodes of Contention (MEC) Dataset.<sup>146</sup> My unit of analysis is country-campaign, and outcome of interest is military response. I do not include all campaigns identified by MEC, though. I first drop those in countries without militaries.<sup>147</sup> Some occurred in countries that could be considered democratic, according to their Polity IV scores or regime type classification in the years prior. This matters for my argument because the authority democratic regimes delegate to their militaries is derived from sources independent of a particular leader or party. During popular regime challenges, that source of military authority will be more secure. I thus drop democracies, defined as a

---

<sup>146</sup> This project, under the direction of Dr. Erica Chenoweth, is ongoing and the data has not been publicly released. See more at: [http://www.du.edu/korbel/sie/research/chenow\\_mec\\_major\\_episodes\\_contention-1.html](http://www.du.edu/korbel/sie/research/chenow_mec_major_episodes_contention-1.html).

<sup>147</sup> That is, all cases identified in MEC and are countries with militaries. For example, the 2003-2004 protest movement in Haiti is identified by MEC, but Haiti did not have a military during this period (Yamine Shamsie, "Building 'Low-Intensity' Democracy in Haiti: The Contribution," *Third World Quarterly* 25, no. 6 (2004): 1097-1115) and so I exclude it. I list and describe other such cases in my case narratives, in the Appendix. Also, nine cases are ongoing in 2015, and I exclude those.

Polity IV score above six (a conventional threshold).<sup>148</sup> The preceding logic also leads me to drop Soviet Republic cases.<sup>149</sup> The authority the Republics delegated to their militaries was ultimately rooted in the Soviet government, to which they were subordinate. Finally, I drop Slovakia (1989-1992) and Slovenia (1989-1990) because they were not independent states at the time of their campaigns. Altogether, this generates 112 observations. However, one of the main independent variables, institutional coup-proofing, has a limited temporal coverage. The below analyses are consequently of cases from 1970 to 2015, which number 98.

As described in the previous chapter, I use two dependent variables in this study: one, *defections*, and two, type of military loyalty shifts (*type shift*). Conceptually, *defections* measures the presence of military loyalty shifts, while *type shift* measures loyalty shifts according to the extent and quality of the military organization's involvement. *Type shift* differentiates among low level, high level, fragmented, and united loyalty shifts, specifically. I coded both variables by constructing a new dataset of military responses to all campaigns in countries with militaries identified by MEC (n=161).<sup>150</sup>

To code the dependent variable for each case, I conducted research using a combination of primary and secondary sources, relying largely on academic journals but

---


<sup>148</sup> I report the results from a set including democratic cases in the Appendix.

<sup>149</sup> This includes Belarus 1988-1991, Estonia 1987-1991, Kyrgyzstan 1990-1991, Latvia 1989-1991, and Lithuania 1988-1991.

<sup>150</sup> The MEC dataset has a defections variable, *defect\_sec*. It is coded at the campaign level of analysis and defined as "Security forces defect/fail to cooperate with target regime" (MEC codebook, author's copy). Because the MEC project uses a different research and coding process, *defect\_sec* and *defections* are only 54.98% correlated. *Defect\_sec* also does not capture different types of loyalty shifts, as *type shift* does.

consulting with news and other reports when secondary sources were inconclusive. I triangulated these sources to make an informed and detailed coding decision, which I describe and justify using case narratives. These narratives are found in the Appendix.

In finalizing the categories and coding rules for my *type shift* variable, I considered alternate conceptualizations, including those offered by other scholars. Sharon Nepstad, for example, has theorized a “spectrum of security force responses.”<sup>151</sup> This spectrum and its categories are shown in Figure 1. Basically, Nepstad defines and differentiates the categories according to the level of military cooperation or noncooperation with regime orders, as an indicator of the level of security force support for the state versus the civil resisters.



Rather than levels of military cooperation with regime orders, however, I am interested in the number and rank of the military involved in the shifts. From my argument, I expect this variation to be explained by different logics and to have different impacts on post-protest political outcomes. Military noncooperation is also difficult to classify empirically, particular at the lower levels of shirking or selective compliance. It can be hard to determine whether the regime gave orders, and if the observed military behavior was in response to those orders.

<sup>151</sup> Sharon Erickson Nepstad, *Nonviolent Struggle: Theories, Strategies, and Dynamics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 128.

Accordingly, I developed my own categories and coding rules for the *type shift* variable. I briefly summarize them below and display their variation across the universe of cases in Figure 2.

*Loyal:* No part of the military shifts loyalty, and the military represses or otherwise follows regime orders, indicating its support of the regime.


*Neutral:* No part of the military shifts loyalty, but the military does not actively support the regime.

*Low level loyalty shifts:* There is dissent at low levels of the military, among the rank and file or lower-ranking officers, involving a group of individuals or at most a few units. The dissent typically takes the form of becoming unreliable to military or civilian leaders or temporarily joining with the protesters.

*Fragmented high level shifts:* A significant part of the military, including some middle- or high-ranking officers, removes support from the regime. This occurs either in sections, with one exhibiting continued loyalty to the regime or disagreement with the decision of the other to shift loyalty, or in a widespread but fragmented manner, with no clear direction from military leadership.

*United defections:* The full military removes support from the regime, often with a statement or declaration from the military leadership. There is no observable disagreement within the military over this decision. At times, the shift is accompanied by explicit support of the protesters; others, such support is effective but implicit.

Figure 2. Types of loyalty shifts across the universe of cases



### Reviewing the Hypotheses

The argument I develop in Chapter Two results in the following hypotheses.

*Hypothesis 1:* Defections will be more likely if the regime has used coup-proofing strategies that threaten military functional authority.

*Hypothesis 1a:* Defections will be more likely in personalist regimes, because their forms of control threaten military functional authority.

*Hypothesis 1b:* Defections will be less likely in single-party regimes, because their forms of control do not threaten military functional authority.

*Hypothesis 1c:* Defections will be less likely in military regimes, because their forms of control do not threaten military functional authority.

*Hypothesis 2:* Defections will be more likely if the protest movement is committed to nonviolence and large in size.

*Hypothesis 3:* In regimes that coup-proof, defections will be more likely if the military was recently defeated in conflict.

*Hypothesis 4:* Defections will be less likely if the military is involved in an ongoing conflict or the regime is facing a violent challenge.

*Hypothesis 5:* Greater levels of threat to military functional authority will increase the likelihood of higher level loyalty shifts.

*Hypothesis 5a:* Institutional coup-proofing will increase the likelihood of high level loyalty shifts (and especially united defections), but not low level loyalty shifts.

*Hypothesis 5b:* Personalist coup-proofing will increase the likelihood of all loyalty shifts, but low level and fragmented high level more than united defections.

*Hypothesis 6:* If the regime has used coup-proofing, protest movement size and nonviolence will increase the likelihood of high level loyalty shifts.

Before I describe the data, below is a summary table of my argument's main concepts along with their variable name, definition, operationalization, and source.

Table 1. Summary of main concepts in quantitative analysis 1			Source
Concept	Variable Name	Definition	Operationalization
Military defections	<i>defections</i>	Significant military disloyalty	Loyalty shifts by middle- or high-ranking officers
Types of military loyalty shifts	<i>type_shift</i>	org's involvement in disloyalty	Loyalty shifts by the rank and file or low-ranking officers versus middle- or high-ranking officers, and whether divided or united
Threats to military functional authority	<i>ICP</i>	Institutional coup-proofing	effective armed organizations over the 5 years prior to the campaign
	<i>PCP</i>	Personalist coup-proofing	Regime type with rule by personalist dictator
	<i>loss</i>	Recent military loss	Conflict in three years prior to start of campaign that ended in non-victory (not: win, low activity, or actor ceases to exist)
Non-threats to military functional authority	<i>party/military</i>	Control that does not threaten military functional authority	Regime type with rule by dominant or single party or the military as an institution
Protest movement support of military authority	<i>size</i>	Campaign size	Highest recorded participation in campaign divided by population size, logged
	<i>nonviolence</i>	Campaign commitment to nonviolence	Absence of a radical flank
Ongoing violent conflict	<i>ongoing</i>	Ongoing conflict	Conflict during the campaign in which the government was a party
	<i>violent</i>	Ongoing violent campaign	A violent campaign occurring independently from but simultaneously to the nonviolent campaign
			Bohmelt and Pilster 2015
			GWF 2014; Svobik 2012; Pinckney 2016; original data
			UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset v.2-2015
			GWF 2014; Svobik 2012; Pinckney 2016; original data
			MEC; NAVCO 2.0
			MEC
			UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset v.2-2015
			MEC



## Explanatory Variables

I measure my main explanatory variable, coup-proofing, in two ways. First, I use a measure of institutional coup-proofing. This form likely spans all regime types and so has effects independent of those proxied by regime type measures.<sup>152</sup> Hypothesis 5a posits a relationship between this particular form and loyalty shifts. Following the extant literature,<sup>153</sup> I operationalize institutional coup-proofing as the level of counterbalancing, measured as the number of effective armed organizations and calculated as an index of ground-based regular militaries and ground-based forces parallel to the army.<sup>154</sup> I get data on the level of counterbalancing from Bohmelt and Pilster,<sup>155</sup> and calculate my measure, *EffectiveNumber*, by averaging the number of effective armed organizations (including the regular military) in a country during the five years prior to the

---

<sup>152</sup> According to Ulrich Pilster and Tobias Bohmelt, “Do Democracies Engage Less in Coup-Proofing? On the Relationship between Regime Type and Civil-Military Relations,” *Foreign Policy Analysis* 8, no. 4 (2012): 355-72, non-democracies generally are more likely than democracies to institutional coup-proof. In the Appendix, I use descriptive statistics to show the level of institutional coup-proofing is quite similar across regime types.

<sup>153</sup> Philipp M. Lutscher, “The More Fragmented the Better? The Impact of Armed Forces Structure on Defection during Nonviolent Popular Uprisings,” *International Interactions* 42, no. 2 (2016): 350-75; Pilster and Bohmelt, “Do Democracies Engage Less in Coup-Proofing? On the Relationship between Regime Type and Civil-Military Relations,” 355-72.

<sup>154</sup> This measure is developed from the Military Balance data published yearly by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a source that has been heavily criticized for its inconsistencies and errors (Aaron Belkin, *United We Stand? Divide-and-Conquer Politics and the Logic of International Hostility* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2005), 156; Todd S. Sechser and Elizabeth N. Saunders, “The Army You Have: The Determinants of Military Mechanization, 1979-2001,” *International Studies Quarterly* 54, no. 2 (2010): 941). Tobias Bohmelt and Ulrich Pilster, “The Impact of Institutional Coup-Proofing on Coup Attempts and Coup Outcomes,” *International Interactions* 41, no. 1 (2015): 158-82 and Pilster and Bohmelt, “Do Democracies Engage Less in Coup-Proofing? On the Relationship between Regime Type and Civil-Military Relations,” 355-72 account for many of these issues, and refine and expand the data. Though the measure has been accepted as an indicator of institutional coup-proofing for a number of peer-reviewed studies, results using it (as *ICP*) should be interpreted with caution. This is an additional reason that I measure coup-proofing in two ways.

<sup>155</sup> Bohmelt and Pilster, “The Impact of Institutional Coup-Proofing on Coup Attempts and Coup Outcomes,” 158-82.

campaign.<sup>156</sup> In my analysis, *EffectiveNumber* ranges from 1 to 3.614155.<sup>157</sup> Lutscher claims that the number of organizations, or the level of security force fragmentation, has a curvilinear relationship with military defections, and uses the original variable, a squared term, and a measure of deviation from the equilibrium of two armed organizations in his analysis.<sup>158</sup> I do the same. However, following normality tests, I also calculated the square root, and end up using this measure (*ICP*) because it results in the most normal data distribution. It is also the only operationalization of *ICP* that ever reaches statistical significance in my models. (I discuss what this finding means for Lutscher's argument in the conclusion.)

I also measure coup-proofing using regime type, drawing on my argument that generated Hypotheses 1a through c. For measures of regime type, I rely primarily on the "Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions" data from Geddes et al. (GWF).<sup>159</sup> The

---

<sup>156</sup> Another way of measuring institutional coup-proofing might have been change in the *EffectiveNumber*; that is, the creation of counterforces in the years prior to the campaign. However, my argument posits that it is counterforces' existence that matters, as a threat to functional authority which in the context of protests leads to loyalty shifts. Also, given the likelihood of measurement errors in the data, I think it is preferable to consider the number of counterforces averaged across multiple years rather than the change from one year to the next.

<sup>157</sup> To illustrate *EffectiveNumber*'s counts and corresponding organizations, I offer a couple of examples. A case with 1 effective armed organization is Uruguay prior to 1984-1985. I have not found supporting evidence for those years, but the CIA reports that as of 1985 Uruguay's defense forces included an army, navy, air force, and maritime police, and two police units (*The World Factbook* (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 1985)). Mali pre-1990-1991 had the highest number of effective armed organizations. Again, I have not found evidence for this, but in 1993 Mali's security forces included the army, air force, gendarmerie, the Republican Guard, and the police. Both the gendarmerie and the Republican Guard were under the Defense Department ("Mali Human Rights Practices, 1993," *U.S. Department of State*, January 31, 1994, [http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/democracy/1993\\_hrp\\_report/93hrp\\_report\\_africa/Mali.html](http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/democracy/1993_hrp_report/93hrp_report_africa/Mali.html)).

<sup>158</sup> Lutscher, "The More Fragmented the Better? The Impact of Armed Forces Structure on Defection during Nonviolent Popular Uprisings," 350-75.

<sup>159</sup> Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz, "Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A New Data Set," *Perspectives on Politics* 12, no. 2 (2014): 313-31. I update this data through 2015 using

categorization of regime type in this dataset is useful my purposes: it captures the differences in decisionmaking across regimes, based on the leadership group's interests and the leader's exercise of power.<sup>160</sup> The regime type coding is determined by the substantive characteristics of the leadership group, as well as how much the group can actually constrain the leader.<sup>161</sup>

GWF's dataset uses and updates the regime type classification of Geddes.<sup>162</sup> It codes regimes as dominant/single party rule (*party*), rule by the military as an institution (*military*), or rule by personalist dictators (unconstrained by either a strong party or unified military) (*personal*), among others.<sup>163</sup> In my analyses, the other categories, as well as the categories the effects of which I am not testing with that model, form a base regime type. In other words, I assess the effects of the regime type variables I include in each model relative to all other, excluded regime types. I code each case according to its regime type in the year prior to the start of the campaign.<sup>164</sup>

---

Jonathan Pinckney, "Expanding GWF Data," unpublished dataset (2016) and my own research. Details are provided in the Appendix.

<sup>160</sup> One concern might be that some regime types are more likely to experience campaigns, and that the factors responsible for that relationship are unobservable characteristics driving any relationships between regime type and loyalty shifts. However, as shown in the Appendix, the campaigns in my dataset are fairly evenly distributed across regime types, particularly those of explanatory interest (i.e. personal, party, and military).

<sup>161</sup> Geddes et al., "Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A New Data Set," 314-5.

<sup>162</sup> Barbara Geddes, "What Do We Know about Democratization after Twenty Years?," *Annual Review of Political Science* 2 (1999): 115-44.

<sup>163</sup> Geddes et al., "Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A New Data Set," 317.

<sup>164</sup> In 23 cases, regime type changes in the five years prior to or during the campaign. I created an indicator variable (*gwfindicator*) to control for this, but including it in the models changes the results very little.

The GWF data attempts to differentiate between regimes where power is concentrated in an individual, whether military or civilian, and regimes where military rule is “collegial.”<sup>165</sup> This differentiation is the basis for their coding of personalist versus military regimes. However, in the course of my research I encountered some regimes coded by GWF (using a typology that groups similar regimes together) as military-personal that seemed more personalist than military. In such cases, the regimes were controlled less by the military as an institution and more by a military strongman. For this reason, I used Svulik’s Institutions in Dictatorships data to recode as personal (*PCP*) the regimes GWF codes as military, when classified by Svulik as military-personal (rather than military-corporate).<sup>166</sup> This change affected 8 cases (4 of which are non-democracies) and also resulted in a new military regime variable that excludes the re-coded cases (*military*).

As for the independent variables related to the protest campaign, I again use the MEC data. It codes a variable for the highest recorded participation in the campaign. It has many missing values, though, so I supplement its measures with a campaign size estimate variable from the NAVCO 2.0 Data Project.<sup>167</sup> Following Chenoweth and Stephan,<sup>168</sup> I log these numbers and then divide them by the log of the country’s

---

<sup>165</sup> Geddes et al., “Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A New Data Set,” 319.

<sup>166</sup> Milan Svulik, *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2012). For example, Geddes et al. and Svulik both code Pakistan 1967 as military-personal.

<sup>167</sup> Erica Chenoweth and Orion A. Lewis, “Unpacking Nonviolent Campaigns: Introducing the NAVCO 2.0 Dataset,” *Journal of Peace Research* 50, no. 3 (2013): 415-23.

<sup>168</sup> Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2011).

population size at the start of the campaign to generate a measure of campaign per capita (*size*).<sup>169</sup> MEC also includes a binary indicator of whether the campaign had a radical flank, which I use to measure the campaign's commitment to nonviolence. While all campaigns included in my universe of cases rely primarily on nonviolent methods, some campaigns include incidental violence, and nearly a third do as shown by the descriptive statistics in the Appendix. I reverse MEC's coding so that "1" is the absence of a radical flank (*nonviolence*).<sup>170</sup>

To measure loss, I use the Uppsala Conflict Data Project (UCDP) Conflict Termination Dataset v.2-2015.<sup>171</sup> I code this variable if the case-country government lost an interstate or internal conflict in the 3 years prior to the start of the campaign, and define loss broadly as non-victory. In the UCDP data, this includes loss, ceasefire, or peace agreement outcomes (i.e. not win, low activity, or actor ceases to exist). The broad definition is necessary to encompass any outcome short of defeat of the enemy;

---

<sup>169</sup> NAVCO uses an indicator variable for campaign size, with each category as a range. I recoded its values as number of participants and found MEC and NAVCO disagree on approximately 25 cases. I use NAVCO's measures for these cases, and its lower bounds as the number. Given these complications (and the challenges associated with counting the number of participants in a campaign), I advise caution in interpreting *size* and its effects. I return to this point in the results below.

<sup>170</sup> I also include an indicator for institutionalized opposition, from V-Dem (Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Joshua Krusell, Anna Lührmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Constanza Sanhueza Petrarca, Johannes von Römer, Laura Saxer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, and Steven Wilson, "V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v7.1," *Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project* (2017)), according to the same logic. Perhaps the existence of an opposition party provides the protest movement some institutional support, and is perceived as more moderate and less threatening to order and stability and military authority than demonstrators in the streets. However, I do not find any relations between this variable, *opposition*, and defections or types of loyalty shifts.

<sup>171</sup> Joakim Kreutz, "How and When Armed Conflicts End: Introducing the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset," *Journal of Peace Research* 47, no. 2 (2010): 243-50.

even so, it produces only 11 observations. *Loss* is rare in this dataset, which may affect its statistical relationships with the dependent variables.

I also use this UCDP dataset for my variable indicating ongoing conflict (*ongoing*), or the presence of a conflict during the campaign in which the case-country government was a party. I measure ongoing conflict a second way – using the *violsim* variable from the MEC dataset, which I rename *violent*. This variable is coded when a violent campaign occurred independently from but simultaneously to the nonviolent campaign.<sup>172</sup>

### Control Variables

I include a number of control variables, or variables that likely impact either loyalty shifts or the explanatory variables and could confound my results. The only existing statistical analysis of military defections using quantitative data is Lutscher,<sup>173</sup> so I follow his lead in terms of control variables. I include some of his controls already, as explanatory variables: military regime (*military*) and conflict, measured as *loss*, *ongoing*, and *violent* following my argument's expectations. Others that both Lutscher and I include are: GDP per capita, military expenditure and personnel, regime leader's years in power, and level of democracy.

First, I control for GDP per capita. I calculate this measure (*GDP per capita*, logged) by averaging a country's GDP per capita over the five years prior to the start of the campaign. I primarily use the World Bank's data, but consult Gleditsch on 20 cases

---

<sup>172</sup> MEC codebook, author's copy, 3.

<sup>173</sup> Lutscher, "The More Fragmented the Better? The Impact of Armed Forces Structure on Defection during Nonviolent Popular Uprisings," 350-75.

on which the World Bank is missing information.<sup>174</sup> According to Powell, poor economic performance reduces regime legitimacy, and could make military political interventions more likely.<sup>175</sup> It could also increase the likelihood of military loyalty shifts. Second, also drawing on Powell, I control for the financial support of the military, or a country's level of military expenditure divided by its number of military personnel. I calculate this variable indicating soldier quality (*soldier quality*, logged) from the Correlates of War National Material Capabilities (v5.0) data<sup>176</sup> and use an average of these measures over the five years prior to the campaign. According to Powell, the higher this number, the more likely the military should be to support the status quo, or remain loyal to the regime.<sup>177</sup>

I also control for the number of years the regime leader has been in power (*incumbent*, logged), using the Archigos dataset from Goemans et al.<sup>178</sup> This is different than regime duration; as Geddes et al. find, the average time to regime failure is about double the time to leader ouster, or 14 years.<sup>179</sup> My use of regime type as an explanatory

---

<sup>174</sup> The World Bank, *World Development Indicators* (Oxford: Oxford University Press); Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, "Expanded Trade and GDP Data," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46, no. 5 (2002): 712-24. The World Bank is in constant 2010 dollars, while Gleditsch is in constant 1996 dollars. I rescale the Gleditsch observations by multiplying them by an index of 1996 values divided by 2010 values (from the *Statistical Abstracts of the United States*).

<sup>175</sup> Powell, "Determinants of the Attempting and Outcome of Coups d'etat."

<sup>176</sup> J. David Singer, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey, "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965," in *Peace, War, and Numbers*, ed. Bruce M. Russett. (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1972), 19-48.

<sup>177</sup> Powell, "Determinants of the Attempting and Outcome of Coups d'etat," 1017-40.

<sup>178</sup> Henk E. Goemans, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Giacomo Chiozza, "Introducing Archigos: A Dataset of Political Leaders," *Journal of Peace Research* 46, no. 2 (2009): 269-83.

<sup>179</sup> Geddes et al., "Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A New Data Set," 320.

variable follows my argument that it is the regime's characteristics that matter for coup-proofing. Still, it is possible that leaders who have been in power longer have been better able to implement and use coup-proofing strategies or other forms of military control. It is also possible, as Lutscher notes, that a military is less likely to support a leader if he is a lame duck, or going to leave power soon anyway.<sup>180</sup>

I control for the level of democracy using the V-Dem dataset.<sup>181</sup> I code this for each case by calculating the average polyarchy score in the five years prior to the campaign (*dem level*, logged). In the V-Dem data, polyarchy is an index that measures achievement of the ideal of electoral democracy. Military loyalty shifts might be less likely in more democratic regimes for a couple of reasons: democracies have more regime legitimacy, and they engage in less coup-proofing.<sup>182</sup> However, because I only analyze non-democracies, the higher this measure, the closer the regime is to anocracy. From Powell, coups are more likely in anocracies than democracies or nondemocracies – because democracies are more legitimate, and nondemocracies can prevent them.<sup>183</sup>

---

<sup>180</sup> Cited by Lutscher, "The More Fragmented the Better? The Impact of Armed Forces Structure on Defection during Nonviolent Popular Uprisings," 350-75; Henry E. Hale, "Regime Cycles: Democracy, Autocracy, and Revolution in Post-Soviet Eurasia," *World Politics* 58, no. 1 (2005): 140; Holger Albrecht, "Revolution or Coup d'Etat? The Role of the Military in Egypt," in *Revolution and Regime Change in Egypt*, eds. Holger Albrecht and Thomas Demmelhuber (Baden-Baden: Homos, 2013), 69. Regime leaders in some cases leave power in the five years prior to or during the campaign. Because I am interested in the effects of regime type rather than individual leadership, I do not indicate when a leader has been in power fewer than five years (though his or her time in power is measured by *lincumbent*. I do create an indicator variable for when regime leadership changes during the campaign (*leaderchange*, coded for 24 cases). Including it in the models does not change the overall results.

<sup>181</sup> Coppedge et al., "V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v7.1."

<sup>182</sup> Pilster and Bohmelt, "Do Democracies Engage Less in Coup-Proofing? On the Relationship between Regime Type and Civil-Military Relations," 355-72.

<sup>183</sup> Powell, "Determinants of the Attempting and Outcome of Coups d'etat," 1035.



Military loyalty shifts may also be more likely. Including this control allows me to account for either impact of democracy level on disloyalty.

Lutscher also includes a dummy variable for voluntary recruitment, as a military that is voluntarily recruited might be more likely to repress or remain loyal to the regime than one that is conscripted.<sup>184</sup> However, the Military Recruitment Data Set,<sup>185</sup> which provides this variable, is missing a significant number of observations. Consequently, I only use it in simple, bivariate regressions, where I find it has no impact. These tests are in the Appendix.

Unlike Lutscher, I also control for whether the country experienced a military coup in the five years prior to the campaign. I use Powell and Thyne's updated coup data to code this variable, *coup*.<sup>186</sup> Longstanding research shows that a history of military intervention in politics leads to more military intervention in politics.<sup>187</sup> Thus, a recent coup may increase the likelihood of military loyalty shifts. It may particularly increase the likelihood of fragmented or disunited shifts, given that coups are often undertaken by middle-ranking or junior officers<sup>188</sup> or are the product of military factional rivalry.<sup>189</sup>

---

<sup>184</sup> Lutscher, "The More Fragmented the Better? The Impact of Armed Forces Structure on Defection during Nonviolent Popular Uprisings," 362.

<sup>185</sup> Nathan W. Toronto, "Military Recruitment Data Set, version 2014," available at <http://www.nathantoronto.com/academicresearch>.

<sup>186</sup> Jonathan M. Powell and Clayton L. Thyne, "Global Instances of Coups from 1950 to 2010: A New Dataset," *Journal of Peace Research* 48, no. 2 (2011): 249-59.

<sup>187</sup> John B. Londregan and Keith T. Poole, "Poverty, the Coup Trap, and the Seizure of Executive Power," *World Politics* 42, no. 2 (1990): 151-83.

<sup>188</sup> William R. Thompson, "Organizational Cohesion and Military Coup Outcomes," *Comparative Political Studies* 9, no. 3 (1976): 255-76.

Tables 2 and 3 below contain summary statistics of all of the independent and control variables.

Table 2. Summary statistics: binary independent and control variables

Variable	0	1	Personal	Party	Military	Other
Regime Type			36	38	23	13
Nonviolence	32	80				
Loss	99	10				
Conflict	77	32				
Viol Campaign	78	34				

Table 3. Summary statistics: continuous independent and control variables

Variable	N	Mean	Std Dev	Min	Max
ICP	96	1.932995	0.6018629	1	3.614155
Size	97	0.6611237	0.1208322	0.3780322	0.9207059
Dem Level	111	0.2543	0.1304003	0.0718359	0.6949281
Incumbent	111	3870.252	3152.003	0	12236
GDP per capita	108	3489.935	3354.155	232.25	18095.26
Soldier Quality	109	8489.819	7629.897	147.8844	42163.1

## Methods

I employ two estimation strategies, depending on my outcome of interest. I use probit regression to determine the probability of *defections*, a binary variable. I use multinomial logistic regression for *type shift* because it is a nominal variable.<sup>190</sup> I use multinomial logit regression rather than ordered logistic regression because I do not consider the categories of loyalty shifts to be ordered by rank. In tests using multinomial logistic regression, I combine the loyal and neutral categories to form the omitted

<sup>189</sup> Patrick J. McGowan, "African Military Coups d'etat, 1956-2001: Frequency, Trends, and Distribution," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 41, no. 3 (2003): 339-70.

<sup>190</sup> Multinomial logit regression is preferable to alternative models unless there is a very large-N, according to Jay K. Dow and James W. Endersby, "Multinomial Probit and Multinomial Logit: A Comparison of Choice Models for Voting Research," *Electoral Studies* 23, no. 1 (2004): 107-22.

baseline category (n=60, or 54% of the dataset). This reflects my interest in explaining types of military loyalty shifts versus no loyalty shift, which includes military neutrality. The coefficient estimates should be interpreted as the effects on the log-odds of a type of military loyalty shift relative to military loyalty/neutrality, for a one unit increase in the predictor. I cluster robust standard errors around country, as some countries have multiple cases.

Before presenting my multivariate results, I present some cross-tabulations of the independent and dependent variables as a means of describing the data and assessing non-probabilistic relationships. In Table 4, I show the mean *EffectiveNumber* or level of institutional coup-proofing (ICP) across defections and types of loyalty shifts. It appears that ICP is higher in militaries that defect, and higher for united defections than the other shifts. The variation in defections and loyalty shifts across regime types in Table 5 is also suggestive; defections and loyalty shifts occur often in personalist regimes, while shifts in party regimes are rare. The variation in military regimes is less clear.

Table 4. Summary statistics for ICP across outcomes

	Mean	Std Dev	Min	Max
No Defections	1.889617	0.5787084	1	3.162959
Defections	2.02395	0.6480771	1	3.614155
Loyal/Neutral	1.882559	0.5621013	1	3.149361
Low Level	1.917845	0.6650199	1	3.162959
Fragmented High Level	1.921999	0.665045	1	3.162959
United Defections	2.147747	0.6283252	1.122787	3.614155

Table 5. Variation in outcomes across regime types

	Personal	Party	Military	Other	Total
No Defections	19 (25.7%)	32 (43.2%)	13 (17.6%)	10 (13.5%)	74 (100%)
Defections	17 (47.2%)	6 (16.7%)	10 (27.8%)	3 (8.3%)	36 (100%)
No Shift	13 (22.4%)	26 (44.8%)	10 (17.2%)	9 (15.5%)	58 (100%)
Low Level	6 (37.5%)	6 (37.5%)	3 (18.75%)	1 (6.25%)	16 (100%)
Fragmented	8 (40%)	2 (10%)	8 (40%)	2 (10%)	20 (100%)
United	9 (56.25%)	4 (25%)	2 (12.5%)	1 (6.25%)	16 (100%)

Table 6 shows that mean campaign per capita, or the measure of protest movement size, is larger in cases where militaries defect or shift loyalty versus remain loyal. From Table 7, most instances of loyalty shifts occur when the protest movement is nonviolent, though that seems to also hold for instances of loyalty. In all, the shape of the data seems to fit my expectations, prior to the addition of covariates and measurement of statistical significance.

Table 6. Summary statistics for size across outcomes

	Mean	Std Dev	Min	Max
No Defections	0.6566305	0.1270985	0.3780322	0.9207059
Defections	0.6702504	0.1083313	0.4408454	0.8354856
Loyal/Neutral	0.6418224	0.1282201	0.3780322	0.9207059
Low Level	0.7158629	0.1073814	0.5323344	0.8927312
Fragmented High Level	0.680569	0.1034155	0.4465078	0.8354856
United Defections	0.6585559	0.1161367	0.4408454	0.8267764

Table 7. Variation in outcomes across nonviolence measure

	Nonviolence		Total
	0	1	
No Defections	21 (27.6%)	55 (72.4%)	76 (100%)
Defections	11 (30.6%)	25 (69.4%)	36 (100%)
No Shift	13 (21.7%)	47 (78.3%)	60 (100%)
Low Level	8 (50%)	8 (50%)	16 (100%)
Fragmented High Level	6 (30%)	14 (70%)	20 (100%)
United Defections	5 (31.3%)	11 (68.8%)	16 (100%)

## Results

I begin by testing the hypotheses generated from my argument about military disloyalty, or Hypotheses 1 through 4. I display the models with control variables here, as they are the most theoretically and empirically interesting. The models without control variables are in the Appendix, but I note in the text when they differ substantially from the results with controls. These results are also limited to the subset of MEC campaigns described above. Analyses of these cases offer the most valid tests of my argument for the effects of threats to military functional and delegated authority on military loyalty shifts, though at the expense of number of observations and thus the tests' statistical power. As previously noted, I report the results for the full dataset in the Appendix.

I first test Hypothesis 1, or the effects of coup-proofing on defections. Model H1-H1a is also a test of H1a, or the independent effect of personalist regimes. The results in Table 8, "H1-H1a" support H1 and H1a: coup-proofing in its institutional and personalist forms threatens military functional authority and increases the probability of defections. Some of the control variables also have their expected effects. The regime leader's incumbency and a recent coup positively impact defections, while greater financial support of the military makes defections less probable. Surprisingly, higher GDP per capita is positively associated with defections. The level of democracy does not seem to matter either way.

This first model is additive, meaning it estimates the independent effects of the variables. I also interact them and show the results in Table 1, under "Interaction."<sup>191</sup>

---

<sup>191</sup> In models with an interaction term, the main effects of the interacted variables may not be meaningful and should be interpreted with caution.

Here, I am interested if their effects are conditional: if PCP has greater effects on the probability of defections in the presence of ICP, and vice versa, because together they are more threatening to military functional authority. The interaction term is positive but not statistically significant. In the model without control variables, it is statistically significant, with a p-value of .046.

**Table 8. Models of coup-proofing and defections**


	H1-H1a	Interaction
ICP	2.808*** (0.7280)	2.134* (0.8620)
PCP	1.132** (0.3920)	-0.9250 (1.7110)
Dem Level	0.7710 (1.4420)	0.6520 (1.4290)
Incumbent	0.898** (0.2990)	0.862** (0.2930)
GDP per capita	0.749** (0.2570)	0.734** (0.2510)
Soldier Quality	-1.146** (0.3520)	-1.129** (0.3470)
Coup	1.542** (0.5230)	1.469** (0.5140)
PCP x ICP		1.5150 (1.2570)
Constant	-8.069** (2.8240)	-6.803* (2.7110)
Observations	94	94
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.289	0.296
AIC	100.726	101.86
BIC	121.072	124.75

Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001

Despite the absence of statistical significance in Table 8, it is possible that the variables' conditional relationships with defections exist over part of the covariate space. To investigate this, I calculate each variable's marginal effects at substantively meaningful values of the other – specifically, at personalist and non-personalist regimes and ICP as an EffectiveNumber (of armed organizations) of 1, 2, and 3 - and display the results in Figure 3. PCP and ICP both have greater effects on the probability of defections in the presence of the other. Militaries that have been coup-proofed through personalist control and the use of counterforces are more likely to defect than militaries that have been coup-proofed through either form alone. Specifically, the probability of defections increases to between .57 and .83 in personalist regimes with one or two counterforces.

Figure 3. Marginal effects of coup-proofing on the probability of defections



Note: All of the marginal effects are statistically significant besides PCP=0/EN=1.

Next, I test Hypotheses 1b and c, or the effects of other regime types on defections. This follows from my argument that single-party and military regimes control

their militaries in ways less threatening to military functional authority. I test these hypotheses separately from H1 and H1a because I am interested in the effects of each regime type relative other regime types, including personalist. I do include ICP, since single-party and military regimes may use institutional coup-proofing and I want to assess the regime types' independent effects. Both single-party and military regimes are negatively associated with defections, but only single-party's association is statistically significant (Table 9). This supports H1b more than H1c. While single-party regimes seemingly control their militaries in ways that do not threaten military functional authority, decreasing the probability of defections, the structure and exercise of power in military regimes cannot be said to impact defections. ICP remains positive and significant in these models. Regardless of these regime types, institutional coup-proofing increases defections' probability.



Table 9. Models of other regime types and defections

	H1b
Party Regime	-1.270** (0.4050)
Military Regime	-0.4480 (0.4470)
ICP	2.516*** (0.6930)
Dem Level	0.9380 (1.4250)
Incumbent	1.007*** (0.2980)
GDP per capita	0.667** (0.2440)
Soldier Quality	-1.048** (0.3500)
Coup	1.436** (0.5070)
Constant	-7.882** (2.8190)
Observations	94
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.307
AIC	100.659
BIC	123.549

Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001

I test Hypothesis 2, or the relationship between protester characteristics and defections, and display the results in Table 10. In an additive model including size and nonviolence (“H2”), I find that neither the size of the campaign nor the absence of a radical flank (commitment to nonviolence) has a significant, positive impact on the probability of defections. (Their interaction also has no impact. I show this in the Appendix.) PCP and ICP maintain their effects in this model. However, my argument

overall contends that a military will be more likely to shift loyalty when the regime has threatened its sources of authority and the protesters are an alternative. In other words, Hypothesis 2 implies the effects of coup-proofing and protester characteristics on defections are conditional on each other. As such, I first interact the two protester variables with the coup-proofing variables. None of the interaction terms are significant, as I show in the Appendix. In a combination of these models, though, I calculate a three-way interaction between PCP, ICP, and size, and display the results under “Interaction” in Table 5. (I also interacted PCP and ICP with nonviolence, but the resulting conditional relationships are not interesting. I include them in the Appendix.)

Table 10. Models of protester characteristics and defections, controlling for and conditional on coup-proofing

	H2	Interaction
Size	0.1450 (1.2360)	-25.3730 (13.9060)
Nonviolence	-0.4650 (0.3310)	-0.4350 (0.3330)
PCP	1.182** (0.4200)	-10.4320 (11.6660)
ICP	2.409** (0.7450)	-10.4040 (6.4450)
Dem Level	0.5940 (1.4450)	0.9440 (1.4070)
Incumbent	0.953** (0.3260)	1.032** (0.3620)
GDP per capita	0.775** (0.2860)	0.853** (0.2960)
Soldier Quality	-1.1760** (0.3780)	-1.271** (0.4140)
Coup	1.785** (0.6160)	2.153** (0.7680)
PCP x ICP x Size		-9.5440 (13.5800)
ICP x Size		18.3910 (10.2160)
PCP x Size		14.1450 (17.5150)
PCP x ICP		7.9780 (9.0430)
Constant	-7.6330** (2.7970)	9.6130 (8.9910)
Observations	90.00	90.00
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.31	0.34
AIC	99.87	104.37
BIC	124.86	139.36


Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001

Three-way interactions are challenging to interpret, so I also create two graphs: the marginal effects of the interaction between ICP and size when the regime is not personalist (Figure 4), and of the same interaction when the regime is personalist (Figure 5). In calculating marginal effects, I use ICP's values at EffectiveNumber 1, 2, and 3, as above, and protest movement size at small, medium, and large values of campaign per capita (.40, .65, .90).


The conditional effects of these two-way interactions in non-personalist regimes and personalist regimes is evident in their different shapes. In substantive terms, the probability of defections is greater with more counterforces and larger protests, and the effects of counterforces and protests are greater in personalist regimes. High levels of threat to military functional authority, in the context of medium and large protests, have a large effect on the probability of defections – increasing their predicted probability to between .55 and .99 with one or two counterforces and medium or large protests.

Figure 4. Marginal effects of ICP and size on defections in non-personalist regimes



Note: The marginal effects are statistically significant at EN=2/Medium Size; EN=3/Medium Size; EN=3/Large Size.

Figure 5. Marginal effects of ICP and size on defections in personalist regimes



Note: The marginal effects are statistically significant at EN=2/Medium Size; EN=3/Medium Size; EN=2/Large Size; EN=3/Large Size.

I next test for the effects of recent military defeat (*loss*) on defections. My argument and specifically Hypothesis 3 expects that coup-proofing will have a larger effect on defections in the presence of military defeat. I first test for a relationship between *loss* and *defections*, and find none, as shown in Table 11. Next, I test H3 more directly by interacting *loss* with the coup-proofing variables (“Interaction”). The interaction terms are not significant, but when I calculate their substantive effects I find that in personalist regimes with two counterforces, recent military loss increases the probability of defections from .518 to .938, and in personalist regimes with three counterforces, recent military loss increases the probability of defections from .875 to .999. This information is displayed in Table 12. Militaries that have been coup-proofed (through personalist and institutional forms) and defeated in conflict are more likely to defect.

Table 11. Models of loss and defections, controlling for and conditional on coup-proofing

	Loss	Interaction
Loss	0.0600 (0.5420)	3.289 (2.805)
ICP	2.805*** (0.7250)	2.570* (1.195)
PCP	1.126** (0.3870)	-0.175 (2.148)
Dem Level	0.7700 (1.4340)	0.695 (1.437)
Incumbent	0.899** (0.3030)	0.925** (0.304)
GDP per capita	0.745** (0.2470)	0.770** (0.268)
Soldier Quality	-1.142*** (0.3420)	-1.173** (0.363)
Coup	1.540** (0.5240)	1.552** (0.558)
Loss x PCP x ICP		7.554 (3.980)
Loss x ICP		-2.921 (2.005)
Loss x PCP		-8.334 (5.312)
PCP x ICP		0.907 (1.562)
Constant	-8.070** (2.8390)	-7.825** (2.962)
Observations	94	94
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.289	0.317
AIC	102.713	107.422
BIC	125.603	140.484

Table 12. Predicted probability of defections in coup-proofed militaries, by whether or not have recently been defeated in conflict

	No loss	Loss
Personalist regime with 1 counterforce (EN=2)	0.518	0.938
Personalist regime with 2 counterforces (EN=3)	0.875	0.999

Lastly, I test Hypothesis 4 and show the results in Table 13. Ongoing conflict measured as *violsim* does have a statistically significant effect on the probability of military defections, though in the opposite direction than expected. However, this positive relationship disappears when controlling for coup-proofing and protester characteristics, in the “Full Model.” The presence of an ongoing conflict or violent campaign does not seem to concentrate the military in a way that makes it more supportive of the status quo and thus less likely to defect. Neither does civil conflict increase the probability of defections when accounting for factors related to the military’s authority.



Table 13. Models of ongoing conflict and defections

	Ongoing	Violent	Full Model
Conflict	0.1740 (0.3030)		
Dem Level	0.2380 (1.1490)	0.1490 (1.1420)	0.3160 (1.3780)
Incumbent	0.473* (0.1870)	0.504** (0.1840)	0.951** (0.3170)
GDP per capita	0.2090 (0.1560)	0.2380 (0.1550)	0.765** (0.2860)
Soldier Quality	-0.476** (0.1560)	-0.498** (0.1580)	-1.174** (0.3680)
Coup	0.8700 (0.4750)	0.9080 (0.4660)	1.838** (0.6210)
Viol Campaign		0.639* (0.2690)	0.5640 (0.3100)
ICP			2.298** (0.8030)
PCP			1.201** (0.4470)
Size			0.2270 (1.2940)
Nonviolence			(0.5260) (0.3530)
Constant	-1.8950 (2.0640)	-2.3170 (2.0200)	-7.548** (2.8400)
Observations	103	103	90
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.12	0.153	0.333
AIC	129.005	124.606	99.282
BIC	147.448	143.049	126.78

Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001

To summarize this section, I find support for my argument's expectations that coup-proofing (ICP and PCP alone and together) increases the probability of military defections. I also find that single-party regimes and their forms of military control matter

for military defections, making them less probable. I do not find evidence that the protester characteristics independently impact defections. However, when I consider the conditional effects of size, it seems that larger protests increase the probability of defections in the presence of coup-proofing (personalist regimes with counterforces). I find a similar conditional relationship between military loss and defections. Coup-proofed militaries that have been defeated recently are much more likely to defect. The overall results are interesting, especially when I explore them substantively. These threats to military functional authority and the protest movement as an alternative matter for defections, even when controlling for the influence of other factors.

With some support for my hypotheses on general defections, I move on to test those that propose a relationship between coup-proofing and protester characteristics and type of military loyalty shifts. In Table 14, I show the results of my tests of Hypotheses 5a and 5b – the independent effects of the forms of coup-proofing on types of loyalty shifts. I find some support for both. ICP increases the likelihood of high level but not low level shifts. Counterforces threaten the military, leading to loyalty shifts by the upper ranks. The lower ranks may be unable to shift loyalty because they risk punishment by these counterforces or their superiors. PCP has a positive and statistically significant effect on all shifts, and especially fragmented high level. In terms of control variables, the longer the regime leader has been in power, the more likely are high level shifts. A recent military coup increases the likelihood of military disloyalty, but only of the disunited type – perhaps because of the deleterious effects of coups on the military organization. Surprisingly, greater soldier quality is only negatively and statistically significantly

associated with fragmented high level shifts. This may indicate that financial support of the military does not prevent all loyalty shifts, just those by a weakened military organization. The impacts of higher GDP per capita are also limited to fragmented high level shifts, but in the opposite direction than expected. The level of democracy is weakly associated with low level shifts.

Table 14. Model of coup-proofing and loyalty shift types

	Low Level	Fragmented	United
PCP	1.933* (0.8770)	2.869*** (0.8630)	2.111* (0.9140)
ICP	2.2290 (1.8510)	5.865** (1.9180)	5.443*** (1.5870)
Dem Level	-5.185* (2.3230)	-1.5030 (4.7940)	1.4820 (3.6010)
Incumbent	0.3180 (0.4310)	2.060* (0.8560)	1.203* (0.5480)
GDP per capita	0.3120 (0.3840)	2.139** (0.7740)	0.6000 (0.5070)
Soldier Quality	0.1050 (0.7660)	-2.540** (0.9670)	-1.4250 (0.8570)
Coup	2.358* (1.1400)	4.548** (1.4110)	1.3710 (1.3510)
Constant	-9.9430 (6.3870)	-21.452* (8.5000)	-11.917* (5.1890)
Observations	94		
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.246		
AIC	218.519		
BIC	279.558		

Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001

Next, I test Hypothesis 5 directly by interacting coup-proofing with loss. Here, threats to military functional authority are greatest, and high level loyalty shifts should be especially likely. In Table 15, I specifically interact PCP with loss; I report the absence of

results for the interaction between ICP and loss in the Appendix. (This may be a product of the data, given the rareness of *loss*.) As shown by the interaction terms, loss increases PCP's effects on all types of loyalty shifts, when controlling for ICP.

Table 15. Model of loss by coup-proofed militaries and loyalty shift types

	Low Level	Fragmented	United
Loss	0.0960 (0.9670)	-0.4020 (1.3280)	-13.732*** (1.6680)
PCP	1.7170 (0.8770)	2.817** (0.9210)	1.7390 (0.9580)
Loss x PCP	15.315*** (1.3930)	14.776*** (1.6390)	29.732*** (1.9520)
ICP	2.2020 (1.8020)	5.842** (1.9650)	5.278*** (1.5760)
Dem Level	-4.7240 (2.4640)	-1.5350 (4.9460)	1.5270 (3.3920)
Incumbent	0.3320 (0.4390)	2.047* (0.8540)	1.286* (0.5570)
GDP per capita	0.2600 (0.3930)	2.163** (0.8000)	0.6020 (0.4870)
Soldier Quality	0.1110 (0.7660)	-2.557* (0.9960)	-1.3850 (0.8240)
Coup	2.356* (1.1420)	4.585** (1.4570)	1.6060 (1.4250)
Constant	-9.7670 (6.4420)	-21.332* (8.3960)	-12.641* (5.2830)
Observations	94		
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.264		
AIC	226.301		
BIC	302.6		


Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001

However, when I calculate the marginal effects of PCP at substantively meaningful values of loss (0 and 1), they are only statistically significant for united

defections. This finding is shown graphically in Figure 6: a military that has been coup-proofed using personalist forms is more likely to defect as a united organization when it has recently been defeated in conflict. Here, its threatened functional authority is especially evident.

Figure 6. Marginal effects of PCP and military loss on united defections



Next, I evaluate support for Hypothesis 6, or the effects of the protest movement on types of loyalty shifts. So far, I have only considered the role of threats to military functional authority – without considering how the protest movement as an alternative might further impact a military’s response. I first assess the variables individually. Then, I use interactions to test the overall argument for high level loyalty shifts: militaries that have been coup-proofed are more likely to shift loyalty through united defections when protests are large and nonviolent. Conversely, lower levels of coup-proofing, or coup-proofing with smaller protests not necessarily committed to nonviolence, may impact the likelihood of lower level loyalty shifts.

I find support for H6 as well as other hypotheses with the additive model (Table 16). As concerns H5a and 5b, when controlling for protester characteristics, ICP independently increases the likelihood of high level but not low level shifts. Personalist coup-proofing increases the likelihood of all shifts, but fragmented high level and low level more than united defections, perhaps because of its effects on the military organization.<sup>192</sup> Size only has a positive, statistically significant effect on low level shifts – without taking into account any interactions with coup-proofing, anyway. Larger protests may be more likely to require the involvement of the rank and file and low-ranking officers, and thus provide them motives and opportunities to disobey regime orders or join the opposition movement.<sup>193</sup> Nonviolence does not seem to matter, at least not as measured and included here. From the summary statistics in Table 2, MEC codes most of the protest movements in this dataset as nonviolent (67%), so perhaps nonviolence is defined overly broadly as to have significant impacts.

---

<sup>192</sup> These findings are further borne out when I do individual probit regressions for types of loyalty shifts, as binary outcomes. I report the full results in the Appendix, but summarize them here. On low level shifts, PCP has a positive and weak effect (p-value .083), while ICP's association is far from statistically significant. For fragmented high level shifts, PCP has a positive and strong effect (p-value .007). ICP also has a positive effect, but statistically, it is not significant (p-value .071). For united defections, PCP is positive but not statistically significant, while ICP is positive with a p-value of .022.

<sup>193</sup> Holger Albrecht and Dorothy Ohl, "Exit, Resistance, Loyalty: Military Behavior during Unrest in Authoritarian Regimes," *Perspectives on Politics* 14, no. 1 (2016): 38-52.

Table 16. Model of protester characteristics and loyalty shift types, controlling for coup-proofing

	Low Level	Fragmented	United
Size	10.138*** (3.0760)	3.5970 (2.6160)	3.1900 (3.8550)
Nonviolence	-0.8500 (0.8330)	-1.0370 (0.8280)	-0.9670 (0.8850)
ICP	2.9200 (1.8710)	5.576** (2.0220)	5.508** (1.6990)
PCP	3.048** (1.0710)	3.561** (1.0920)	2.630* (1.1890)
Dem Level	-4.7060 (2.8740)	-2.5890 (4.9360)	1.0370 (4.7730)
Incumbent	0.1610 (0.2640)	2.119* (0.9940)	1.268* (0.5700)
GDP per capita	0.1650 (0.5020)	2.227* (0.8810)	0.7020 (0.5740)
Soldier Quality	-0.1960 (0.7140)	-2.722* (1.1550)	-1.6320 (0.8860)
Coup	1.6030 (0.9610)	4.941** (1.6430)	1.5950 (1.4930)
Constant	-12.627* (6.2840)	-22.143** (8.5870)	-12.882* (5.4970)
Observations	90		
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.306		
AIC	211.506		
BIC	286.5		

Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001

In the model shown in Table 17, I interact ICP and size. (I interact the other combinations of coup-proofing and protest movement variables and find that their interaction terms and marginal effects are insignificant or not meaningful. I include the results in the Appendix. Nonviolence as measured does not seem to matter for loyalty shifts, and large protests may be unable to generate united defections by a military whose

organization has been damaged by personalist coup-proofing.) I am interested in whether higher levels of ICP combined with large protests will increase the likelihood of united defections. At first glance, I find additional support for H5b and the effects of PCP. Personalist coup-proofing threatens military functional authority but also negatively impacts the military organization, having greater effects on low level and fragmented shifts than united defections.

For H6, the interaction term of ICP and size is negative and statistically significant on low level shifts. Its negative coefficient along with size's positive coefficient seems to indicate that as ICP get larger, the positive effect of size on the likelihood of low level shifts gets smaller. When I calculate the marginal effects at the variables' substantively meaningful values, few are significant but generally align with my argument. I show the results in the Appendix and summarize them here: the predicted probability of low level shifts increases to .75 with large protests when there are no counterforces. Size is explanatory of low level shifts, but only at low levels of ICP. The presence of more counterforces seems to reduce the ability of the rank and file and low-ranking officers to shift loyalty, regardless of protest size.



Table 17. Model of protester characteristics and loyalty shift types, conditional on ICP

	Low Level	Fragmented	United
Size	44.200* (17.5580)	-7.1010 (17.6110)	-34.9000 (27.0280)
Nonviolence	-0.7920 (0.8250)	-1.0470 (0.8620)	-1.0740 (0.9170)
ICP	20.914* (8.5290)	0.4660 (8.9090)	-11.9830 (12.5600)
PCP	3.146** (1.0480)	3.704*** (1.1080)	2.469* (1.1860)
Size x ICP	-24.630* (12.1650)	8.4070 (13.0000)	27.8550 (19.7730)
Dem Level	-4.9080 (2.8640)	-2.4200 (5.5460)	2.3940 (4.3830)
Incumbent	0.1340 (0.2900)	2.227* (1.0410)	1.325* (0.5340)
GDP per capita	0.1400 (0.5250)	2.325* (0.9250)	0.7940 (0.5670)
Soldier Quality	-0.1990 (0.7150)	-2.851* (1.2410)	-1.824* (0.9270)
Coup	1.1150 (0.8050)	5.337** (1.8130)	1.8140 (1.5770)
Constant	-37.163** (13.1170)	-16.3530 (14.1930)	11.1730 (17.3440)
Observations	90		
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.328		
AIC	212.681		
BIC	295.175		


Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001

The interaction term on united defections is not statistically significant, but the variables have marginal effects. It is clear, based on Figure 7, that the effect of each on the predicted probability of the outcome is conditional on the values of the other. Further, these effects of ICP and size are statistically significant at their highest values. United

defections are up to 84 percent likely when the regime uses two counterforces and the protests are large. Here, the military's functional capabilities and authority are threatened by the existence of other security forces. That the protests involve large numbers of the population indicates to the military that the movement for regime change is widely supported, and a new government may be more legitimate.


Figure 7. Marginal effects of ICP and size on united defections



Note: The marginal effects are statistically significant at EN=2/Medium Size; EN=3/Medium Size; EN=3/Large Size.

Lastly, I calculate the marginal effects of PCP on the predicted probability of each outcome (holding the other covariates at their means) and display them in Figure 8. As suggested by the coefficients and signs, personalist coup-proofing increases the probability of fragmented high level shifts most, followed by low level shifts, with only a small effect on united defections. This supports my expectations – because militaries that have been personalist coup-proofed are more likely to shift loyalty, yet are organizationally weakened and may struggle to defect as united organizations.

Figure 8. Marginal effects of PCP on types of loyalty shifts



These final statistical results and substantive effects provide support for my overall argument regarding the relationship between threats to military functional authority and types of military loyalty shifts, and the protest movement as affecting military disloyalty by being more supportive of military authority. Large protests increase the likelihood of united defections by a military that has been coup-proofed because they indicate the opposition movement is widely supported and perhaps more legitimate than the regime that has threatened military functional authority. Large protests also increase the likelihood of low level shifts, at least when there are few counterforces to monitor and punish disloyalty at this level. Coup-proofing through personalist control primarily affects fragmented shifts because of its impacts on the military organization in addition to its threats to military functional authority. I discuss these findings' contributions and limitations and introduce the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) to conclude.

## Conclusions

To summarize, militaries that have been coup-proofed do appear more likely to shift loyalty from authoritarian regimes in response to anti-regime protest movements, and the positive effects of coup-proofing on defections are stronger when the military has recently been defeated in conflict or when the protest movement is large in size. Militaries that have been coup-proofed are also more likely to shift loyalty at higher levels, but different forms of coup-proofing have different effects. Personalist coup-proofing makes low level and fragmented high level shifts (and to a lesser extent, united defections) more likely, and my argument suggests this is because of its impacts on the military organization. Institutional coup-proofing makes high level shifts and especially united defections more likely, but has no effect on low level loyalty shifts. This is probably because the presence of more counterforces makes it difficult for small numbers of the rank and file or low ranking officers to shift loyalty without being detected or punished. Low level shifts are more likely during large protests, perhaps because such protests are likely to involve these sections of the military and provide them the motivation and ability to act. Finally, large protests increase the effect of institutional coup-proofing on united defections.

In this chapter, then, I used quantitative data and regression analyses to generate preliminary support for my argument's empirical expectations. These findings come about through statistically significant relationships between the independent and dependent variables. The explanatory factors related to coup-proofing and protester characteristics (in particular, size) have the hypothesized effects on defections and types

of loyalty shifts. The relationships hold even when accounting for the influence of other, potentially confounding factors. This method – regression analysis – is particularly useful for demonstrating the independent effects of the variables, such as personalist and institutional coup-proofing, for which I have specific sub-hypotheses. It is also capable of testing for the conditional effects of variables. The results confirm that the coup-proofing and protester characteristics' effects are stronger when considered together, and that they interact differently for the types of loyalty shifts. The models with interactions pose challenges for my analysis, though, given that the terms are either statistically insignificant or substantively difficult to interpret. Including them also reduces the statistical degrees of freedom in an already small set of cases/number of observations.

This evidence altogether provides backing for my overall argument that militaries are more likely to shift loyalty to the protesters when the regime has threatened military sources of authority and the protesters offer an alternative. Greater threats to military functional authority increase the likelihood of high level shifts, as does regime coup-proofing along with large protests. The regime's forms of military control matter for military authority and thus loyalty. This is further demonstrated by the negative relationship between single-party regimes and defections. The protest movement is also important – as the military's ultimate source of delegated authority, and the regime challenge to which it responds. The protests' characteristics affect whether and how the military shifts loyalty. But protest size and nonviolence are not sufficient for explaining

military disloyalty, particularly at higher levels. The military must be facing threats to its functional authority, too.<sup>194</sup>

This evidence also challenges the existing scholarship on defections. Though small, it offers some key propositions: military loyalty shifts are more likely when the regime has used a) identity-based ties;<sup>195</sup> b) divide and rule tactics;<sup>196</sup> c) either no counterforces or many counterforces;<sup>197</sup> or d) counterforces, and the opposition is credible.<sup>198</sup> I find support for the analyses' general intuition, that coup-proofing by the regime increases the likelihood of defections. However, I challenge any of these singular explanations by finding that they vary depending on the type of loyalty shifts. I organize them into a more coherent whole with my argument on military sources of authority. I also bring in the protest movement and show that protester characteristics (in particular, size) meaningfully condition the effects of coup-proofing on military disloyalty.

As a transition to the next chapter, I address the shortcomings of the above analysis. First, the data has some issues. As I mentioned above, the data on institutional coup-proofing and protest size are spotty and may be mismeasured or unreliable. I also

---

<sup>194</sup> This is against the expectations of Chenoweth and Stephan, who find that the probability of defections increases as campaign membership increases (*Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*, 48).

<sup>195</sup> Theodore McLaughlin, "Loyalty Strategies and Military Defection in Rebellion," *Comparative Politics* 42, no. 3 (2010): 333-50.

<sup>196</sup> Terence Lee, "The Armed Forces and Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Explaining the Role of the Military in 1986 Philippines and 1998 Indonesia," *Comparative Political Studies* 42, no. 5 (2009): 640-69; *Defect or Defend: Military Responses to Popular Protests in Authoritarian Asia* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014).

<sup>197</sup> Lutscher, "The More Fragmented the Better? The Impact of Armed Forces Structure on Defection during Nonviolent Popular Uprisings," 350-75.

<sup>198</sup> Julien Morency-Laflamme, "A Question of Trust: Military Defection During Regime Crises in Benin and Togo," *Democratization* 25, no. 3 (2018): 464-80.

recognize that my other coup-proofing variable – personalist regime type – is a very imperfect proxy measure of the actual coup-proofing strategies in which I am interested. I believe the variable captures important aspects of regime exercise of authority, that vary across regime types. But I cannot point to the variable and its effects in my models and know exactly what part of “personalist regime” is doing the explanatory work.

Fortunately, there are ongoing efforts to improve data on these concepts. One exciting project is De Bruin’s Security Force Dataset, which collects data on coup-proofing in more clearly defined and disaggregated forms.<sup>199</sup> MEC is also ongoing and perhaps its updated version will have new data on campaign membership. I look forward to the release of these datasets so that I can see if my findings using the coarser measures hold, and to generate new insights regarding my argument and its observable implications.

Finally, all probabilistic statistical analyses encounter the same issues: the possibility of omitted variable bias and endogeneity, and the challenge of drawing causal inferences from correlational data. The first set of issues are in some ways compounded here because of my relatively small sample size. In the qualitative case study chapters I better evaluate the causal mechanisms. First, though, I use Qualitative Comparative Analysis to assess my argument’s propositions as combinations of causal conditions, using a smaller number of especially comparable cases. The relationships I have hypothesized are more complicated than the linear, additive ones regression analysis assumes. QCA’s strengths as a technique allows me to build on the preliminary evidence

---

<sup>199</sup> Erica De Bruin, “Mapping Coercive Institutions: A New Data Set of State Security Forces, 1960-2010”, forthcoming.

gathered in this chapter while more directly assessing the configurations of factors that produce outcomes.



## CHAPTER FOUR: QUALITATIVE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Because I have a relatively small number of cases and my argument concerns factors related to regime-military relations and the protest movement that combine to produce threats to military functional authority, in this chapter I use another method to assess empirical support: qualitative comparative analysis (QCA). This method is recommended when the number of cases is less than 100, because probabilistic statistical analyses and results could be unstable and underpowered. QCA is also a configurational rather than regression approach, so it can assess the multiple causal pathways or combinations of conditions that lead to an outcome. Using logical inference or Boolean analysis, it produces configurations that describe the data and suggest causal relations.

To review, I argue that militaries will be more likely to shift loyalty when the regime has compromised their functional capacities and the protest movement is an alternative source of military authority. It follows that both regime coup-proofing and protester characteristics matter. In conjunctural terms, regime coup-proofing and a large and nonviolent protest movement combine as different levels of threat to military authority that produce different military responses. Because the variables matter for their impacts on military authority, they may be substitutable and conditional. For example, regime coup-proofing in both its institutional and personalist forms may threaten military functional authority and increase the likelihood of defections. But

nonviolent. Further, other variables such as military loss may not have independent effects on defections but could increase their likelihood if the military has been coup-proofed.

In the previous chapter, I presented preliminary evidence for my argument and the hypothesized relationships using quantitative data and regression techniques. I also acknowledged that approach's shortcomings. The models without interactions assume the variables' relationships are linear and additive – that the more independent variables present, the more likely the dependent variable - and not true tests of my theoretical expectations. When I added interactions to the models, the terms were either statistically insignificant or substantively difficult to interpret. The additional terms also reduced the statistical degrees of freedom in an analysis of an already relatively small number of cases. Lastly, loyalty shifts likely occur as a result of multiple causal processes, but such complexity is challenging to unravel using regressions.

I use QCA to explicitly evaluate my argument and hypotheses in terms of conjunctural causation that is contextual, where causal factors may substitute for each other. In particular, I generate findings for necessary and/or sufficient conditions and sufficient combinations of conditions, for each of the outcomes. This differs from testing whether independent variables have statistically significant positive or negative effects on the dependent variable while controlling for other factors. Rather, it is a means to assess how causal conditions combine to produce an outcome. I find that the explanatory factors related to coup-proofing and protester characteristics matter because

they combine, in multiple ways, to affect military functional and delegated authority and thus cause military loyalty shifts.

### **Brief Introduction to QCA as a Method**

In the social sciences, theories often imply or expect equifinality (i.e. multiple causal pathways to the same outcome) or multicausality (i.e. many causal factors matter for an outcome). Such theories are difficult to evaluate empirically, and especially using probabilistic statistics. A classic example to illustrate the shortcomings of such analyses is explaining why an employee was fired from her job. She could be fired for committing various infractions, each being enough: skipping work, stealing from the copyroom, lying to her boss. In regression analysis, the relationship between these factors and the outcome is modeled such that the more infractions she commits, the more likely she will be fired. QCA enables researchers to conclude that these factors or conditions are in fact causally equivalent: the presence of each is sufficient for her firing.<sup>200</sup> An outcome can result from different factors or combinations of factors.

QCA was designed to assess the causal contributions of different conditions to an outcome. It takes into account the strengths and weaknesses of both quantitative and qualitative approaches, aiming to “allow systematic cross-case comparisons, while at the same time giving justice to within-case complexity.”<sup>201</sup> Its focus on causal complexity aligns it with qualitative research, but its ability to examine evidence across

---

<sup>200</sup> This is a common illustration, but here I draw on Chan’s use of it. Steve Chan, “Explaining War Termination: A Boolean Analysis of Causes,” *Journal of Peace Research* 40, no. 1 (2003): 49-66.

<sup>201</sup> Benoit Rihoux and Charles C. Ragin, eds., *Configurational Comparative Methods: Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and Related Techniques* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2009), xviii.

a larger set of cases means it can identify more generalized relationships. Given these features, it is useful for analysis of small to medium-N sets of data.<sup>202</sup>

QCA's main weakness is that it does not provide estimates of the statistical significance and magnitude of independent variables' effects on the dependent variable.<sup>203</sup> Social scientists such as Braumoeller (2015) have criticized QCA for this reason and others.<sup>204</sup> However, the QCA program I use below allows me to calculate solutions' coverage and consistency, which provide parameters of fit and indicate empirical relevance. I employed regression methods in the previous chapter to analyze and assess the variables' statistical relationships. These approaches together provide support for my argument's empirical expectations.

### **This Chapter's QCA Strategy**

The primary goal of QCA is to identify necessary and sufficient conditions for the outcome.<sup>205</sup> Necessary conditions are those that are shared by cases with the same outcome, while sufficiency is determined by investigating whether cases with the same conditions also have the same outcomes.<sup>206</sup> In QCA, the researcher creates a truth table

---

<sup>202</sup> Benoit Rihoux, "Case-Oriented Configurational Research Using QCA (Qualitative Comparative Analysis)", in *Oxford Handbook of Political Science: Methodology* edited by Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier, Henry E. Brady, and David Collier (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 423.

<sup>203</sup> However, as Chan points out, estimating the statistical effects of independent variables may be problematic if the "relevant causal processes are not mutually exclusive." Chan, "Explaining War Termination: A Boolean Analysis of Causes," 63.

<sup>204</sup> Bear F. Braumoeller, "Guarding Against False Positives in Qualitative Comparative Analysis," *Political Analysis* 23, no. 4 (2015): 471-487. Specifically, he says that QCA is vulnerable to type I error and multiple inference.

<sup>205</sup> Charles C. Ragin, *Fuzzy-Set Social Science* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2000).

<sup>206</sup> Rihoux, "Case-Oriented Configurational Research Using QCA (Qualitative Comparative Analysis)," 724.

with all possible combinations of conditions and outcomes and the cases that fit them. She then analyzes the truth table for combinations sufficient for the outcome and assesses the findings in terms of the hypothesized causal relations. In this chapter, I follow these steps using a Stata package, *fuzzy*. It produces solution terms for the sufficient configurations by performing various tests with standards that I specify.

I use the same data that I did for the regression analyses. Following my discussion in Chapter Three, I do not include democratic, Soviet Republic, or non-independent cases. QCA does not allow for “control variables,” so I apply a number of scope conditions to further restrict my dataset to cases that are especially comparable. Specifically, I include only post-Cold War cases that did not experience a coup in the five years prior to the campaign, as these two factors were theoretically interesting and at times statistically important controls in the previous chapter.<sup>207</sup> This reduced dataset has 58 cases. In sum, I analyze two medium-n datasets of conditions and outcomes: one of countries that are independent, non-democratic, and non-Soviet Republic; and one of countries that are also post-Cold War with no recent coups.

Most of the conditions are dichotomous variables; in QCA terms, they are calibrated as crisp sets. I calibrate the two continuous variables, *EffectiveNumber* and *size*, as crisp sets as well. I do this because I am interested in the effects of presence of institutional coup-proofing (ICP) versus absence of ICP, and large campaigns (SIZE) versus small campaigns. Dichotomous variables and crisp sets measure differences in type rather than degree. As I detail below, I define the specific set membership scores

---

<sup>207</sup> I also applied a scope condition related to the incumbent variable, but it did not change the below findings.

(i.e. whether an observation is coded 1 or 0) depending on the particular outcome of interest. Importantly, though, I define membership and code observations based on my argument and knowledge of the cases, rather than by relying on “internal criteria” like mean or mode.<sup>208</sup>

### Empirical Propositions

Here I list the empirical propositions I test with QCA. They are essentially the hypotheses from Chapter Two, but more explicitly identify the presence or absence of conditions, in particular combinations, under which the outcome is likely to occur. The key defines the conditions’ abbreviations. In standard QCA notation, “\*” denotes “and”, “+” denotes “or”, upper-case letters denote the presence of a condition, and lower-case letters denote the absence of a condition.

Key:

ICP = institutional coup-proofing

PCP = personalist coup-proofing

SIZE = protest movement size

NV = protest movement nonviolence (or absence of a radical flank)

OPP = institutionalized opposition (see footnote 170 in Chapter Three)

LOSS = recent military loss

VIOL = ongoing violent conflict

Defections = ICP \* SIZE \* NV + PCP \* SIZE \* NV + ICP \* OPP + PCP \* OPP

*Interpretation:* Defections are likely in cases with coup-proofing (either form)

---

<sup>208</sup> Charles C. Ragin, *Redesigning Social Inquiry: Fuzzy Sets and Beyond* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 30.

and large, nonviolent protests, or coup-proofing (either form) and an institutionalized opposition.

Low level loyalty shifts =  $icp * PCP * loss * medSIZE + icp * PCP * loss * medsize * VIOLSIM$

*Interpretation:* Low level shifts are likely in cases with personalist coup-proofing (not institutional coup-proofing), medium-sized (or larger) protests, and no recent military loss, or personalist coup-proofing (not institutional coup-proofing), small protests and no recent military loss but ongoing violent conflict. Protest movement nonviolence will not matter.

Fragmented high level loyalty shifts =  $PCP * modICP * loss * medSIZE + PCP * modICP * loss * NV + PCP * icp * medSIZE * NV$

*Interpretation:* Fragmented high level shifts are likely in cases with personalist coup-proofing, moderate institutional coup-proofing, and medium-sized (or larger) or nonviolent protests, or personalist coup-proofing and medium-sized (or larger), nonviolent protests.

United defections =  $ICP * PCP * lgSIZE * NV + ICP * PCP * OPP + ICP * LOSS * SIZE * NV + PCP * LOSS * SIZE * NV + ICP * LOSS * OPP + PCP * LOSS * OPP$

*Interpretation:* United defections are likely in cases with both forms of coup-proofing (or one form and military loss) and large, nonviolent protests (or an institutionalized opposition).

My goal with QCA is to uncover the combinations of conditions under which defections and types of military loyalty shifts occur. As suggested by Schneider and

Wagemann,<sup>209</sup> I also analyze the conditions under which the outcomes do not occur. I take each outcome in turn in the following sections.

### **Findings: Defections**

First, I analyze defections. I start with the conditions I expect to be most explanatory for the outcome and use the full set of cases (i.e. independent non-democracies, non-Soviet Republics). Because I am interested in the effects of any amount of institutional coup-proofing and large campaigns, I assign ICP a score of 1 if the effective number of armed organizations is greater than 2, and SIZE a score of 1 if the campaign per capita is greater than .7.<sup>210</sup>

Before assessing the conditions' combinations, I test if any of them is individually necessary for defections. Necessity is a high bar, and following Ragin, I set the minimal consistency benchmark for necessity at a level of .9.<sup>211</sup> I use *fuzzy* to produce a sufficiency and necessity matrix and display it in Table 1. Sufficiency scores are in the upper left, and necessity in the lower right. The matrix shows that no conditions qualify as necessary for defections. The closest is NV, at .677. In terms of the overall dataset, though, NV is present in 70 percent of the cases, so it is unsurprising that it is almost

---

<sup>209</sup> Carsten Q. Schneider and Claudius Wagemann, *Set-Theoretic Methods for the Social Sciences: A Guide to Qualitative Comparative Analysis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

<sup>210</sup> An effective number of two means there is at least one ground based force parallel to the regular military. A campaign per capita of .7 is higher than the mean (.659), and is roughly equivalent to a non-logged campaign size divided by total population value of .006. In case terms, the campaign against the military dictatorship in Thailand in October and November 1973 was roughly this size, with approximately 250,000 participants relative to a population of just over 4 million. It was considered a "massive student protest" (Frank C. Darling, "Student Protest and Political Change in Thailand," *Pacific Affairs* 47, no. 1 (1974), 15) that included a "large sector of the citizenry" (Clark D. Neher, "Stability and Instability in Contemporary Thailand," *Asian Survey* 15, no. 12 (1975), 1103).

<sup>211</sup> Ragin, *Fuzzy-Set Social Science*.



always present in defections. As for sufficiency, PCP scores highest with .469. This condition is the one that individually is most sufficient for defections.

Table 1. Sufficiency and necessity matrix for defections outcome

	Defections	ICP	PCP	SIZE	NV	OPP
OPP	0.321	0.434	0.415	0.377	0.642	1.000
NV	0.339	0.387	0.371	0.371	1.000	0.548
SIZE	0.455	0.364	0.273	1.000	0.697	0.606
PCP	0.469	0.344	1.000	0.281	0.719	0.688
ICP	0.389	1.000	0.306	0.333	0.667	0.639
Defections	1.000	0.452	0.484	0.484	0.677	0.548

Next, I examine the configurations' consistency with sufficiency for the outcomes, or the degree to which the configurations are sufficient for defections. The *fuzzy* program analyzes the truth table and evaluates the combinations of conditions that are sufficient for the outcome, using various tests and standards. I set a consistency threshold of .75, the minimal value suggested by Ragin. This produces a complex solution of six configurations. It is likely that some conditions are irrelevant, so *fuzzy* uses inferential logic/Boolean algebra to simplify or reduce the results. This yields a "final reduction set" or solution of five configurations, as well as measures of coverage and consistency. I show the results in Table 2.

Table 2. Sufficient configurations for defections outcome (full dataset)

	Consistency	Coverage	
		Raw	Unique
ICP*pcp*SIZE*nv*opp	1.000	0.032	0.032
ICP*PCP*size*nv*OPP	1.000	0.097	0.097
PCP*SIZE*NV*opp	1.000	0.097	0.065
ICP*PCP*NV*opp	1.000	0.065	0.032
ICP*PCP*SIZE*NV	1.000	0.097	0.065
Total coverage = 0.323			
Solution consistency = 1.000			

The solution consistency is 1.000, meaning that all cases with these configurations have defections. (Consistency is analogous to model fit in a regression analysis.) The total coverage is quite low, at .323. The configurations leave many cases of defection unexplained; they are not very empirically relevant. Though disappointing, this result is perhaps unsurprising, given that so far I have included only the main conditions and am using the full set of cases.

Rather than interpret these results, I scope the dataset to post-Cold War cases with no recent coups, to reduce the influence of other factors. Using the same processes as above, I get four configurations, with a consistency score of 1.000 and better coverage of .538. I show them in Table 3. The first insight from the solution is that PCP is present in every configuration. This means that in the presence of PCP, the other conditions' combinations are causally equivalent. Against my expectations, the other form of coup-proofing, ICP, is not individually important. But that neither PCP alone nor PCP and ICP together are sufficient for defections supports my overall argument that coup-proofing must be combined with either large, nonviolent protests or an institutionalized opposition for this outcome. The only configuration in which SIZE and OPP are absent, both forms of coup-proofing are present, with NV.

Table 3. Sufficient configurations for defections outcome (reduced dataset)

	Consistency	Coverage	
		Raw	Unique
ICP*PCP*size*nv*OPP	1.000	0.231	0.231
PCP*SIZE*NV*opp	1.000	0.154	0.077
ICP*PCP*NV*opp	1.000	0.154	0.077
ICP*PCP*SIZE*NV	1.000	0.154	0.077
Total coverage = 0.538			
Solution consistency = 1.000			

Lastly, I attempt to achieve a higher coverage score – or explain more cases of defections - by adding other conditions. Specifically, I add VIOL (expecting it to be absent in cases of defection) and PARTY (expecting it to be either absent, or present in combination with ICP and large, nonviolent protests).<sup>212</sup> The *fuzzy* analysis produces nine configurations that reduce to six. Together, they have a consistency score of 1.000 and coverage of .692. Including the additional conditions does explain more cases. They also make the configurations more complex and interpretation of them challenging. I show the results in Table 4. In brief, however: PCP is again nearly always present. The only configuration in which it is absent includes PARTY (with NV and OPP, but not ICP surprisingly). SIZE/NV and OPP again seem to substitute for each other. Further, if NV is present but SIZE and OPP are absent, both forms of coup-proofing must be present, too. VIOL does not seem to matter, though it may be an important condition in party regimes.

---

<sup>212</sup> From Chapters Two and Three, single-party regimes are less likely to experience defections, when controlling for institutional coup-proofing. Though these regimes do not use personalist coup-proofing, they may use institutional, and may experience defections when protests are especially large and nonviolent.

Table 4. Sufficient configurations for defections outcome (reduced dataset with additional conditions)

	Consistency	Coverage	
		Raw	Unique
icp*PCP*SIZE*NV*viol*opp*party	1.000	0.077	0.077
ICP*PCP*size*NV*viol*opp*party	1.000	0.077	0.077
ICP*PCP*SIZE*NV*viol*OPP*party	1.000	0.077	0.077
ICP*PCP*SIZE*NV*VIOL*opp*party	1.000	0.077	0.077
icp*pcp*NV*VIOL*OPP*PARTY	1.000	0.154	0.154
ICP*PCP*size*nv*OPP*party	1.000	0.231	0.231
Total coverage = 0.692			
Solution consistency = 1.000			

In sum, then, coup-proofing and protester or opposition characteristics combine in various ways to produce defections. For these cases, personalist coup-proofing and either large, nonviolent protests or an institutionalized opposition must be present for defections to occur. Defections may occur in party regimes, but only when protests are nonviolent, there is an institutionalized opposition, and a violent campaign is ongoing. Perhaps a violent campaign generates military discontent with the regime in ways similar to coup-proofing. It is important to remember that the defections outcome groups both types of high level shifts together, even though they are likely explained by different causal processes. I assess such differences below, but first analyze the conditions under which defections do not occur.

### Findings: No Defections

I follow an abbreviated version of the above steps to get a basic explanation of the absence of defections. I limit my reporting of findings to those for the main conditions and the reduced set of cases. Using the .75 threshold, the conditions result in 15 configurations that reduce to six. The solution has a coverage score of .805 and

consistency of 1.000. It seems that these combinations of conditions explain the absence of defections well. Coup-proofing (specifically ICP) is present in only one configuration. OPP, NV, and SIZE are present in varying combinations, but absent coup-proofing, they are sufficient for no defections (not sufficient for defections).

Table 5. Sufficient configurations for no defections outcome (reduced dataset)

	Consistency	Coverage	
		Raw	Unique
ICP*pcp*NV*OPP	1.000	0.098	0.049
icp*pcp*opp	1.000	0.171	0.073
pcp*size*OPP	1.000	0.268	0.122
icp*size*NV	1.000	0.341	0.049
size*NV*OPP	1.000	0.341	0.073
icp*SIZE*nv	1.000	0.098	0.073
Total coverage = 0.805			
Solution consistency = 1.000			

### Findings: Low Level Loyalty Shifts

I follow the same steps for the other outcomes, starting with low level loyalty shifts. I score ICP and SIZE differently because I expect low level shifts to be unlikely in cases with any amount of institutional coup-proofing, and likely in cases with at least medium-sized protests. I calibrate ICP as a fuzzy set by standardizing the continuous measure. I assign SIZE a 1 if campaign per capita is greater than .65.<sup>213</sup> From the empirical proposition above, I add conditions for military loss (LOSS) and ongoing violent campaign (VIOL). I do not expect LOSS to matter but add it to begin

<sup>213</sup> This is close to the mean value of campaign per capita and corresponds to a case such as Kyrgyzstan's Tulip Revolution in spring 2005. Around 20,000 protesters participated in the campaign, relative to a population of 5.16 million, for a campaign per capita of .004. According to analysts, the campaign did not generate as much participation as similar movements in neighboring countries, and its success owed more to state weakness than "extremely large demonstrations" (Mark R. Beissinger, "Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena: The Diffusion of Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions," *Perspectives on Politics* 5, no. 2 (2007)).

differentiating solutions for low level versus high level shifts. I do not have clear expectations for VIOL. Violent conflict is likely to involve the rank and file, though, so perhaps its presence will have an effect.

Using these conditions, I test for sufficiency and necessity with a matrix that I show in Table 6. No conditions are necessary, though SIZE, at .727, comes close. A medium-sized (or larger) protest movement is almost necessary for low level loyalty shifts. No condition is close to sufficient; LOSS scores highest, but only .222.

Table 6. Sufficiency and necessity matrix for low level loyalty shifts outcome

	Low level	ICP	PCP	LOSS	SIZE	NV	VIOL
VIOL	0.188	0.566	0.344	0.156	0.562	0.750	1.000
NV	0.094	0.476	0.375	0.094	0.562	1.000	0.375
SIZE	0.154	0.530	0.288	0.115	1.000	0.692	0.346
LOSS	0.222	0.513	0.444	1.000	0.667	0.667	0.556
PCP	0.182	0.427	1.000	0.121	0.455	0.727	0.333
ICP	0.121	1.000	0.314	0.103	0.615	0.680	0.404
Low level	1.000	0.492	0.545	0.182	0.727	0.545	0.545

I examine the configurations' sufficiency, again applying the .75 consistency threshold. Running this test in *fuzzy* produces a complex solution of five sets, which logically reduce to three. The solution consistency is .929, and total coverage .333. The results are in Table 7. At first glance it is evident that ICP is either absent or missing in all of the solutions, as expected. PCP is not always present; when it is absent, either LOSS, SIZE, and NV are present (with VIOL absent), or SIZE and VIOL are present (with LOSS and NV absent).

Table 7. Sufficient configurations for low level loyalty shifts outcome (full dataset)

	Coverage		
	Consistency	Raw	Unique
icp*pcp*LOSS*SIZE*Nv*viol	0.767	0.083	0.083
pcp*loss*SIZE*nv*VIOL	1.000	0.167	0.167
PCP*LOSS*SIZE*nv*VIOL	1.000	0.083	0.083
Total coverage = 0.333			
Solution consistency = 0.929			

I scope my dataset before interpreting the results further. For these cases, seven configurations consistent with sufficiency at .75 reduce to three, plus a set of two alternates. As shown in Table 8, the consistency is now 1.000, but the coverage improves very little. Overall though this is an improvement. ICP is again absent or missing in the configurations. PCP is often present; when it is absent, SIZE and VIOL are present, and LOSS and NV are absent. SIZE is almost always present. VIOL is present in every configuration – for low level shifts to occur, it is therefore important that a violent conflict is ongoing. This is interesting, especially since the factor was not statistically significant in my regression analyses. Perhaps VIOL provides the rank and file motivation or opportunity for disloyalty in the context of protests. In sum, it seems that low level loyalty shifts are likely under conditions of ongoing violent conflict along with either medium-sized (or larger) protests or personalist coup-proofing. Protest movement nonviolence and recent military loss do not have clear effects.

Table 8. Sufficient configurations for low level loyalty shifts outcome (reduced dataset)

	Coverage		
	Consistency	Raw	Unique
pcp*loss*SIZE*nv*VIOL	1.000	0.125	0.125
PCP*loss*size*Nv*VIOL	1.000	0.125	0.125
PCP*LOSS*SIZE*nv*VIOL	1.000	0.125	0.125
Total coverage = 0.375			
Solution consistency = 1.000			
And one of:			
icp*loss*SIZE*nv*VIOL			
icp*PCP*SIZE*nv*VIOL			

The findings support my expectations in some ways but not others. Low level shifts are likely to occur when protests are at least medium-sized and a violent conflict is ongoing. Perhaps the probable involvement of the rank and file or low ranking officers in such protests and conflict provides them the motivation and opportunity to shift loyalty. In terms of coup-proofing, the shifts are unlikely under institutional coup-proofing, and somewhat likely under personalist coup-proofing in the context of other conditions. Overall, the low coverage scores indicate this outcome might be partly explained by factors that I am not considering, that are perhaps less structural and even more context specific.

### Findings: No Low Level Loyalty Shifts

I show findings for the absence of low level loyalty shifts in Table 9, following an analysis with the theoretically informed conditions on the reduced set of cases. 27 configurations have consistency scores higher than .75. They reduce to eight, resulting in a solution with coverage of .948 and consistency of .926. In terms of insights, one configuration includes PCP and SIZE, but ICP, NV, and VIOL are also present. Low level loyalty shifts are unlikely to occur when PCP and SIZE are absent, or when they are



present along with other conditions. In the latter configurations, the cases may be higher level loyalty shifts.

Table 9. Sufficient configurations for no low level loyalty shifts outcome (reduced dataset)

	Consistency	Coverage	
		Raw	Unique
ICP*PCP*SIZE*NV*VIOL	1.000	0.022	0.022
icp*loss*size*viol	0.891	0.198	0.056
pcp*loss*SIZE*viol	1.000	0.196	0.109
LOSS*size*nv*VIOL	1.000	0.043	0.043
pcp*loss*NV	0.950	0.413	0.130
pcp*NV*viol	1.000	0.217	0.043
loss*NV*viol	0.905	0.413	0.027
loss*SIZE*NV	0.889	0.348	0.021
Total coverage = 0.948			
Solution consistency = 0.926			

### Findings: Fragmented High Level Shifts

Next up for analysis is fragmented high level shifts, and from the above I expect a combination of personalist coup-proofing, moderate ICP, and medium-sized or nonviolent protests to be sufficient. Personalist coup-proofing alone may be sufficient if it is accompanied by protests that are both medium-sized (or larger) and nonviolent. Accordingly, I assign ICP a score of 1 when the effective number of armed organizations is greater than 2.25, and SIZE a score of 1 when campaign per capita is larger than .65.<sup>214</sup> I first produce a sufficiency and necessity matrix (Table 10). NV is close to necessity, at .722, but does not meet the benchmark of .9. PCP has the highest

<sup>214</sup> For ICP, this is a higher threshold than previous calibrations. It indicates that on average, cases have more than one counterforce to the regular military.

consistency score, .242. After determining that no conditions are individually necessary or sufficient, I move on to assessing the configurations' sufficiency.

Table 10. Sufficiency and necessity matrix for fragmented high level loyalty shifts outcome

	Fragmented	ICP	PCP	LOSS	SIZE	NV	VIOL
VIOL	0.219	0.375	0.344	0.156	0.562	0.750	1.000
NV	0.203	0.266	0.375	0.094	0.562	1.000	0.375
SIZE	0.212	0.327	0.288	0.115	1.000	0.692	0.346
LOSS	0.222	0.333	0.444	1.000	0.667	0.667	0.556
PCP	0.242	0.242	1.000	0.121	0.455	0.727	0.333
ICP	0.200	1.000	0.320	0.120	0.680	0.680	0.480
Fragmented	1.000	0.278	0.444	0.111	0.611	0.722	0.389

At the consistency threshold of .75, the *fuzzy* program returns five configurations that reduce to four. They are shown in Table 11. The consistency of the solution is 1.000, and the coverage is .278. Somewhat surprisingly, PCP is not present in all of the configurations. VIOL may substitute for it, given that it is present in both configurations that PCP is absent. As expected, cases with PCP, SIZE, and NV (and absent ICP) are cases with fragmented high level shifts, but LOSS is present too, and the cases are few in number. The only configuration in which both forms of coup-proofing are present also has NV and VIOL and an absence of LOSS. While VIOL was not a statistically significant independent variable in Chapter Three, it seems to be an important condition here.

Table 11. Sufficient configurations for fragmented high level loyalty shifts outcome (full dataset)

	Consistency	Coverage	
		Raw	Unique
icp*pcp*LOSS*SIZE*NV*VIOL	1.000	0.056	0.056
icp*PCP*LOSS*SIZE*NV*viol	1.000	0.056	0.056
ICP*pcp*loss*size*nv*VIOL	1.000	0.056	0.056
ICP*PCP*loss*NV*VIOL	1.000	0.111	0.111
Total coverage = 0.278			
Solution consistency = 1.000			

Now I do the analysis with the scope conditions. However, because fragmented high level shifts so often occur in cases that have recently experienced military coups, I cannot drop cases according to that indicator. I instead add it as a condition for post-Cold War cases. This produces three configurations, with a consistency score of 1.000 and coverage of .375 (Table 12). COUP is present in every configuration. In the presence of COUP, the combinations of the other conditions are causally equivalent. Together, PCP, SIZE, and NV (and COUP, with LOSS absent) are sufficient for some fragmented high level shifts, as expected. Similar to the above, VIOL may substitute for PCP, and the presence of both forms of coup-proofing is combined with NV, VIOL, and COUP, and an absence of LOSS (as well as SIZE).

Table 12. Sufficient configurations for fragmented high level loyalty shifts outcome (reduced dataset)

	Consistency	Coverage	
		Raw	Unique
icp*PCP*loss*SIZE*NV*viol*COUP	1.000	0.125	0.125
ICP*pcp*loss*size*nv*VIOL*COUP	1.000	0.125	0.125
ICP*PCP*loss*size*NV*VIOL*COUP	1.000	0.125	0.125
Total coverage = 0.375			
Solution consistency = 1.000			

Lastly, I add OPP, to see if doing so might explain more cases. I do not expect it to be necessary for fragmented high level shifts, but it might substitute for campaign size and nonviolence in the presence of moderate coup-proofing. I keep COUP as a condition. Five configurations are consistent with sufficiency at .75, and five configurations are part of the reduction set shown in Table 13. The addition of OPP increases solution coverage by quite a lot, to .714. These results suggest that the forms of coup-proofing substitute for each other – fragmented high level shifts may occur under PCP or (moderate levels of) ICP, but at least one must be present. When both are present, so are conditions indicating the protest movement as an alternative. Recall though that SIZE here is measured broadly and refers to medium-sized (and larger) protests. Also, institutionalized opposition is present only when there has been a recent coup. Perhaps coups’ detrimental effects on military organizations outweigh the effects of an institutionalized opposition on military sources of authority that could otherwise generate united defections. As above, when PCP is absent, VIOL is present. This may indicate that ongoing violent conflict divides the military or fragments the military response in ways comparable to personalist coup-proofing.

Table 13. Sufficient configurations for fragmented high level loyalty shifts outcome (reduced dataset with additional condition)

	Consistency	Coverage	
		Raw	Unique
icp*PCP*loss*SIZE*NV*viol*COUP*OPP	1.000	0.143	0.143
ICP*pcp*loss*size*nv*VIOL*COUP*OPP	1.000	0.143	0.143
ICP*pcp*loss*size*NV*VIOL*coup*opp	1.000	0.143	0.143
ICP*PCP*loss*size*NV*VIOL*COUP*OPP	1.000	0.143	0.143
ICP*PCP*loss*SIZE*NV*viol*coup*opp	1.000	0.143	0.143
Total coverage = 0.714			
Solution consistency = 1.000			

### **Findings: No Fragmented High Level Shifts**

To assess the conditions under which fragmented high level shifts do not occur, I perform the steps with the main conditions (including COUP) on the reduced set of cases. This produces 28 solutions that reduce to 15, with a coverage of .821 and consistency of .979. The solution is complicated, but from Table 14 yields a few insights. PCP is mostly absent, but when it is present, it is often combined with ICP or LOSS, which I would expect to produce united defections (i.e. not fragmented high level). No configurations include the presence of PCP, SIZE, and NV, which also supports my expectations. Many are simply the absence of the main conditions – personalist coup-proofing (and its substitute, ongoing violent conflict) along with medium-sized (or larger), nonviolent protests.

Table 14. Sufficient configurations for no fragmented high level loyalty shifts outcome (reduced dataset)

	Coverage		
	Consistency	Raw	Unique
ICP*pcp*loss*size*NV*VIOL*COUP	1.000	0.018	0.018
ICP*pcp*LOSS*size*nv*VIOL*coup	1.000	0.018	0.018
ICP*pcp*LOSS*size*NV*viol*coup	1.000	0.018	0.018
ICP*PCP*loss*size*nv*viol*coup	1.000	0.018	0.018
ICP*PCP*LOSS*SIZE*NV*VIOL*coup	1.000	0.018	0.018
icp*pcp*SIZE*NV*viol*coup	1.000	0.071	0.018
PCP*loss*SIZE*nv*VIOL*coup	1.000	0.036	0.036
icp*PCP*LOSS*nv*VIOL*coup	1.000	0.036	0.036
ICP*pcp*loss*SIZE*nv*COUP	1.000	0.054	0.054
icp*pcp*loss*viol*coup	1.000	0.214	0.089
icp*pcp*loss*nv*viol	1.000	0.161	0.018
icp*loss*size*NV*viol	0.917	0.196	0.018
pcp*loss*SIZE*NV*coup	1.000	0.179	0.054
icp*loss*size*NV*coup	0.933	0.250	0.000
icp*loss*NV*VIOL*coup	1.000	0.179	0.018
Total coverage = 0.821			
Solution consistency = 0.979			

### Findings: United Defections

To finish, I analyze united defections. I expect them to occur under conditions of moderate to high levels of ICP (an effective number greater than 2.25), personalist coup-proofing, and large protests (campaign per capita greater than .7) that are nonviolent, with military loss and an institutionalized opposition combining or substituting in various ways. This follows from my argument that united defections, as the highest level of military loyalty shifts, are explained by major threats to the military's functional authority together with a protest movement that is committed to nonviolence and widely supported. I test for necessity and sufficiency among the individual conditions. As shown by the matrix in Table 15, NV and OPP score highest for necessity, at .643. In terms of

sufficiency, all conditions score fairly low, but the highest is PCP at .250, followed closely by ICP at .240.

Table 15. Sufficiency and necessity matrix for united defections outcome

	United	ICP	PCP	LOSS	SIZE	NV	OPP
OPP	0.170	0.283	0.415	0.075	0.377	0.642	1.000
NV	0.145	0.274	0.371	0.097	0.371	1.000	0.548
SIZE	0.212	0.242	0.273	0.152	1.000	0.697	0.606
LOSS	0.222	0.333	0.444	1.000	0.556	0.667	0.444
PCP	0.250	0.250	1.000	0.125	0.281	0.719	0.688
ICP	0.240	1.000	0.320	0.120	0.320	0.680	0.600
United	1.000	0.429	0.571	0.143	0.500	0.643	0.643

I test these conditions' combinations for consistency with sufficiency for united defections. Four configurations meet the .75 threshold, and they remain after performing the reduction. Overall, they have a consistency score of 1.000 and coverage of .357. At first glance and in contrast to fragmented high level, PCP is always present. ICP often is; when it is absent, LOSS (as an additional threat to military functional authority) and OPP or SIZE and NV are present. OPP and SIZE/NV are substitutable. These findings align with my expectations fairly well, but the configurations do not explain many cases.

Table 16. Sufficient configurations for united defections outcome (full dataset)

	Consistency	Coverage	
		Raw	Unique
icp*PCP*loss*SIZE*NV*opp	1.000	0.071	0.071
icp*PCP*LOSS*size*NV*OPP	1.000	0.071	0.071
ICP*PCP*loss*size*nv*OPP	1.000	0.143	0.143
ICP*PCP*LOSS*SIZE*NV*opp	1.000	0.071	0.071
Total coverage = 0.357			
Solution consistency = 1.000			

I examine the configurations' consistency scores on the reduced set of cases. This produces five configurations, with a fairly good coverage of .667, relative to those

previously. The findings in Table 17 are similar to the above. PCP is again present in every configuration, and when ICP is absent, LOSS and OPP are present or SIZE and NV are present. The most explanatory of the configurations (with a coverage score of .222) has both forms of coup-proofing and an institutionalized opposition; in this context, an institutionalized opposition substitutes for large and nonviolent protests. LOSS is present in some configurations.

Table 17: Sufficient configurations for united defections outcome (reduced dataset)

	Consistency	Coverage	
		Raw	Unique
icp*PCP*loss*SIZE*Nv*opp	1.000	0.111	0.111
icp*PCP*LOSS*size*nv*OPP	1.000	0.111	0.111
ICP*PCP*loss*size*nv*OPP	1.000	0.222	0.222
ICP*PCP*loss*SIZE*Nv*OPP	1.000	0.111	0.111
ICP*PCP*LOSS*SIZE*Nv*opp	1.000	0.111	0.111
Total coverage = 0.667			
Solution consistency = 1.000			

Lastly, I add the ongoing violent conflict (VIOL) condition as well as a condition for party regimes (PARTY) to see how they might combine with the others to produce united defections. On the smaller set of cases, the test for sufficiency produces eight configurations that reduce to six. Overall, they have a very high coverage score of .899, with consistency at 1.000 (Table 18). These conditions explain united defections very well, and combine in ways almost identical to above. Both forms of coup-proofing, large and nonviolent protests, and military loss (as well as ongoing violent conflict) are sufficient for united defections. All of these conditions need not be present, though; personalist coup-proofing combined with large and nonviolent protests also produce united defections, if there is no ongoing violent conflict. Institutional coup-



proofing is not necessary, but can produce united defections when personalist coup-proofing and an institutionalized opposition are present. United defections also occur in party regimes in the context of nonviolent protests, institutionalized opposition, and ongoing violent conflict.

Table 18. Sufficient configurations for united defections outcome (reduced dataset with additional conditions)

	Consistency	Coverage	
		Raw	Unique
icp*PCP*loss*SIZE*NV*viol*opp*party	1.000	0.111	0.111
icp*PCP*LOSS*size*nv*VIOL*OPP*party	1.000	0.111	0.111
ICP*PCP*loss*SIZE*NV*viol*OPP*party	1.000	0.111	0.111
ICP*PCP*LOSS*SIZE*NV*VIOL*opp*party	1.000	0.111	0.111
icp*pcp*loss*NV*VIOL*OPP*PARTY	1.000	0.222	0.111
ICP*PCP*loss*size*nv*OPP*party	1.000	0.222	0.111
Total coverage = 0.889			
Solution consistency = 1.000			

### Findings: No United Defections

The analysis of the absence of united defections results in 21 configurations that reduce to eight, shown in Table 19. The solution's coverage score is .886 and its consistency score is .975. Of the configurations, the two that are most explanatory (coverage of .273) include only one form of coup-proofing, an institutionalized opposition but small protests, and no loss or violent conflict. In no configurations are both forms of coup-proofing present, or one form and military loss with large, nonviolent protests/an institutionalized opposition. In sum, these findings support my expectations for cases unlikely to have united defections.

Table 19. Sufficient configurations for no united defections outcome (reduced dataset)

	Consistency	Coverage	
		Raw	Unique
icp*PCP*LOSS*SIZE*nv*opp	1.000	0.023	0.023
pcp*loss*SIZE*Nv*opp	1.000	0.091	0.091
pcp*LOSS*size*Nv*opp	1.000	0.045	0.045
ICP*pcp*size*nv*OPP	1.000	0.045	0.045
icp*PCP*loss*OPP	1.000	0.273	0.114
PCP*loss*size*Nv	1.000	0.250	0.091
icp*pcp*loss*size	0.923	0.273	0.182
icp*pcp*loss*nv	1.000	0.136	0.045
Total coverage = 0.886			
Solution consistency = 0.975			

### Conclusions

This chapter provides additional empirical support for my argument through application of a second analytic technique, one that is well-suited to my theoretical expectations and cases: QCA. I have now used multiple methods to assess the validity of my findings and reach tentative conclusions regarding my causal claims. In Ragin's terms, I have "explore[d] alternative ways of establishing a meaningful dialogue between ideas and evidence."<sup>215</sup> I am more confident in the results as a consequence, given that both QCA and regression analyses have strengths and weaknesses.

Using QCA in particular, I demonstrated that the outcomes of interest in this study cannot be explained by a single factor or even a single combination of factors. Military defections and loyalty shifts are complex phenomena. In the regression analyses, coup-proofing and protester characteristics independently affected loyalty shifts and varied in terms of the statistical significance of their associations. But as explanatory

<sup>215</sup> Charles C. Ragin, *The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1987), viii.

factors they also combine and substitute in different ways to affect overall military authority, as I would expect from my argument. I now have a better understanding of the causal processes that produce the outcomes, particularly in the medium-N set of cases.

More specifically, I confirmed that military sources of authority are important for explaining military loyalty shifts. General loyalty shifts, or defections, occur when the regime has threatened military functional authority and the protest movement or opposition is an acceptable alternative. Fewer threats to military functional authority may lead to low level shifts when the lower ranks are motivated – by personalist coup-proofing, or large protests – and there is opportunity because of an ongoing violent conflict and an absence of counterforces to monitor and punish disloyalty. Fragmented high level shifts are likely when a military with a recent history of coups or compromised organization faces threats to its functional authority, and the opposition is medium-sized or nonviolent protests or institutionalized. Finally, the highest level shifts, united defections, require greater threats to functional authority plus a large, nonviolent, or institutionalized opposition. Overall, the high consistency scores of the configurations confirm that these combinations are highly associated with the outcomes. But, the low coverage scores indicate there are cases that the conditions do not explain, and other factors that matter.

The combinations of conditions and their relations of necessity and sufficiency support my theoretical claims. I cannot infer causal relations from them, though, because I cannot assess causal processes using QCA. I also cannot account for those factors I did not measure quantitatively and cross-nationally, even though I was able to eliminate the influence of some extraneous factors by using a more comparable set of cases. Following

the next chapter and my quantitative analysis of the impact of types of loyalty shifts on democratization, I use three case studies to better establish the causal mechanisms linking the conditions and outcomes. I trace how forms of regime coup-proofing actually threaten military functional capabilities, and how the protest movement does or does not support overall military authority. In the context of the movement's challenge to the regime, the military shifts loyalty according to the level of threat to its authority.

## CHAPTER FIVE: ANALYZING THE IMPACT OF MILITARY LOYALTY SHIFTS ON DEMOCRATIZATION

In 1989, students, teachers, and civil servants in Benin began a pro-democracy strike that continued on-and-off for the next year. While a minority remained loyal to the authoritarian regime of President Mathieu Kerekou, large sections of the military removed their support. By the end of 1989, Kerekou was forced to agree to a National Conference, and in 1990, the body stripped him of his power and installed a new executive. At the start of 1991 the transitional government held successful elections, beginning a process of democratization.<sup>216</sup> Sudanese protesters were similarly successful in overthrowing autocrat President Muhammad Numeiri in 1985. Student protests were followed by a general strike and culminated in large demonstrations. The military's leadership shifted loyalty from the regime and then established a military council to oversee the transition. General elections were held a year later, but in 1989 Colonel Omar al-Bashir seized power and continues to rule as dictator.<sup>217</sup>

So far in this dissertation, I have focused on when and why militaries shift loyalty in response to anti-regime protest movements. The above examples and scholarly research demonstrate that military loyalty shifts frequently play an important role in such movements. The research also shows that successful movements can overthrow autocrats

---

<sup>216</sup> Mathurin C. Hounnikpo, "The Military and Democratization in Africa: A Comparative Study of Benin and Togo," *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 28, no. 2 (2000): 210-229.

<sup>217</sup> Kamal Osman Salih, "The Sudan, 1985-9: The Fading Democracy," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 28, no. 2 (1990): 199-224.

and usher in regime change and democracy. But when does military support for anti-regime protests also support democratization as it did in Benin? Beyond the link between military defections and movement outcomes, we know little about how military responses to anti-regime protests matter for future political outcomes.

In this chapter, I present an argument for the effects of types of military loyalty shifts on post-protest movement democracy. It draws on the theoretical puzzle I identified in the introduction, or the conflicting expectations over the role of the military in politics. The literature on civil-military relations claims that civilian control of the military is necessary for democratization. This would lead us to expect a politically active military – such as the one in Benin – to have damaging effects on democracy. The democratization literature, particularly that on pacted transitions, finds that military involvement (through cooperation with other elites) can help to bring about democracy. Yet that is not always the case, as this failed in Sudan. While the civil resistance literature has demonstrated the importance of military defections for the success of anti-regime campaigns, it has yet to focus on whether this works to support political change.

Following these literatures' key insights, I argue military loyalty shifts in response to anti-regime protests can be supportive of political change, but that some types are more supportive of democratization than others. Loyalty shifts by a unified military organization allow the military leadership to influence the democratic transition and challenge the establishment of civilian control. Loyalty shifts that are fragmented indicate a weaker military that will have less influence over the transition, making post-campaign democracy more likely. This logic follows from my explanation of military loyalty shifts

that draws in part on the relations between authoritarian regimes and militaries. Regime control strategies may threaten military functional authority as well as weaken the military organization. Regimes' use of coup-proofing thus affects both the likelihood and quality of the military's loyalty shifts, with implications for civilian control and democratization following mass, nonviolent protests.

I use this theoretical framework to generate two hypotheses that I test through statistical analyses of my quantitative data. I find support for my expectations, even after controlling for campaign outcomes and other determinants of democratization, as well as partially accounting for possible endogeneity between military response and democratization. In what follows, I review the literature on the role of militaries in democratic change, present my argument for the effects of types of military loyalty shifts, and describe my empirical strategy and the evidence the analyses provide. I close with a discussion of this research's implications and shortcomings, in part as a transition to my examination of the causal mechanisms underlying the relationship between military shifts and democratization using the case studies in the next chapters.

### **Understanding the Military's Role in Democratization**

In earlier chapters, I developed an argument for why militaries shift loyalty in response to anti-regime protest movements. I leveraged my general argument to also explain types of military loyalty shifts, following my contention that militaries defect or shift loyalty in various ways. My motivation for explaining military loyalty shifts is the demonstrated link between their presence during protests and the success of such protests in overthrowing authoritarian regimes. Implicit in this link and in my discussion of them is that militaries' support of pro-democracy protesters also supports democratization. In

the introduction I questioned whether civilian control is a necessary precursor to democratic change, given the findings of the pact and civil resistance literatures. In this chapter I directly interrogate the claim that loyalty shifts support democratization, but first review the competing expectations of the literatures and the theoretical puzzle they generate.

The military is an important actor in processes of political change, and so has had a prominent position in research on democratization. Much of this research came about as a result of the Third Wave of democratization across Latin American and Southern Europe, where “...scholars inquired when and under what circumstances leaders of military regimes would abdicate and initiate a transition to democracy.”<sup>218</sup> Yet frequent military seizures of power through coups and ongoing military prerogatives leading to democratic backsliding over the same period led scholars of civil-military relations to focus on the deleterious effects militaries can have on new democracies. The impact of the military on democratization outcomes thus remains uncertain; as Kuehn notes in his recent introduction to new research on the topic, it can be midwife or gravedigger of democracy.<sup>219</sup>

Militaries can be supportive of democratization through elite-led agreements, according to research on Third Wave democratic transitions. O’Donnell and Schmitter,<sup>220</sup>

---

<sup>218</sup> David Kuehn, “Midwives or Gravediggers of Democracy? The Military’s Impact on Democratic Development,” *Democratization* 24, no. 5 (2017): 785.

<sup>219</sup> *Ibid.*, 783-800.

<sup>220</sup> Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).



Przeworski,<sup>221</sup> Burton, Gunther, and Higley,<sup>222</sup> and Mainwaring,<sup>223</sup> among others focus on the processes leading from a breakdown in the authoritarian regime to negotiations for political change leading to a new democratic system. These analyses stress the interactions among elite actors during the contingent and uncertain transition from authoritarian rule, in which the military was often heavily involved, to democracy. In successful transitions, elites strategically decide to pursue liberalization, opening the way for democratization.

The military was an important elite actor in many Third Wave transitions and scholarly explanations of them. Many of the countries that underwent transitions had been military regimes, and the military's decision to give up power to civilians was necessary for political change. In other, non-military regimes, militaries had the capacity and resources to affect democratization. On the basis of this research, prior to a transition, the military must be included in or tolerant of an authoritarian regime's decision to liberalize. During the transition, the military, as a powerful institution with coercive capabilities, may exercise greater influence than other, pro- or anti-democracy actors.<sup>224</sup>

Because the military is such a key player, its support of democratization can be crucial for political change. For instance, one form of particularly successful Third Wave

---

<sup>221</sup> Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

<sup>222</sup> Michael G. Burton, Richard Gunther, and John Higley, "Introduction: Elite Transformations and Democratic Regimes," in *Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe*, eds. John Higley and Richard Gunther (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 1-37.

<sup>223</sup> Scott Mainwaring, "Brazilian Party Underdevelopment in Comparative Perspective," *Political Science Quarterly* 107, no. 4 (1992): 677-707.

<sup>224</sup> Guillermo O'Donnell, "Transitions, Continuities, and Paradoxes," *Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective* (1992): 17-56.

transitions involved agreements among the military and elites that made democratization more acceptable by guaranteeing the military's future interests.<sup>225</sup> In some cases, these "pacts" between military softliners and the civilian opposition led to democracy.<sup>226</sup> In others, "...military leaders took the lead, at times in response to opposition and popular pressure, in bringing about the change in regime."<sup>227</sup> More generally, this research suggests that the military can support democratization by initiating political change and making transition processes possible.

Yet, as a powerful actor with organizational interests, the military can also threaten new democracies and democratic consolidation. This is a key claim of the civil military relations literature. In democracies, civilians must control government policy decisions, including those concerning the military.<sup>228</sup> Military intervention in politics challenges civilian policymaking. Military involvement in democratic transitions, in particular, interferes with the establishment of civilian control and impedes civilian-led democratization.<sup>229</sup> A more normative claim of the literature follows: the role of the

---

<sup>225</sup> Terry Lynn Karl, "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America," *Comparative Politics* 23, no. 1 (1990): 1-21; O'Donnell and Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*.

<sup>226</sup> Josep M. Colomer, "Transitions by Agreement: Modeling the Spanish Way," *The American Political Science Review* 84, no. 4 (1991): 1283-1302.

<sup>227</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, "How Countries Democratize," *Political Science Quarterly* 106, no. 4 (1991): 584.

<sup>228</sup> Felipe Aguero, "Legacies of Transitions: Industrialization, the Military, and Democracy in South America," *Mershon International Studies Review* 42, no. 2 (1998): 383-404.

<sup>229</sup> Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*; David Pion-Berlin, ed., *Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: New Analytical Perspectives* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001); Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds, and Anthony Forster, eds., *Democratic Control of the Military in Postcommunist Europe: Guarding the Guards* (London: Palgrave, 2002).

military during and after the transition should be minimized so that civilians are able to create and manage the institutions and rules of a new democratic regime.

Military involvement in politics takes various forms, from direct military intervention in politics, with coups as the extreme, to military influence over political decisionmaking.<sup>230</sup> In all, a lack of civilian control generally means that the military is not secondary to democratically-elected leaders and their appointed officials. As Chambers et al. explain, civilian control is "...that distribution of decision-making power in which civilians alone have authority to decide on national policies and their implementation."<sup>231</sup> A lack of civilian control threatens all aspects of democracy, including elections, political rights, civil rights, and horizontal accountability.<sup>232</sup> This logic suggests, counter to the above, that a politically active military will be harmful to democratization.

In sum, democratization and civil-military relations scholars point to the importance of militaries in politics and political change, but reach different conclusions regarding their impact on democracy. Militaries sometimes act to bring about a transition from the authoritarian regime, but in doing so can exercise influence over the transition processes and outcomes.<sup>233</sup> Specifically, in the transition period, powerful militaries can

---

<sup>230</sup> Aurel Croissant, David Kuehn, Paul W. Chambers, and Siegfried O. Wolf, "Beyond the Fallacy of Coup-Ism: Conceptualizing Civilian Control of the Military in Emerging Democracies," *Democratization* 17, no. 5 (2010): 950-75; Alfred Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988).

<sup>231</sup> Chambers, Croissant, Kuehn, and Wolf, "Beyond the Fallacy of Coup-ism: Conceptualizing Civilian Control of the Military in Emerging Democracies," 955.

<sup>232</sup> *Ibid.*, 960.

<sup>233</sup> Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone*.

expand their autonomy, claim institutional privileges, exercise decision-making authority, veto particular policies – and remain outside civilian control going forward.<sup>234</sup> A military may support democratization by partnering with pro-democracy actors, but its active role during the transition can hurt the civilian control that is critical to consolidating democracy.

### Military Political Roles in the Context of Anti-Regime Protest Movements

The civil resistance literature has shown the military can play a supportive role in a different form of political change, and this dissertation aims to understand when this is more likely. Classic analyses of democratic transitions pay little attention to civil society or nonelite actors, but recent research has focused on the importance of civil resistance for democratization with military loyalty shifts as a key determinant of campaign success. Transitions driven by civil society are more effective at promoting democracy than those controlled by elites.<sup>235</sup> While both violent and nonviolent action can bring down authoritarian regimes, nonviolent action is more likely to force regime change that leads to democracy.<sup>236</sup> Lastly, nonviolent movements have a positive effect on short- and long-term democracy regardless of campaign success.<sup>237</sup>

---

<sup>234</sup> Muthia Alagappa, ed., *Military Professionalism in Asia: Conceptual and Empirical Perspectives* (East-West Center, 2001); Aurel Croissant, “From Transition to Defective Democracy: Mapping Asian Democratization,” *Democratization* 11, no. 5 (2004): 156-178.

<sup>235</sup> Petter Grahl Johnstad, “Nonviolent Democratization: A Sensitivity Analysis of How Transition Mode and Violence Impact the Durability of Democracy,” *Peace and Change* 35, no. 3 (2010): 464-82; Adrian Karatnycky and Peter Ackerman, *How Freedom is Won: From Civil Resistance to Durable Democracy* (New York, NY: Freedom House, 2005).

<sup>236</sup> Mauricio Rivera Celestino and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, “Fresh Carnations or All Thorn, No Rose? Nonviolent Campaigns and Transitions in Autocracies,” *Journal of Peace Research* 50, no. 3 (2013): 385-400.

<sup>237</sup> Jan Teorell, *Determinants of Democratization: Explaining Regime Change in the World, 1972-2006* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan, *Why Civil*

To recall from earlier, military support through defections from the authoritarian regime makes the success of nonviolent campaigns 46 times more likely.<sup>238</sup> In marked contrast, military defections have no effect on the success of violent movements.<sup>239</sup> However, despite defections' importance, the link between them and other political outcomes is uncertain. The insights from the democratization and civil-military relations literatures lead to conflicting expectations. Militaries can support democratization in cooperation with other elites. They are also crucial to the success of anti-regime protest movements; yet, in these contexts, democracy is "...only one potential outcome."<sup>240</sup> In what follows, I draw on my explanation of types of military loyalty shifts to develop a logic for how the types differently impact democratization. Some forms of regime control threaten the sources of military authority and compromise the military organization. Loyalty shifts therefore reflect to some extent military organizational strength or weakness, with implications for the military's role in politics.

### **Authoritarian Regime Control and the Quality of Military Loyalty Shifts**

When militaries respond to mass nonviolent protests by shifting support to the protesters, their disloyalty to the regime may be supportive of political change and democratization. But military defections and successful anti-regime movements do not always end in democracy. Understanding this variation requires attention to my explanation of types of military loyalty shifts, and particularly my focus on military

---

*Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2011).

<sup>238</sup> Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*, 22.

<sup>239</sup> *Ibid.*, 23.

<sup>240</sup> Kuehn, "Midwives or Gravediggers of Democracy? The Military's Impact on Democratic Development," 786.

sources of authority. To review: I argue that militaries are more likely to shift loyalty when the authoritarian regime, through coup-proofing, has threatened military functional capacities and the military's functional claims to authority. Militaries may be able to rely on their delegated authority, but mass protests challenge regime legitimacy, and this source of military authority, too.

Authoritarian regimes that control their militaries using coup-proofing strategies threaten military functional authority. These strategies also affect the military organization, which helps to explain the types of military loyalty shifts – in particular, whether loyalty shifts involve high-ranking officers, and whether they are united or fragmented. Forms of coup-proofing that structure the military primarily on the basis of personalized control weaken the military organization, making low level and fragmented high level shifts more likely than united defections. Forms such as institutional coup-proofing that increase military discontent but do not divide the military organization increase the likelihood of united defections, especially when the protest movement is large. I find support for this argument in Chapters Three and Four.

The ways militaries respond to anti-regime protest movements, ranging from loyalty to united defections, is therefore explained by threats to military authority and reflects the impact of regime control strategies on the military organization. A military that responds to protests with high level but fragmented shifts is relatively weak. This type of disloyalty may make both campaign success and democratization more likely, even though it amounts to military involvement in politics outside the regime's delegated authority in the civil-military relations literature's sense of civilian control. A military that shifts loyalty as a united military organization will support protesters without

positively impacting democratization, because the military leadership will be more able to influence the transition and, in line with the classic literature's expectations, hurt civilian democracy.

These expectations follow the logic of my earlier argument and are grounded in the literatures reviewed above. In general, militaries that shift loyalty to the protesters support political change by virtue of removing backing from the authoritarian regime, often leading to its collapse. Loyalty shifts that go beyond the rank and file to involve significant parts of the military at higher levels mean most of the military is in favor of regime change. These shifts make campaign success more likely,<sup>241</sup> and similar to cases of military-opposition pacts, may provide the conditions for democratic transition.<sup>242</sup> Thus, democratization will be more likely when militaries shift significant support from the regime to the protesters.

*Hypothesis 1: High level military loyalty shifts positively impact democratization.*

Conversely, military involvement in regime change may harm democratization because it is political involvement outside of civilian control. Civilian actors need space during transitions to operate free from military interference. When a military has influence over the transition, the establishment of civilian control by newly-elected civilians will be more difficult.<sup>243</sup> As Aguero writes, "...transitions have decisively influenced the varying degrees to which the militaries retain or are given prerogatives in

---

<sup>241</sup> Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*.

<sup>242</sup> Karl, "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America."

<sup>243</sup> Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds., *Civil-Military Relations and Democracy* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone*.

the successor regime and, in turn, the nature of civil-military relations in the new democracies.”<sup>244</sup> Without civilian control, these new democracies will struggle to consolidate and may regress.<sup>245</sup>

Thus, types of high level loyalty shifts likely vary in their impact on democratization. Those that are directed over a united organization indicate a relatively strong military that, while supportive of protesters, may be able to involve itself in the transition in ways that challenge the establishment of civilian control. Democratization may still occur, through the efforts of civilian protesters and opposition elites, but military support through its response will have less impact. In contrast, high level, fragmented loyalty shifts indicate a relatively weak military organization that is both supportive of political change and easier for the new civilian authorities to control.

*Hypothesis 2:* High level, united military defections have less of an impact on democratization than high level, fragmented military loyalty shifts.

This argument breaks with the existing civil-military relations literature and posits that militaries, though outside of civilian control, may support democratization by supporting popular, nonviolent calls for political change. Yet it also acknowledges the challenges a powerful military can pose to democratization, and makes clear that not all military loyalty shifts have the same post-protest impacts. I test these hypotheses below, using my data on military responses and regression techniques. I attempt a few strategies to tease out the loyalty shifts’ independent impacts on measures of democracy. I find

---

<sup>244</sup> Aguero, “Legacies of Transitions: Institutionalization, the Military, and Democracy in South America,” 385.

<sup>245</sup> Chambers, Croissant, Kuehn, and Wolf, “Beyond the Fallacy of Coup-ism: Conceptualizing Civilian Control of the Military in Emerging Democracies,” 960.



some evidence for Hypothesis 2, or the positive effects of fragmented high level shifts. These shifts' effects become less clear when I control for other determinants of democratization, but remain greater than those of united defections or other shifts.

### **Empirical Strategy**

Earlier, I made the case for disaggregating military defections into types of military loyalty shifts, in order to better understand the military organization's involvement. I continue that discussion here by claiming that the way scholars have so far conceptualized and measured military defections is a barrier also to understanding the impact of militaries post-protests. Broadly categorizing military shifts of support as defections masks important variation in the likely role of a military in the political transition. Thus, I use my data on military responses and the *type shift* variable as the main explanatory factor in this analysis.


As in Chapter Three, my universe of cases is all maximalist anti-regime, nonviolent campaigns from 1946 to 2015 as identified by MEC, less those that occurred in democracies, Soviet Republics, non-independent countries, or countries without militaries. I again show the results for all cases in the Appendix. The unit of analysis is country-campaign, which produces 112 observations. As shown in Table 1, 52.68% of the campaigns in the dataset were successful at achieving regime change according to MEC's definitions.

Table 1. Anti-regime campaign success

Success	Freq.	Percent
Unsuccessful	53	47.32
Successful	59	52.68
Total	112	100.00

To review, *type shift* indicates the military response to the overall anti-regime protest movement. A military can respond with loyalty to the regime by defending it. A military can be neutral, and neither actively support the regime nor shift support to the protesters. Parts of a military's rank and file or low ranking officers can shift loyalty. A military can shift loyalty at high levels but as a fragmented organization. Or, a military can shift loyalty through united defections. For this analysis, I keep the loyal and neutral categories separate, to consider the possibility that a military's non-involvement in the protests impacts democratization. I show the frequencies of these categories across the cases in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Frequencies of categories of *type shift*



As shifts of support from the regime, all military responses besides loyalty and neutrality might be expected to help bring about campaign success. I illustrate the associations between categories of *type shift* and campaign outcomes in Table 2. Success is more likely for some responses than others. Success does not necessarily result in democracy, but there is evidence that nonviolence has a positive effect on democracy

regardless of campaign outcome.<sup>246</sup> In any case, I control for campaign *success* in my analyses to ensure the relationships between loyalty shifts and democratization do not depend on this outcome.

Table 2. Frequency of campaign outcomes per *type shift*

<i>type_shift</i>	Unsuccessful	Successful
Loyal	19 (35.85%)	6 (10.17%)
Neutral	19 (35.85%)	16 (27.12%)
Low Level	13 (24.53%)	3 (5.08%)
Fragmented High Level	1 (1.89%)	19 (32.2%)
United Defections	1 (1.89%)	15 (25.4%)
Total	53 (100%)	59 (100%)

In evaluating the effects of categories of *type shift*, I include a number of other factors that might also affect democratization and could confound my results. Though many possible determinants of democracy have been proposed, I lean on the results of Teorell.<sup>247</sup> He tests social, economic, international, and agency-related factors and identifies those that are the most robust predictors of democratization. Some of these predictors act as triggers to democratization; one such trigger is peaceful demonstrations, the context of this study. It is the slower-moving variables that have the most explanatory power, though, so I concentrate on these as controls.

Impediments to democratization include large geographic size (*area*, the log of a country's area in 1000s of square kilometers), and economic dependency on foreign trade (*trade*, or the sum of exports and imports of goods and services expressed as a fraction of GDP). I calculate both from World Bank data. Other impediments are Muslim

<sup>246</sup> Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*; Rivera Celestino and Gleditsch, "Fresh Carnations or All Thorn, No Rose? Nonviolent Campaigns and Transitions in Autocracies."

<sup>247</sup> Teorell, *Determinants of Democratization: Explaining Regime Change in the World, 1972- 2006*.

populations, driven by the Arab region and accounted for by *region* dummies, and *fuel exports* (also from the World Bank). Sustainers of democratization include socioeconomic modernization and economic freedom. I do not replicate Teorell's measures of these variables, but use GDP per capita from the World Bank (supplemented by Gleditsch),<sup>248</sup> a proxy for development that is associated with democracy.<sup>249</sup>

I include a *Cold War* dummy to capture changes in the international system over time. The end of the Cold War marked a new normative commitment to democracy by the international community, resulting in increased pressures for the spread and institutionalization of democratic forms of government and against coups and other forms of military intervention.<sup>250</sup> I also include a control for the country's Polity IV score in the year prior to the campaign (*Dem Level*).

I measure my dependent variable of democracy in two ways: the country's Polity IV score in year five after the campaign (*politypost5*), and the change in its Polity IV score from the year prior to the campaign to year five after (*politychange5*). Polity scores range from -10 to 10. In the first measure, greater values indicate more democratic in absolute terms, while in the second, greater values indicate more democratic relative to pre-campaign levels. Together they provide a sense of the explanatory factors' effects on

---

<sup>248</sup> As in Chapter Three, I primarily use the World Bank's data, but consult Gleditsch on cases where the World Bank is missing information. I detail the process by which I rescale the Gleditsch data in Chapter Three, footnote 29. The World Bank, *World Development Indicators* (Oxford: Oxford University Press); Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, "Expanded Trade and GDP Data," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46, no. 5 (2002): 712-24.

<sup>249</sup> John B. Longdegran and Keith T. Poole, "Does High Income Promote Democracy?," *World Politics* 49, no. 1 (1996): 1-30.

<sup>250</sup> Clayton L. Thyne and Jonathan M. Powell, "Coup d'etat or Coup d'Autocracy? How Coups Impact Democratization," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 12, no. 2 (2016): 192-213.

overall democratization and ensure that the effects are not limited to one measure of democracy. As further robustness checks, I include tests using a binary measure of democracy (with democracy defined as Polity scores of six or higher) and continuous measures using V-Dem's polyarchy measure in the Appendix.<sup>251</sup> The results generally hold up, though as below, the effects of the shifts (in particular, Fragmented High Level) are much stronger in the absence of controls.

Tables 3 and 4 contain summary statistics for the dependent and control variables.

Table 3. Summary statistics: continuous dependent and control variables

Variable	N	Mean	Std Dev	Min	Max
politypost5	110	1.6455	6.2142	-9	10
politychange5	110	5.9000	6.4764	-11	19
V-Dem post	97	0.4466	0.2386	0.0722	0.9025
V-Dem change	97	0.2014	0.2426	-0.3494	0.7731
Dem Level (Polity)	112	-4.2321	4.0758	-10	5
Dem Level (V-Dem)	111	0.2543	0.1304	0.0718	0.6949
GDP per capita	108	7.6995	1.0900	5.2843	10.3414
Trade	87	66.7387	43.1989	0.2177	280.3610
Fuel Exports	70	15.7901	26.6837	0.0000	99.9134
Area	105	12.7033	1.3880	9.9451	16.0550

<sup>251</sup> Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Joshua Krusell, Anna Lührmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Constanza Sanhueza Petrarca, Johannes von Römer, Laura Saxer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, and Steven Wilson, "V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v7.1," *Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project* (2017).

Table 4. Summary statistics: binary dependent and control variables

Variable	0	1
dempost5	62	48
Cold War	48	64
Asia	82	30
Americas	93	19
Africa	89	23
Europe	94	18
FSU	107	5
MENA	95	17

#### Exogenous Methods and Results

I start by running basic tests of the relationship between categories of *type shift* and democracy, with some models that include *success* and the other determinants of democracy as controls. Here, I am in effect assuming that military loyalty shifts are exogenous to democratization. I enter in *type shift* as a set of dummy variables, each representing a category or type of military loyalty shift. Loyal serves as the omitted baseline category. The resulting coefficients are then the effect of the other categories of *type shift* on democracy, relative to loyalty. I use OLS regression and calculate robust standard errors with cases clustered by country, to account for the fact that some countries experienced multiple campaigns over the period of analysis.

In Table 5, Model 1 reports the results of a simple regression between categories of *type shift* and *politypost5*, controlling for *Dem Level*. Fragmented High Level has a positively, statistically significant effect on democracy, while the other military responses (including United Defections) do not. This supports Hypothesis 2 but not 1. In Model 2, which includes control variables, the effect of Fragmented High Level disappears. The number of observations also dramatically decreases. I drop *Trade* and *Fuel Exports* for

Model 3 because neither is associated with democracy at a statistically significant level and their data has many missing observations. Here, Fragmented High Level is again positive and statistically significant. None of the other categories are statistically significant, though United Defection's (and Neutral's) coefficient is positive.

Table 5. *type shift* and democratization measured as *politypost5*

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
Neutral	1.7100	(1.4720)	-0.8090	(1.7620)	0.2720	(1.3640)
Low Level	0.4760	(2.1180)	-0.3510	(2.5560)	-0.5260	(1.8340)
Fragmented	6.752***	(1.6580)	2.6190	(2.8080)	3.991*	(1.9590)
United	2.5510	(1.5530)	-0.1030	(2.3060)	0.8760	(1.9120)
Dem Level (Polity)	0.528***	(0.1260)	0.3240	(0.2120)	0.462*	(0.1850)
Success			3.807*	(1.6970)	3.889**	(1.3690)
GDP per capita			-0.0100	(1.3730)	0.8510	(0.8040)
Trade			0.0050	(0.0160)		
Fuel Exports			0.0180	(0.0320)		
Area			-0.7700	(0.5250)	-0.5070	(0.4280)
Cold War			2.8260	(2.2690)	3.5820	(1.8100)
Asia			2.0640	(3.9500)	4.167*	(2.0370)
Americas			4.7410	(4.0600)	5.434*	(2.5230)
Africa			-3.6240	(5.3690)	0.2700	(2.0260)
FSU			-3.0490	(4.8220)		
MENA			-3.4200	(4.8130)	-1.9090	(2.3880)
Europe					3.0120	(3.1330)
Constant	1.7440	(1.1300)	9.2770	(14.7560)	-3.4630	(8.7430)
Observations	110		67		101	
R <sup>2</sup>	0.199		0.408		0.454	
AIC	700.685		417.053		617.554	
BIC	716.888		454.533		656.781	

Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001

The results are similar in Table 6, when the dependent variable is *politychange5*.

Fragmented High Level has a positive and statistically significant effect on democracy, relative to loyalty. Its effect is no longer statistically significant but still positive in the

presence of control variables in Model 2, and returns to significance in Model 3. In response to anti-regime protests, then, military loyalty shifts that are high level and fragmented positively impact democratization, while military neutrality, low level shifts, and united defections do not. These findings support Hypothesis 2 – high level military loyalty shifts differ in their impacts on democratization. A significant loyalty shift by a weaker military organization is more likely to bring about democracy because of the implications it has for the protest movement as well as civilian control and democratic consolidation.



Table 6. *type shift* and democratization measured as *politychange5*

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
Neutral	1.710	(1.472)	-0.809	(1.762)	0.272	(1.364)
Low Level	0.476	(2.118)	-0.351	(2.556)	-0.526	(1.834)
Fragmented	6.752***	(1.658)	2.619	(2.808)	3.991*	(1.959)
United	2.551	(1.553)	-0.103	(2.306)	0.876	(1.912)
Dem Level	-0.47***	(0.126)	-0.676**	(0.212)	-0.538**	(0.185)
Success			3.807*	(1.697)	3.889**	(1.369)
GDP per capita			-0.010	(1.373)	0.851	(0.804)
Trade			0.005	(0.016)		
Fuel Exports			0.018	(0.032)		
Area			-0.770	(0.525)	-0.507	(0.428)
Cold War			2.826	(2.269)	3.582	(1.810)
Asia			2.064	(3.950)	4.167*	(2.037)
Americas			4.741	(4.060)	5.434*	(2.523)
Africa			-3.624	(5.369)	0.270	(2.026)
FSU			-3.049	(4.822)		
MENA			-3.420	(4.813)	-1.909	(2.388)
Europe					3.012	(3.133)
Constant	1.744	(1.130)	9.277	(14.76)	-3.463	(8.743)
Observations	110		67		101	
R <sup>2</sup>	0.262		0.598		0.519	
AIC	700.685		417.053		617.554	
BIC	716.888		454.533		656.781	

Standard errors in parentheses


\* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001

To assist with interpretation of these results, I calculate the predicted values of *politychange5* at each category of *type shift* (holding the other covariates at their mean values) and plot them in Figure 2. This graph more clearly demonstrates the substantive impacts of Fragmented High Level versus the other military responses on democracy.

The predicted value of *politychange5* is between 4.66 and 5.46 (the maximum possible

value being 20) for the categories of Loyal, Neutral, and Low Level, reflecting the positive impact overall of civil resistance on democracy. It increases to approximately 9 when militaries shift loyalty through Fragmented High Level shifts, compared to 6 for United Defections. In substantive terms, both high level shifts positively impact democratization, but in line with Hypothesis 2 the effects of Fragmented High Level shifts are greater.

Figure 2. Predicted values of *politychange5* at different categories of *type shift*



### Endogenous Methods and Results

Importantly, the above models do not account for the possibility of endogeneity between military loyalty shifts and democratization. Military loyalty shifts may emerge in contexts where democratization is already underway, meaning that military responses to anti-regime protests have no real effect on democratization beyond campaign outcome. I

want to be confident that shifts, and particularly fragmented high level shifts, do not only occur in conditions where democracy is already present or developing.

To deal with potential endogeneity, I first set up a model that includes both determinants of democratization and determinants of military loyalty shifts, based on the findings of Chapter Three. To review, these latter factors include institutional coup-proofing (*ICP*), personalist coup-proofing (*PCP*), and protest size or campaign per capita (*Size*). A coup in the last five years was also an important predictor of Fragmented High Level shifts (*Coup*).<sup>252</sup> Testing the hypotheses with this model allows me to control for any effects they may have on democratization, not limited to their relationship with the types of loyalty shifts. Table 7 displays the results for *politypost5* (Model 1) and *politychange5* (Model 2).

---

<sup>252</sup> I include summary statistics of these variables for this analysis in the Appendix.

Table 7. *type shift* and democratization, with determinants of *type shift*

	Model 1		Model 2	
Neutral	1.1410	(1.3890)	1.4140	(1.3890)
Low Level	-1.2770	(2.1250)	-1.2770	(2.1250)
Fragmented	2.6690	(1.9280)	2.6690	(1.9280)
United	0.5140	(2.1570)	0.5140	(2.1570)
Dem Level (Polity)	0.600***	(0.1340)	-0.40***	(0.1340)
ICP	-0.9750	(3.1080)	-0.9750	(3.1080)
PCP	3.1330	(1.7070)	3.1330	(1.7070)
Size	5.3200	(5.6530)	5.3200	(5.6530)
Coup	0.4080	(1.1290)	0.4080	(1.1290)
Success	3.800**	(1.1370)	3.800**	(1.1370)
GDP per capita	0.7960	(0.6710)	0.7960	(0.6710)
Area	-0.1800	(0.6280)	-0.1800	(0.6280)
Cold War	2.0570	(1.7600)	2.0570	(1.7600)
Asia	6.200*	(2.6680)	6.200*	(2.6680)
Americas	7.526*	(3.2230)	7.526*	(3.2230)
Africa	0.8720	(2.2180)	0.8720	(2.2180)
Europe	7.692*	(3.0010)	7.692*	(3.0010)
MENA	-0.3710	(2.6350)	-0.3710	(2.6350)
Constant	-10.2250	(12.0940)	-10.2250	(12.0940)
Observations	89		89	
R <sup>2</sup>	0.526		0.607	
AIC	537.971		537.971	
BIC	585.255		585.255	

Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001

Unfortunately, none of the categories of *type shift* have a statistically significant relationship with democracy when accounting for factors related to the regime, protest movement, or structural determinants of democratization. Neutral, Fragmented High Level, and United Defections have positive coefficients. However, when I drop *Success*, the effect of Fragmented High Level shifts returns, as shown in Table 8. United

Defections also has a positive effect on democracy, but it is not statistically significant, and Fragmented High Level's coefficient is larger. This supports Hypothesis 2.

Table 8. *type shift* and democratization, with determinants of *type shift* and no success

	Model 1		Model 2	
Neutral	1.6100	(1.4800)	1.6100	(1.4800)
Low Level	-1.6290	(2.1730)	-1.6290	(2.1730)
Fragmented	5.053**	(1.8520)	5.053**	(1.8520)
United	2.8140	(1.8300)	2.8140	(1.8300)
Dem Level (Polity)	0.611***	(0.1450)	-0.389**	(0.1450)
ICP	-1.3120	(3.2730)	-1.3120	(3.2730)
PCP	2.8110	(1.7980)	2.8110	(1.7980)
Size	7.6940	(5.8950)	7.6940	(5.8950)
Coup	0.0900	(1.1680)	0.0900	(1.1680)
GDP per capita	0.6490	(0.7690)	0.6490	(0.7690)
Area	-0.0620	(0.6540)	-0.0620	(0.6540)
Cold War	2.5800	(1.9260)	2.5800	(1.9260)
Asia	5.0620	(3.1610)	5.0620	(3.1610)
Americas	7.668*	(3.5560)	7.668*	(3.5560)
Africa	0.1320	(2.7180)	0.1320	(2.7180)
Europe	7.656*	(3.3970)	7.656*	(3.3970)
MENA	-2.0060	(3.0740)	-2.0060	(3.0740)
Constant	-9.8300	(12.6480)	-9.8300	(12.6480)
Observations	89		89	
R <sup>2</sup>	0.465		0.556	
AIC	546.713		546.713	
BIC	591.509		591.509	

Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001

Given these findings, I move on to a two-stage model in an attempt to more directly account for potential endogeneity in the relationship between Fragmented High Level and democracy. In the first stage, I set up an equation to determine Fragmented High Level shifts. Again, I draw on the results of Chapter Three. I use multinomial logit regression with *type shift* as the dependent variable, but limit my interest and the result to

the relationship between this type of loyalty shift and its determinants. The model is a good predictor of Fragmented High Level, as shown in Table 9.

Table 9. First stage model, for Fragmented High Level instrument

PCP	4.326***	(1.2720)
ICP	6.250**	(2.2710)
Size	5.3660	(2.9570)
Nonviolence	-1.3270	(0.9260)
Viol Conflict	1.952**	(0.7030)
Dem Level (VDem)	-3.3910	(5.3100)
Incumbent	2.317*	(1.0890)
GDP per capita	2.293*	(0.9240)
Soldier Quality	-2.784*	(1.1750)
Coup	5.526**	(1.8430)
Constant	-26.314**	(9.7680)

I save the predicted probability generated from this first equation and use it as an instrument for my second equation, an OLS regression with *politychange5* as the dependent variable.<sup>253</sup> I also include a range of covariates between the models.<sup>254</sup> Table 10, Model 1 includes *Success*, and Fragmented High Level is positively but not significantly associated with democratization (its p-value is .078). Model 2 does not include *Success* and here Fragmented High Level's instrument has a positive and statistically significant effect on the outcome. This supports Hypothesis 2 while partially

<sup>253</sup> I attempt to use CDSIMEQ from Keshk 2003 (Maddala 1983), which tests a two-equation system with a dichotomous endogenous variable and a continuous dependent variable. However, because calculating the instrument for Fragmented High Level requires modeling it relative to the other categories of *type shift*, I must use a separate equation. Standard errors should be interpreted with caution. Omar M.G. Keshk, "CDSIMEQ: A Program to Implement Two-Stage Probit Least Squares," *The Stata Journal* 3, no. 2 (2003): 157-67; G.S. Maddala, *Limited-Dependent and Qualitative Variables in Econometrics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). The correlation between the predicted probability for Fragmented High Level and a dummy variable for Fragmented High Level is .5135.

<sup>254</sup> I do not include Dem Level and GDP per capita because I use these covariates to determine the instrument for Fragmented High Level.

allaying endogeneity concerns.<sup>255</sup> This type of loyalty shift appears to have an independent impact on democracy.

Table 10. Second stage model, instrument and democratization (*politychange5*)

	Model 1		Model 2	
Pr(Fragmented)	3.2410	(1.8080)	5.365*	(2.1500)
Success	4.842***	(1.1130)		
Area	-0.0550	(0.5460)	0.1600	(0.6590)
Cold War	0.8080	(1.8650)	0.8760	(1.8570)
Asia	-2.2070	(2.2810)	-3.8850	(2.3180)
Africa	-6.127*	(2.4070)	-6.568*	(2.5010)
Europe	1.5350	(2.9390)	1.2460	(3.0690)
FSU	-7.745**	(2.6970)	-8.097*	(3.1640)
MENA	-8.522***	(2.2890)	-10.43***	(2.3020)
Constant	7.2320	(8.7100)	7.7790	(10.0900)
Observations	88		88	
R <sup>2</sup>	0.515		0.396	
AIC	533.537		550.735	
BIC	558.31		573.031	

Standard errors in parentheses  
\* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001

In summary, this evidence generally supports my argument and hypotheses. High level military loyalty shifts can positively impact democratization, even when controlling for campaign outcome and other determinants of democracy. The type of loyalty shift matters, though: full defections by a united military organization have less of an impact than high level shifts by a fragmented military. This is because united defections allow the military leadership to influence the democratic transition and challenge the establishment of civilian control, compared to militaries that are disunited and weaker

<sup>255</sup> However, this result does not hold in models with *politypost5* as the dependent variable. Thus, this two-stage technique is an imperfect means of addressing endogeneity.

and will likely have less influence. These findings challenge the civil-military relations literature's claims that a politically active military is harmful for democratization, while supporting its overall intuition that civilian control is necessary for democratic consolidation.

### **Conclusions**

This analysis confirms the importance of military loyalty shifts for both anti-regime protest movement outcomes and post-protest democratization. Through it, I support the claim I have implicitly been making throughout the dissertation: that military support for anti-regime protests can support democratization. I add to the insights of the existing literatures on the military's role in politics, as well as my earlier argument regarding the effects of strategies of regime control on the military's authority and organization. The forms authoritarian regime control of the military takes impacts military responses to protests, which in turn impact democratization. I also further demonstrate the value of considering types of loyalty shifts, because differences in the extent and quality of military organizations' loyalty shifts have varying impacts on democracy.

These findings speak to the literatures on civil-military relations and democratization. The military may play a positive role in democratization, especially when it partners with other elites or offers support to nonelites. During mass, nonviolent challenges to an authoritarian regime, the military's role is often crucial – both in terms of campaign success and democratization. This runs counter to the conventional wisdom among civil-military scholars that a military acting outside of its authority delegated by civilians is problematic for democracy. There are ways a military may involve itself in



political transitions that challenge the establishment of civilian control and democracy, though. This analysis provides insights as to when this is more likely in the context of protest movements. Authoritarian regime control of the military impacts the nature of military support for protesters, and thus the likelihood of democratic civilian control and democratic consolidation. I examine these relationships in more detail and as causal processes through the case studies in the next chapters.

## **CHAPTER SIX: MALI – AUTHORITY THREATS, UNITED DEFECTIONS, AND MILITARY-LED DEMOCRATIZATION**

In Mali, major protests against President Moussa Traore began in fall 1990. They ramped up in January 1991, shortly after a conflict between the national government and a Tuareg rebel movement ended in negotiations. The Malian military's poor performance during this conflict owed to the effects of Traore's coup-proofing strategies on military capabilities and put its functional authority in question. In the context of threats to the military's functional authority, large, nonviolent protests challenged the regime as the source of the military's delegated authority. My argument would expect high level military loyalty shifts in response. Given the Malian military's united defection, my argument would also expect it to have influence over the post-Traore transition, challenging the establishment of democratic civilian control.

This chapter uses the Malian case to demonstrate the logic of my argument for high level united defections and their impacts on democratization. In what follows, I show that the Traore regime exercised control over the military such that when faced with mass protests, the military shifted loyalty. In particular, Traore's use of institutional and personalist coup-proofing and the effects his control had on military effectiveness during conflict led the military to fully defect in response to large anti-regime protests. The military's disloyalty was responsible for the protest movement's success but put military leaders in a position to control the initial post-campaign transition period. The Malian

military acted outside regime control and in support of protesters and political change, yet created some challenges for post-protest democratization.

### **Traore's Regime and Control of the Military**

In 1991, the Malian military was under the control of a former military regime whose civilianized, one-party rule had little legitimacy. Moussa Traore came to power in a 1968 military coup against President Modibo Keita. Traore's regime transitioned to military-backed civilian rule over the next decade. A new constitution was approved in 1974, and Traore created the Democratic Union of the Malian People (UPDM) party in 1979.<sup>256</sup> He was elected president in June 1979, receiving 99 percent of the vote,<sup>257</sup> and reelected in 1985.<sup>258</sup> In spite of the UPDM, he exercised mostly personal authority, ruling largely through decree<sup>259</sup> and "...control[ing] all aspects of Malian life."<sup>260</sup>

Traore controlled the military with the potential threat it posed against him in mind. It was President Keita's poor management of this threat that had led to his downfall. Traore and other officers seized power partly in response to Keita using the military to serve his regime and ideology. For example, Keita set up Communist party

---

<sup>256</sup> J. Tyler Dickovick, "Legacies of Leftism: Ideology, Ethnicity, and Democracy in Benin, Ghana and Mali," *Third World Quarterly* 29, no. 6 (2008): 1127.

<sup>257</sup> "Mali Human Rights Practices, 1993," *U.S. Department of State* January 31, 1994, [http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/democracy/1993\\_hrp\\_report/93hrp\\_report\\_africa/Mali.html](http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/democracy/1993_hrp_report/93hrp_report_africa/Mali.html).

<sup>258</sup> N. Sandomirsky, "Mali, Republic of: Traore, Moussa," In *Encyclopedia of African History*, edited by K. Shillington (London, UK: Routledge, 2004).

<sup>259</sup> N.C. Brockman, "Traore, Moussa," in *African Biographical Dictionary* (Amenia, New York: Grey House Publishing, 2006).

<sup>260</sup> Sandomirsky, "Mali, Republic of: Traore, Moussa."

sections within military units and employed them for development projects.<sup>261</sup> He also created a People's Militia that acted as his personal guards. It numbered approximately 9,000 by late 1968 and received paramilitary training.<sup>262</sup>

The military resented its position in Keita's regime. In particular, it resented the Militia and considered it a political move out of line with military interests.<sup>263</sup> In the military's view, the Militia was set up "...to neutralize the army's technical monopoly of violence."<sup>264</sup> Prior to the coup, Traore and other junior officers expressed their displeasure regarding the Militia to Keita and requested he either disband it or put it under army control. They claimed it was "...creating mass insecurity and discontent through intimidation."<sup>265</sup> Keita did not heed their advice, and soon after seizing power, the military council headed by Traore liquidated the MP as well as the *Comite National de Defense de la Revolution*, Keita's Communist party body.<sup>266</sup>

Traore understood these sources of military discontent when he took power, yet structured the military primarily to secure his rule. Following early military unrest, Traore used his rising position in the anti-Keita coup coalition to purge those who

---

<sup>261</sup> Miles D. Wolpin, "Dependency and Conservative Militarism in Mali," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 13, no. 4 (1975): 603.

<sup>262</sup> *Ibid.*, 601.

<sup>263</sup> Nicole Ball, "The Military in Politics: Who Benefits and How," *World Development* 9, no. 6 (1981): 574.

<sup>264</sup> S.J. Baynham, "The Military in Africa," *Africa Insight* 15, no. 4 (1985): 279.

<sup>265</sup> Wolpin, "Dependency and Conservative Militarism in Mali," 610.

<sup>266</sup> *Ibid.*, 611.

disagreed with him, replacing them with loyalists.<sup>267</sup> According to later writings by retired officers, he regularly imprisoned members of the military suspected of disloyalty.<sup>268</sup> He engaged in institutional coup-proofing, dividing the Republican Guard, or “Red Berets”, from the regular army “Green Berets”. The Red Berets were outside the army chain of command and answered directly to Traore.<sup>269</sup>

These strategies protected Traore but did not provide for military interests. Despite high security expenditures (in part to fund the Red Berets), the living conditions of military personnel were poor.<sup>270</sup> Rank and file soldiers frequently went unpaid. His weakening of the military and the military hierarchy through personalist coup-proofing created tensions between senior officers and the rank and file, and fears of mutiny.<sup>271</sup> Though the Traore regime remained in power, military discontent was evident, with multiple coup attempts reported during the 1980s.<sup>272</sup>

The effects of Traore’s control on military capabilities and their implications for military functional authority became clear in its performance against Tuareg rebels. The northern conflict, though ongoing, flared up in June 1990. Poorly armed members of the

---

<sup>267</sup> Miles D. Wolpin, “Legitimizing State Capitalism: Malian Militaries in Third-World Perspective,” *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 18, no. 2 (1980): 287-8.

<sup>268</sup> Alioune Sow, “Nervous Confessions: Military Memoirs and National Reconciliation in Mali,” *Cahiers d’Etudes Africaines* 50, no. 197 (2010): 79.

<sup>269</sup> Juan Carlos Castilla Barea, “The Malian Armed Forces Reform and the Future of EUTM,” *Instituto Espanol de Estudios Estrategicos* (2013): 3.

<sup>270</sup> Anatole Ayissi and Nouhoum Sangare, “Mali,” in *Budgeting for the Military Sector in Africa*, <http://books.sipri.org/files/books/SIPRI06OmHu/SIPRI06OmHu06.pdf>.

<sup>271</sup> Andrew Clark, “From Military Dictatorship to Democracy: The Democratization Process in Mali,” *Journal of Third World Studies* 12, no. 1 (1995): 210.

<sup>272</sup> “Mali Human Rights Practices.”

People's Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MPLA) attacked a police station, seeking to free rebels that had been captured by Malian security forces earlier in the year. The attack was successful, and the rebels stole weapons and vehicles.<sup>273</sup>

As the conflict continued, the military was forced to become more engaged, using arrests and violence.<sup>274</sup> By the final months of 1990, though, the MPLA had won "...a number of resounding victories over the Malian army."<sup>275</sup> This was despite the rebels numbering only around 200, and the army deploying 4000 soldiers, or two-thirds of its total strength, to the region.<sup>276</sup> The military did not have sufficient resources, equipment, or overall capacity to defeat the Tuaregs.<sup>277</sup>

The military's ineffectiveness was largely tied to its organizational weakness, which was a product of Traore's personalist control and support of forces counter to the military. The military leadership had problems directing increasingly unreliable units stationed in the north.<sup>278</sup> The rank and file were not certain to follow orders from the military hierarchy. Intra-military disagreements between soldiers and officers "...significantly weakened their loyalty and collective strength."<sup>279</sup> The military was not

---

<sup>273</sup> Baz Lecocq and Georg Klut, "Tuareg Separatism in Mali," *International Journal* 68, no. 3 (2013).

<sup>274</sup> Thomas Krings, "Marginalization and Revolt Among the Tuareg in Mali and Niger," *GeoJournal* 36, no. 1 (1995): 60.

<sup>275</sup> Lecocq and Klut, "Tuareg Separatism in Mali."

<sup>276</sup> Ibid.

<sup>277</sup> Nancy Anna, "Violent Conflicts and Civil Strife in West Africa: Causes, Challenges, and Prospects," *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development* 3, no. 1 (2014).

<sup>278</sup> Kare Lode, "The Peace Process in Mali," *Security Dialogue* 28, no. 4 (1997): 413.

<sup>279</sup> Kristine Hauge Storholt, "Lessons Learned from the 1990-1997 Peace Process in the North of Mali," *International Negotiation* 6 (2001): 335.

powerful or cohesive, and so unable to carry out its functional role – providing for a secure society.

Because of the link between military capabilities and regime control, the Tuareg conflict strained the regime-military relationship. “Continuous losses produced exhaustion and resentment on the part of the army, which...could not successfully continue the military struggle.”<sup>280</sup> As a result, the military stopped supporting the government’s efforts in the area.<sup>281</sup> The Tuaregs, while not an especially formidable threat to the state, had resisted military defeat. In the process, the military had suffered losses to military personnel and reputation. According to public opinion, the army had given up.<sup>282</sup>

The Traore regime signed a ceasefire in January 1991 that gave northern Mali some autonomy.<sup>283</sup> At that point, victory was unlikely because the regime “...had no control over the army.”<sup>284</sup> Further, a matter of greater urgency was growing anti-Traore protests in the capital. Traore needed to move elite troops from the north to Bamako to defend his regime.<sup>285</sup> The ceasefire was then part of a decision to “...focus on efforts to hold on to power.”<sup>286</sup> It also became another source of discontent for the military: “It was

---

<sup>280</sup> Ibid., 335.

<sup>281</sup> Ibid., 335.

<sup>282</sup> Lode, “The Peace Process in Mali,” 413.

<sup>283</sup> Lecocq and Klut, “Tuareg Separatism in Mali.”

<sup>284</sup> Storholt, “Lessons Learned from the 1990-1997 Peace Process in the North of Mali,” 335.

<sup>285</sup> Lecocq and Klut, “Tuareg Separatism in Mali.”

<sup>286</sup> Storholt, “Lessons Learned from the 1990-1997 Peace Process in the North of Mali,” 335.

widely believed that [the signing of the peace agreement] was done so the military could be turned on the increasingly restless population... As well as resenting this role, the military felt slighted by the speedy settlement with the Tuaregs.”<sup>287</sup>

Traore moved to negotiate in part to secure his rule, but the ceasefire had the effect of further undermining his popular legitimacy. The agreement was reached with little input from many northern communities, or the political opposition.<sup>288</sup> It was far from an acceptable resolution to the conflict, for either the larger Malian population or the military. Both “...were enraged by the pledges of the agreements and perceived the concessions made to the Tuaregs as a threat to the integrity of the country.”<sup>289</sup> Traore sought to keep the details of the agreement secret, knowing the “special status” for the Tuaregs would be controversial. As expected, protests broke out as details of the agreement were leaked.<sup>290</sup>

In sum, the conflict served to make the regime’s threats to military functional authority especially clear, putting the military’s delegated and functional authority in tension. Traore’s coup-proofing had damaged military capabilities, decreasing military effectiveness in conflict and threatening military functional authority. Further, he ended the conflict partly to delegate some authority to the military to end the growing popular protests against it. The challenge to the regime’s legitimacy also challenged the

---

<sup>287</sup> Jonathan Manthorpe, “Another Family Autocracy Falls,” *Edmonton Journal*, March 27, 1991.

<sup>288</sup> Jose Luengo-Cabrera, “Symptoms of an Enduring Crisis: Prospects for Addressing Mali’s Conflict Catalysts,” *Africa Policy Journal* 8 (2012): 11.

<sup>289</sup> Ibid.

<sup>290</sup> Lode, “The Peace Process in Mali,” 413.



legitimacy of the military's delegated authority, in the context of already diminished military functional authority.

### **Anti-Traore Protests and the Military's Response**

The failure of the Traore regime to support Mali's territorial integrity only further challenged its claims to authority. The UPDM had been unable to solve many of the country's problems over the previous decade, and "...very early on, Malians began to question its legitimacy."<sup>291</sup> Though initially Traore himself had been popular, corruption undermined his rule. It was well known that his family and those close to him were benefiting from power.<sup>292</sup> Groups began to demand multi-partyism in 1990, but the regime refused to make reforms.<sup>293</sup> Opposition took the form of demonstrations and strikes and escalated in 1991. On January 21, the extent of the opposition to Traore became clear; hundreds of students rioted in Bamako after authorities banned marches calling for multiparty democracy.<sup>294</sup>

Traore took a hardline stance in response to the unrest, offering no concessions. He asserted control over the situation by reshuffling his cabinet and putting some of his military supporters in charge of the Ministry of Justice and Ministry of the Interior.<sup>295</sup> The Interior Minister, General Sekou Ly, had previously served in the position but left

---

<sup>291</sup> Margaret A. Novicki, "Interview: Soumana Sako, Managing the Transition," *Africa Report* 36, no. 5 (1991): 49.

<sup>292</sup> Jane Turriffin, "Mali: People Topple Traore," *Review of African Political Economy* 52 (1991): 98.

<sup>293</sup> Margaret A. Novicki, "Interview: Soumana Sako, Managing the Transition," *Africa Report* 36, no. 5 (1991): 49.

<sup>294</sup> "World Peru Debt Relief Sought," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch News*, January 23, 1991.

<sup>295</sup> Jane Turriffin, "Mali: People Topple Traore," *Review of African Political Economy* 52 (1991): 100.

due to rumors of corruption. His first tenure was marked by the severe suppression of strikes by teachers and students in 1979 and 1980.<sup>296</sup> This move thus signaled Traore would again use repression if needed.

The regime's reaction to the January demonstrations encouraged a renewed challenge to the regime in mid-March.<sup>297</sup> The protests required security force involvement, and at this point, the military seemed loyal to Traore and willing to repress on his orders. On March 22, soldiers fired on protesters in Bamako, killing at least 22, wounding hundreds, and setting off widespread rioting. Following this violent episode, Traore indicated he was willing to discuss the protesters' grievances, but declared alleged violence on the part of the protesters unjustified. He announced a state of emergency and imposed a curfew in an attempt to tamp down the situation.<sup>298</sup>

The next day, March 23, saw more military repression and a new stage in the anti-Traore movement. Large groups of women marched in the streets of Bamako to protest the previous day's killings. Soldiers shot and killed five of them, then chased the rest and other demonstrators into a building and set it on fire, killing another 65.<sup>299</sup> Such egregious and indiscriminate violence shocked Malians and observers around the world. It is unclear whether the regime or military leadership ordered the killings. In response,

---

<sup>296</sup> "Human Rights Group Accuses Mali of Torturing Children," *The Associated Press* [London], January 29, 1991.

<sup>297</sup> Mark Huband, "Mali's Traore Overthrown in Putsch," *United Press International*, March 26, 1991.

<sup>298</sup> Michelle Faul, "Soldiers Fire on Protesters in Mali, Kill 22," *The Associated Press*, March 22, 1991.

<sup>299</sup> Michelle Faul, "Witnesses: Troops Fire on Protesters, Block Hospitals," *The Associated Press*, March 25, 1991.

though, the opposition demanded Traore resign, because he “...had no moral right to remain as president of the country”<sup>300</sup> after such violence on his behalf.

Traore agreed to talks with opposition leaders and lifted the state of emergency and curfew. He remained confident in his position, at least partly because he believed he had the support of the army. He told a radio station that he would not step down from power, instead urging calm from the protesters so that the security forces could stop using lethal force.<sup>301</sup>

The military’s loyalty was not absolute, however. So far, military support of the regime through repression had not ended the popular challenge. The opposition, including the National Union of Malian Workers and students, called for more demonstrations on March 25. 45,000 people took to the streets, and for the first time in four days, troops did not fire on the protesters.<sup>302</sup> The unrest challenged the military’s interest in order and functional authority, but was due to Traore’s refusal to resign. The leaders of seven civil society associations had the day before released a statement threatening an indefinite strike until Traore left power.<sup>303</sup> More repression may have ended the protests, but would have further compromised military delegated authority – the ultimate source being the population.

---

<sup>300</sup> Margaret A. Novicki, “Interview: Soumana Sako, Managing the Transition,” *Africa Report* 36, no. 5 (1991): 50.

<sup>301</sup> Faul, “Witnesses: Troops Fire on Protesters, Block Hospitals.”

<sup>302</sup> Michelle Faul, “Thousands Strike to Demand President’s Resignation,” *The Associated Press*, March 24, 1991.

<sup>303</sup> “Mali President Said Captured by Troops,” *The Associated Press*, March 25, 1991.

Importantly, the protesters were committed to nonviolence, large in size, and diverse in support, indicating they might be an alternative source of military authority. In the later stages of the protest movement, the opposition set up an umbrella group labeled the Committee for the Coordination of Opposition (CCAOD). It brought together students, trade unionists, opposition politicians, and human rights activists. Earlier, the Alliance for Democracy in Mali (ADEMA), a major opposition organization, had proclaimed itself a political party. It had strong, broad-based support in both urban and rural areas.<sup>304</sup> At the protests' height, tens of thousands of people were demonstrating against the regime.<sup>305</sup> The regime was facing a major challenge, would likely need military support to withstand it.

On March 26, military leaders opted to preserve the military's functional authority by shifting loyalty to the protesters. A group of officers led by Lieutenant Colonel Amadou Toumani Toure (ATT) informed a human rights activist and representative of the opposition that they had arrested Traore.<sup>306</sup> ATT was commander of a paratrooper battalion and former head of the Red Berets.<sup>307</sup> Later that day, he explained the military's loyalty shift to a press conference, saying, "We just did what the people wanted... We

---

<sup>304</sup> Clark, "From Military Dictatorship to Democracy: The Democratization Process in Mali," 212.

<sup>305</sup> Faul, "Soldiers Fire on Protesters in Mali, Kill 22."

<sup>306</sup> "Mali President Said Captured by Troops."

<sup>307</sup> Chris Simpson, "Politics-Mali: Ex-Military Leader Favored to Win Elections," *Global Information Network*, May 2002.

completed what they started.”<sup>308</sup> The arrest largely had the support of the rest of the military.<sup>309</sup>

The operation to arrest Traore involved a small number of high ranking officers. However, no members or factions of the military remained loyal to Traore or expressed disagreement with ATT’s decision. It does not seem that the rank and file or low ranking officers shifted loyalty prior to Traore’s arrest, but their resentments towards him were well known and mutiny rumors may have spurred ATT to act. As popular opposition to the regime increased, security forces tasked to respond “...had to be constantly monitored and frequently replaced.”<sup>310</sup> Traore’s weakening of the military organization did not prevent it from defecting in full, given the great threats to its sources of authority.

Rather, the Malian military responded to the anti-regime protests according to my argument’s expectations regarding threats to military authority and military loyalty shifts. In the military’s view, Traore was no longer able to keep the peace – either in the capital, or the north.<sup>311</sup> According to media reports, the military was especially affected when Traore’s orders for tanks and soldiers on the streets of Bamako resulted in massive loss of life.<sup>312</sup> Continued loyalty would have meant further threats to military functional authority from Traore’s control and the unrest for which his increasingly illegitimate rule

---

<sup>308</sup> Remi Oyo, “West Africa: Change and Conflict,” *IPS-Inter Press Service*, March 27, 1991.

<sup>309</sup> Turriffin, “Mali: People Topple Traore,” 98.

<sup>310</sup> Sow, “Nervous Confessions: Military Memoirs and National Reconciliation in Mali,” 79.

<sup>311</sup> “President Arrested in Mali Takeover,” *The Toronto Star*, March 27, 1991.

<sup>312</sup> Mark Huband, “Army Seizes Power in Mali After Up to 170 Die in Riots,” *The Guardian*, March 25, 1991.

was to blame. Instead, the military supported the protest movement as an alternative. In the days following, military leaders committed to their new source of delegated by authority by issuing an apology to representatives of the opposition for the atrocities soldiers had committed against the protesters.<sup>313</sup>

The impacts of Traore's control on military functional capabilities were especially clear following the Tuareg conflict. Traore was unable to prevent the military from acting against him to preserve its functional authority, even with the use of institutional coup-proofing. ATT, a former commander of the Red Berets – the force tasked with guarding the president – led the defections. In fact, ATT may have used his ties to the Red Berets and access to the regime they gave him to mount the arrest.<sup>314</sup> Traore's counterforces did not secure his regime, and generated further military discontent. And despite Traore's weakening of the military, these control strategies combined with the Tuareg conflict and the large and nonviolent protests led to united defections.

Additional implications of the military's concern with restoring its functional authority were evident in its actions after Traore's arrest, offering further support for my argument. It moved to return order to the country, by closing Mali's borders and international airport. It also imposed a dusk-to-dawn curfew, and with the civilian opposition appealed for calm in the streets. Violence in the aftermath claimed the lives of 59 people – but most of the dead were alleged looters, killed by soldiers.<sup>315</sup> ATT and the

---

<sup>313</sup> Gerald Bourke, "Mali Army Deposes President," *The Independent*, March 27, 1991.

<sup>314</sup> Andrew McGregor, "Red Berets, Green Berets," *Terrorism Monitor* 11, no. 4 (2013).

<sup>315</sup> "Strikers Return to Work in City Marred by Debris from Riots, Coup," *The Associated Press*, March 27, 1991.

united military organization had supported the anti-Traore protesters by protecting its sources of authority. Its loyalty shift had a less clearly positive impact on democratization during the transition.

### **Military Authority and Democratization Outcomes**

The military remained united in the period following Traore's arrest, allowing the leadership to take decisive control of the situation. The military quickly arrested all of Traore's ministers. However, it did not arrest any army chiefs, even those involved in repression.<sup>316</sup> It then took the lead of the transition by setting up a National Reconciliation Council (NRC) of 17 army officers, some of whom had been very close to Traore. These included an aid, Lieutenant Colonel Oumar Dialloa, and the director of the Defense Ministry, Lieutenant Colonel Cheikh Oumar Diarra.<sup>317</sup> This further signaled a united military leadership whose discontent was with the Traore regime and not along military divisions.

The NRC's plans for the transition were initially unclear. The officers stated they were going to replace Traore's "bloodthirsty and corrupt regime" with a multiparty democracy.<sup>318</sup> They also met with pro-democracy leaders, promising to cooperate with them. Yet a lack of details led to pressure from the CCAOD over military intentions and civilian involvement.<sup>319</sup> As a result, 10 officers and 15 representatives of the political

---

<sup>316</sup> Mark Hubard, "Malian Pro-Democracy Activists Demand Role in Government," *United Press International*, March 28, 1991.

<sup>317</sup> "Strikers Return to Work in City Marred by Debris from Riots, Coup."

<sup>318</sup> "Military Overthrows Mali Dictator, Promises Democracy," *The Associated Press*, March 25, 1991.

<sup>319</sup> P.J. Imperator, "Mali: Downfall of a Dictator," *Africa Report* 36, no. 4 (1991): 26.

organizations formed a new body, the Transition Committee for the Wellbeing of the People (CTSP). It held a national conference from July 29 to August 12, during which it developed a constitution and other governing documents.<sup>320</sup> The new constitution was adopted by referendum in January 1992.<sup>321</sup>

Throughout this period, there was concern about the military's role in the democratization processes, and whether it would accept rule by a new civilian government. The CTSP included civilians, but ATT remained in control as president. In a late August 1991 interview with Soumana Sako, interim and civilian prime minister, Sako stated:

...the military is coming out of a period of 23 years in which it exercised power, and we are now asking them, during this period of transition, to prepare to give up power to civilian, democratically-elected politicians. This situation obviously doesn't please all the soldiers, officers, and junior officers.<sup>322</sup>

For the time being, the transitional government had a military head of state, ATT, and civilian head of government, Sako. Problems had been avoided because, according to Sako, "...there [was] perfect harmony between the two."<sup>323</sup> The goal was that the army would respect the upcoming elections and then return to the barracks.<sup>324</sup>

---

<sup>320</sup> Novicki, "Interview: Soumana Sako, Managing the Transition," 50.

<sup>321</sup> Sophia Moestrup, "The Role of Actors and Institutions: The Difficulties of Democratic Survival in Mali and Niger," *Democratization* 6, no. 2 (1999): 178.

<sup>322</sup> Novicki, "Interview: Soumana Sako, Managing the Transition," 51.

<sup>323</sup> *Ibid.*, 51.

<sup>324</sup> *Ibid.*, 50.



The transition ended fairly successfully with parliamentary and presidential elections in 1992, and ATT's relinquishing of power two months later.<sup>325</sup> ADEMA won a majority of legislative seats and Alpha Omar Konare, leader of ADEMA, won the presidency.<sup>326</sup> It did not take long for public dissatisfaction with the new government to develop, especially given continued economic problems. This new unrest led to worry about military intervention, with open fears of a possible coup in 1994.<sup>327</sup> New challenges followed in 1997, when the opposition boycotted a second round of elections after the first had been canceled over poor organization.<sup>328</sup> These tensions threatened the consolidation of the civilian, democratic regime.

The military did not directly hurt consolidation nor formally return to politics during this period, even though its leadership had been united in disloyalty. This owed largely to continued civilian pressure against military intervention, as well as the military hierarchy's ability to prevent coup attempts.<sup>329</sup> Military leaders retained political influence, however, and ATT in particular re-entered politics when he ran for and won the 2002 presidential election.<sup>330</sup> ATT promised throughout his campaign that if elected he would release Traore, who had been in prison since his arrest. Traore was released

---

<sup>325</sup> Simpson, "Politics-Mali: Ex-Military Leader Favored to Win Elections."

<sup>326</sup> Moestrup, "The Role of Actors and Institutions: The Difficulties of Democratic Survival in Mali and Niger," 178.

<sup>327</sup> "Economic Woes Shake Mali's Democracy," *The Christian Science Monitor*, March 14, 1991.

<sup>328</sup> Moestrup, "The Role of Actors and Institutions: The Difficulties of Democratic Survival in Mali and Niger," 180.

<sup>329</sup> Novicki, "Interview: Soumana Sako, Managing the Transition," 50.

<sup>330</sup> Simpson, "Politics-Mali: Ex-Military Leader Favored to Win Elections."

days before ATT took office.<sup>331</sup> Civilian-led democracy was further destabilized in March 2012 when ATT's term was cut short by a coup, partly in response to his government's failed efforts against a new Tuareg rebellion.<sup>332</sup> As one analyst writes, "Ironically, for many Malians the only way to get democracy back on track was a coup d'état..."<sup>333</sup> The intervention established the continued role of the military in the country's political trajectory and put the future of civilian control in question.

### Conclusions

By 1991, the Malian military had a long history of involvement in politics, often taking the form of repression against unarmed civilians. In fact, it was known for its record of human rights abuse. It had used brutal force to repress student-led anti-government demonstrations in 1980,<sup>334</sup> and in July 1990, engaged in indiscriminate violence against Tuareg rebels as well as non-combatants.<sup>335</sup> It also killed protesters during the 1991 uprising.

In the end, however, the military in 1991 supported democratic change by shifting loyalty from the Traore regime to the protest movement. This response was not due to a change of heart or a new normative commitment to democracy by the military, but rather its concern with its sources of authority. Traore's coup-proofing threatened military

---

<sup>331</sup> "Mali Ex-Ruler Rejects Pardon," *BBC News*, May 30, 2002.

<sup>332</sup> Adam Nossiter, "Soldiers Overthrow Mali Government in Setback for Democracy in Africa," *The New York Times*, March 22, 2012.

<sup>333</sup> Susanna D. Wing, "Mali: Politics of a Crisis," *African Affairs* 112, no. 448 (2013): 479.

<sup>334</sup> "Mali Human Rights Practices."

<sup>335</sup> Tor A. Benjaminsen, "Does Supply-Induced Security Drive Violent Conflicts in the African Sahel," *Journal of Peace Research* 45, no. 6 (2008): 830.

functional authority by reducing its effectiveness, which was especially evident through conflict with the Tuareg rebels. The mass protests against Traore then challenged his legitimacy and reduced military delegated authority. In this context, the military played a supportive role in political change by preserving its functional authority and defecting to the protesters.

This case study demonstrates that a politically active military can support pro-democracy protesters and political change, yet challenge civilian-led democratization. Thus it both develops and confirms claims from the civil-military relations literature. The Malian military's disloyalty to the Traore regime was crucial to the success of the protest movement. Further, it was Traore's forms of control over the military that helped to produce this outcome. Because the military organization was united in its defection, however, the military leadership was able to involve itself in the transition process and democratic politics. This was particularly notable in ATT's 2002 election and subsequent pardoning of Traore, and culminated in the coup of 2012.

## **CHAPTER SEVEN: BANGLADESH – AUTHORITY THREATS, FRAGMENTED SHIFTS, AND CIVILIAN-LED DEMOCRATIZATION**

In December 1990, President Hussain Muhammad Ershad of Bangladesh faced mass protests that required he call on the military for support. While Ershad had exerted some control over the faction-ridden military during his time in power, he did so by establishing personal ties of loyalty based on cronyism. This control threatened military functional capabilities by weakening the military organization. The protests that first developed in October 1987 were large and nonviolent, but had difficulties uniting due to longstanding tensions between the main opposition parties. My argument would expect significant loyalty shifts to the protesters, but along military divisions or across a disorganized military. It would also expect limited military influence over the democratic transition.

In this chapter, I use the case of Bangladesh to assess the relationship between medium levels of threat to military functional authority in the form of personalist coup-proofing and high level, fragmented military loyalty shifts. I find that Ershad's granting of political and economic benefits to loyal senior officers generated discontent among junior officers who worried that the military leadership was corrupt and ineffective. The junior officers pressured the chief of army staff to shift loyalty from Ershad, though some seniors were in favor of intervening on Ershad's behalf. In the end, Ershad's regime fell. The military loyalty shifts supported the protesters and the subsequent political change

was democratizing, because democratically-elected civilians were able to establish civilian control over the fragmented military organization.

### **Ershad's Regime and Control of the Military**

Ershad was serving as army chief of staff when he seized power by coup in 1982. His coup continued a long tradition of military intervention in politics. Beginning with the Bangladesh military's first post-independence coup in August 1975, it launched a series of 22 coups, countercoups, and mutinies.<sup>336</sup> Most of the coups were a result of a sharp divide and competition for power between the "freedom fighters", or irregular troops who had fought in East Pakistan, and the repatriated troops that had served in the Pakistani army prior to independence.<sup>337</sup> The divide developed out of the war and worsened with Bangladesh's victory and the fusion of the two forces as one national military in December 1971.

The coups represented a struggle for supremacy between the military factions and furthered the military divide. They also challenged the military hierarchy because they were often carried out by junior officers. Intra-military discontent was otherwise evident in the large-scale mutinies and desertions that took place in 1975, 1976, and 1977.<sup>338</sup> Throughout this post-independence period, the Bangladesh military intervened in politics. The coups were however most associated with a fundamental weakness of the military organization.

---

<sup>336</sup> Aurel Croissant, et al., *The Palgrave Macmillan Democratization and Civilian Control in Asia* (Springer, 2013), 12.

<sup>337</sup> Steven I. Wilkinson, "Democratic Consolidation and Failure: Lessons from Bangladesh and Pakistan," *Democratization* 7, no. 3 (2000): 214.

<sup>338</sup> *Ibid.*, 214.

Ershad was a repatriated officer, but his coup was not part of this factional conflict. His predecessor, Ziaur Rahman (Zia), had favored the repatriated officers and put them in positions of authority.<sup>339</sup> He eliminated many freedom fighters from the military altogether; his “great purge” from 1977 to 1981 involved executing more than 1000 officers and other soldiers.<sup>340</sup> Because of Zia’s heavy hand, the most intense struggles over this division had ended by the time Ershad took power.

Still, Ershad sought to secure his regime by further stabilizing the military. He followed Zia in weeding out the freedom fighters. He placed repatriated and other favored military officers in positions of power, including political and administrative positions.<sup>341</sup> This increased military and political authority and provided the officers positions to advance themselves. Under his control, officers were appointed to the federal government, police, foreign service, and public corporations.<sup>342</sup> By 1985, all seven members of his cabinet and nearly 1500 other positions in the civilian administration were filled by members of the military. He also increased military funding – the defense budget as well as salaries and other benefits.<sup>343</sup>

Ershad’s strategies were effective for reducing intra-military conflict and preventing military challenges to his rule. As Hakim writes,

---

<sup>339</sup> Syed Serajul Islam, “The State in Bangladesh under Zia (1975-81),” *Asian Survey* 24, no. 5 (1984): 571.

<sup>340</sup> Derek Brown, “Bangladesh on Brink of Violence after ‘Election’,” *The Guardian (London)*, March 17, 1988.

<sup>341</sup> Jeremie Codron, “Putting Factions ‘Back In’ the Civil-Military Relations Equation,” *South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal* Free-Standing Articles (18 October 2007).

<sup>342</sup> Bhuian Monoar Kabir, “Politico-Economic Limitations and the Fall of the Military-Authoritarian Government in Bangladesh,” *Armed Forces and Society* 21, no. 4 (1995): 555

<sup>343</sup> Muhammad A. Hakim, “Bangladesh: The Beginning of the End of Militarized Politics?,” *Contemporary South Asia* 7, no. 3 (1998): 289-90.

With handsome salaries, lucrative fringe benefits, the prospect of rapid promotion, ever-increasing military budgets, and the opportunity of appointment to the government bureaucracy, the armed forces seemed to be reasonably satisfied. Ershad was considerably successful in maintaining control over a faction-ridden and undisciplined military...<sup>344</sup>

Indeed, he faced no coup attempts or rebellions during his tenure.<sup>345</sup> The military was well provided for, and society was increasingly militarized as a result.

Ershad's overall structuring of authority was fundamentally personalist, though. While his rule was not unlike that of previous Bangladeshi leaders, its personalist nature was deeper and more extensive. For example, Ershad's political party, the Jatiya Party (JP), relied on him completely, for its direction and organization.<sup>346</sup> More generally, Ershad did not rule through institutions but rather monopolized policy and personnel decisions. He used his personal control of state resources to distribute political patronage and create networks of loyal clients.<sup>347</sup>

His control of the military was similarly based on loyalty ties rather than merit-based standards. His personalist coup-proofing divided the repatriated military into favored and disfavored factions, weakening military autonomy and hierarchy. Specifically, he used divide and rule tactics to promote some officers and reward them financially, while sending others to undesirable postings with inadequate salaries.<sup>348</sup> He

---

<sup>344</sup> Ibid., 290.

<sup>345</sup> Ibid., 290.

<sup>346</sup> Mohammad Tanzimuddin Khan, "Working of Democracy in Bangladesh," paper prepared for the Project on State of Democracy in South Asia, *Lokniti Centre for the Study of Developing Societies* (2008).

<sup>347</sup> Gowher Rizvi, "Bangladesh: Towards Civil Society," *The World Today* 47, no. 8/9 (1991): 155.

<sup>348</sup> Wilkinson, "Democratic Consolidation and Failure: Lessons from Bangladesh and Pakistan," 213.

frequently reshuffled the military command to prevent a centralization of power and the emergence of threats.<sup>349</sup> His appointment of officers to civilian posts was “mainly selective, discretionary, and limited to senior officers and Ershad loyalists.”<sup>350</sup> The military leaders he favored were political powerful, and corrupt.<sup>351</sup>

Ershad exercised control over the military. But the forms in which he delegated it authority had negative implications for the military organization’s interests in its functional capacity and authority. His personalist strategies created new divisions between the upper and lower ranks, politicized the military leadership, and damaged the military organization. The weak military institution with its lack of functional capacities lost credibility in the eyes of medium and lower ranking officers.<sup>352</sup> The senior officers’ political appointments gave them a stake in the regime, but took away from the military’s focus on its ability to play a functional role in society. The military was not involved in conflict over this period, though, and so not directly confronted by the effects of Ershad’s policies. Growing protests against Ershad challenged his rule, and threatened the military’s reliance on authority delegated by legitimate civilians.

### **Anti-Ershad Protests and the Military’s Response**

The anti-Ershad protests that developed in the late 1980s challenged a regime that had long struggled to legitimize its rule. Ershad took power just months after the election

---

<sup>349</sup> Arthur Max, “Mass Demonstrations in Bangladesh in Defiance of State of Emergency,” *The Associated Press*, November 30, 1990.

<sup>350</sup> Kabir, “Politico-Economic Limitations and the Fall of the Military-Authoritarian Government in Bangladesh,” 559.

<sup>351</sup> *Ibid.*, 560.

<sup>352</sup> Kabir, “Politico-Economic Limitations and the Fall of the Military-Authoritarian Government in Bangladesh,” 560.



of a new president. At the time, the ruling Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) was having problems governing, and fighting within the party and between it and its main political opponent, the Awami League (AL), had produced clashes.<sup>353</sup> Still, his coup was not the result of conflict between the government and military, or intra-military conflict. Rather, it “...ruptured the civil-military elite consensus that had been nurtured by Zia, and it also alienated the masses.”<sup>354</sup>

After seizing power, Ershad suspended the constitution and banned all political parties. In 1983, he assumed the presidency. He civilianized the government by forming the JP later that year.<sup>355</sup> These initial steps to solidify his rule were unsuccessful; the JP failed to generate support despite its participation in elections.<sup>356</sup> Ershad’s close control of the JP also weakened the parliament’s functioning.<sup>357</sup> Ershad then attempted to bolster his legitimacy by holding a referendum in March 1985, but the opposition responded by demanding the withdrawal of martial law. The military had to use shows of force to keep order during the vote.<sup>358</sup> Ershad restored the constitution and full political activity in 1986, but this lasted less than a year.<sup>359</sup>

---

<sup>353</sup> Peter J. Bertocci, “Bangladesh in the Early 1980s: Praetorian Politics in an Intermediate Regime,” *Asian Survey* 22, no. 10 (1982): 989.

<sup>354</sup> Rizvi, “Bangladesh: Towards Civil Society,” 155.

<sup>355</sup> G.H. Peiris, “Political Conflict in Bangladesh,” *Ethnic Studies Report* 16 no. 1 (1998): 55.

<sup>356</sup> Kabir, “Politico-Economic Limitations and the Fall of the Military-Authoritarian Government in Bangladesh,” 555.

<sup>357</sup> Khan, “Working of Democracy in Bangladesh.”

<sup>358</sup> Peiris, “Political Conflict in Bangladesh,” 55.

<sup>359</sup> E. Bennett and D. Mallick, “Country Report (Bangladesh),” *CEMARE*: 82.

Ershad was thus unable to legitimize himself through elections, most of which the opposition boycotted or refused to accept when he did not meet their demands. He was also unable to turn around the economic crisis and governance failures from which the country was suffering when he took power. He almost immediately began to implement structural adjustment measures, but these produced little economic stability or growth. Under his rule, Bangladesh became increasingly reliant on foreign aid, as well.<sup>360</sup>

Though discontent was present from the start of Ershad's regime, protests ramped up in October 1987. He responded by declaring a state of emergency in November and dissolving parliament in December. The regime regained some stability, and the BNP and AL let up on their demands. This was partly because the AL's leadership was concerned that further instability would bring about a military coup, and that it could be sympathetic to the BNP.<sup>361</sup> In general, the two parties' longstanding divisions prevented them from putting substantial pressure on Ershad.<sup>362</sup> Ershad withstood this particular challenge as a result.

The opposition boycotted the 1988 elections but the anti-regime movement then stalled, largely because of devastating natural disasters over the fall and winter that displaced millions.<sup>363</sup> Protests reorganized in spring 1990 though when Ershad announced new elections for early 1991. Increasingly, students participated alongside the

---

<sup>360</sup> Khan, "Working of Democracy in Bangladesh."

<sup>361</sup> Kabir, "Politico-Economic Limitations and the Fall of the Military-Authoritarian Government in Bangladesh," 557-8.

<sup>362</sup> Farid Hossain, "Law Sparks Clashes, Strike Shuts Down Dhaka," *The Associated Press*, July 13, 1987.

<sup>363</sup> Syedur Rahman, "Bangladesh in 1989: Precarious Institution Building Amid Crisis Management," *Asian Survey* 29, no. 2 (1989): 219.

more established political organizations. A particularly violent confrontation between security forces and demonstrators in October impelled twenty-two existing student organizations to join to form the All-Party Students' Unity group.<sup>364</sup> Their determined involvement ushered in a new phase in the campaign. In this period, "...political alliances were under tremendous pressure from students and other sectors of civil society to be united and announce programs that would keep the movement going to oust the government."<sup>365</sup> Protests became more steady, and the BNP and AL's division less central.

As the protests' momentum grew, the Ershad regime took aggressive measures to limit their impact. It had mostly relied on the police and paramilitary forces, including the Bangladesh Rifles, with little military involvement.<sup>366</sup> At times, however, these forces resisted being used by Ershad against unarmed protesters. The police could be unreliable, and the Rifles were open about their discontent.<sup>367</sup> Consequently, the regime began to look to the military for support. This resulted in particularly violent confrontations such as in October 1990 when soldiers killed five and injured several hundred demonstrators.<sup>368</sup>

---

<sup>364</sup> Parvaz Azharul Huq, "Civil Society and Democratization in Bangladesh," *Social Change* 35, no. 2 (2005): 94.

<sup>365</sup> Kabir, "Politico-Economic Limitations and the Fall of the Military-Authoritarian Government in Bangladesh," 568.

<sup>366</sup> Codron, "Putting Factions 'Back In' the Civil-Military Relations Equation."

<sup>367</sup> Rizvi, "Bangladesh: Towards Civil Society," 157.

<sup>368</sup> Peiris, "Political Conflict in Bangladesh," 56.

Some of Ershad's attempts to end the popular challenge only escalated the unrest. First, he armed parts of the JP, including their student branches. These armed groups came to be his main arm of repression – beyond the role of the military. They even engaged in violent battles on the Dhaka University campus.<sup>369</sup> Second, in late November he released criminals who went armed to confront the students.<sup>370</sup> This led to more violence and generated more protests. Such efforts thus failed to restore regime legitimacy (or military delegated authority), and further threatened military functional authority with disorder and instability. It was at this point that junior military officers' complaints about Ershad became public.<sup>371</sup>

Ershad had few options remaining. The opposition demanded that he transfer power to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, who would then form an interim government and hold elections.<sup>372</sup> After meeting with some senior military commanders, he declared a state of emergency on November 27 to “safeguard internal security.”<sup>373</sup> The protests continued, and troops opened fire on demonstrators, killing up to 50.<sup>374</sup> On December 3, Ershad proposed concessions, but the emboldened opposition rejected

---

<sup>369</sup> Codron, “Putting Factions ‘Back In’ the Civil-Military Relations Equation.”

<sup>370</sup> Barbara Crossette, “Revolution Brings Bangladesh Hope,” *The New York Times*, December 9, 1990.

<sup>371</sup> Ibid.

<sup>372</sup> Kabir, “Politico-Economic Limitations and the Fall of the Military-Authoritarian Government in Bangladesh,” 568.

<sup>373</sup> “Crisis Talks in Dhaka,” *Herald Sun*, November 26, 1990.

<sup>374</sup> Raymond Whitaker, “Martial Law Looms in Bangladesh,” *The Independent (London)*, November 30, 1990.

them.<sup>375</sup> Huq writes of this period: "...the movement for the removal of Ershad and restoration of democracy reached its climax when many professional groups such as university teachers, lawyers, journalists, doctors, engineers, artists, and others lent their unequivocal support to the movement."<sup>376</sup> Under these conditions, it was increasingly clear that Ershad needed the military to end the challenge.

However, from the start of the protests there were "...growing doubts about [middle-ranking officers'] patience" with Ershad and his inability to restore his legitimacy and societal order.<sup>377</sup> Many were critical of the state of emergency and at least two battalion commanders sent to reinforce the capital in late November refused to put their troops on the streets to kill students.<sup>378</sup> When Ershad attempted to move reinforcement units to Dhaka, Chief of General Staff Major General Abdus Salam resisted, saying he needed additional orders from other military leaders.<sup>379</sup> As of early December, the troops that had fired on demonstrations just a week previously now stood by.<sup>380</sup> The military's loyalty was not absolute, but any loyalty shifts were disorganized and temporary.

---

<sup>375</sup> Huq, "Civil Society and Democratization in Bangladesh," 95.

<sup>376</sup> Ibid., 95.

<sup>377</sup> Derek Brown and Arshad Mahmud, "Ershad Ready to Talk Peace After Week of Street Clashes," *The Guardian (London)*, November 18, 1987.

<sup>378</sup> V.G. Kulkarni, "Cycle of the Repression Returns with Emergency Rule: Full Circle," *The Far Eastern Economic Review*, December 6, 1990: 14.

<sup>379</sup> Kabir, "Politico-Economic Limitations and the Fall of the Military-Authoritarian Government in Bangladesh," 560.

<sup>380</sup> A.K.M. Jamal Uddin, "The Movement for the Restoration of Democracy in Bangladesh, 1982- 1990: A Study of Political Sociology" (PhD diss., University of Leeds, 2006), 189.

In these later stages of the anti-Ershad movement, the demonstrations were moderately large, numbering in the tens of thousands.<sup>381</sup> They were also diverse, involving workers, doctors, and intellectuals, from across ethnic and kinship groups.<sup>382</sup> Notably absent, however, were organized laborers from the agricultural or industrial sectors. Students continued to play an outsized role, maintaining pressure on the BNP- and AL-led opposition groups to unite in their challenge to Ershad.<sup>383</sup> Still, the leadership of the organized parties remained important. Their conflictual history and the fact that the AL was known to be anti-military likely affected the military's view of them as alternatives to Ershad.<sup>384</sup>

On December 6, Ershad called on the military to end the protests with force. Chief of Army Staff Nuruddin Khan refused, and Ershad resigned as a result.<sup>385</sup> Reports emerged that Khan had acted largely as a middleman after junior officers advised him they would not support an increasingly illegitimate government.<sup>386</sup> These officers could no longer rely on their delegated authority. They were also dissatisfied with Ershad's control of the military institution. According to media coverage of the situation, they were specifically unhappy about Ershad's patronage-based promotions and the constant

---

<sup>381</sup> Earleen Fisher, "Alert for Military Threats, Ershad Underestimated the People," *The Associated Press*, December 5, 1990.

<sup>382</sup> Wilkinson, "Democratic Consolidation and Failure: Lessons from Bangladesh and Pakistan," 205.

<sup>383</sup> Huq, "Civil Society and Democratization in Bangladesh," 94-5.

<sup>384</sup> Uddin, "The Movement for the Restoration of Democracy in Bangladesh, 1982- 1990: A Study of Political Sociology," 189.

<sup>385</sup> Kulkarni, "Cycle of the Repression Returns with Emergency Rule: Full Circle," 14.

<sup>386</sup> Farid Hossain, "President Resigns, Hands Over Power," *The Associated Press*, December 6, 1990.

changes in command.<sup>387</sup> Consequently, they had come to “...assert the apolitical nature of the military in its institutional interests.”<sup>388</sup>

This response by the military was divided, as one faction of the military supported intervention on behalf of Ershad and pressured Khan to take power.<sup>389</sup> “It was generally known that the top army brass had been divided between Ershad loyalists and neutralists, and that [Khan] had been performing a difficult balancing act in the early days of December.”<sup>390</sup> Khan himself succeeded an Ershad loyalist, Lieutenant General Atiqur Rahman, and had only served as Chief since August 1990.<sup>391</sup> In the aftermath of Ershad’s resignation, Khan took care to remove the interventionist generals, as well as intelligence chiefs who reported directly to the president, from positions of power. He also disbanded Ershad’s elite officer guard.<sup>392</sup> The loyalty shift was also disorganized, with junior officers who had become increasingly unreliable pressuring Khan to refuse Ershad’s orders.

In the end, Khan and a large section of the military refused to back Ershad, effectively shifting loyalty from his regime to the opposition. Ershad attempted to control the military and the threat it posed to his rule, but his strategies of coup-proofing based

---

<sup>387</sup> Arthur Max, “Ershad Quit Following Revolt by Military,” *The Associated Press*, December 8, 1990.

<sup>388</sup> Kabir, “Politico-Economic Limitations and the Fall of the Military-Authoritarian Government in Bangladesh,” 560.

<sup>389</sup> *Ibid.*, 560.

<sup>390</sup> Kulkarni, “Cycle of the Repression Returns with Emergency Rule: Full Circle,” 14.

<sup>391</sup> Talukder Manizurraman, “The Fall of the Military Dictator: 1991 Elections and the Prospect of Civilian Rule in Bangladesh,” *Pacific Affairs* 65, no. 2 (1992): 208.

<sup>392</sup> Kulkarni, “Cycle of the Repression Returns with Emergency Rule: Full Circle,” 14.

on ties of personal loyalty threatened military functional authority. For the lower and middle-ranking officers, "...corruption and incompetence of top military and government leaders, with whom the military as an institution came to be identified, cost dearly."<sup>393</sup>

Ershad rewarded officers' loyalty with political and economic benefits that took from the military's core competencies. Non-loyalist officers believed the military's institutional interests – "...a sufficient defense budget, a respectable image for the soldiery, and lack of external interference in the army's internal affairs"<sup>394</sup> - were better served under a different form of regime control. After nearly three years of protests against his regime, the military's delegated authority was also increasingly in question, even if the opposition was internally divided. Much of the military did not want to support a regime that had failed to legitimize itself – and that had threatened both sources of military authority in the process.

As my argument expects, Ershad's forms of control generated high level yet fragmented and disunited loyalty shifts. Those officers who expressed loyalty to Ershad and preferred intervention did not act in a way that prevented the fall of the regime, however. Consequently, the military response supported protesters and political change. As Khan and Husain write, "It remains a reasonable speculation that without this

---

<sup>393</sup> Kabir, "Politico-Economic Limitations and the Fall of the Military-Authoritarian Government in Bangladesh," 560.

<sup>394</sup> V.G. Kulkarni, "Armed Neutrality: Military Chief to Seek Apolitical Role for Forces," *Far Eastern Economic Review* 150, no. 52 (1990): 15.



response from the military, the bastion of power of Ershad, the fate of the uprising would have been different.”<sup>395</sup> How then did the loyalty shifts affect democratization?

### **Military Authority and Democratization Outcomes**

After Ershad resigned, a three-month transitional government was set up, headed by the chief justice of the Supreme Court, Shahbuddin Ahmed. It declared a state of emergency, restored civil liberties, and organized elections for February 1991. They were considered free and fair by observers, and the BNP won the most seats and formed a new government.<sup>396</sup> In some ways, Bangladesh’s democratic transition was against long odds. The country had a literacy rate of 35.52% and a low per capita GDP: “[a]s such, it seemed to lack several prerequisites to democracy.”<sup>397</sup> Furthermore, the transition followed military rule.

There were significant concerns that the military would play a major, and negative, role in the newly established democracy. Of its 24 years of independence, the country had been under military rule or significant military influence for 17.<sup>398</sup> During the protests, some of the opposition worried that military support for Ershad’s ouster would result in the reimposition of military rule rather than democracy.<sup>399</sup> In the run-up

---

<sup>395</sup> Mohammad Mohabb Khan and Syed Anwar Husain, “Process of Democratization in Bangladesh,” *Contemporary South Asia* 5, no. 3 (1996).

<sup>396</sup> Craig Baxter and Syedur Rahman, “Bangladesh Vote – 1991: Building Democratic Institutions,” *Asian Survey* 31, no. 8 (1991): 683.

<sup>397</sup> Sarah Tasnim Shehabuddin, “Bangladeshi Politics Since Independence,” in *Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Bangladesh*, edited by Ali Riaz and Mohammed Sajjadur Rahman (Routledge, 2016).

<sup>398</sup> Khan, “Working of Democracy in Bangladesh.”

<sup>399</sup> “Bangladesh: Opposition Calls for an Interim Government,” *IPS-Inter Press Service*, December 14, 1987.

to the elections, both the AL and BNP expressed support for a democratic government free of military interference.<sup>400</sup> The AL threatened to reform the military if it were to take control of the government.<sup>401</sup>

Yet the military did not involve itself in the new democracy, instead coming under partial civilian control. The BNP prime minister Khaleda Zia immediately retired or otherwise removed the senior officers closest to Ershad.<sup>402</sup> A new parliamentary system was implemented that provided for a stronger legislature and a head of government with more power over the military; the presidential office traditionally responsible for the military's political involvement was reduced to mostly ceremonial functions. In particular, the prime minister took over the Armed Forces Division, a body that coordinated the three service branches, allowing the government to oversee military affairs including personnel appointments and deployment decisions. It also subordinated the Ministry of Defense.<sup>403</sup>

For its part, the military post-Ershad concentrated on "...restoring the military's image as a moral and efficient organization."<sup>404</sup> The military had a long history of factionalism. In December 1990, some senior officers feared that supporting Ershad or

---

<sup>400</sup> Rizvi, "Bangladesh: Towards Civil Society," 159.

<sup>401</sup> "Opposition Calls for New Strikes," *United Press International*, December 16, 1987.

<sup>402</sup> Codron, "Putting Factions 'Back In' the Civil-Military Relations Equation."

<sup>403</sup> Siegfried O. Wolf, "Civil-Military Relations and Democracy in Bangladesh," *Applied Political Science of South Asia* Special Issue (2013): 18-19.

<sup>404</sup> Syed Imtiaz Ahmed, "Civilian Supremacy in Democracies with 'Fault Lines': The Role of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defense in Bangladesh," *Democratization* 13, no. 2 (2006): 289.

taking power would lead to a renewal of the conflict from the 1970s and early 1980s.<sup>405</sup> But factional divisions and rivalries owing to Ershad's personal forms of control played an even bigger role in the military's stance. In fact, "Had the military been fully professional and a tightly organized group...it would have managed to take control of the government."<sup>406</sup> The military factions did not come together to either remain loyal to Ershad or fully defect to the protesters, leaving divisions that reduced the military's overall political influence.

The military remained mostly out of politics and thus supportive of democratization in the days and years following. Khan assisted Prime Minister Zia in removing Ershad loyalists, in part to head off any attempts to seize power.<sup>407</sup> A potential civil-military confrontation that did not end up challenging the democratic system occurred in May 1996. President Abdur Rahman Biswas sacked and interned Army Chief Lieutenant General Abu Saleh Mohammed Nasim and some of his top military colleagues for allegedly conspiring to topple the government. There were suspicions as to Biswas's motivations and the credibility of this claim, but Nasim and the rest of the army did not challenge the civilian government's decision.<sup>408</sup> The military at times struggled to

---

<sup>405</sup> Wilkinson, "Democratic Consolidation and Failure: Lessons from Bangladesh and Pakistan," 205.

<sup>406</sup> Baladas Ghoshal, "The Anatomy of Military Interventions in Asia: The Case of Bangladesh," *India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs* 65, no. 1 (2009): 77.

<sup>407</sup> Barbara Crossette, "Bangladesh Army Chief Ousts Some Commanders," *The New York Times*, December 10, 1990.

<sup>408</sup> Hakim, "Bangladesh: The Beginning of the End of Militarized Politics?," 293.

adjust to civilian control, but in the years following largely resisted a return to its former political role.<sup>409</sup>

### Conclusions

By 1990, the Bangladesh military was accustomed to involvement in politics – whether through direct seizures of power over the first decades of independence or service in the government bureaucracy and all its benefits as rewards for loyalty under Ershad. Ershad seemed to have satisfied the military with this latter strategy and other forms of coup-proofing, as he did not face any coup attempts during his tenure. What he did face, though, was years of mass protest by a civilian opposition unhappy with his autocratic rule.

The Bangladesh military supported democratization by supporting anti-Ershad protesters in December 1990. Its loyalty shift was fragmented, across a disunited organization. According to my argument, this is because Ershad controlled the military in ways that threatened its functional authority – reducing its autonomy and weakening its organizational integrity. Ershad’s policies prioritized loyalty over institutional quality. The protest movement was disruptive, and dominated by two antagonistic opposition parties. Even so, Ershad’s failure to restore his legitimacy threatened military delegated authority. The officers most concerned with these developments pressured Khan to shift loyalty, even without the support of some generals.

Though Bangladesh’s democratization faced many challenges after Ershad’s fall, most of them resulted from ongoing tensions between the BNP and AL, rather than civil-military relations. The military, despite its long history in politics, remained largely under

---

<sup>409</sup> Ghoshal, “The Anatomy of Military Interventions in Asia: The Case of Bangladesh,” 77.

democratic and civilian control. My argument and findings suggest this is in part due to its divisions and relative weakness and its particular type of loyalty shift.

## **CHAPTER EIGHT: PERU – FUNCTIONAL AUTHORITY, LOW LEVEL DISCONTENT AND SHIFTS, AND CIVILIAN-LED DEMOCRATIZATION**

In Peru, protests followed President Alberto Fujimori's controversial 2000 election to what was widely considered an unconstitutional third term. The demonstrators were not successful at preventing Fujimori's inauguration, but continued as allegations emerged regarding Fujimori's close advisor, Vladimiro Montesinos. Montesinos was head of the notorious national intelligence agency, and directly implicated in political violence and corruption. These revelations, even more than the protests, put the government's legitimacy and the Peruvian military's delegated authority at risk. However, the military's functional authority was less in question following a brutal yet effective counterinsurgency against the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path). Fujimori's coup-proofing strategies, though personalist, ultimately did not threaten military functional authority. My argument would expect less extensive military loyalty shifts, with little role for the military in regime change or democratization.

This chapter draws on the Peru case to trace my explanation for low level loyalty shifts, or shifts that involve limited numbers of the rank and file or low ranking officers. I show that while Fujimori controlled the upper levels of the military through forced retirements and non-meritocratic promotions, he rewarded its loyalty by increasing military autonomy in the fight against the rebels. Its effectiveness here bolstered the self-conception it had had since ruling from 1968 to 1980: a professional military responsible

for national security and development. Additionally, the anti-Fujimori protesters did not represent an alternative source of military authority even as the regime's legitimacy waned. In the end, while the movement put important pressure on Fujimori, and low level military loyalty shifts demonstrated discontent within the lower- and middle-ranks, Fujimori's regime fell as a result of other forces. Following this, the country democratized, with little involvement by the largely discredited military.

### **Fujimori's Regime and Control of the Military**

Fujimori was unexpectedly elected to the presidency in 1990.<sup>410</sup> Peru had democratized in 1980, following years of military dictatorship, but the first two civilian presidents presided over growing political and economic instability. Sendero Luminoso threatened both rural and urban areas, while the country's GDP declined by 12 percent and inflation rose to 7,000 percent.<sup>411</sup> This "disillusion with the political class, all major parties, and a failing system of government" provided Fujimori, a political outsider, the conditions for victory.<sup>412</sup>

Fujimori's status as a non-establishment candidate meant he had little support from political parties, civil society groups, or other elites. His lack of ties to traditional political institutions also made his rule largely personalist; according to Barr, Fujimori frequently used and abused executive decrees as a means to avoid dealing with Congress,

---

<sup>410</sup> Steve Ellner, "The Contrasting Variants of the Populism of Hugo Chavez and Alberto Fujimori," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 35 (2003): 143.

<sup>411</sup> Lewis Taylor, "From Fujimori to Toledo: The 2001 Elections and the Vicissitudes of Democratic Government in Peru," *Government and Opposition* 40, no. 4 (2005): 567.

<sup>412</sup> Ibid.

creating a system that scholars came to term “delegative democracy.”<sup>413</sup> From 1990 to 1992, for example, Fujimori issued an average of 29 constitutional decrees per month.<sup>414</sup> Given Peru’s past with military rule, Fujimori also feared the military, and sought to gain control over it with the help of Montesinos, a former army captain.<sup>415</sup>

The military had seized power from President Fernando Belaunde Terry in 1968. It was motivated by a desire to advance the country and prevent another insurgency like the one it had eliminated over six months in 1965 and 1966.<sup>416</sup> In Stepan’s extended analysis of the military over this period, he describes its “...new professionalism of internal security and national development.”<sup>417</sup> The military believed itself capable of restructuring the state such to create stability. Despite the military regime’s efforts at agrarian reform and industrialization, though, economic recession hit Peru in the mid-1970s. The military institution decided to return to the barracks before it was completely discredited. The military no longer ruled the country, but remained confident in itself as a respected, reformist organization.<sup>418</sup>

Using Montesinos, Fujimori’s main strategy was to implement extensive military personnel changes based around loyalty to him. Beginning in November 1991, using

---

<sup>413</sup> Robert R. Barr, “The Persistence of Neopopulism in Peru? From Fujimori to Toledo,” *Third World Quarterly* 24, no. 6 (2003): 1167.

<sup>414</sup> *Ibid.*, 1167.

<sup>415</sup> Enrique Obando, “Fujimori and the Military,” *NACLA Report on the Americas* 30, no. 1 (1996).

<sup>416</sup> Luigi R. Einaudi, “Revolution from Within? Military Rule in Peru Since 1968,” *Comparative International Development* 8, no. 1 (1973): 79.

<sup>417</sup> Stepan, *The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective*, 129.

<sup>418</sup> Wendy Hunter, “Continuity or Change? Civil-Military Relations in Democratic Argentina, Chile, and Peru,” *Political Science Quarterly* 112, no. 3 (1997): 453-75; David Pion-Berlin, “Military Autonomy and Emerging Democracies in South America,” *Comparative Politics* 25, no. 1 (1992): 83-102.



Legislative Decree 752, Fujimori assumed control over military promotions and retirements.<sup>419</sup> Fujimori made these decisions mostly with regards to the military's upper ranks. "By forcing out officers whose loyalty was suspect, and rewarding those whose support was unconditional, Montesinos helped Fujimori secure the backing of the military."<sup>420</sup> Most of these more "suspect" officers were from the institutionalist faction of the military, which disagreed with Fujimori's use of the military for political purposes.<sup>421</sup> The remaining loyalist officers formed a base of support for Fujimori's regime.

Much of the work of identifying the institutionalists was done by Montesinos and the National Intelligence Service, or SIN. The SIN had a reputation of being "...highly militarized, corrupt, conspiring, and free of judicial and legislative oversight."<sup>422</sup> Through it, Fujimori "...gain[ed] complete control of the [military]."<sup>423</sup> Fujimori also used the SIN to monitor the political opposition and any threats it posed.<sup>424</sup> He expanded the organization's power in April 1995, following his reelection.<sup>425</sup>

---

<sup>419</sup> Maria Emma Wills, "Peru's Failed Search for Political Stability," *Crisis States Programme Working Papers* 1 (2003): 29.

<sup>420</sup> Obando, "Fujimori and the Military."

<sup>421</sup> Ibid.

<sup>422</sup> Maiah Jaskoski, "Civilian Control of the Armed Forces in Democratic Latin America: Military Prerogatives, Contestation, and Mission Performance in Peru," *Armed Forces and Society* 38, no. 1 (2012): 79.

<sup>423</sup> Steve Ellner, "The Contrasting Variants of the Populism of Hugo Chavez and Alberto Fujimori," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 35 (2003): 148.

<sup>424</sup> Obando, "Fujimori and the Military."

<sup>425</sup> Steven Levitsky and Maxwell A. Cameron, "Democracy Without Parties? Political Parties and Regime Change in Fujimori's Peru," *Latin American Politics and Society* 45, no. 3 (2003): 14.

Fujimori's auto-golpe or self-coup in April 1992 strengthened the perception that he had a cooperative relationship with the military, despite his personalist control of it. With the help of armored tanks on Lima's streets, he suspended Congress, the courts, and constitutional guarantees. He had been fairly popular leading up to this point, following progress on the economy and security, but this move cemented his power.<sup>426</sup> He formalized his expanded executive authority with a new constitution that was approved by referendum in 1993.<sup>427</sup>

In exchange for the military's support in this instance and generally, Fujimori provided for some military interests. Specifically, Fujimori used a series of executive decrees to increase military power and autonomy in its fight against the Shining Path.<sup>428</sup> The military had been fighting the Shining Path and the smaller Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru (MRTA) since the 1980s, with little success.<sup>429</sup> Under Belaunde and Garcia, the government had no clear strategy, and consequently, "...neither president gained control over guerrilla violence."<sup>430</sup> The military was frustrated by these failures and the ongoing insecurity.<sup>431</sup>

---

<sup>426</sup> Levitsky and Cameron, "Democracy Without Parties? Political Parties and Regime Change in Fujimori's Peru," 8.

<sup>427</sup> Ellner, "The Contrasting Variants of the Populism of Hugo Chavez and Alberto Fujimori," 143.

<sup>428</sup> Jo-Marie Burt, "'Quien Habla es Terrorista': The Political Use of Fear in Fujimori's Peru," *Latin American Research Review* 41, no. 3 (2006).

<sup>429</sup> Jaskoski, "Civilian Control of the Armed Forces in Democratic Latin America: Military Prerogatives, Contestation, and Mission Performance in Peru," 75.

<sup>430</sup> Moises Arce, "Political Violence and Political Approval in Peru," *The Journal of Politics* 65, no. 2 (2003): 575.

<sup>431</sup> Obando, "Fujimori and the Military."

Under Fujimori, in contrast, the military got “carte blanche authority”<sup>432</sup> to fight the rebels. Beginning in November 1991, Fujimori placed military commanders in charge of the conflict’s emergency zones.<sup>433</sup> This allowed the military to take all steps necessary to secure the areas. Indeed, military officers allegedly involved in war crimes as part of their missions were pardoned by Fujimori.<sup>434</sup> Later, in June 1995, Congress passed two amnesty laws that applied to all military operations in emergency zones since 1980.<sup>435</sup> “In all, Fujimori dealt with Sendero forcefully and militarized the counterinsurgency to a far greater degree than previous administrations.”<sup>436</sup>

It took awhile for these policy changes to generate military successes, though. The Shining Path launched a series of bombings in Lima during April and May 1992. The military split between the institutionalists and loyalists worsened amid fears the rebels were gaining strength, and the military was failing to create security. Soon after the bombings, the institutionalists reportedly made plans to seize power from Fujimori. “They believed a counter-coup would restore Peru to constitutional rule, rebuff the impending threat of a Shining Path triumph, and end the political manipulation of the armed forces that they perceived as a threat to the entire military institution.”<sup>437</sup> These

---

<sup>432</sup> Wills, “Peru’s Failed Search for Political Stability,” 29.

<sup>433</sup> Jaskoski, “Civilian Control of the Armed Forces in Democratic Latin America: Military Prerogatives, Contestation, and Mission Performance in Peru,” 75.

<sup>434</sup> Arce, “Political Violence and Political Approval in Peru,” 576.

<sup>435</sup> Jaskoski, “Civilian Control of the Armed Forces in Democratic Latin America: Military Prerogatives, Contestation, and Mission Performance in Peru,” 75.

<sup>436</sup> Arce, “Political Violence and Political Approval in Peru,” 576.

<sup>437</sup> Obando, “Fujimori and the Military.”

officers looked for support from the institutionalist generals who had been forced out of the military in late 1991, as well as other frustrated lower and middle-ranking officers.<sup>438</sup>

Military discontent at these lower ranks was well known during this period. The chief complaint among military institutionalists was Fujimori's system of promotions and rotations based on loyalty rather than professional merit.<sup>439</sup> In their view, the system "...endangered the autonomy and professionalism of the military."<sup>440</sup> They expressed their dissent in various ways besides the rumored coup attempts; in one instance by leaking information to the media that implicated Montesinos and high ranking officers in the abduction and murder of students and a professor.<sup>441</sup> The case was brought to a military court, though, with no repercussions for the accused.<sup>442</sup>

The fight against the Shining Path and the position of the institutionalists changed with the September 12, 1992 capture of the group's leader, Abimael Guzman. This was a major victory for Fujimori and his military allies. The institutionalists never attempted their coup, but in November 1992 more than 40 of them were arrested.<sup>443</sup> With these arrests, many of Fujimori's opponents in the military were gone. His attention to military organizational interests further secured his position. According to Enrique Obando, "The quid pro quo in the military's support for Fujimori was his promise to broadly expand

---

<sup>438</sup> Ibid.

<sup>439</sup> John Crabtree, "The Collapse of Fujimorismo: Authoritarianism and its Limits," *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 20, no. 3 (2001): 292.

<sup>440</sup> Obando, "Fujimori and the Military."

<sup>441</sup> Cynthia Sanborn, et al., "Democracy and Governance in Peru: An Assessment," *USAID* (2000), 44.

<sup>442</sup> Obando, "Fujimori and the Military."

<sup>443</sup> Ibid.

military power in the counterinsurgency effort.”<sup>444</sup> Over time, the military was able to claim other successes in the fight against the rebels: violence associated with the insurgency declined greatly over the mid- to late-1990s.<sup>445</sup> The rebels’ presence was reduced to just remote areas of the country. By 2000, the rebels posed little threat.<sup>446</sup> The military was still unpopular, but no longer seen as ineffective.<sup>447</sup> A brutal counterinsurgency had bolstered the military’s functional authority.

In sum, Fujimori used Montesinos to co-opt the military into his increasingly authoritarian and personalist rule. Their personnel decisions generated military discontent, particularly among officers who had not yet been retired or at lower ranks concerned with the impact on military capabilities. Yet Fujimori also increased military power and autonomy as part of his counterinsurgency policies. “Although weakened and de-professionalized at the national level by Fujimori’s co-optative methods, at the regional one the Army became stronger.”<sup>448</sup> This allowed the military leadership to reduce the threat of the Shining Path rebels. The military’s view of itself as an organization capable of protecting national development was not threatened by Fujimori’s control. By the late 1990s, then, the military had significant authority; at times exercising issuing its own political proclamations or using tanks in the streets to

---

<sup>444</sup> Ibid.

<sup>445</sup> Arce, “Political Violence and Political Approval in Peru,” 573.

<sup>446</sup> Jaskoski, “Civilian Control of the Armed Forces in Democratic Latin America: Military Prerogatives, Contestation, and Mission Performance in Peru,” 75.

<sup>447</sup> Wills, “Peru’s Failed Search for Political Stability,” 29.

<sup>448</sup> Ibid., 30.

“reinforce its positions.”<sup>449</sup> Officers who disagreed with this approach had largely been retired and replaced with Fujimori loyalists.

### **Anti-Fujimori Protests and the Military’s Response**

Fujimori was generally popular during the early and mid-1990s, especially as Peruvians began to attribute their country’s increased security and stability to him. After 1992, protests occurred annually on the anniversary of his auto-golpe. Still, most of the population seemed to support his rationale for the power grab – that greater executive power was necessary to carry out economic reforms and defeat the Shining Path – and he was re-elected by a landslide in April 1995.<sup>450</sup>

Fujimori capitalized on this support to pursue a third term. In August 1996, Congress passed a law allowing him to run again in 2000, reasoning he had only been elected once under the 1993 constitution.<sup>451</sup> But not long after, reports emerged on growing opposition to Fujimori’s efforts: “...[Fujimori’s] economic policies have failed to provide jobs and the fading threat of leftist rebels has ceased to justify his blatant disregard for democratic checks and balance.”<sup>452</sup> These criticisms were compounded by Fujimori’s personalist rule, which lacked the political institutions to build up his

---

<sup>449</sup> Steven Levitsky, “Fujimori and Post-Party Politics in Peru,” *Journal of Democracy* 10, no. 3 (1999): 79.

<sup>450</sup> Ibid.

<sup>451</sup> Levitsky and Cameron, “Democracy Without Parties? Political Parties and Regime Change in Fujimori’s Peru,” 14.

<sup>452</sup> Bill Cormier, “AP Photos Staffing,” *Associated Press International*, July 27, 2000.

legitimacy.<sup>453</sup> He did not even use his governing party because Montesinos considered it a threat.<sup>454</sup>

The 2000 election was held as scheduled, despite ongoing questions about its legality and an investigation into Montesinos's involvement in drug trafficking.<sup>455</sup> Fujimori failed to secure 50 percent of the vote in the first round on April 9. When he attempted to claim victory anyway, he was met with protests, forcing him into a second round.<sup>456</sup> Prior to the vote, the leading opposition candidate Toledo withdrew to protest what he claimed was the government's manipulation of the electoral process.<sup>457</sup> This opened the way for the military and police to declare Fujimori the winner on June 9. A few days later the Peruvian Electoral National Jury confirmed their declaration.<sup>458</sup> Fujimori was to be sworn into office on July 28.

After protests failed to prevent Fujimori's election, plans were made to disrupt his inauguration in late July. Protests had been ongoing in Lima since the elections, but on July 26, the first of three days of planned demonstrations, 10,000 people turned out.<sup>459</sup>

---

<sup>453</sup> Levitsky, "Fujimori and Post-Party Politics in Peru."

<sup>454</sup> Ellner, "The Contrasting Variants of the Populism of Hugo Chavez and Alberto Fujimori," 154.

<sup>455</sup> Crabtree, "The Collapse of Fujimorismo: Authoritarianism and its Limits," 287.

<sup>456</sup> Lewis Taylor, "Alberto Fujimori's Peripeteia: From 'Re-Eleccion' to Regime Collapse," *European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies* (2001): 12.

<sup>457</sup> Robert R. Barr, "The Persistence of Neopopulism in Peru? From Fujimori to Toledo," *Third World Quarterly* 24, no. 6 (2003): 1163.

<sup>458</sup> Maria Victoria Whittingham Munevar, "The Fall of Fujimori in Peru: A Case of Global Governance," (2004), 16.

<sup>459</sup> Reynaldo Munoz, "Peru's Fujimori to Resign by Tuesday: Prime Minister," *Agence France Presse*, November 19, 2000.

Concern over potential unrest led the government to set up barricades and bring in thousands of police troops to the capital. Army units were put on standby.<sup>460</sup> On July 27, the police did not attempt to intervene.<sup>461</sup> On July 28, though, at least 80 people, both police and demonstrators, were injured.<sup>462</sup> Fujimori named an opposition politician as his prime minister, as some form of concession to demands.<sup>463</sup> Otherwise, the protests had little impact, and the situation settled somewhat.

In September, a series of events put Fujimori's third term much more in question. First, a video was leaked to the press that showed Montesinos bribing a member of Congress. The congressman had been part of the opposition before switching parties to support Fujimori, and Montesinos was seen handing him thousands of dollars in cash.<sup>464</sup> This followed closely on reports that Montesinos had been involved in arms trafficking to the FARC rebel group in Colombia.<sup>465</sup> Both the opposition and ruling parties demanded an investigation. Protests broke out to call for Montesino's resignation.<sup>466</sup> Fujimori attempted to get control of the situation, and it was reported on September 15 that he had fired Montesinos. The next day, however, Montesinos emerged and tried to arrest the

---

<sup>460</sup> Monte Hayes, "Peru's Fujimori Facing Massive Protests as He Assumes Third Term," *The Associated Press*, July 26, 2000.

<sup>461</sup> Cormier, "AP Photos Staffing."

<sup>462</sup> Monte Hayes, "Two Dead, Dozens Injured, Buildings Ablaze as Fujimori Takes Oath in Peru," *The Associated Press*, July 28, 2000.

<sup>463</sup> Rick Vecchio, "Peru Government Looks to Thwart Huge Protest," *The Associated Press*, July 26, 2000.

<sup>464</sup> "Fujimori Calls for Reconciliation Ahead of New Elections," *Agence Free Presse*, October 11, 2000.

<sup>465</sup> Carmen Ross Balbi and David Scott Palmer, "'Reinventing' Democracy in Peru," *Current History* 100, no. 643 (2001): 68.

<sup>466</sup> Monte Hayes, "AP Photo LIM101-102," *Associated Press International*, July 28, 2000.



assistant to the head of the SIN because he suspected him of being involved in the video's release. Perhaps seeking to distance themselves from Montesinos, the navy refused to follow his arrest orders.<sup>467</sup>

The feelings of the rest of the military – and particularly the upper ranks loyal to Montesinos – were unclear. Fujimori met with his cabinet on September 17, amid continued protests, reportedly to make plans for leaving power. During this period, “Rumors spread through Lima...that Fujimori decided to call new elections because of resistance from high military officers when he tried to fire...Montesinos.”<sup>468</sup> But in a televised address, Fujimori announced that in addition to holding new elections in which he would not be a candidate, he was deactivating the SIN.<sup>469</sup>

Montesinos's faction demonstrated no resistance to or dissent over the SIN's deactivation. Experts weighed in that the military was unlikely to revolt over this decision,<sup>470</sup> perhaps because they expected Montesinos's position, and their benefits, to be unchanged. In fact, the loyalists in the upper ranks retained their positions, with the general next in line for the post of commander of the armed forces a loyalist too.<sup>471</sup>

---

<sup>467</sup> Anthony Faiola, “How Fujimori's Power Unraveled; Peruvian's Ally Aided His Rise, and His Fall,” *The Washington Post*, September 24, 2000.

<sup>468</sup> Hayes, “Peru's Fujimori Facing Massive Protests as He Assumes Third Term.”

<sup>469</sup> “Peru's Embattled President Fujimori Calls New Elections, Says He Won't Run; His Re-Election Has Been Criticized Internationally as Corrupt,” *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, September 17, 2000.

<sup>470</sup> Monte Hayes, “AP Photos LIM101-102,” *Associated Press International*, September 18, 2000.

<sup>471</sup> Monte Hayes, “Peruvians Relieved Spy Chief Gone, But Worry He Can Strike From Abroad,” *The Associated Press*, September 26, 2000.

Discontent middle-ranking officers were also likely supportive of Fujimori<sup>472</sup> – for them, the SIN’s deactivation was a move in the right direction.

Fujimori went a step further a few days later, when he fired Montesinos. This generated considerable uncertainty, and concerns over a possible military coup – by either officers seeking to remove both Fujimori and Montesinos or officers seeking to keep Montesinos in place.<sup>473</sup> Montesinos was detained on September 18 by soldiers acting on the orders of the commander of the armed forces, General Jose Villaneuva Ruestra.<sup>474</sup> Then, on September 20, Fujimori declared that he would reduce his third term to one year and hold elections ahead of schedule.<sup>475</sup> There is no indication that the military played a role in Fujimori’s decision. Though close to Montesinos, the military leadership remained loyal to Fujimori over this period.

With these concessions – Montesinos’s arrest and the new elections – Fujimori seemed to regain some stability for the rest of his term. According to analysts, he had strong support in the parliament, the judiciary, and most of the military, and was likely to remain in power.<sup>476</sup> On September 21, the commanders of the army, air force, navy, and police confirmed this view by issuing a statement in support of Fujimori, while urging

---

<sup>472</sup> Monte Hayes, “AP Photos LIM101-102.”

<sup>473</sup> Roland Flamini, “Global Impact News Alert,” *United Press International*, September 18, 2000.

<sup>474</sup> Anthony Faiola, “Military is Focus of Peru Crisis; Fate of Ex-Official Remains Unclear,” *The Washington Post*, September 19, 2000.

<sup>475</sup> Taylor, “Alberto Fujimori’s Peripeteia: From ‘Re-Eleccion’ to Regime Collapse,” 18.

<sup>476</sup> Abraham Lama, “Politics-Peru: Montesinos’ Return Heightens Crisis,” *IPS-Inter Press Service*, October 23, 2000.

calm from the population.<sup>477</sup> Yet rumors of a coup led Montesinos to flee Peru on September 23.<sup>478</sup> Fujimori followed this news by quickly scheduling a number of visits to military commands, to reassert his authority.<sup>479</sup>

Fujimori's legitimacy took another hit when it came out that Montesinos had gone to Panama and would not face corruption charges.<sup>480</sup> This was the final straw for some of Fujimori's supporters in Congress; on September 26, five members of the Fujimori's Peru 2000 (P2000) party resigned, which cost him his majority.<sup>481</sup> Soon after, lawmakers from the ruling and opposition parties voted to officially deactivate the SIN. Emboldened, protesters turned out to demand Fujimori's immediate resignation and the extradition of Montesinos from Panama to be subject to legal consequences.<sup>482</sup>

Montesinos returned to Peru in secret on October 22, after Panama refused to give him asylum.<sup>483</sup> Fearing for his continued influence over the military, Fujimori retired a number of top officers in the days following.<sup>484</sup> He then called an emergency cabinet

---

<sup>477</sup> Bill Cormier, "Peru's Armed Forces Declare Support for Fujimori," *The Associated Press*, September 21, 2000.

<sup>478</sup> Taylor, "Alberto Fujimori's Peripeteia: From 'Re-Eleccion' to Regime Collapse," 18.

<sup>479</sup> Balbi and Palmer, "'Reinventing' Democracy in Peru," 69.

<sup>480</sup> "Peru Transportation Strike Worsens Amid Political Congress," *Associated Press International*, September 27, 2000.

<sup>481</sup> "Fujimori's Future Tied to Spy Chief," *The Toronto Star*, September 26, 2000.

<sup>482</sup> Rick Vecchio, "Peruvian Congress Votes to Dismantle Exiled Spy Chief's Agency," *The Associated Press*, September 28, 2000.

<sup>483</sup> Luis Jaime Cisneros, "Ex-Security Chief Montesinos Arrives in Peru, VP Resigns," *Agence France Presse*, October 23, 2000.

<sup>484</sup> Julio Javier Aguayo, "The Legislature Strikes Back in Peru: The Role of Congress in the Demise of Fujimori in 2000," (2004): 197.

meeting that included the heads of the army, navy, and air force, to discuss the events.<sup>485</sup> He also visited a number of military installations, likely to suggest control of the situation.<sup>486</sup>

Yet opposition to Fujimori was increasing because it had become obvious that he “...cannot control the military brass, nor Montesinos, who continues managing the generals that he himself placed in the highest points of command.”<sup>487</sup> In the view of the protesters and others, Fujimori needed to remove the military leadership and replace them with generals who were free from association with Montesinos. His inability to do so weakened his position and led to calls for his resignation.<sup>488</sup> In response, Fujimori embarked on a highly publicized and widely mocked “manhunt” for Montesinos, while insisting he was in charge of the military.<sup>489</sup>

In this context of ongoing protests and Fujimori’s illegitimacy, the military’s delegated authority was compromised. The military’s functional authority was largely intact, however, and so the challenge to Fujimori’s regime did not put the military’s sources of authority in tension. The military’s effectiveness at providing order and stability, and its functional role in society, was not in question given the Shining Path’s defeat. The military was an organization capable of defending the national interest.

---

<sup>485</sup> Cisneros, “Ex-Security Chief Montesinos Arrives in Peru, VP Resigns.”

<sup>486</sup> Reynaldo Munoz, “Peru’s Fujimori to Resign by Tuesday: Prime Minister,” *Agence France Presse*, November 19, 2000.

<sup>487</sup> Lama, “Politics-Peru: Montesinos’ Return Heightens Crisis.”

<sup>488</sup> Ibid.

<sup>489</sup> Rick Vecchio, “Urgent,0599 BC-Peru,” *Associated Press International*, October 25, 2000.

The protest movement also did not represent an alternative source of delegated authority for a military that could still rely on its functional authority. At the protests' height, they numbered more than 100,000 and involved students, labor unions, peasant organizations, NGOs, women's organizations, and political parties.<sup>490</sup> They never became as large, or as sustained, as opposition leaders had hoped, though. Toledo vowed to put at least 200,000 people on the streets on July 27 but ended up with a respectable but not overwhelming 80,000, with a smaller crowd in the following days.<sup>491</sup>

Overall, it was difficult for the movement's leadership to build popular opposition in a country that was extremely de-politicized from the violence of a 20 year civil war and the fracturing of democratic institutions, including political parties. Over the conflict, 68,000 people were victims of political violence by the state security forces or insurgent groups.<sup>492</sup> Peruvians were dissatisfied with the democracy that had failed to provide solutions to societal problems.<sup>493</sup> Their growing frustrations with Fujimori did not necessarily translate into support for the opposition. As reported during this period, "Many question whether Toledo's star can continue to rise solely on cries of election fraud, saying an opposition leader has yet to emerge who can rally a poor country around

---

<sup>490</sup> Gerardo Renique and Deborah Poole, "Popular Movements, the Legacy of the Left, and the Fall of Fujimori," *Socialism and Democracy* 14, no. 2 (2000): 53-74.

<sup>491</sup> Hayes, "Two Dead, Dozens Injured, Buildings Ablaze as Fujimori Takes Oath in Peru."

<sup>492</sup> Burt, "'Quien Habla es Terrorista': The Political Use of Fear in Fujimori's Peru," 38.

<sup>493</sup> *Ibid.*, 42.

real demands for social and economic change.”<sup>494</sup> The protest movement struggled to present a capable challenge to the regime’s authority.

The only loyalty shifts that occurred in response to the anti-Fujimori protest movement were low level, by a small section of low-ranking officers. On October 29, a military garrison in the southern region of Peru rebelled against Fujimori and the military leadership. The rebellion involved around 100 soldiers and was led by Army Lieutenant Ollanta Humala Tasso, head of an anti-aircraft artillery unit. They took control of a copper mine and from there made a number of demands: that Fujimori be unseated, Montesinos jailed, and the armed forces general staff demoted.<sup>495</sup> These demands reflected the main sources of discontent for low to middle ranking officers in the Fujimori military, and those of the protesters.

Though the loyalty shift involved few soldiers, it was the clearest and most organized signal of anti-regime and pro-opposition sentiment from the military during the protests. It also received a significant amount of attention throughout Peru, and observers watched for indications that Humala’s broadcasted “Manifesto to the Peruvian People” would set off a larger armed forces rebellion.<sup>496</sup> Some army reservists and veterans of the 1995 conflict with Ecuador rallied and marched in support of the rebels, with plans to

---

<sup>494</sup> Bill Cormier, “Fujimori’s Rival: Opposition Leader with a Shaky Base,” *Associated Press International*, July 27, 2000.

<sup>495</sup> Renique and Poole, “Popular Movements, the Legacy of the Left, and the Fall of Fujimori,” 60.

<sup>496</sup> “Peruvian Army Orders Rebellion to be Put Down, as Rebels Take Hostage,” *Agence France Presse*, October 29, 2000.

join them.<sup>497</sup> Beyond this, though, the loyalty shifts did not spread – to other geographic areas, or to other units or ranks of the military.<sup>498</sup>

Neither did the shift of support by the military have much of an impact on the protest movement or its outcomes. The rebels and their demands had a receptive audience in the protesters, and two small demonstrations that included former members of the military were held in support of them. They were easily dispersed by police with tear gas,<sup>499</sup> and the rest of the country remained calm. Further, Toledo and others in the opposition were hesitant to encourage rebellion, because doing so would have provided cause to the claim that the country was unstable – and thus open to a coup by the upper ranks.<sup>500</sup> Along these lines, other politicians condemned the soldiers and called for the military to stay in the chain of command.<sup>501</sup>

The Peruvian military responded to the anti-Fujimori protests according to my argument's expectations. That is, while Fujimori's coup-proofing strategies were based on personalist ties of loyalty, they did not clearly threaten military functional authority. His other forms of control – providing for military autonomy and power in exchange for its support – resulted in an effective (though brutal) counterinsurgency. This was particularly important given the military's legacy as a professional organization

---

<sup>497</sup> Renique and Poole, "Popular Movements, the Legacy of the Left, and the Fall of Fujimori," 60.

<sup>498</sup> Aguayo, "The Legislature Strikes Back in Peru: The Role of Congress in the Demise of Fujimori in 2000," 207.

<sup>499</sup> "Peru Police Use Tear Gas Against Demonstrators Supporting Revolt," *Agence France Presse*, October 31, 2000.

<sup>500</sup> "Peruvian Army Orders Rebellion to be Put Down, as Rebels Take Hostage."

<sup>501</sup> Aguayo, "The Legislature Strikes Back in Peru: The Role of Congress in the Demise of Fujimori in 2000," 206.

responsible for national security, an understanding of itself that survived Fujimori's rule. During the protests, the high level officers remained loyal to Fujimori, and, despite well-known discontent among the mid- and low-ranking officers, only a small group of soldiers far from Lima shifted loyalty from the regime. The military leadership issued an order for troops to search for and put down the rebellion.<sup>502</sup> In the end, it fizzled out largely on its own.<sup>503</sup>

Even without significant military loyalty shifts, though, Fujimori's regime was near collapse. The release of a video showing Montesinos toasting military officers for their assistance in the elections was the final, fatal blow to Fujimori's legitimacy as president.<sup>504</sup> On November 19, Prime Minister Salas announced Fujimori would be resigning soon, in part because the opposition had taken control of Congress and was likely to remove Fujimori on grounds of 'moral incapacity'. The Second Vice President, Marquez, reported that he had met with the military high command to discuss next steps.<sup>505</sup> Fujimori stepped down and the military issued a statement saying it would continue to show "...absolute respect to the decisions taken by the legitimately constituted authorities."<sup>506</sup>

---

<sup>502</sup> "Group of Peruvian Soldiers Revolt Against Fujimori," *Agence France Presse*, October 29, 2000.

<sup>503</sup> "Troops Barred from Joining Rebellious Lieutenant," *Deutsche Presse-Agentur*, November 1, 2000.

<sup>504</sup> Renique and Poole, "Popular Movements, the Legacy of the Left, and the Fall of Fujimori," 61.

<sup>505</sup> Reynaldo Munoz, "Peru's Fujimori to Resign by Tuesday: Prime Minister," *Agence France Presse*, November 19, 2000.

<sup>506</sup> Reynaldo Munoz, "News Fujimori to Resign Triggers Consternation in Peru," *Agence France Presse*, November 19, 2000.



## Military Authority and Democratization Outcomes

After Fujimori resigned, Congress started work on a political transition by naming Valentin Paniagua interim president.<sup>507</sup> The military's role in democratization was an immediate concern, given its many links to the former regime. However, the suddenness of Fujimori's fall prevented the military and other regime elites from reaching a formal agreement with the opposition to protect their positions. Paniagua's new government had more space to act as a result.<sup>508</sup> Even more importantly, the military was discredited by its association with Montesinos and its support of a regime whose corruption and violence had now been exposed.

Paniagua got to work immediately and fired the armed forces chief and other top military officers, as well as over a hundred other officers considered loyal to Montesinos. He named General Carlos Tafur, a critic of Montesinos who had been forced into retirement, head of the armed forces.<sup>509</sup> Additionally, in the weeks following, 2000 representatives of 14 political groups signed a National Accord committing to democratization. One point in the accord called for an official reorganization of the security services with limits on the political role of the military.<sup>510</sup>

---

<sup>507</sup> Barr, "The Persistence of Neopopulism in Peru? From Fujimori to Toledo," 1163.

<sup>508</sup> Cynthia McClintock, "An Unlikely Comeback in Peru," *Journal of Democracy* 17, no. 4 (2006): 98.

<sup>509</sup> Balbi and Palmer, "'Reinventing' Democracy in Peru," 70.

<sup>510</sup> Taylor, "From Fujimori to Toledo: The 2001 Elections and the Vicissitudes of Democratic Government in Peru," 566.

The first post-Fujimori presidential election was held in spring 2001. Toledo was declared the winner and took office in July.<sup>511</sup> He followed Paniagua's lead in minimizing the former regime's influence, most notably when his government convicted and imprisoned Montesinos, and charged other military and civilian officials for their involvement in corruption and human rights violations under Fujimori.<sup>512</sup> Toledo's government also passed legislation to create a new, reformed intelligence agency, and in December 2005 reduced the military's involvement in intelligence.<sup>513</sup> Under Toledo, a Commission for Truth and Reconciliation began to uncover and report on the political violence of the counterinsurgency.<sup>514</sup>

Toledo was quite unpopular, but this did not lead to major challenges from the military or elements of the former regime. By the end of his term in 2006 his approval ratings were in the single digits and overall support for democracy had declined.<sup>515</sup> His government was forced to declare a 30 day state of emergency in May 2003 due to ongoing protests over economic issues. Yet the military remained uninvolved in politics. Observers considered a coup unlikely, because the military was still disgraced by Fujimori's rule.<sup>516</sup>

---

<sup>511</sup> Barr, "The Persistence of Neopopulism in Peru? From Fujimori to Toledo," 1163.

<sup>512</sup> McClintock, "An Unlikely Comeback in Peru," 97.

<sup>513</sup> Jaskoski, "Civilian Control of the Armed Forces in Democratic Latin America: Military Prerogatives, Contestation, and Mission Performance in Peru," 79.

<sup>514</sup> McClintock, "An Unlikely Comeback in Peru," 97.

<sup>515</sup> Ibid., 96.

<sup>516</sup> Taylor, "From Fujimori to Toledo: The 2001 Elections and the Vicissitudes of Democratic Government in Peru," 586.

Indeed, despite the military's past in politics, and its lack of support for regime change, it did not inhibit the democratization process. As of 2005, "While remnants loyal to the previous regime remain in the army and secret service, civilian control over these organs is at its strongest since the 1920s."<sup>517</sup> This included even the role of the military in counterinsurgency policy, where it went from having nearly complete control over all aspects to just security in limited areas.<sup>518</sup> The loyalty shift by the small section of low-ranking officers had a minimal impact on Fujimori's regime, but it fell anyway, with little role for the overall military in the transition to democracy. The military's position at that stage of Peruvian history more than its response to the protests explained the successful democratization.

### Conclusions

In the years following Fujimori's fall, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and other investigations revealed the Peruvian military's brutal violence during the counterinsurgency. Reports concluded that the military and other state security forces were responsible for 40 percent of the nearly 70,000 instances of political violence between 1980 and 2000, as well as many thousands of detainments and disappearances.<sup>519</sup> The extent of the military's corruption also became clear, particularly the wealth high-ranking officials had accumulated through their anti-narcotics work.<sup>520</sup>

---

<sup>517</sup> Ibid., 587.

<sup>518</sup> Jaskoski, "Civilian Control of the Armed Forces in Democratic Latin America: Military Prerogatives, Contestation, and Mission Performance in Peru," 76.

<sup>519</sup> Burt, "'Quien Habla es Terrorista': The Political Use of Fear in Fujimori's Peru," 38.

<sup>520</sup> Jaskoski, "Civilian Control of the Armed Forces in Democratic Latin America: Military Prerogatives, Contestation, and Mission Performance in Peru," 75.

However, all of this occurred in the context of military success in the campaign against the Shining Path. The military's functional capacities were therefore not in question.

Montesinos's involvement in this violence and corruption and Fujimori's close association with him were key to Fujimori's rapid loss of power and consequent resignation. The protest movement put important pressure on Fujimori and his supporters despite its somewhat indirect link to the regime's fall: "...the resurgence of civil society played a very dynamic role in denying the regime the legitimacy it sought to ensure through fraud and violence."<sup>521</sup> The military played a very limited role in the fall of Fujimori's regime because only a small section of troops and low-ranking officers shifted loyalty.

The Peruvian military's response to the anti-Fujimori protest movement follows my explanation for low level loyalty shifts. The soldiers that rebelled and the wider group of officers that favored political change were frustrated by Fujimori's strategies of military control, and Montesinos's corrupting influence. But while Fujimori's personnel decisions benefitted loyal officers at the expense of others, they did not weaken military functional capabilities in the context of the Shining Path insurgency. The protest movement also did not sustain momentum such that the military viewed it as an alternative source of authority, even as Fujimori's legitimacy suffered. The military's upper ranks were able to wage the Shining Path conflict with little political interference and remained loyal to Fujimori until the end, with long-term implications for the military's reputation.

---

<sup>521</sup> Burt, "Quien Habla es Terrorista": The Political Use of Fear in Fujimori's Peru," 57.

## CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUSION

“Just as the literature on the execution of coups stresses the role of ‘swingmen’ at crucial conjectures, so the (nonexistent) literature on noncoups should emphasize the strategic importance of ‘swingmen’ in making alternative outcomes possible. These officers may support the transition much more because of what they believe is good for the armed forces than because of any enthusiasm for democracy.”<sup>522</sup>

In this dissertation, I have offered answers to two questions: Why do militaries shift their loyalty from non-democratic regimes in some instances of anti-regime protests and not others, and why do these shifts sometimes lead to democratic change? Existing research shows that military loyalty shifts are significant determinants of the success of civil resistance campaigns against authoritarian regimes. A body of work is developing to explain such military defections, but it provides competing arguments and is based largely on case studies of a few well-known instances of military responses to protests. The other literatures on the military’s role in political change disagree on whether and how the military can support democratization, and do not address the particular context of civil society-led transitions.

I was motivated to explore these questions by the theoretical puzzle – that this topic is one the literatures on the military in politics cannot fully explain. Perhaps more important, though, is the topic’s major contemporary relevance. Civil resistance campaigns have increased in frequency to become the primary means of challenge to

---

<sup>522</sup> Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 25.

authoritarian regimes.<sup>523</sup> They are an effective strategy of political contention, especially relative to violent campaigns.<sup>524</sup> Thus, support for democratization today often takes the form of support of unarmed civilians seeking to overthrow illiberal, repressive, and autocratic regimes using tactics such as protests, strikes, and sit-ins. It requires paying close attention to the response of the military and other regime security forces.

Understanding why militaries shift loyalty, and the impacts of shifts on democratization, is key to the continued success of nonviolence. It requires a reassessment of militaries and politics that takes the possibility of this particular military role seriously.

I developed an argument that is based in the military's sources of authority: the authority delegated them by leaders on behalf of the population, and the authority they gain by virtue of their functional role in society. In delegating the military authority, authoritarian regimes often structure it in ways that protect the regime by reducing military functional capabilities. The authoritarian regime thus threatens military functional authority. Popular challenges to the regime put the military's delegated and functional authority in tension. If the military's functional authority is already in question, supporting an illegitimate regime will not restore it or societal stability and security. A protest movement that is large and committed to nonviolence may be more supportive of military authority.

In these contexts, militaries do not just remain loyal or defect; they respond to popular regime challenges with loyalty shifts that vary in terms of the extent and quality

---

<sup>523</sup> Erica Chenoweth, "Trends in Nonviolent Resistance and State Response: Is Violence Towards Civilian-based Movements on the Rise?", *Global Responsibility to Protect* 9, no. 1 (2017): 86-100.

<sup>524</sup> Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011).

of the military organization's involvement. Specifically, loyalty shifts may involve the lower or higher ranks, and be fragmented or united. I also proposed an argument to explain these different shifts, drawing on my general argument but specifying its implications for the military organization. Some strategies of regime control, or forms of coup-proofing, will just generate military discontent. Others – personalist, specifically - will also compromise the military organization, making low level or fragmented loyalty shifts more likely than united defections. Large protest movements lead to disloyalty by the rank and file and together with coup-proofing produce high level shifts.

I used the logic of my argument to generate expectations for the effects of military loyalty shifts on democracy. Military loyalty shifts during anti-regime protests are crucial to movements' success. Successful movements (and civil resistance generally) are likely to positively impact democratization. I investigated whether military loyalty shifts also impact democratization. The civil-military relations literature expects that a politically active military will harm democratic consolidation. The scholarship on pacted transitions views the military as potentially supportive of democracy. Thus, I argued that high level shifts may positively impact democratization by supporting protest movement success. I also argued that high level shifts that are fragmented will have more of an impact than united defections because a civilian regime can more easily establish control over a weak military organization.

I generated various forms of empirical support for these arguments and their expectations. First, I employed new data on military responses to all major anti-regime protests from 1946 to 2015 along with quantitative measures of coup-proofing and

protester characteristics to test my hypotheses for military defections and types of loyalty shifts. Based on regression analyses, threats to military functional authority have significant impacts on the likelihood of military disloyalty. The explanatory factors' conditional effects confirm that they interact to either threaten or support military authority. Independently, they have the expected effects on types of military loyalty shifts via their impacts on the military organization. These results hold in the presence of various covariates, increasing my confidence in their explanatory power across space and time.

I also used Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), a medium-N strategy that explicitly accounts for the complex causal relations between my argument's conditions and outcomes. The results support those from the regression analyses, while providing new insights as to how coup-proofing and protest movement factors combine and substitute to produce threats to military functional authority and thus military loyalty shifts. Together, these analytical strategies provide a robust and meaningful assessment of the importance of the factors for explaining military disloyalty.

Next, I tested the hypotheses related to the impact of military loyalty shifts on democratization. From the regression analyses, the shifts do not have major independent effects on democracy levels, when accounting for other determinants of democratization and addressing potential endogeneity issues. Still, fragmented high level shifts have a consistently positive and stronger impact on democratization than united defections (or other shifts). A military that shifts support to the protesters but is unable or unlikely to exercise significant influence over the new civilian-led political system is better for



democracy. The limitations of regression and more general quantitative analyses hold here, though: the challenges of dealing with possible omitted variable bias and simultaneity, and the inability to establish causation from correlations or descriptive inferences. Further, I propose a fairly long causal chain from regime control to military responses to democratization. I therefore finished with three case studies that demonstrate my argument's processes in richer detail.

In the case studies, I used evidence from three instances of major anti-regime protests and the military responses to them to show how authoritarian regime control of the military, in the context of a particular protest movement, affected military authority and led to military loyalty shifts. The cases – Mali 1990-1991, Bangladesh 1987-1990, and Peru 2000 - varied along their independent variables, or levels of threat to military functional authority, and as a result varied in terms of military loyalty shifts. The type of shift reflected in part the strength of the military organization, and this affected the military's participation in post-protest politics.

Altogether, these findings support my argument, and contribute to existing understandings of militaries' roles in politics. Militaries can play positive roles by shifting loyalty to anti-authoritarian regime protest movements and supporting democratic change. They may be more likely to do so because of their particular institutional interests related to the provision of societal stability and security. It is through their performance of functional roles and creation of order that they gain authority. But this functional authority is sometimes threatened by the civilian authorities responsible for their delegated authority. When a regime faces a popular challenge to its

legitimacy and rule, the military may choose to act outside its delegated authority to preserve its functional authority by supporting the protesters. These conclusions suggest theoretical, methodological, and policy contributions.

### **Theoretical Contributions**

My focus on military sources of authority draws on the foundational scholarship on militaries and military interests. The particular context of military responses to prodemocracy protests brings in the insights of the pact and civil resistance literatures. Militaries as organizations have particular institutional concerns, including the conditions that provide for their effectiveness in maintaining a stable and secure society. A longstanding claim across the work on militaries in politics is that militaries will act when these concerns are not met, sometimes by seizing power. For militaries, “The desire to maintain order can...prompt the removal of a regime and even the transformation of a status quo that seems to be productive of disorder.”<sup>525</sup> Regime coup-proofing is aimed at reducing the threat of such military actions, in part by harming military functional capabilities. This in turn generates military discontent. Militaries may not stage coups, or successful ones, but they may respond to popular regime challenges with disloyalty. Military involvement in this form of political change can support both its institutional interests and civil society-led democratization.

In making this argument, I challenge the civil-military relations literature’s central contention that a military acting against its delegated authority is problematic for democratization. I do not disagree that a military outside civilian control will challenge

---

<sup>525</sup> Martin C. Needler, “Military Motivations in the Seizure of Power,” *Latin American Research Review* 10, no. 3 (1975): 68.

democratic consolidation; in fact, I find support for this claim in Chapter Five. Rather, through this dissertation I demonstrate a different starting point for analyses of the military that has important implications for our understanding of the military and politics. The pact literature describes how militaries and civilians can cooperate for political change, while the civil resistance literature demonstrates the importance of military defections to campaign success. The civil-military relations literature has so far not taken these points seriously such that it recognizes the potentially positive role a politically active military can play in democratic transitions. A military may act outside the regime's delegated authority - but in favor of its functional authority - to support democratization.

I have used this insight to explore military responses to protests, but it allows a reconsideration of militaries and politics in general. Scholars should pursue more nuanced understandings of the causes and impacts of military political activity short of coups. There are many ways militaries can withdraw support from authoritarian regimes, for example – some that bolster civilian control, others that undermine it. It is possible that some can support democratic political outcomes, too. In the context of popular, prodemocracy protests, both military disloyalty and loyalty to the regime are political, but one may help to bring about democratic change.

### **Methodological Contributions**

The most significant methodological contribution of this dissertation is my development of a large-N dataset on military responses to anti-regime protest movements. The minimal existing data on defections groups various types of loyalty shifts together and does not specify the rank and size of the military involved. Some

measure whether or not the military defects at all over the course of the campaign, while others analyze defections at each campaign-year and thus answer a different empirical question.

My dataset advances the empirical record on military responses to protests significantly. My conceptualization of loyalty shifts as types provides new ways of thinking about these responses, and forms a foundation from which other questions related to the military organization can be asked and answered. In doing so, it follows similar developments in the study of coups, where scholars are increasingly differentiating them on the basis of which parts of the military hierarchy participate. They then make claims as to the coups' likelihood of success<sup>526</sup> and their threats to particular leaders versus overall regimes.<sup>527</sup> I have organized military responses in one way, for theoretical and empirical reasons. Other conceptualizations will provide for new analyses of determinants and implications.

Helpfully, the dataset narratives provide overviews of the main events of each protest movement and additional details on the military responses. Using this foundation, future scholars can collect and code new variables that further the research on military involvement in anti-regime protests. Examples of fruitful areas of inquiry include: specifics on the service and rank of the defectors; military involvement in particular instances of repression; the temporal development of the protests and the military

---

<sup>526</sup> Naunihal Singh, *Seizing Power: The Strategic Logic of Military Coups* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014).

<sup>527</sup> Deniz Askoy, David B. Carter, and Joseph Wright, "Terrorism and the Fate of Dictators," *World Politics* 67, no. 3 (2015): 423-468.

responses; the spread of disloyalty from individual soldiers to significant military segments; and the role of other security forces and their relations with the military.

Importantly, I used the data to generate various forms of empirical support for my argument. Each of the methods confirmed my general expectations but revealed something new about the relationship between the explanatory factors and outcomes of interest. Together, they allowed me to estimate the relative importance of coup-proofing and protester characteristics, showed that they combine and condition each other, and illustrate the causal processes linking them to loyalty shifts and from loyalty shifts to democracy. The overall empirical strategy speaks to the value of using multiple techniques to assess a theory's claims, especially given the complexity of the particular phenomena under study here. Despite the shortcomings of my evidence – the relatively small number of cases, the fairly broad and structural independent variables, the possibility of mismeasurement and the challenges of establishing causality – I am confident in my findings because I triangulated methodological approaches to reach them.

### **Policy Implications**

Popular challenges to authoritarian regimes continue, from Venezuela to Iran to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Observers are closely watching their developments, including how each country's military responds. For example, recent reporting on the protests has noted growing splits within the Venezuelan military,<sup>528</sup>

---

<sup>528</sup> Girish Gupta and Anggy Polanco, "All Eyes on Venezuela Military after Protests, Vote," *Reuters*, August 1, 2017, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-politics-military/all-eyes-on-venezuela-militaryafter-protests-vote-idUSKBN1AH5GC>.

speculated whether the Iranian regime will deploy the army,<sup>529</sup> and worried about more repression at the hands of security forces in the Congo.<sup>530</sup> Movement participants and outside observers recognize that the military is key to whether the regime withstands the challenge or the protesters succeed in overthrowing it. This dissertation's argument and findings will thus be of interest to policymakers who support civil-society led democratization and recognize the vital role of the military in protests' outcomes – and who also have concerns about the military's involvement in politics.

Indeed, practitioners have sought answers to the dissertation's questions and at the same time confirmed military defections' importance. Sharp writes that protesters must remove the regime's pillars of support, one being the military,<sup>531</sup> while Ackerman and Merriman include military defections on a "to-do" list for successful movements.<sup>532</sup> They and others do not have a clear understanding of how to achieve this goal, drawn from the experiences of many campaigns. According to this dissertation, whether loyalty shifts occur is partly out of protesters' hands. Much depends on the regime's structuring of its relations with the military – in particular, its use of strategies that protect itself at the expense of military functional capabilities. However, it follows from this framework of military interests and authority that the protest movement can present itself as more

---

<sup>529</sup> Michael Georgy, "Iranian Army Commander Offers to Help Police Suppress Unrest," *Reuters*, January 3, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-rallies/iranian-army-commander-offers-to-help-policesuppress-unrest-idUSKBN1ET0IR>.

<sup>530</sup> "DRC: Death Toll Rises in Anti-Government Protests," *Al Jazeera*, January 1, 2018, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/01/drc-death-toll-rises-anti-government-protests-180101054654009.html>.

<sup>531</sup> Gene Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action* (Porter Sargent Publishers: 1973).

<sup>532</sup> Peter Ackerman and Hardy Merriman, "The Checklist for Ending Tyranny," (2014).

supportive of both than the regime. It can do so by involving more people, from diverse yet organized groups, that are committed to nonviolence. Its leaders should highlight these qualities. Protesters may also want to leverage the post-military defeat period as one during which a military is especially concerned for its authority and perhaps more likely to shift loyalty.

Protest movements and their supporters seek to generate military loyalty shifts because they leave “even the most tyrannical leaders...powerless and vulnerable.”<sup>533</sup> But having achieved the overthrow of the dictator, some movements are disappointed in their attempts to establish democracy. There are many reasons a transition to democracy may fail. Military control over the transition processes is one possibility. This dissertation shows that types of military loyalty shifts vary in their impacts on post-movement political outcomes. Militaries are powerful organizations, and, for better or worse, their involvement in the protests will matter for their involvement in the new civilian governments.

Protesters and their external supporters likely cannot influence whether the military shifts loyalty as a fragmented or united organization, or the strength of the military going into the transition. Once the shift occurs, however, they can and should seek to limit the military’s involvement. A united military organization is dangerous for democracy even if it was supportive of pro-democracy protesters. The Mali case is instructive here, for the Committee for the Coordination of Opposition pressured the

---

<sup>533</sup> Sharon Erickson Nepstad, “Nonviolent Resistance in the Arab Spring: The Critical Role of Military-Opposition Alliances,” *Swiss Political Science Review* 17, no. 4 (2011): 486.

military leadership to include civilians in the interim government.<sup>534</sup> This reduced the military's influence and created space for the democratically-elected civilian government to establish some control over the military. Policymakers that recognize militaries can play positive roles during protests should remain circumspect about the military's continued role in the democracy it helped to usher in.

### **Future Research Program**

Studying the military as I have done here – its involvement in politics short of seizing power, the implications for democratization in civil society-led or other forms, and the effects of its relations with the authoritarian regime – offers a number of avenues for future research. Some of these build on the data I collected for the dissertation; others draw on the dissertation's theoretical framework. First, the data and analysis are more disaggregated than existing quantitative work on defections, yet the relationships could be confirmed at other, some more micro, levels. As I noted in the conclusion of Chapter Three, a number of scholars are collecting new data that measures the specifics of regime control of the military. These efforts will prove useful to investigating more thoroughly the links between particular forms of control and military loyalty shifts or other behaviors, including during non-crisis periods.

Second, the dissertation's argument and findings might be enriched with fieldwork. Interviewing members of the military that did or did not shift loyalty could provide fascinating details as to the "why" behind their individual and organizational responses. The case studies provide some confirmation that militaries perceive coup-proofing as threatening their functional capabilities and authority, but more evidence is

---

<sup>534</sup> P.J. Imperator, "Mali: Downfall of a Dictator," *Africa Report* 36, no. 4 (1991): 26.



needed that they recognize a popular challenge to the regime as a challenge to their delegated authority. It would also be highly interesting to examine how views of the tension between military functional and delegated sources of authority, and the protest movement as an alternative, vary over the course of the protests and across military forces and ranks.

In terms of other research questions, I noted in Chapter One that this study might be extended to violent campaigns. While I would expect military loyalty shifts to be less likely in response to violent anti-regime movements, it is possible that the military, or parts of it, shift loyalty under certain circumstances. Military loyalty shifts during nonviolent or violent campaigns might also have impacts on other post-protest outcomes, such as civil conflict. Fragmented high level shifts are better for democracy, relative to united defections, but a less cohesive military organization may make conflict more likely – by either military factions, or actors which the weak military is unable to counter. Finally, other security forces have different sources of authority, and likely shift loyalty for different reasons than the military. The military's interests in its provision of societal order and stability means it might respond to security forces' loyalty and disloyalty in ways worthy of investigation.

### **Conclusion**

The military is one of the regime's pillars of support, and also the regime's biggest threat. The military can employ its capabilities for violence against elite and nonelite civilians, but also to guard the state and its population from harm. The military can remain loyal to the authoritarian regime in the face of a popular challenge, or remove

loyalty and support democratic change. During major anti-regime protests, military loyalty and disloyalty are both political actions, yet have very different implications for a country's political future. For the opposition, military loyalty shifts are "...a material, psychological, and moral victory"<sup>535</sup> that creates the opportunity for a new system of government. For the military, shifts are a way to ensure its role as guarantor of societal stability and security, and the authority it produces.

Through this dissertation, I have offered an explanation for military loyalty shifts that draws on military interests and authority. I have sought to further our understanding of military roles in politics generally and in the important particular context of prodemocracy civil resistance campaigns. Unarmed civilians will continue to take to the streets in opposition to autocratic regimes, in hopes of a better future but at risk to their lives. Perhaps it is too much to ask for a military in such circumstances to support democratization – but a military that recognizes its authority is better served by regime change may side with the people and bring it about anyway.

---

<sup>535</sup> Richard Andrew Hall, "Theories of Collective Action and Revolution: Evidence from the Romanian Transition of December 1989," *Europe-Asia Studies* 52, no. 6 (2000): 181.

## References

- “2017 Freedom in the World.” *Freedom House*. (2017). <https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world>.
- Ackerman, Peter and Hardy Merriman. “The Checklist for Ending Tyranny.” (2014).
- Aguayo, Julio Javier. “The Legislature Strikes Back in Peru: The Role of Congress in the Demise of Fujimori in 2000.” (2004).
- Aguero, Felipe. “Legacies of Transitions: Institutionalization, the Military, and Democracy in South America.” *International Studies Review* 42, no. 2 (1998): 383-404.
- Alagappa, Muthiah. “Military and Democratic Development in Asia: A Complex Narrative.” In *Military Engagement: Influencing Armed Forces Worldwide to Support Democratic Transitions*, edited by Dennis C. Blair. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2013.
- Alagappa, Muthiah, ed. *Military Professionalism in Asia: Conceptual and Empirical Perspectives*. East-West Center, 2001.
- Albrecht, Holger. “Revolution or Coup d’Etat? The Role of the Military in Egypt.” In *Revolution and Regime Change in Egypt*, edited by Holger Albrecht and Thomas Demmelhuber. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2013.
- Albrecht, Holger. “Does Coup-Proofing Work? Political-Military Relations in Authoritarian Regimes amid the Arab Uprisings.” *Mediterranean Politics* 20, no. 1 (2015): 36-54.
- Albrecht, Holger and Dorothy Ohl. “Exit, Resistance, Loyalty: Military Behavior during Unrest in Authoritarian Regimes.” *Perspectives on Politics* 14, no. 1 (2016): 38-52.
- Annan, Nancy. “Violent Conflicts and Civil Strife in West Africa: Causes, Challenges, and Prospects.” *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development* 3, no. 1 (2014).
- Arce, Moises. “Political Violence and Political Approval in Peru.” *The Journal of Politics* 65, no. 2 (2003): 572-583.
- Askoy, Deniz, David B. Carter, and Joseph Wright. “Terrorism and the Fate of Dictators.” *World Politics* 67, no. 3 (2015): 423-468.

- Avant, Deborah. "Conflicting Indicators of 'Crisis' in American Civil-Military Relations." *Armed Forces and Society* 24, no. 3 (1998): 375-388.
- Avant, Deborah D. *The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
- Ayissi, Anatole and Nouhoum Sangare. "Mali." In *Budgeting for the Military Sector in Africa*. <http://books.sipri.org/files/books/SIPRI06OmHu/SIPRI06OmHu06.pdf>.
- Balbi, Carmen Rosa and David Scott Palmer. "'Reinventing' Democracy in Peru." *Current History* 100, no. 643 (2001): 65-72.
- Ball, Nicole. "The Military in Politics: Who Benefits and How." *World Development* 9, no. 6 (1981): 569-582.
- Barany, Zoltan. "The Role of the Military." *Journal of Democracy* 22, no. 4 (2011): 24-35.
- Barea, Juan Carlos Castilla. "The Malian Armed Forces Reform and the Future of EUTM." *Instituto Espanol de Estudios Estrategicos* (2013).
- Barr, Robert R. "The Persistence of Neopopulism in Peru? From Fujimori to Toledo." *Third World Quarterly* 24, no. 6 (2003): 1161-1178.
- Baynham, S.J. "The Military in Africa." *Africa Insight* 15, no. 4 (1985).
- Beissinger, Mark R. "Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena: The Diffusion of Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions." *Perspectives on Politics* 5, no. 2 (2007).
- Belkin, Aaron. *United We Stand? Divide-and-Conquer Politics and the Logic of International Hostility*. Albany, New York: SUNY Press, 2005.
- Belkin, Aaron and Evan Schofer. "Toward a Structural Understanding of Coup Risk." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 47, no. 5 (2003): 594-620.
- Bell, Curtis and Jun Koga Sudduth. "The Cases and Outcomes of Coup during Civil War." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61, no. 7 (2015): 1432-1455.
- Bellin, Eva. "The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective." *Comparative Politics* 36, no. 2 (2004): 139-157.
- Bellin, Eva. "Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons from the Arab Spring." *Comparative Politics* 44, no. 2 (2012): 127-149.

- Benjaminsen, Tor A. "Does Supply-Induced Scarcity Drive Violent Conflicts in the African Sahel?" *Journal of Peace Research* 45, no. 6 (2008): 819-836.
- Bennett, E., and D. Mallick. "Country Report (Bangladesh)." *CEMARE*.
- Bertocci, Peter J. "Bangladesh in the Early 1980s: Praetorian Politics in an Intermediate Regime." *Asian Survey* 22, no. 10 (1982): 988-1008.
- Biddle, Stephen and Robert Zirkle. "Technology, Civil-Military Relations, and Warfare in the Developing World." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 19, no. 2 (1996): 171-212.
- Binnendijk, Anika Locke and Ivan Marovic. "Power and Persuasion: Nonviolent Strategies to Influence State Security Forces in Serbia (2000) and Ukraine (2004)." *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 39, no. 3 (2006): 411-429.
- Bohmelt, Tobias and Ulrich Pilster. "The Impact of Institutional Coup-Proofing on Coup Attempts and Coup Outcomes." *International Interactions* 41, no. 1 (2015): 158-162.
- Bou Nassif, Hicham. "Generals and Autocrats: How Coup-Proofing Predetermined the Military Elite's Behavior in the Arab Spring." *Political Science Quarterly* 130, no. 2 (2015): 245-275.
- Bourke, Gerald. "Mali Army Deposes President." *The Independent*. March 27, 1991.
- Braumoeller, Bear F. "Guarding Against False Positives in Qualitative Comparative Analysis." *Political Analysis* 23, no. 4 (2015): 471-487.
- Brockman, N.C. "Traore, Moussa." In *African Biographical Dictionary*. Amenia, New York: Grey House Publishing, 2006.
- Brooks, Risa. "Abandoned at the Palace: Why the Tunisian Military Defected from the Ben Ali Regime in January 2011." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 36, no. 2 (2013): 205-220.
- Brown, Cameron S., Christopher J. Fariss, and Blake McMahon. "Recouping after Coup-Proofing: Compromised Military Effectiveness and Strategic Substitution." *International Interactions* 42, no. 1 (2016): 1-30.
- Brown, Derek. "Bangladesh on Brink of Violence after 'Election'." *The Guardian (London)*, March 17, 1988.
- Brown, Derek and Arshad Mahmud. "Ershad Ready to Talk Peace After Week of Street Clashes." *The Guardian (London)*, November 18, 1987.

- Burnell, Peter. "Autocratic Opening to Democracy: Why Legitimacy Matters." *Third World Quarterly* 27, no. 4 (2006): 545-562.
- Burt, Jo-Marie. "'Quien Habla es Terrorista:' The Political Use of Fear in Fujimori's Peru." *Latin American Research Review* 41, no.3 (2006): 32-62.
- Burton, Michael G., Richard Gunther, and John Higley. "Introduction: Elite Transformations and Democratic Regimes." In *Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe*, edited by John Higley and Richard Gunther, 1-37. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
- Callahan, Mary P. "Civil-Military Relations in Indonesia: Reformasi and Beyond." *Occasional Paper* no. 4. Monterey, California: Center for Civil-Military Relations Naval Postgraduate School, 1999.
- Casper, Brett Allen and Scott A. Tyson. "Popular Protest and Elite Coordination in a Coup d'etat." *The Journal of Politics* 76, no. 2 (2014): 548-564.
- Chambers, Paul, Aurel Croissant, David Kuehn, and Siegfried O. Wolf. "Beyond the Fallacy of Coup-ism: Conceptualizing Civilian Control of the Military in Emerging Democracies." *Democratization* 17, no. 5 (2010): 950-975.
- Chan, Steve. "Explaining War Termination: A Boolean Analysis of Causes." *Journal of Peace Research* 40, no. 1 (2003): 49-66.
- Chaudhry, Naghman. "Pakistan's First Military Coup." Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2012.
- Chenoweth, Erica. "Trends in Nonviolent Resistance and State Response: Is Violence Towards Civilian-based Movements on the Rise?" *Global Responsibility to Protect* 9, no. 1 (2017): 86-100.
- Chenoweth, Erica and Maria Stephan. *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2011.
- Chenoweth, Erica and Orion A. Lewis, "Unpacking Nonviolent Campaigns: Introducing the NAVCO 2.0 Dataset." *Journal of Peace Research* 50, no. 3 (2013): 415-23.
- Chiozza, Giacomo and H.E. Goemans. "International Conflict and the Tenure of Leaders: Is War Still Ex Post Inefficient?" *American Journal of Political Science* 48, no. 3 (2004): 604-619.
- Cisneros, Luis Jaime. "Ex-Security Chief Montesinos Arrives in Peru, VP Resigns." *Agence France Presse*. October 23, 2000.

- Clark, Andrew. "From Military Dictatorship to Democracy: The Democratization Process in Mali." *Journal of Third World Studies* 12, no. 1 (1995): 201.
- Codron, Jeremie. "Putting Factions 'Back In' the Civil-Military Relations Equation." *South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal* Free-Standing Articles (18 October 2007).
- Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Joshua Krusell, Anna Lührmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Constanza Sanhueza Petrarca, Johannes von Römer, Laura Saxer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, and Steven Wilson. "V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v7.1." *Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project* (2017).
- Colomer, Josep M. "Transitions by Agreement: Modeling the Spanish Way." *The American Political Science Review* 84, no. 4 (1991): 1283-1302.
- Cormier, Bill. "AP Photos Staffing." *Associated Press International*. July 27, 2000.
- Cormier, Bill. "Fujimori's Rival: Opposition Leader with a Shaky Base." *Associated Press International*. July 27, 2000.
- Cormier, Bill. "Peru's Armed Forces Declare Support for Fujimori." *The Associated Press*. September 21, 2000.
- Cottey, Andrew, Timothy Edmunds, and Anthony Forster, eds. *Democratic Control of the Military in Postcommunist Europe: Guarding the Guards*. London: Palgrave, 2002.
- Coughlan, Elizabeth P. "Democratizing Civilian Control: The Polish Case." *Armed Forces and Society* 24, no. 4 (1998).
- Crabtree, John. "The Collapse of Fujimorismo: Authoritarianism and its Limits." *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 20, no. 3 (2001): 287-303.
- Crabtree, John and Laurence Whitehead. *Towards Democratic Viability: The Bolivian Experience*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001.
- "Crisis Talks in Dhaka." *Herald Sun*, November 26, 1990.
- Croissant, Aurel. "From Transition to Defective Democracy: Mapping Asian Democratization." *Democratization* 11, no. 5 (2004): 156-178

- Croissant, Aurel, David Kuehn, Philip Lorenz, and Paul Chambers. *Democratization and Civilian Control in Asia*. Springer, 2013.
- Croissant, Aurel and David Kuehn. "Patterns of Civilian Control of the Military in East Asia's New Democracies." *Journal of East Asian Studies* 9, no. 2 (2009): 187-217.
- Croissant, Aurel, David Kuehn, Paul W. Chambers, and Siegfried O. Wolf. "Beyond the Fallacy of Coup-Is: Conceptualizing Civilian Control of the Military in Emerging Democracies." *Democratization* 17, no. 5 (2010): 950-75.
- Crossette, Barbara. "Revolution Brings Bangladesh Hope." *The New York Times*, December 9, 1990.
- D'Anieri, Paul J. "Explaining the Success and Failure of Post-Communist Revolutions." *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 39, no. 3 (2006): 331-350.
- Darling, Frank C. "Student Protest and Political Change in Thailand." *Pacific Affairs* 47, no. 1 (1974).
- De Bruin, Erica. "Preventing Coups d'etat: How Counterbalancing Works." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (2017).
- De Bruin, Erica. "Mapping Coercive Institutions: A New Data Set of State Security Forces, 1960-2010." Forthcoming.
- Debs, Alexandre and H.E. Goemans. "Regime Type, the Fate of Leaders, and War." *American Political Science Review* 104, no. 3 (2010): 430-445.
- DeMerrit, Jacqueline H.R. "Delegating Death." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59, no. 3 (2015): 428- 454.
- Diamond, Larry and Marc F. Plattner, eds. *Civil-Military Relations and Democracy*. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996.
- Dickovick, J. Tyler. "Legacies of Leftism: Ideology, Ethnicity, and Democracy in Benin, Ghana and Mali." *Third World Quarterly* 29, no. 6 (2008): 1119-1137.
- Dow, Jay K. and James W. Endersby. "Multinomial Probit and Multinomial Logit: A Comparison of Choice Models for Voting Research." *Electoral Studies* 23, no. 1 (2004): 107-22.
- "DRC: Death Toll Rises in Anti-Government Protests." *Al Jazeera*. January 1, 2018. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/01/drc-death-toll-rises-anti-government-protests-180101054654009.html>.



- Eckstein, Harry. "Case Studies and Theory in Political Science." In *Handbook of Political Science, vol. 7. Political Science: Scope and Theory*, edited by Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975.
- "Economic Woes Shake Mali's Democracy." *The Christian Science Monitor*. March 14, 1991.
- Einaudi, Luigi R. "Revolution from Within? Military Rule in Peru Since 1968." *Comparative International Development* 8, no. 1 (1973): 71-87.
- Ellner, Steve. "The Contrasting Variants of the Populism of Hugo Chavez and Alberto Fujimori." *Journal of Latin American Studies* 35 (2003): 139-162.
- Enloe, Cynthia H. *Ethnic Soldiers: State Security in Divided Societies*. University of Georgia Press, 1980.
- Escriba-Folch, Abel and Joseph Wright. "Dealing with Tyranny: International Sanctions and the Survival of Authoritarian Rulers." *International Studies Quarterly* 54, no. 2 (2010): 335-359.
- Faiola, Anthony. "How Fujimori's Power Unraveled; Peruvian's Ally Aided His Rise, and His Fall." *The Washington Post*. September 24, 2000.
- Faiola, Anthony. "Military is Focus of Peru Crisis; Fate of Ex-Official Remains Unclear." *The Washington Post*. September 19, 2000.
- Farcau, Bruce W. *The Transition to Democracy in Latin America: The Role of the Military*. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 1996.
- Faul, Michelle. "Soldiers Fire on Protesters in Mali, Kill 22." *The Associated Press*. March 22, 1991.
- Faul, Michelle. "Thousands Strike to Demand President's Resignation." *The Associated Press*. March 25, 1991.
- Faul, Michelle. "Witnesses: Troops Fire on Protesters, Block Hospitals." *The Associated Press*. March 24, 1991.
- Feaver, Peter D. "The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control." *Armed Forces and Society* 23, no. 2 (1996): 149-178.
- Feaver, Peter D. "Civil-Military Relations." *Annual Review of Political Science* 2 (1999): 211-241.

- Finer, Samuel E. *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*. Transaction Publishers, 2002.
- Fisher, Earleen. "Alert for Military Threats, Ershad Underestimated the People." *The Associated Press*, December 5, 1990.
- Flamini, Roland. "Global Impact News Alert." *United Press International*. September 18, 2000.
- "Fujimori Calls for Reconciliation Ahead of New Elections." *Agence France Presse*. October 11, 2000.
- "Fujimori's Future Tied to Spy Chief." *The Toronto Star*. September 26, 2000.
- Gaub, Florence. "The Libyan Armed Forces between Coup-Proofing and Repression." *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 36, no. 2 (2013): 221-244.
- Geddes, Barbara. "What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 2, no. 1 (1999): 115-144.
- Geddes, Barbara, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz. "Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A New Data Set." *Perspectives on Politics* 12, no. 2 (2014): 313-31.
- Gellner, David N. "Nepal and Bhutan in 2006: A Year in Revolution." *Asian Survey* 47, no. 1 (2007): 80-86.
- Georgy, Michael. "Iranian Army Commander Offers to Help Police Suppress Unrest." *Reuters*. January 3, 2018. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-rallies/iranian-army-commander-offers-to-help-police-suppress-unrest-idUSKBN1ET0IR>.
- Gerring, John and Lee Cojocar. "Case-Selection: A Diversity of Methods and Criteria." *Sociological Methods and Research* (2016).
- Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede. "Expanded Trade and GDP Data." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46, no. 5 (2002): 712-24.
- Goemans, Henk E., Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Giacomo Chiozza. "Introducing Archigos: A Dataset of Political Leaders." *Journal of Peace Research* 46, no. 2 (2009): 269-83.
- "Group of Peruvian Soldiers Revolt Against Fujimori." *Agence France Presse*. October 29, 2000.

- Gupta, Girish and Anggy Polanco. "All Eyes on Venezuela Military after Protests, Vote." *Reuters*. August 1, 2017. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-politics-military/all-eyes-on-venezuela-military-after-protests-vote-idUSKBN1AH5GC>.
- Hagopian, Frances. "'Democracy by Undemocratic Means?'" *Comparative Political Studies* 23, no. 2 (1990): 147-170.
- Hakim, Muhammad A. "Bangladesh: The Beginning of the End of Militarized Politics?" *Contemporary South Asia* 7, no. 3 (1998): 289-90.
- Hale, Henry E. "Regime Cycles: Democracy, Autocracy, and Revolution in Post-Soviet Eurasia." *World Politics* 58, no. 1 (2005): 133-65.
- Hall, Richard Andrew. "Theories of Collective Action and Revolution: Evidence from the Romanian Transition of December 1989." *Europe-Asia Studies* 52, no. 6 (2000): 1069-93.
- Harkness, Kristen A. "The Ethnic Army and the State." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 60, no. 4 (2016): 587-616.
- Hayes, Monte. "AP Photo LIM101-102." *Associated Press International*. July 28, 2000.
- Hayes, Monte. "AP Photos LIM101-102." *Associated Press International*. September 18, 2000.
- Hayes, Monte. "Fujimori Meets with Cabinet to Pave Way for New Elections." *The Associated Press*. September 17, 2000.
- Hayes, Monte. "Peru's Fujimori Facing Massive Protests as He Assumes Third Term." *The Associated Press*. July 26, 2000.
- Hayes, Monte. "Peruvians Relieved Spy Chief Gone, But Worry He Can Strike From Abroad." *The Associated Press*. September 26, 2000.
- Hayes, Monte. "Two Dead, Dozens Injured, Buildings Ablaze as Fujimori Takes Oath in Peru." *The Associated Press*. July 28, 2000.
- Horowitz, Donald L. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. University of California Press, 1985.
- Hossain, Farid. "Law Sparks Clashes, Strike Shuts Down Dhaka." *The Associated Press*, July 13, 1987.
- Hossain, Farid. "President Resigns, Hands Over Power." *The Associated Press*, December 6, 1990.

- Houngnikpo, Mathurin C. "The Military and Democratization in Africa: A Comparative Study of Benin and Togo." *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 28, no. 2 (2000): 210-229.
- Hoyt, Timothy D. "Social Structure, Ethnicity, and Military Effectiveness: Iraq, 1980-2004." *Military Power* (2007): 55-79.
- Huband, Mark. "Army Seizes Power in Mali After Up to 170 Die in Riots." *The Guardian*. March 27, 1991.
- Huband, Mark. "Death Toll in Mali Violence Nears 150." *The Guardian*. March 25, 1991.
- Huband, Mark. "Malian Pro-Democracy Activists Demand Role in Government." *United Press International*. March 28, 1991.
- Huband, Mark. "Mali's Traore Overthrown in Putsch." *United Press International*. March 26, 1991.
- "Human Rights Group Accuses Mali of Torturing Children." *The Associated Press [London]*. January 29, 1991.
- Hunter, Wendy. "Continuity or Change? Civil-Military Relations in Democratic Argentina, Chile, and Peru." *Political Science Quarterly* 112, no. 3 (1997): 453-475.
- Huntington, Samuel P. *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957.
- Huntington, Samuel P. "How Countries Democratize." *Political Science Quarterly* 106, no. 4 (1991): 579-616.
- Huq, Parvaz Azharul. "Civil Society and Democratization in Bangladesh." *Social Change* 35, no. 2 (2005): 85-100.
- Imperator, PJ. "Mali: Downfall of a Dictator." *Africa Report* 36, no. 4 (1991): 24.
- Islam, Syed Serajul. "The State in Bangladesh under Zia (1975-81)." *Asian Survey* 24, no. 5 (1984): 556-73.
- Jackman, Robert W. "The Predictability of Coups d'etat: A Model with African Data." *American Political Science Review* 72, no. 4 (1978): 1262-1275.
- Janowitz, Morris. *The Professional Soldier*. Simon and Schuster, 1960.

- Jaskoski, Maiah. "Civilian Control of the Armed Forces in Democratic Latin America: Military Prerogatives, Contestation, and Mission Performance in Peru." *Armed Forces and Society* 38, no.1 (2012): 70-91.
- Johnstad, Petter Grahl. "Nonviolent Democratization: A Sensitivity Analysis of How Transition Mode and Violence Impact the Durability of Democracy." *Peace and Change* 35, no. 3 (2010): 464-82
- Kabir, Bhuian Monoar. "Politico-Economic Limitations and the Fall of the Military-Authoritarian Government in Bangladesh." *Armed Forces and Society* 21, no. 4 (1995): 553-72.
- Kamrava, Mehran. "Military Professionalization and Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East." *Political Science Quarterly* 115, no. 1 (2000): 67-92.
- Karatnycky, Adrian and Peter Ackerman. *How Freedom is Won: From Civil Resistance to Durable Democracy*. New York, NY: Freedom House, 2005.
- Karl, Terry Lynn. "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America." *Comparative Politics* 23, no. 1 (1990): 1-21.
- Khan, Mohammad Tanzimuddin. "Working of Democracy in Bangladesh." Paper prepared for the Project on State of Democracy in South Asia, *Lokniti Centre for the Study of Developing Societies* (2008).
- Kohn, Richard H. "How Democracies Control the Military." *Journal of Democracy* 8, no. 4 (1997): 140-153.
- Krings, Thomas. "Marginalization and Revolt Among the Tuareg in Mali and Niger." *GeoJournal* 36, no. 1 (1995): 57-63.
- Kuehn, David. "Midwives or Gravediggers of Democracy? The Military's Impact on Democratic Development." *Democratization* 24, no. 5 (2017): 783-800.
- Kulkarni, V.G. "Armed Neutrality: Military Chief to Seek Apolitical Role for Forces." *Far Eastern Economic Review* 150, no. 52 (1990): 14-15.
- Kulkarni, V.G. "Cycle of the Repression Returns with Emergency Rule: Full Circle." *The Far Eastern Economic Review*, December 6, 1990.
- Kreutz, Joakim. "How and When Armed Conflicts End: Introducing the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset." *Journal of Peace Research* 47, no. 2 (2010): 243-50.
- Lama, Abraham. "Politics-Peru: Montesinos' Return Heightens Crisis." *IPS-Inter Press Service*. October 23, 2000.

- Lecocq, Baz and Georg Klute. "Tuareg Separatism in Mali." *International Journal* 68, no. 3 (2013): 424-434.
- Lee, Terence. "The Armed Forces and Transitions from Authoritarian Rule." *Comparative Political Studies* 42, no. 5 (2009): 640-669.
- Lee, Terence. *Defect or Defend: Military Responses to Popular Protests in Authoritarian Asia*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014.
- Levitsky, Steven. "Fujimori and Post-Party Politics in Peru." *Journal of Democracy* 10, no. 3 (1999): 78-92.
- Levitsky, Steven and Maxwell A. Cameron. "Democracy Without Parties? Political Parties and Regime Change in Fujimori's Peru." *Latin American Politics and Society* 45, no. 3 (2003): 1-33.
- Linz, Juan J. and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.
- Lode, Kare. "The Peace Process in Mali." *Security Dialogue* 28, no. 4 (1997): 409-424.
- Londregan, John B. and Keith T. Poole. "Poverty, the Coup Trap, and the Seizure of Executive Power." *World Politics* 42, no. 4 (1990): 151-183.
- Luengo-Cabrera, Jose. "Symptoms of an Enduring Crisis: Prospects for Addressing Mali's Conflict Catalysts." *Africa Policy Journal* 8 (2012): 9-19.
- Lutscher, Philipp M. "The More Fragmented the Better? The Impact of Armed Forces Structure on Defection during Nonviolent Popular Uprisings." *International Interactions* 42, no. 2 (2016): 350-375.
- Lutterbeck, Derek. "Arab Uprisings, Armed Forces, and Civil-Military Relations." *Armed Forces and Society* 39, no. 1 (2013): 28-52.
- Luttwak, Edward. *Coup d'etat*. Penguin Press, 1968.
- Magaloni, Beatriz. "Credible Power-Sharing and the Longevity of Authoritarian Rule." *Comparative Political Studies* 41, no. 4-5 (2008): 715-741.
- Mainwaring, Scott. "Brazilian Party Underdevelopment in Comparative Perspective." *Political Science Quarterly* 107, no. 4 (1992): 677-707.

- “Major Episodes of Contention Data Project.” Unpublished dataset.  
[https://www.du.edu/korbel/sie/research/chenow\\_mec\\_major\\_episodes\\_contention-1.html](https://www.du.edu/korbel/sie/research/chenow_mec_major_episodes_contention-1.html).
- Makara, Michael. “Rethinking Military Behavior during the Arab Spring.” *Defense & Security Analysis* 32, no. 3 (2016): 209-223.
- “Mali Ex-Ruler Rejects Pardon.” *BBC News*. May 30, 2002.
- “Mali Human Rights Practices, 1993.” *U.S. Department of State*. January 31, 1994.  
[http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/democracy/1993\\_hrp\\_report/93hrp\\_report\\_africa/Mali.html](http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/democracy/1993_hrp_report/93hrp_report_africa/Mali.html).
- “Mali President Said Captured by Troops.” *The Associated Press*. March 25, 1991.
- Manthorpe, Jonathan. “Another Family Autocracy Falls.” *Edmonton Journal*. March 27, 1991.
- Marcum, Anthony S. and Jonathan N. Brown. “Overthrowing the ‘Loyalty Norm’: The Prevalence and Success of Coups in Small-Coalition Systems, 1950 to 1999.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 60, no. 2 (2016): 256-82.
- Marcum, Anthony S. and Jonathan N. Brown. “Is More Institutional Coup-Proofing Better or Worse for Regime Protection? Evidence from the Philippines, 1986-1987.” *Asian Journal of Political Science* 25, no. 1 (2017): 109-129.
- Marinov, Nikolay and Hein Goemans. “Coups and Democracy.” *British Journal of Political Science* 44, no. 4 (2014): 799-825.
- Mayer, Robert. “Strategies of Justification in Authoritarian Ideology.” *Journal of Political Ideologies* 6, no. 2 (2001): 147-168.
- Max, Arthur. “Mass Demonstrations in Bangladesh in Defiance of State of Emergency.” *The Associated Press*, November 30, 1990.
- McCargo, Duncan. “Are Military Coups Going Out of Style?” *Institute for Advanced Study*. 2016. <https://www.ias.edu/ideas/2016/mccargo-coups>.
- McClintock, Cynthia. “An Unlikely Comeback in Peru.” *Journal of Democracy* 17, no. 4 (2006): 95-109.
- McGowan, Patrick J. “African Military Coups d’etat, 1956-2001: Frequency, Trends, and Distribution.” *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 41, no. 3 (2003): 339-70.
- McGregor, Andrew. “Red Berets, Green Berets.” *Terrorism Monitor* 11, no. 4 (2013).

- McLaughlin, Theodore. "Loyalty Strategies and Military Defection in Rebellion." *Comparative Politics* 42, no. 3 (2010): 333-350.
- "Military Overthrows Mali Dictator, Promises Democracy." *The Associated Press*. March 26, 1991.
- Moestrup, Sophia. "The Role of Actors and Institutions: The Difficulties of Democratic Survival in Mali and Niger." *Democratization* 6, no. 2 (1999): 171-186.
- Morency-Laflamme, Julien. "A Question of Trust: Military Defection During Regime Crises in Benin and Togo." *Democratization* 25, no. 3 (2018): 464-80.
- Munevar, Maria Victoria Whittingham. "The Fall of Fujimori in Peru: A Case of Global Governance." (2004).
- Munoz, Reynaldo. "News Fujimori to Resign Triggers Consternation in Peru." *Agence France Presse*. November 19, 2000.
- Munoz, Reynaldo. "Peru's Fujimori to Resign by Tuesday: Prime Minister." *Agence France Presse*. November 19, 2000.
- Munoz, Reynaldo. "Peruvian President Dismisses Possibility of Coup." *Agence France Presse*. October 25, 2000.
- Munoz, Reynaldo. "President Dismisses Possibility of Coup." *Agence France Presse*. October 25, 2000.
- Needler, Martin C. "Political Development and Socioeconomic Development: The Case of Latin America." *American Political Science Review* 62, no. 3 (1968): 889-897.
- Needler, Martin C. "Military Motivations in the Seizure of Power." *Latin American Research Review* 10, no. 3 (1975): 63-79.
- Neher, Clark D. "Stability and Instability in Contemporary Thailand." *Asian Survey* 15, no. 12 (1975): 1097-113.
- Nepstad, Sharon Erickson. "Nonviolent Resistance in the Arab Spring: The Critical Role of Military-Opposition Alliances." *Swiss Political Science Review* 17, no. 4 (2011): 485-491.
- Nepstad, Sharon Erickson. "Mutiny and Nonviolence in the Arab Spring." *Journal of Peace Research* 50, no. 3 (2013): 337-349.
- Nepstad, Sharon Erickson. *Nonviolent Struggle: Theories, Strategies, and Dynamics*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2015.



- Nordlinger, Eric A. "Soldiers in Mufti: The Impact of Military Rule Upon Economic and Social Change in Non-Western States." *American Political Science Review* 64, no. 4 (1970): 1131- 1148.
- Nordlinger, Eric A. *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments*. Prentice Hall, 1977.
- Nossiter, Adam. "Soldiers Overthrow Mali Government in Setback for Democracy in Africa." *The New York Times*. March 22, 2012.
- Novicki, Margaret A. "Interview: Soumana Sako: Managing the Transition." *Africa Report* 36, no. 5 (1991).
- Obando, Enrique. "Fujimori and the Military." *NACLA Report on the Americas* 30, no. 1 (1996).
- O'Donnell, Guillermo. *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics*. No. 9. Berkeley: Institution of International Studies, University of California, 1973.
- O'Donnell, Guillermo. "Transitions, Continuities, and Paradoxes." *Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective* (1992): 17- 56.
- O'Donnell, Guillermo and Philippe C. Schmitter. *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.
- Osuna, Jose Javier Olivas. "The Deep Roots of the Carnation Revolution: 150 years of Military Interventionism in Portugal." *Portuguese Journal of Social Science* 13, no. 2 (2014): 215-231.
- Oyo, Remi. "West Africa: Change and Conflict." *IPS-Inter Press Service*. March 27, 1991.
- Peabody, Robert L. "Perceptions of Organizational Authority: A Comparative Analysis." *Administrative Science Quarterly* 6, no. 4 (1962): 463-482.
- Peiris, G.H. "Political Conflict in Bangladesh." *Ethnic Studies Report* 16, no. 1 (1998).
- "Peruvian Army Orders Rebellion to be Put Down, as Rebels Take Hostage." *Agence France Presse*. October 29, 2000.

- “Peru’s Embattled President Fujimori Calls New Elections, Says He Won’t Run; His Re-election Has Been Criticized Internationally as Corrupt.” *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*. September 17, 2000.
- “Peru Police Use Tear Gas Against Demonstrators Supporting Revolt.” *Agence France Presse*. October 31, 2000.
- “Peru Transportation Strike Worsens Amid Political Congress.” *Associated Press International*. September 27, 2000.
- Pilster, Ulrich and Tobias Bohmelt. “Coups-Proofing and Military Effectiveness in Interstate Wars, 1969-99.” *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 28, no. 4 (2011): 331-350.
- Pilster, Ulrich and Tobias Bohmelt. “Do Democracies Engage Less in Coups-Proofing? On the Relationship between Regime Type and Civil-Military Relations.” *Foreign Policy Analysis* 8, no. 4 (2012): 355-372.
- Pinckney, Jonathan. “Expanding GWF Data.” Unpublished dataset (2016).
- Pion-Berlin, David. “Military Autonomy and Emerging Democracies in South America.” *Comparative Politics* 25, no. 1 (1992): 83-102.
- Pion-Berlin, David, ed. *Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: New Analytical Perspectives*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001.
- Piplani, Varun and Caitlin Talmadge. “When War Helps Civil-Military Relations.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 60, no. 8 (2015): 1368-1394.
- Powell, Jonathan. “Determinants of the Attempting and Outcome of Coups d’etat.” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 56, no. 6 (2012): 1017-1040.
- Powell, Jonathan. “Regime Vulnerability and the Diversionary Threat of Force.” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 58, no. 1 (2014): 169-196.
- Powell, Jonathan M. and Clayton L. Thyne. “Global Instances of Coups from 1950 to 2010: A New Dataset.” *Journal of Peace Research* 48, no. 2 (2011): 249-59.
- Powell, Jonathan, Trace Lasley, and Rebecca Schiel. “Combating Coups d’etat in Africa, 1950-2014.” *Studies in Comparative International Development* 51, no. 4 (2016): 482-502.
- “President Arrested in Mali Takeover.” *The Toronto Star*. March 27, 1991.

- Przeworski, Adam, *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
- Quinliven, James T. "Coup-Proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East." *International Security* 24, no. 2 (1999): 131-165.
- Ragin, Charles C. *Fuzzy-Set Social Science*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2000.
- Ragin, Charles C. *Redesigning Social Inquiry: Fuzzy Sets and Beyond*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2008.
- Rahman, Syedur. "Bangladesh in 1989: Precarious Institution Building Amid Crisis Management." *Asian Survey* 29, no. 2 (1989): 216-22.
- Renique, Gerardo and Deborah Poole. "Popular Movements, the Legacy of the Left, and the Fall of Fujimori." *Socialism and Democracy* 14, no. 2 (2000): 53-74.
- Rihoux, Benoit. "Case-Oriented Configurational Research Using QCA (Qualitative Comparative Analysis)." In *Oxford Handbook of Political Science: Methodology*, edited by Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier, Henry E. Brady, and David Collier. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
- Rihoux, Benoit and Charles C. Ragin, eds. *Configurational Comparative Methods: Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and Related Techniques*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2009.
- Rivera Celestino, Mauricio and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch. "Fresh Carnations or All Thorn, No Rose? Nonviolent Campaigns and Transitions in Autocracies." *Journal of Peace Research* 50, no. 3 (2013): 385-400.
- Rizvi, Arshad Javed. "Civil-Military Relations: A Comparative Study of Pakistan." *International Research Journal of Interdisciplinary and Multidisciplinary Studies* 1, no. 8 (2015): 34-44.
- Rizvi, Gowher. "Bangladesh: Towards Civil Society." *The World Today* 47, no. 8/9 (1991): 155-60.
- Salih, Kamal Osman. "The Sudan, 1985-9: The Fading Democracy," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 28, no. 2 (1990): 199-224.
- Sanborn, Cynthia, Francisco Eguiguren, Bruce Kay, and Michele Schimpp. "Democracy and Governance in Peru: An Assessment." *USAID* (2000).

- Sandomirsky, N. "Mali, Republic of: Traore, Moussa." In *Encyclopedia of African History*, edited by K. Shillington. London, UK: Routledge, 2004.
- Schneider, Carsten Q. and Claudius Wagemann. *Set-Theoretic Methods for the Social Sciences: A Guide to Qualitative Comparative Analysis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
- Scobell, A. "Why the People's Army Fired on the People: The Chinese Military and Tiananmen." *Armed Forces and Society* 18, no. 2 (1992): 193-213.
- Seawright, Jason and John Gerring. "Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research." *Political Research Quarterly* 61, no. 2 (2008): 294-308.
- Sechser, Todd S. and Elizabeth N. Saunders. "The Army You Have: The Determinants of Military Mechanization, 1979-2001." *International Studies Quarterly* 54, no. 2 (2010): 481-511.
- Shamsie, Yasmine. "Building 'Low-Intensity' Democracy in Haiti: The Contribution," *Third World Quarterly* 25, no. 6 (2004): 1097-1115.
- Share, Donald and Scott Mainwaring. "Transitions through Transaction: Democratization in Brazil and Spain." In *Political Liberalization in Brazil: Dynamics, Dilemmas, and Future*, edited by Wayne Selcher, 175-215. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1986.
- Sharp, Gene. *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*. Porter Sargent Publishers: 1973.
- Shelley, B. "Protest and Globalization: Media, Symbols, and Audience in the Drama of Democratization." *Democratization* 8, no. 4 (2001): 155-174.
- Simpson, Chris. "Politics-Mali: Ex-Military Leader Favored to Win Elections." *Global Information Network*. May 2002.
- Singer, J. David, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey. "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965." In *Peace, War, and Numbers*, edited by Bruce M. Russett, 19-48. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1972.
- Singh, Naunihal. *Seizing Power: The Strategic Logic of Military Coups*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014.
- Sow, Alioune. "Nervous Confessions Military Memoirs and National Reconciliation in Mali." *Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines* 50, no. 197 (2010): 69-93.
- Stepan, Alfred. *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone*. Princeton University Press, 1988.

- Stepan, Alfred. *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971.
- Stepan, Alfred C. *The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978.
- Storholt, Kristine Hauge. "Lessons learned from the 1990-1997 peace process in the North of Mali." *International Negotiation* 6 (2001): 331-356.
- "Strikers Return to Work in City Marred by Debris from Riots, Coup." *The Associated Press*. March 27, 1991.
- Sudduth, Jun Koga. "Coups Risk, Coup-Proofing, and Leader Survival." *Journal of Peace Research* 54, no. 1 (2017): 3-15.
- Sukma, Rizal. "The Military and Democratic Reform in Indonesia." In *Military Engagement: Influencing Armed Forces Worldwide to Support Democratic Transitions*, edited by Dennis Blair, 113-138. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2013.
- Svolik, Milan W. "Power Sharing and Leadership Dynamics in Authoritarian Regimes." *American Journal of Political Science* 53, no. 2 (2009): 477-494.
- Svolik, Milan W. "Moral Hazard in Authoritarian Repression and the Fate of Dictators." *Political Economist* 53, no. 2 (2011): 7-9.
- Svolik, Milan W. *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*. Cambridge University Press, 2012.
- Talmadge, Caitlin. *The Dictator's Army: Battlefield Effectiveness in Authoritarian Regimes*. Cornell University Press, 2015.
- Taylor, Lewis. "Alberto Fujimori's Peripeteia: From 'Re-Eleccion' to Regime Collapse." *European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies* (2001): 3-24.
- Taylor, Lewis. "From Fujimori to Toledo: The 2001 Elections and the Vicissitudes of Democratic Government in Peru." *Government and Opposition* 40, no. 4 (2005): 565-596.
- Teorell, Jan. *Determinants of Democratization: Explaining Regime Change in the World, 1972-2006*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
- The World Bank. *World Development Indicators*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- The World Factbook*. Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 1985.

- Thompson, Mark R. "Stolen Elections: The Case of the Serbian October." *Journal of Democracy* 15, no. 4 (2004): 159-172.
- Thompson, William R. *The Grievances of Military Coup-Makers* No. 47. Sage Publications, 1973.
- Thompson, William R. "Democracy and Peace: Putting the Cart Before the Horse?" *International Organization* 50 (1996): 141-174.
- Thompson, William R. "Organizational Cohesion and Military Coup Outcomes," *Comparative Political Studies* 9, no. 3 (1976): 255-76.
- Toronto, Nathan W. "Military Recruitment Data Set, version 2014." <http://www.nathantoronto.com/academicresearch>.
- "Troops Barred from Joining Rebellious Lieutenant." *Deutsche Presse-Agentur*. November 1, 2000.
- Turriffin, Jane. "Mali: People Topple Traore." *Review of African Political Economy* 52 (1991): 97-103.
- Valenzuela, Arturo. "A Note on the Military and Social Science Theory." *Third World Quarterly* 7, no. 1 (1985): 132-143.
- Valenzuela, J. Samuel. "Labor Movements in Transitions to Democracy: A Framework for Analysis." *Comparative Politics* 21, no. 4 (1989): 445-472.
- Van Acker, Tomas. "Understanding Burundi's Predicament." *Africa Policy Brief* 11 (2015).
- Vecchio, Rick. "Peru Government Looks to Thwart Huge Protest." *The Associated Press*. July 26, 2000.
- Vecchio, Rick. "Peruvian Congress Votes to Dismantle Exiled Spy Chief's Agency." *The Associated Press*. September 28, 2000.
- Vecchio, Rick. "Urgent,0599 BC-Peru." *Associated Press International*. October 25, 2000.
- Weeks, Jessica L. "Strongmen and Straw Men: Authoritarian Regimes and the Initiation of International Conflict." *American Political Science Review* 106, no. 2 (2012): 326-347.
- Whitaker, Raymond. "Martial Law Looms in Bangladesh." *The Independent (London)*, November 30, 1990.

- Wilkinson, Steven I. "Democratic Consolidation and Failure: Lessons from Bangladesh and Pakistan." *Democratization* 7, no. 3 (2000): 203-226.
- Wills, Maria Emma. "Peru's Failed Search for Political Stability." *Crisis States Programme Working Papers* 1 (2003).
- Wing, Susanna D. "Mali: Politics of a Crisis." *African Affairs* 112, no. 448 (2013): 476-485.
- Wolpin, Miles D. "Dependency and Conservative Militarism in Mali." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 13, no. 4 (1975): 585-620.
- Wolpin, Miles D. "Legitimizing State Capitalism: Malian Militarism in Third-World Perspective." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 18, no. 2 (1980): 281-295.
- "World Peru Debt Relief Sought." *St. Louis Post-Dispatch News*. January 23, 1991.
- Wright, Joseph. "How Foreign Aid Can Foster Democratization in Authoritarian Regimes." *American Journal of Political Science* 53, no. 3 (2009): 552-571.

## APPENDIX A: MILITARY RESPONSE NARRATIVES

### **Albania 1/30/1990-3/31/1991 – loyal**

After months of popular regime opposition, on July 2, 1990, police fired on people trying to flee the country. The government declared a partial state of emergency. Demonstrations were small, but police deployed to guard public buildings at times clashed with protesters. President Ramiz Alia met with some students in the movement on December 10, and then convened the Central Committee so it could declare the introduction of political pluralism. Free elections were scheduled for February, but then postponed until March 31. Protests developed in response, and on February 20, became too large for the police and special troops to deal with. The police injured some demonstrators by firing warning shots, but some members of the security forces reportedly sympathized with them. Alia's government resigned and a new Presidential Council formed to rule until the elections. The military remained loyal to the regime throughout, and was involved in repression, including during demonstrations on February 22. The military was weak though and so most of the repression was the responsibility of internal security forces. The regime had reduced military funding because of economic crisis and used the secret political police and intelligence organizations to purge the military according to loyalty to the Communist party. Some accounts of these events report the Minister of Internal Affairs, Hekuran Isai, refused Alia's orders that the police and security forces end the February unrest. Others dispute this narrative and conclude Alia himself decided against using force. The communists won the mostly free and fair March 1991 elections but their government fell within six months, opening the way to a new, non-communist government.

#### Sources:

- Austin, Robert C. and Jonathan Ellison. "Post-Communist Transitional Justice in Albania." *East European Politics and Society* (2008).
- Biberaj, Elez. "Albania at the Crossroads." *Problems of Communism* 40, no. 5 (1991): 1-16.
- Chiodi, Luisa. "Mass Migration, Student Protests, and the Intelligentsia Popullore in the Albanian Transition to Democracy." *Cosmos WP 2* (2012).
- Danopoulos, Constantine P. and Konstantinos S. Skandalis. "The Military and its Role in Albania's Democratization." *Armed Forces and Society* 37, no. 3 (2011): 399-417.
- Tarifa, Taos. "Albania's Road from Communism: Political and Social Change, 1990-1993." *Development and Change* (1995).

### **Algeria 1/22/2011-5/2/2011 - loyal**

Riots by mostly young men began in early January. On January 20, some of the country's political and social organizations started a new anti-regime campaign that held a march for democracy on January 22. This was quickly broken up by a large police force. The protest movement succeeded at getting the government to give some concessions, including lifting the state of emergency. But continued demonstrations in early February



were unsuccessful and outnumbered by the security forces, mostly riot police. The protesters were also highly internally divided at this point. The military remained loyal to the regime, and overall reacted with restraint, especially relative to earlier protest movements. At this stage the military had a large budget and was involved in economic activities in both the public and private sectors. President Bouteflika had brought the military under his control by forcing some high level resignations in the mid-2000s. At the same time, he promoted a new generation of officers. The military intelligence service (DRS) remained powerful, though, and there was some speculation that the head of the DRS, General Medience, was angered by the resignations.

Sources:

Entelis, John P. "Algeria: democracy denied, and revived?" *The Journal of North African Studies* 16.4 (2011): 653-678.

Layachi, Azzedine. "Algeria's Rebellion by Installments." *Middle East Research and Information Project*, March 12, 2011. <http://www.merip.org/mero/mero031211>.

Ulrich, Marybeth P., and Carol A. Atkinson. "The Arab Spring and Arab Militaries: The Role of the Military in the Transitioning Middle East." Paper presented at the biennial meeting of the International Political Science Association World Congress, Madrid, Spain, July 8-12, 2012.

Volpi, Frederic. "Algeria versus the Arab Spring." *Journal of Democracy* 24.3 (2013): 104-115.

#### **Argentina 4/20/1977-12/10/1983** – fragmented high level

Anti-regime protests began in 1977, but the military junta went through many changes between then and when it fell in 1983. General Roberto Eduardo Viola succeeded General Jorge Rafael Videla as president through regular processes on March 28, 1981. Viola's tenure was cut short when he was ousted by a December 11 coup led by General Leopoldo Galtieri, the Army's Commander in Chief. Viola had begun some political reforms, and Galtieri and other hardliners were opposed to them. The military's divisions remained. Galtieri was a weak leader, but on April 2, 1982, invaded Malvinas, starting the Falklands War. Argentina lost two months later, and Galtieri (presently serving as president, junta member, and army commander) and three other service commanders were forced to resign. General Cristino Nicolaides replaced him as commander of the army, and a caretaker government led by retired General Reynaldo Bignone took power in June. Bignone scheduled elections in line with the recommendations of a multiparty coalition. Military conflicts rose to the surface again, though. Most of the army wanted a continuation of military rule, and Bignone as president meant the army controlled the transition. The air force and navy withdrew from the junta because they wanted a transfer of power. After negotiations, the junta was reestablished in early September, including new air force and navy high commands. It then began negotiations with the opposition. During this time pressure began to build in the lower ranks for an end to military rule. On December 4, 1983, for example, hundreds of conscripts protested against the junta during a military ceremony. This dissent, plus the high level divisions within the military institution, was a fragmented loyalty shifts from the military regime. It agreed to hold

elections and transfer power and in December 1983 Raul Alfonsin, a civilian, became president.

Sources:

Arceneaux, Craig L. "Institutional Design, Military Rule, and Regime Transition in Argentina (1976-1983): An Extension of the Remmer Thesis." *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 16, no. 3 (1997): 327-350.

Goetz, Lieutenant Colonel Robert C. "Argentina: A Country Study. *US Army War College* (1983).

Pion-Berlin, David. "The Fall of Military Rule in Argentina: 1976-1983." *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 27, no. 2 (1985): 55-76.

Zagorski, Paul W. "Civil-Military Relations and Argentine Democracy." *Armed Forces and Society* 14, no. 3 (1988): 407-432.

#### **Armenia 2/20/2007-3/1/2009 - loyal**

Protests ramped up in response to the February 2008 presidential election, which the ruling party candidate (Prime Minister Serzh Sargsyan) won. During protests on March 1, 2009, hundreds of security personnel moved into the city center to break up the crowd, setting off violent clashes. In response, the incumbent president declared a state of emergency. The protests effectively ended at that point. The overall security apparatus was known to be large and experienced, and was effective in ending the popular challenge to the government.

Sources:

Hess, Steve. "Protests, Parties, and Presidential Succession." *Problems of Post-Communism* 57.1 (2010): 28-39.

#### **Bahrain 2/15/2011-5/1/2015 (ongoing) - loyal**

Calls for reform led to demonstrations starting on February 14, 2011. On February 17, the king ordered the police to attack the protesters. This set off an escalatory dynamic, where the regime increased repression, strengthening the demonstrations as well as the protesters' demands. They came to call for an end to the monarchy. While the protests weren't sectarian, they mostly involved Shiites, and one of their demands was for the regime to end its practice of recruiting Sunni foreigners to join the armed forces to increase the Sunni proportion. Sunnis dominated the highest political and military posts, as well as the officer and rank and file positions. The king's concessions and the police's efforts did not end the protests, so on March 15 the regime declared a state of emergency. The military and other security forces, along with troops from Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Qatar, forcefully cleared the main square of demonstrators. There were divisions within the regime over how to respond, but these did not seem to be reflected in the military. A report was commissioned in the months following in an attempt to bring about reconciliation. It criticized the government's repression, but put most of the blame on unnamed, low-ranking officers.

Sources:

Ambrosio, Thomas. "Democratic States and Authoritarian Firewalls." *Contemporary Politics* 20, no. 3 (2014): 331-346.

Josua, Maria and Mirjam Edel. "To Repress or Not to Repress." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 27, no. 2 (2015): 289-309.

Nepstad, Sharon Erickson. "Mutiny and Nonviolence in the Arab Spring." *Journal of Peace Research* 50, no. 3 (2013): 337-349.

### **Bangladesh 6/23/1987-12/6/1990** – fragmented high level

Protests against President Hussain Muhammed Ershad went on for more than three years before requiring that he call on the military for support in December 1990. Over that period, Ershad's regime held a number of illegitimate elections. The opposition went from divided between the Bangladesh National Party and the Awami League to united with the participation of twenty two student organizations. Ershad deployed the police and paramilitary forces, and sent in other armed groups to university campuses as demonstrations gained momentum in November. The police could be unreliable and the paramilitary (the Bangladesh Rifles) were open about their discontent, though. Ershad declared a state of emergency on November 27, and troops opened fire on new demonstrations, killing up to 50. Discontent middle-ranking officers were critical of the state of emergency. Troops deployed to the protesters stood by. When Ershad called on the military to end the protests with force on December 6, Chief of Army Staff Nuruddin Khan refused. Ershad then resigned. Khan apparently acted as a middleman after the middle ranks told him they would no longer support Ershad. Some senior generals, however, remained loyal and were in favor of following Ershad's orders. Ershad had provided political and economic benefits to the seniors, generating discontent for others in the military who felt the institution was becoming corrupt and ineffective.

Sources:

Codron, Jeremie. "Putting Factions 'Back In' the Civil-Military Relations Equation." *South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal* Free-Standing Articles (18 October 2007).

Huq, Parvaz Azharul. "Civil Society and Democracy in Bangladesh." *Social Change* 35, no. 2 (2005): 85-100.

Kabir, Bhuian Monoar. "Politico-Economic Limitations and the Fall of the Military-Authoritarian Government in Bangladesh." *Armed Forces and Society* 21, no. 4 (1995): 553-572.

Kulkarni, V. G. "Cycle of the Repression Returns with Emergency Rule: Full Circle." *The Far Eastern Economic Review*. December 6, 1990.

Rizvi, Gowher. "Bangladesh: Towards Civil Society." *The World Today* 47, no. 8/9 (1991): 155- 160.

Wilkinson, Steven I. "Democratic Consolidation and Failure: Lessons from Bangladesh and Pakistan." *Democratization* 7, no. 3 (2000): 203-226.

### **Bangladesh 2/12/2004-4/29/2004** – loyal

The anti-Bangladesh National Party (BNP) government protests were led by the main opposition party, the Awami League (AL). The AL backed down from its demands at the end of April 2004. Though the military doesn't seem to have responded to the protests directly, throughout 2004 parts of the army were deployed to maintain "law and order" as part of an anti-crime drive. Interestingly, in March 2004, the BNP-led government established a Rapid Action Battalion under the police but including military personnel. The Rapid Action Battalion was used to suppress the protests.

Sources:

Freedom House. "Bangladesh: Freedom in the World 2005."

<https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2005/bangladesh>.

Perera, Wimal. "Bangladesh: Awami League Wins Election Landslide After Military Regime Relinquishes Power." *World Socialist Web Site*, January 3, 2009.

<https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2009/01/bang-j03.html>.

Rahman, Waliur. "Police Hold 5,000 in Bangladesh." *BBC News*, April 23, 2004.

[http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south\\_asia/3654129.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3654129.stm).

#### **Bangladesh 10/28/2006-1/11/2007 – united defections**

Prime Minister Zia of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) ended his term in October 2006. Power was transferred to a caretaker government in advance of the new elections. Unrest developed over the neutrality of the head of the caretaker government, K.M. Hasan; he was a former chief justice and thus head according to the constitution, but had been an active member of the BNP before joining the judiciary. He declined to accept the position. This did not resolve the issue, and there was widespread rioting and even violence during December. On January 3, 2007, the Awami League (AL) party announced it would boycott the elections scheduled for January 22. In addition, it planned strikes and blockades. On January 11, President Iajuddin Ahmed, on the orders of the military leadership, declared a state of emergency and cancelled the elections. Under the military's guidance, a new caretaker government was put in place with Chief Advisor Fakhruddin Ahmed and lasted until elections in December 2008. The protests were against the caretaker government of Hasan and the elections under Ahmed. The military leadership removed its support from the caretaker government, and transferred it to a new interim ruling body.

Sources:

Ahmed, Nizam. "Party Politics Under a Non-Party Caretaker Government in Bangladesh." *Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* 48, no. 1 (2010): 23-47.

Ghosahl, Baladas. "The Anatomy of Military Interventions in Asia." *India Quarterly* 65, no. 1 (2009): 67-82.

Quadir, Fahimul. "Consolidating Democracy Without Trust: Bangladesh's Breakdown of Consensus in 2007." *Round Table* 99, no. 406 (2010): 65-73.

Vaugh, Bruce. "Bangladesh: Political and Strategic Developments and U.S. Interests." *Congressional Research Service*, April 1, 2010, <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a520780.pdf>.

**Belarus 10/30/1988-12/8/1991 - neutral**

Protests and overall popular mobilization against the Communist regime increased over this period, as the government opened space for political contention. The demonstrations were relatively peaceful, and the state was reluctant to repress them. During this period, the military in Belarus consisted of units of the Soviet Belorussian Military District; that is, the forces were under control of the Soviets. The most important event during the protest movement was the August 1991 failed coup attempt in Moscow, which provoked large demonstrations in Minsk. Still, in Belarus generally, there was no confrontation between the protesters and the military. There is also no evidence that any parts of the Belarus forces shifted support to the protest movement.

Sources:

Potocki, Rodger. "Dark Days in Belarus." *Journal of Democracy* 13, no. 4 (2002): 142-156. Sanford, George. "Nation, State, and Independence in Belarus." *Contemporary Politics* 3, no. 3 (1997): 225-245.

Titarenko, Larissa, John D. McCarthy, and Clark McPahil. "The Interaction of State Repression, Protest Form and Protest Sponsor Strength During the Transition from Communism in Minsk, Belarus, 1990-1995." *Mobilization: An International Journal* 6, no. 2 (2001): 129-150.

**Belarus 3/19/2006-3/26/2006 – loyal**

Protests began in the lead-up to the 2006 presidential election. On election day March 19, over 100,000 paramilitary and other special forces were put on alert. None were actually deployed to the streets though, besides Colonel Dmitry Pavlinchenko's special police force squad. This group was used to disband protests on March 25th, or Freedom Day. Overall, though, the regime used limited force in response to the unprecedented levels of public protest. Much of the army was ready to act and security forces were responsible for some casualties, but the movement ended relatively peacefully, though unsuccessfully.

Sources:

Etkind, Alexander and Andrei Shcherbak. "The Double Monopoly and its Technologists: The Russian Preemptive Counterrevolution." *Demokratizatsiya*: 229-239.

Korosteleva, Elena. "Questioning Democracy Promotion: Belarus' Response to the Color Revolutions." *Democratization* 19, no. 1 (2012): 37-59.

Marples, David R. "Outpost of Tyranny? The Failure of Democratization in Belarus." *Democratization* 16, no. 4 (2009): 756-776.

**Benin 1/9/1989-4/20/1990 – fragmented high level**

Protests developed throughout 1989, but really presented a challenge to the regime in November and December. When five protesters were killed December 4, President Mathieu Kerekou and other key actors agreed to a national conference. The conference met in February and was intended to be advisory. But it almost immediately declared its right to take binding decisions, and, against opposition from a minority in the military, its right to dismiss the government. Kerekou threatened the conference with military action, but he probably could not rely on much of the military by that point. Kerekou had controlled the military through ethnic balancing, pay and promotions, manipulating postings, and the use of counterforces. Discontent had grown in recent years, evidenced by two coup attempts in 1988, involving military officers and personnel from the presidential guard. From then there was mounting criticism of the political system by officers. By the conference, then, much of the military had withdrawn its support, though not in a direct way. The president of the conference persuaded Kerekou to back down from his threats.

Sources:

Allen, Chris. "Restructuring an Authoritarian State: 'Democratic Renewal' in Benin." *Review of African Political Economy* 54 (1992): 42-58.

Bierschenk, Thomas. "Democratization Without Development: Benin 1989-2009." *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society* 22, no. 3 (2009): 337-357.

Lange, Holly. "Civilian Participation and Respected Culture: A Comparative Analysis of the Democratization and Subsequent Governments of Benin and Cameroon." *The Orator Undergraduate Journal of Political Science* 2 (2007): 48-60.

**Bolivia 12/28/1977-9/17/1982** – fragmented high level

In late 1977, President and General Hugo Banzer announced elections for July 1978. The military's candidate General Juan Pereda was supposed to win, and when he did not, he launched a coup instead. Anti-military protests escalated due to the apparent electoral fraud and then military coup. The situation further destabilized when General David Padilla Arancibia overthrew Pereda on November 24, with the goal of transitioning the country to democracy. Elections were held on July 1, 1979, but no candidate received an absolute majority. The newly-elected Congress named civilian Walter Guevara Arze interim president until June 1980. In November though Colonel Alberto Natusch Busch launched another coup. Guevara Arze refused to step down, though, and protesters took to the streets to support him. Busch conceded. The June 29 elections were won by civilian Siles Zuazo. A rightist faction of the military led by General Luis Meza Garcia Tejada seized power to prevent him from taking office, though. Garcia Meza ruled for a year and was replaced by a new, more reformist, military regime led by General Celso Torrielo in August 1981. The continual instability had created deep divisions within the military and the following July General Guido Vildoso Calderon took over with the mandate of transitioning the country to civilian-led democracy. Congress then put Siles in the presidency because of his 1980 electoral victory, and the military stepped aside. The military institution removed support from the military regime in response to popular regime opposition, but in a disorganized and divided manner.

Sources:

Knudson, Jerry W. "Under the Gun: the Bolivian Press and Military Rule, 1964-1982." *Gazette* 58 (1996): 87-102.

Slater, Dan and Erica Simmons. "Coping by Colluding: Political Uncertainty and Promiscuous Powersharing in Indonesia and Bolivia." *Comparative Political Studies* 46, no. 11 (2012): 1366- 1393.

**Bolivia 3/7/1985-3/23/85 - loyal**

Protests against President Hernan Siles Zuazo took place in the context of economic crisis, including hyperinflation. The military's support of Zuazo had been less than absolute in recent years, with a failed military coup in June 1984 and rumors of other coup attempts. But the military was unhappy with the protesters' violence. Zuazo called on the military to restore order, likely because of military pressure for an end to the violence. The continued demonstrations and strikes led Zuazo to agree to concessions including a special election in July 1985, which he lost. One source said the military was active in Zuazo's resignation, but most others characterize the military as loyal to Zuazo's orders and neutral to the unrest, with rumors of but no actual dissent.

Sources:

*Bolivia Diplomatic Handbook*. International Business Publications, 2005.

"Bolivia: The Military in Politics." *GlobalSecurity.org*.

<https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/bolivia/military-in-politics.htm>.

"Bolivian Workers Overthrow President, 1983-1985." *Global Nonviolent Action Database*. <https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/bolivian-workers-overthrow-president-1983-1985>.

Valenzuela, Arturo. "Latin American Presidencies Interrupted." *Journal of Democracy* 15, no. 4 (2004): 5-19.

Zuazo, Alberto. "Troops and Police Move through the Bolivian Capital." *UPI Archives*. March 20, 1985. <https://www.upi.com/Archives/1985/03/20/Troops-and-police-moved-through-the-Bolivian-capital-Wednesday/2500480142800/>.

**Bolivia 9/29/2003-10/18/2003 – low level**

These protests against President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada turned violent when the military and police followed the government's orders to repress. According to some reports, 80 civilians were killed by the security forces. The protesters did not back down, though. And, as a result of the violence, military divisions came to the surface. Mid-level officers were upset with the senior command's loyalty to the government, including over the repression orders. These disagreements didn't translate into significant loyalty shifts, however. Though some sources state that the military denied Lozada their full support, there is no documentation of actual disloyalty. The most evidence comes from a single source that claims on October 17th (the day with the largest protests) some unit commanders voiced their disagreements. The known discontent and wavering in loyalty

at the lower ranks of the military produces the low level shift classification. Lozada was forced to resign, because of loss of support from his political allies, including the vice president. The military's relations with the public suffered in the years following, because of its involvement in repression.

Sources:

Barr, Robert R. "Bolivia: Another Uncompleted Revolution." *Latin American Politics and Society* 47, no. 3 (2005): 69-90.

"Bolivian President Quits Amid Turmoil." *BBC News*. October 18, 2003.

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3202216.stm>.

Lehoucq, Fabrice. "Bolivia's Constitutional Breakdown." *Journal of Democracy* 19, no. 4 (2008): 110-124.

Mucha, Witold. "Prone to Conflict, but Resilient to Violence. Why Civil Wars Sometimes Do Not Happen: Insights from Peru and Bolivia." *Journal of Peace, Conflict, and Development* 20 (2013): 96-114.

Pion-Berlin, David and Harold Trinkunas. "Civilian Praetorianism and Military Shirking During Constitutional Crises in Latin America." *Comparative Politics* 42, no. 4 (2010): 395-411.

### **Bolivia 3/18/2004-7/18/2004 – neutral**

Opposition to President Carlos Mesa developed into anti-regime protests in March. They escalated in April, when he signed a natural gas export deal with Argentina without waiting for the results of a referendum on gas exports scheduled for July. The political left was hoping to approve greater state involvement in the industry. The referendum passed, and Mesa regained some popular support. The military was not involved in the protests, and Mesa decided against using police force too.

Sources:

"2 Die in Violent Clashes at Bolivian Protest." *New York Times*. June 2, 2004.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/02/world/2-die-in-violent-clashes-at-bolivian-protest.html>.

Buitrago, Miguel A. "Civil Society, Social Protest, and Presidential Breakdowns in Bolivia." In *Presidential Breakdowns in Latin America*, edited by Mariana Llanos and Leiv Marsteintredet, 91-107. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.

"Timeline: Bolivia." *BBC*. August 2, 2012.

[http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/country\\_profiles/1218814.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/country_profiles/1218814.stm)

Turner, Blair. *World Today (Stryker): Latin America 2016-2017*. Roman and Littlefield, 2016.

### **Bolivia 5/23/2005-6/6/2005 - neutral**

Protests developed over a new Hydrocarbons Law that, while rejected by the opposition, was implemented by President Carlos Mesa using his executive powers. Over the same period, the government wavered in holding elections for a new Constitutional Assembly,



despite its wide support, including from the military. After a delay, Mesa announced elections and other concessions, but demonstrations continued. He resigned rather than use violence. He did not order the security apparatus to intervene, and no parts of it supported the protest movement.

Sources:

McNeish, John-Andrew. "Stones on the Road: The Politics of Participation and the Generation of Crisis in Bolivia." *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 25, no. 2 (2006): 220-240.

Mucha, Witold. "Prone to Conflict, but Resilient to Violence. Why Civil Wars Sometimes Do Not Happen: Insights from Peru and Bolivia." *Journal of Peace, Conflict, and Development* 20 (2013): 96-114.

#### **Bosnia 2/4/2014-10/12/2014 - neutral**

These anti-government protests were particularly large and disruptive in the beginning, especially February. During this stage, demonstrators set buildings on fire, and engaged in violent clashes, resulting in injuries to nearly 150 police officers. As they continued, the protests became smaller and more peaceful. But they did not have clear leadership or organization, and did not generate any concessions from the government. It remained in power. They also did not generate a response from the military.

Sources:

Freedom House. "Bosnia And Herzegovina: Nations in Transit 2015."

<https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2015/bosnia-and-herzegovina>.

Pasic, Lana. "Protests, Floods, Elections, Anniversaries and Arrests: Reflecting on Bosnia's Main Events of 2014." *Balkanalyis.com*, January 14, 2015.

<http://www.balkanalyis.com/bosnia/2015/01/14/protests-floods-elections-anniversaries-and-arrests-reflecting-on-bosnias-main-events-of-2014/>.

*Bosnia-Herzegovina 2015 Crime and Safety Report*. United States Department of State Bureau of Diplomatic Security, January 14, 2015.

<https://www.osac.gov/pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=16908>.

#### **Brazil 1/25/1984-1/15/1985 – fragmented high level**

This protest movement, directed against the military regime, demanded direct elections for the presidency. It failed to achieve this goal, but did force the military to agree to a transition. Part of the armed forces was significantly opposed to democratization, yet most of it recognized that the institutional costs of remaining in power were no longer acceptable. This division played out within the junta and the military institution. Because a major faction of the military institution supported democratization, the junta peacefully transitioned from power. In the elections of 1985, the protesters and overall opposition supported a candidate from outside the ruling party, and he took office March 15.

Sources:

Gillepsie, Charles. "Models of Democratic Transition in South America: Negotiated Reform versus Democratic Rupture." In *Democratic Transition and Consolidation in Southern Europe, Latin America and Southeast Asia* edited by Diane Ethier, 45-72.

London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1990.

Mainwaring, Scott. "The Transition to Democracy in Brazil." *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 28, no. 1 (1986): 149-179.

Roett, Riordan. "Review: The Transition to Democratic Government in Brazil." *World Politics* 38, no. 2 (1986): 371-382.

Roett, Riordan and Scott D. Tollefson. "The Transition to Democracy in Brazil." *Current History* 85, no. 507 (1986): 21-25.

### **Bulgaria 10/16/1989-1/15/1990 – neutral**

Pressure for democratization came from the protest movement and through more institutionalized channels. The Club for the Support of Glasnost and Reorganization in Bulgaria was established in late 1988 as a challenge to the regime. All of its founding members had also been members of the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP). The desire for reform within the party was evident in other ways too; in October 1989, for example, minister of foreign affairs Peter Mladenov used an open letter to call for change. At a politburo session on November 9, 1989, a majority of the BCP forced General Secretary Todor Zhivkov to hand in his resignation. Defense Minister Dobri Dzhurov said the army would not support Zhivkov, but it remained loyal to the party. The army was under the control of the BCP, with the highest ranks members of the BCP. In early February 1990, a purely communist government was formed because no other parties wanted to collaborate with the BCP. The BCP was the most organized political group and thus highly involved in the transition.

#### Sources:

Barany, Zoltan D. "Civil-Military Relations in Comparative Perspective: East-Central and Southeastern Europe." *Political Studies* 41, no. 4 (1993): 594-610.

Doykov, Yordan. "The Bulgarian Army – from the Warsaw Pact to NATO." *Papeles del Este* 8 (2004): 1-23.

Simeonova, Elena. "A Revolution in Two Stages: The Curiosity of the Bulgarian Case." In *The 1989 Revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe: From Communism to Pluralism*, edited by Kevin McDermott and Marhew Stibbe. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2015.

Zagorcheva, Dessie P. "The Evolution of Democratic Civil-Military Relations in Bulgaria." *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 15, no. 1 (2002): 29-56.

### **Bulgaria 1/14/2009-1/21/2009 - neutral**

Protests against the Socialist-led government's handling of the financial crisis (which included proposed austerity measures) lasted for a short period in January 2009. At times, demonstrators clashed with the police; in one instance on January 14, so-called extremists attacked police, and they responded with arrests and some violence. The protests remained small (in the low thousands) and did not see any response from the military.

Sources:

“Bulgarian Anti-Government Protest Turns Into Riot.” *Dalje.com*. January 14, 2009. <http://arhiva.dalje.com/en-world/bulgaria-anti-government-protest-turns-into-riot/224068>.  
Ciobanu, Claudia. “Bulgaria: Protests Rise Above Parties, and Against Them.” *IPS – Inter Press Service*. January 26, 2009.  
Markova, Plamenka. “The Case of Bulgaria.” In *Recovering From the Crisis Through Social Dialogue in the New EU Member States*, edited by Igor Guardiancich. International Labor Organization, 2012. 19-45.

#### **Bulgaria 6/14/2013-7/24/2014 – neutral**

The coalition government of Prime Minister Plamen Oresharski faced protests for a number of reasons, one of them being its appointment of a media mogul to head the national security agency. The mogul resigned, but the protests continued and demanded the government’s resignation too. After 14 months, the government agreed to hold new elections. The security forces remained loyal throughout. Violence was fairly minimal, with the exception of a few clashes between protesters and police. The military was not involved.

Sources:

*Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2016 – Bulgaria Country Report*. Gutersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2016.  
“Examining Central and Eastern European Protest Groups.” *Stratfor Worldview*. June 8, 2015. <https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/examining-central-and-eastern-european-protest-groups>.  
Kraev, Ivan. “Why Bulgaria’s Protests Stand Out in Europe.” *The Guardian*. July 30, 2013. <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jul/30/bulgaria-protests-europe>.  
Nikolov, Nikolay. “How Long Does it Take to Overcome an Anti-Democratic Regime – Lessons from Bulgaria.” *OpenDemocracy*. July 24, 2014. <https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/nikolay-nikolov/how-long-does-it-take-to-overcome-antidemocratic-regime-lessons-f>

#### **Burkina Faso 10/21/2014-10/31/2014 – fragmented high level**

Protests began when President Blaise Compaore proposed an amendment to the constitution that would have allowed him to stand for re-election in 2015, for a fifth term of office. They continued for a year then escalated in late October 2014 when the proposed amendment was scheduled for a vote. The state security forces, including the most elite unit within the army, the Presidential Security Regiment (RSP), killed at least 30 demonstrators. In response, the protesters burned down a parliamentary building. They were receiving signals that the military might not use force against them – dozens of soldiers had joined the protests. On October 30, Compaore agreed to withdraw the amendment and to dissolve the government, but not to resign. That same day Army Chief of Staff General Honore Traore issued a communique that he was in charge of the

country. It was unclear whether he was following Compaore's orders, though, given Compaore was still president. The protests continued and on October 31 Compaore resigned after the RSP (led by vice commander Lieutenant Colonel Yacouba Isaac Zida) informed him it wouldn't use violence against the demonstrators. Zida, a largely unknown figure, declared himself head of state, largely because he was at the presidential palace with the main opposition leaders when Compaore resigned. This declaration obviously conflicted with Traore's earlier, and the high level shift was marked by confusion and indecision. The security forces negotiated and on November 1 endorsed Zida. Traore had been close to Compaore, but the RSP was also a feared force in society. The armed forces had a history of infighting, particularly between March and May 2011, when various military units and the presidential guard staged mutinies. This infighting continued post-campaign.

Sources:

"Burkina Faso Parliament Set Ablaze." *BBC News*. October 30, 2014.

<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-29831262>.

Dulani, Boniface. "African Publics Strongly Support Term Limits, Resist Leaders' Efforts to Extend Their Tenure." *Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 30*. May 25, 2015.

[http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Dispatches/ab\\_r6\\_dispatchno30.pdf](http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Dispatches/ab_r6_dispatchno30.pdf).

Dwyer, Maggie. "Situating Soldiers' Demands: Mutinies and Protests in Burkina Faso." *Third World Quarterly* 38, no. 1 (2016): 219-234.

Frere, Marie-Soleil and Pierre Englebert. "Briefing: Burkina Faso – The Fall of Blaise Compaore." *African Affairs* 114, no. 455 (2015): 295-307.

### **Burma 3/1/1988-5/27/1990 – low level**

Anti-regime protests began in March 1988 and were broken up by a combination of riot police and army troops, with many resulting casualties. In July, Burma Socialist Programme Party Chairman (and regime leader) Ne Win stepped down because he was angry over the handling of the protests. He was replaced by Sein Lwin, who assumed the presidency at this time as well. Amid continued unrest, General Saw Maung (the Minister of Defense and Chief of Staff) and the intelligence chief Colonel Khin Nyunt went to Ne Win for advice. Ne Win ordered the senior officials of the party to hand power over to a military council. This preceded the massacre of August 8 (8/8/88), when the military opened fire on demonstrators with machine guns. On August 12, Sein Lwin resigned from his positions and Maung Maung was named the new party chairman, but protests continued. Finally, on September 18, a group of generals organized by Ne Win and led by General Maung Aye announced the formation of the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). With its new authority, the military imposed martial law and used extreme brutality to end the ongoing protests. SLORC held elections on May 20, 1990, as promised, but when the opposition won, SLORC refused to honor the results and the military remained in power. At the start of the protests, Ne Win had been in power since 1962, and was largely responsible for the senior military officers' positions. The military command was united. However, there were reports of loyalty shifts from lower level

personnel; disloyalty within the air force and navy in early September 1988, and discussions among individual soldiers and their units and some movement leaders about joining the demonstrations on September 15.

Sources:

Hlaing, Kyaw Yin. "Setting the Rules for Survival: Why the Burmese Military Regime Survives in an Age of Democratization." *Pacific Review* 22, no. 3 (2009): 271-291.

Schock, Kurt. "People Power and Political Opportunities: Social Movement Mobilization and Outcomes in Philippines and Burma." *Social Problems* 46, no. 3 (1999): 355-375.

Silverstein, Josef. "Civil War and Rebellion in Burma." *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 21, no. 1 (1990): 114-134.

**Burundi 4/23/2015-5/1/2015 (ongoing)** – fragmented high level

On April 25, the ruling party (National Council for the Defense of Democracy-Forces for the Defense of Democracy) named incumbent president Pierre Nkurunziza as its candidate in the presidential elections, meaning he would be running for a third term. Protests started soon after and lasted for several weeks, and were repressed by the police. His decision to do so had the support of the Supreme Court, though. On May 13, while Nkurunziza was out of the country, a faction of the military under the command of Major General Godefroid Niyombare attempted a coup. Niyombare had been an ally of Nkurunziza but was recently dismissed from his position as director of national intelligence after a document in which he called Nkurunziza's third term unconstitutional went public. The protesters celebrated the regime's overthrow, but soon troops loyal to Nkurunziza regained control and arrested some rebels but not Niyombare. (Niyombare became head of a new armed group, the Republican Forces of Burundi.) The failed coup put a damper on the protests, and gave the regime more reason to be repressive of them. The coup involved senior generals and was a high level loyalty shift.

Sources:

Buchanan, Elsa. "Burundi: Coup Leader General Godefroid Niyombare Becomes Head of Forebu Rebels." *International Business Times*. January 21, 2016.  
<http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/burundi-coup-leader-general-godefroid-niyombare-becomes-head-forebu-rebels-1539320>.

Dulani, Boniface. "African Publics Strongly Support Term Limits, Resist Leaders' Efforts to Extend Their Tenure." *Afrobarometer Dispatch* 30 (2015).

Harkness, Kristen A. "Security Assistance in Africa: The Case for More." *Parameters* 45, no. 2 (2015).

Mbugua, Joseph Kioi. "Burundi on the Precipice? Analysis of Current Conflict Dynamics." *Africa AMANI Journal* 1, no. 2 (2015).

Van Acker, Tomas. "Understanding Burundi's Predicament." *Africa Policy Brief* 11 (2015).

Wilén, Nina. "From Foe to Friend? Army Integration After War in Burundi, Rwanda, and the Congo." *International Peacekeeping* 23, no. 1 (2016): 79-106.

### **Cambodia 7/26/1998-9/14/1998 – loyal**

The protests were in response to alleged irregularities in the 1998 elections, and pitted the opposition parties (SRP and FUNCINPEC) against the ruling party (CPP). After weeks of demonstrations, the protesters called for a sit-in. Following a grenade explosion near Prime Minister Hun Sen's home, he dispatched riot police to clear the site, which resulted in violence. There were also confrontations between the police and protesters in other parts of the capital. Hun Sen then banned demonstrations. When the protesters put 8000 people in the streets in defiance, the government crackdown continued, until the movement subsided. The movement was already struggling prior to this, because of growing opposition to Vietnamese influence within Cambodia, and violent attacks on ethnic Vietnamese. The core of the security forces was formed by CPP officers and soldiers, and the military in particular remained loyal.

#### Sources

Hendrickson, Dylan. "Cambodia's Security-Sector Reforms: Limits of a Downsizing Strategy." *Conflict, Security, and Development* 1, no. 1 (2001): 67-82.

Hughes, Caroline. "Parties, Protest, and Pluralism in Cambodia." *Democratization* 9, no. 3 (2002): 165-186.

Hughes, Caroline. "Mystics and Militants: Democratic Reform in Cambodia." *International Politics* 38 (2001): 47-64.

Springer, Simon. "Violence, Democracy, and the Neoliberal 'Order.'" *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 99, no. 1 (2009): 138-162.

### **Chile 7/21/1931-7/27/1931 - neutral**

Regime leader Colonel Carlos Ibanez del Campo came to power in a 1924 coup. In January 1931, he assumed the power to take control during economic crisis. This lost him the backing of his once-allies in the traditional political parties and strained his relations with the military institution. Massive demonstrations broke out in July, resulting in some violence between the protesters and police. Ibanez used the police because he didn't want to send the army into the streets. But, his decision to involve the opposition in a new cabinet had opened the political system such that there was no turning back. Ibanez left power on July 26 to avoid more conflict with the opposition, and because he believed it best the military stay out of politics. The military did not act during the campaign. But, Ibanez's resignation set off a period of instability, with nine different governments over the following 15 months.

#### Sources:

Blakemore, Harold. "Back to the Barracks: the Chilean Case." *Third World Quarterly* 7, no. 1 (1985): 44-62.

Salas Fernandez, Manuel F. "Far Away Yet So Close: Carlos Ibanez's Exile in Argentina, 1931- 1937." MA thesis, University of Texas-Austin, 2012.

Scott, Sam. "Transition to Democracy in Chile: Two Factors." MA thesis, University of Montana, 2001.

Sznajjder, Mario. "A Case of Non-European Fascism: Chilean National Socialism in the 1930s." *Journal of Contemporary History* 28, no. 2 (1993): 269-296.

#### **Chile 5/11/1983-12/14/1989** – united defections

May 11, 1983 was the official start of organized "days of protest" against President Augusto Pinochet. Such demonstrations occurred roughly once a month until September. Pinochet reacted with heavy repression, including arrests, and as the protests failed to achieve their goals in the initial years, they dwindled to involve mostly discontent lower classes. Anti-Pinochet mobilization re-developed from 1985 to 1987 but was divided between Marxists and non-Marxists. Though there were dissenters within the military during this period, they did not see the civilian opposition as an alternative. In accordance with the 1980 constitution, a plebiscite on Pinochet's regime was held in 1988. The vote was an overwhelming no, and Pinochet was forced to step down when the military leadership refused to intervene to keep him in power. Pinochet could not impose martial law because the military institution had defected from him. However, he remained in control of the military until 1998, which complicated the democratic transition.

#### Sources:

Constable, Pamela and Arturo Valenzuela. "Chile's Return to Democracy." *Foreign Affairs* 68, no. 5 (1989-1990): 169-186.

*Global Nonviolent Action Database*. "Chileans Overthrow Pinochet Regime, 1983-1988." <https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/chileans-overthrow-pinochet-regime-1983-1988>.

Loveman, Brian. "Government and Regime Succession in Chile." *Third World Quarterly* 10, no. 1 (1988): 260-280.

Noonan, Rita K. "Women Against the State: Political Opportunities and Collective Action Frames in Chile's Transition to Democracy." *Sociological Forum* 10, no. 1 (1995): 81-111.

#### **China 5/2/1956-7/31/1957** – loyal

This campaign followed from Chairman Mao's Hundred Flowers "experiment", in which he allowed criticism of the Communist Party. For instance, in January 1957, factory workers in Chongqing demanded pay raises from party officials. Soldiers were called in to disperse them using force, but the workers took their calls directly to the municipal party committee headquarters. By May 1957, Mao realized the criticisms had developed too far, and come to challenge the Party's rule. One notable demonstration on May 19 involved Peking University students, which set off demonstrations in other cities. In early June, Mao and the party issued directives that turned the movement into an anti-Rightist campaign. The process of rounding up intellectuals and others for rehabilitation was brutal.

#### Sources:

Chen, Feng. "Against the State: Labor Protests in China in the 1950s." *Modern China* 40, no. 5 (2014): 488-518.

Hao, Zhidong. "May 4th and June 4th Compared: A Sociological Study of Chinese Social Movements." *Journal of Contemporary China* 6, no. 14 (1997): 79-99.

Perry, Elizabeth J. "Moving the Masses: Emotion Work in the Chinese Revolution." *Mobilization: An International Journal* 7, no. 2 (2002): 111-128.

Zhu, Dandan. "The Hungarian Revolution and the Origins of China's Great Leap Policies." *Cold War History* 12, no. 3 (2012): 451-472.

### **China 4/5/1976-12/31/1979 – neutral**

These protests against the Communist regime began when a large crowd gathered in Tiananmen Square on April 5. They gathered to pay homage to late premier Zhou Enlai, but developed into a demonstration against the regime and especially the Cultural Revolution. At this point the regime was dominated by an ultra-left faction of the Communist Party, and it employed state militias to brutally repress the gathering. The militias killed and injured many and arrested hundreds. Deng Xiaoping, a reformist within the Central Committee, was sidelined and forced to resign as a result of the protests. After Chairman Mao Zedong's death in September 1976, the Party was purged and Deng re-emerged. The protests had continued and starting in 1978 Deng re-interpreted them as revolutionary acts acceptable to the regime. This development led to more demonstrations in early 1979, which became known as the Democracy Wall Movement. However, as the protests and their aims became more radical, Deng and a united Party leadership cracked down. The military was mostly uninvolved in the campaign, with the militias carrying out the repression. In part this was because Deng supported the military and it was demoted with him in favor of the militias and their allies. When Deng regained power, he put the militias under the control of the military and the Party. One source mentioned that 11 military officers and soldiers "identified as activists" during the first demonstrations. It included few details, though, and the information was not corroborated by any other sources.

#### Sources:

Boswell, Terry and Ralph Peters. "State Socialism and the Industrial Divide in the World- Economy: A Comparative Essay on the Rebellions in Poland and China." *Critical Sociology* 17, no. 1 (1990): 3-34.

Brodsgaard, Kjeld Erik. "The Democracy Movement in China, 1978-1979: Opposition Movements, Wall Poster Campaigns, and Underground Journals." *Asian Survey* 21, no. 7 (1981): 747-774.

Heilmann, Sebastian. "The Social Context of Mobilization in China: Factions, Work Units, and Activists during the 1976 April 5th Movement." *China Information* 8, no. 3 (1993-1994): 1-19.

Mason, T. David. "Modernization and its Discontents Revisited: The Political Economy of Unrest in the People's Republic of China." *The Journal of Politics* 56, no. 2 (1994): 400-424.



**China 4/16/1989-6/4/1989 – low level**

Ongoing protests were met at various points with violence from the police and army. On May 20, the government declared martial law, ordering troops to occupy the main protest site, Tiananmen Square. The troops soon retreated, though, and two weeks went by. Over this period, the Communist Party was divided over how to respond. Its leaders were concerned about a coup. The military leadership was dissatisfied over the Party divisions and did not want to be used by one side over the other. Some members of the army had reportedly joined the demonstrations, and so the military was also concerned about force disintegration. On June 4, the army, including troops transferred in from other provinces, forced its way into Tiananmen Square, killing hundreds. This was probably at the orders of Deng Xiaoping and other Party leaders. Some within the Party, such as the General Secretary, did not want to use force, but they had been sidelined. By the crackdown, seniors within the Party and the army were in consensus. There were some reports of military disloyalty, though. Some soldiers went missing; it is likely many young, poorly trained troops deserted. Some individual officers and commanders resisted orders to deploy their troops, but details are difficult to confirm. Also, in late May, in response to the Party's indecision, over a hundred military officers and several generals signed a petition calling on the Central Military Commission to not use troops against civilians. Once the Party united, the army leadership did too, and followed Deng's orders.

Sources:

Dittmer, Lowell. "China in 1989: The Crisis of Incomplete Reform." *Asian Survey* 30.1 (1990): 25-41.

Forster, Keith. "Impressions of the Popular Protest in Hangzhou, April/June 1989." *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs* 23 (1990): 97-119. L

ee, Terrence. "The Armed Forces and Transitions from Authoritarian Rule." *Comparative Political Studies* 45, no. 2 (2009): 640-669.

Scobell, Andrew. "Why the People's Army Fired on the People: the Chinese Military and Tiananmen." *Armed Forces and Society* 18, no. 2 (1992): 193-213.

Shelley, Becky. "Protest and Globalization: Media, Symbols, and Audience in the Drama of Democratization." *Democratization* 8, no. 4 (2001): 155-174.

Zuo, Jiping and Robert D. Benford. "Mobilization Processes and the 1989 Chinese Democracy Movement." *The Sociological Quarterly* 36, no. 1 (1995): 131-156.

**China 9/22/2014-5/1/2015 (ongoing) - neutral**

This anti-regime campaign was known as the Umbrella Movement and concentrated in Hong Kong. The protests were highly disruptive, and lost significant public support by the end of 2014. The police were active in repressing them, at times clashing with and injuring demonstrators. In early October, a violent mob attacked demonstrators and the police were accused of failing to protect what was mostly students. The military was not involved.

Sources:

Connors, Adam. "Hong Kong's Umbrella Movement: A Timeline of Key Events One Year On." *ABC*. September 27, 2015. <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-09-28/timeline-hong-kong-umbrella-movement-one-year-on/6802388>.

"Hong Kong Protests: Clashes as Police Clear Road." *BBC*. October 15, 2014.

<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-29623396>.

"Hong Kong Protesters Clash With Police at Government HQ." *BBC*. December 1, 2014.

<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-30270794>.

Iyengar, Rishi. "Hong Kong Government Accused of Using Triads to Attack Student Protesters." *Time*. October 4, 2014. <http://time.com/3464206/blue-ribbon-protesters-occupy-hong-kong-china-democracy-triads/>.

Scobell, Andrew, Arthur S. Ding, Phillip C. Saunders, and Scott W. Harold, editors. *The People's Liberation Army and Contingency Planning in China*. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2015.

### **Croatia 5/25/1999-10/10/2000 - neutral**

This protest movement was successful at forcing the authoritarian regime of Franjo Tudman and his Croatia Democratic Union party to hold free and fair elections, and thus to democratize. This process of political reform was helped along with Tudman's death in December 1999, opening up divisions within the ruling party and space for the opposition. There was no major threat of suppression of the demonstrations by the military or other security forces, or other military response to the protest movement. The military had achieved victory in the war of independence of 1991-1995, though internal forces were rumored to have committed war crimes during it.

#### Sources:

Kuzio, Taras. "Democratic Breakthroughs and Revolutions in Five Postcommunist Countries: Comparative Perspectives on the Fourth Wave." *Demokratizatsiya* 16, no. 1 (2008).

### **Czechoslovakia 11/16/1989-12/10/1989 – loyal**

On November 17, nearly 50,000 students rallied together against the Communist regime. In response, riot police used unprecedented violence, setting off new demonstrations. A general strike on November 27 involved millions of people. The regime was unable to end the challenge. It offered minor concessions, but they were seen as a sign of weakness; the party general secretary (also the Commander in Chief of the army) ordered the People's Militia, or the party paramilitary units, to march on the capital, but it was reported the militia refused to use action. The military was not involved. While both civilian and military leaders considered using force, events changed quickly, and the Central Committee decided on a political solution. Support for the protest movement began to spread among the military in mid-November, and this threat to military discipline led the minister of defense (Milan Vaclavik) to threaten military force. He was also critical of the protesters. The regime never gave intervention orders to Vaclavik, and it never lost control of the security forces. The military was domestically-controlled at

this time though Soviet occupation forces were also present. In December, a reformist government took over the party leadership. Vaclavik was also replaced.

Sources:

Barany, Zoltan D. "Civil-Military Relations in Comparative Perspective: East-Central and Southeastern Europe." *Political Studies* 41, no. 4 (1993): 594-610.

Green, Peter S. "Defense Minister Reportedly Wanted Army to Stop Revolt." *UPI*. October 18, 1990.

Hrdina III, Otakar. "Study of Civil-Military Relations in Crises of Czechoslovak History." MA thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2005.

Karklins, Rasma and Roger Petersen. "Decision Calculus of Protesters and Regimes: Eastern Europe 1989." *The Journal of Politics* 55, no. 3 (1993): 588-614.

Mares, Miroslav. "The Armed Forces and Political Extremism in the Process of Democratization in East Central Europe." Paper presented at the International Political Science Association Congress, Madrid, July 8-12, 2012.

Ritter, Daniel P "Civil Society and the Velvet Revolution." *Cosmos WP* 4 (2012).

Watts, Larry L. "Reform and Crisis in Romanian Civil-Military Relations in 1989-1999." *Armed Forces and Society* 27, no. 4 (2001): 597-622.

#### **Djibouti 1/28/2011-3/4/2011 – neutral**

Protests against President Ismail Omar Guellah that began in late January became violent in mid-February. They involved only a couple of thousand people, mostly youths. Because of the clashes and rioting, the government deployed police, who arrested opposition figures and other activists. The government also banned demonstrations or other meetings of the opposition. Beyond the police, it doesn't seem other security forces were involved.

Sources:

Mesfin, Berouk. "Elections, Politics, and External Involvement in Djibouti." *Institute for Security Studies Situation Report*. April 14, 2011.

<https://www.issafrica.org/uploads/15Apr11Djibouti.pdf>

Styan, David. "Djibouti: Changing Influence in the Horn's Strategic Hub." *Chatham House Briefing Paper*. April 2013. [http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/8681/1/0413bp\\_djibouti.pdf](http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/8681/1/0413bp_djibouti.pdf)

#### **East Germany 5/31/1953-6/17/1953 – loyal**

This protest movement against the Communist regime involved more than 500,000 people, across 560 East German towns. By June 17, the East German police and security forces were no longer able to contain the uprising. In response, the regime declared martial law and the Soviet army (in particular, the Group of Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany, or GSOVG) entered Berlin to put down the challenge. They mostly relied on intimidation but in a few instances fired on demonstrators directly. The Soviets were assisted by the military arm of the East German People's police, and all reports point to subordinates following orders. It later emerged that some troops, junior officers, and even

senior officers of the GSOVG were unhappy with being used against civilians – but no loyalty shifts occurred during the campaign. Many within the military believed the Nazis and their Western patrons organized the riots, and supported ending them with force.

Sources:

Ingimundarson, Valur. “The Eisenhower Administration, the Adenauer Government, and the Political Uses of the East German Uprising in 1953.” *Diplomatic History* 20, no. 3 (1996): 381- 410.

Gobarev, Victor. “Soviet Military Planning and Activities During the East German Uprising of June 1953.” *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 10, no. 4 (1997): 1-29.

Ostermann, Christian F. “‘Keeping the Pot Simmering’: The United States and the East German Uprising of 1953.” *German Studies Review* 19, no. 1 (1996): 61-89.

### **East Germany 12/15/1956-12/22/1956 – neutral**

The Second East Germany uprising against the Communist regime was part of the general crisis in Eastern Europe after Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev’s February 1956 “secret speech”. In the remarks to a closed session of the Soviet Union’s Communist Party Congress, he criticized deceased Soviet Union leader Joseph Stalin. In East Germany, the shock and disillusionment these remarks set off and the resulting period of liberalization saw increased dissent and a wave of strikes. The regime offered minor concessions but was overall united and strong enough to withstand the challenge. The military was not involved.

Sources:

Dale, Gareth. *Popular Protest in East Germany*. New York: Routledge, 2005.

### **East Germany 9/4/1989-11/7/1989 – low level**

The protest movement brought together members of the opposition and reformers within the Communist party. In late September through early October, demonstrations remained small, and the regime relied mostly on preemptive coercion. On October 4, though, there were reports of police repression, which brought out thousands of demonstrators in the following days. More repression as well as arrests followed. The October 9 protests in Leipzig were a turning point, as the regime chose not to use force against 70,000 nonviolent demonstrators. There had been dialogue between the movement and lower party officials, and indecision in the politburo. In fact, Erich Honecker, the East German party boss, had signed an order to use force against the protests, but other officials were unwilling to issue the order. There were also reports that a security chief had told Honecker the police would not be able to beat up hundreds of thousands of people; in the end, the police and military did not act. By October 15, some security forces were siding with the protesters. Low level dissent had been evident since August, including dozens of desertions. In mid- to late-October, some soldiers refused or resisted their officers’ orders to deploy to demonstrations. The military leadership did not shift loyalty, but rather was neutral as the regime conceded to some liberalization.

Sources:

Dale, Gareth. "The East German Revolution of 1989." PhD diss., University of Manchester, 1999.

Hadjar, Andreas. "Nonviolent Political Protest in East Germany in the 1980s." *German Politics* 12, no. 3 (2003): 107-128.

Karklins, Rasma and Roger Peterson. "Decision Calculus of Protesters and Regimes: Eastern Europe 1989." *The Journal of Politics* 55, no. 3 (1993): 588-614.

Lohmann, Susanne. "The Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The Monday Demonstrations in Leipzig, East Germany, 1989-1991." *World Politics* 47, no. 1 (1994): 42-101.

Popplewell, Richard. "The Stasi and the East German Revolution of 1989." *Contemporary European History* 1, no. 1 (1992): 37-63.

Sharman, Jason Campbell. "Culture, Strategy, and State-Centered Explanations of Revolution, 1789-1989." *Social Science History* 27, no. 1 (2003): 1-24.

Thompson, Mark R. "Reluctant Revolutionaries: Anti-Fascism and East German Opposition." *Germany Politics* 8, no. 1 (1999): 40-65.

#### **East Timor 6/6/2006-6/26/2006 – neutral**

Unrest in East Timor began in March 2006, when 600 of the army's 1,400 troops struck and then abandoned their barracks, alleging discrimination because they were from the country's west. Most promotions in the army did in fact go to easterners. The government dismissed the troops, with support from Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri. President Xanana Gusmao, on the other hand, was believed sympathetic to the disaffected soldiers. Gusmao had left the ruling party in the 1980s. He was elected president in 2002, but unable to cultivate personal loyalty from the army whose leadership was loyal to the Fretilin party of Alkatiri. Protests developed during this period, too, and in April turned violent because of clashes between the dismissed soldiers and the increasingly splintered military and police forces that the government had deployed to restore order. Another group of soldiers as well as police (led by Major Alfredo Reinado) abandoned their posts in protest of such a deployment on April 28. They then ambushed loyal soldiers and police on May 23, which generated more violence and riots. Also in May, international troops arrived to help calm the situation. On May 31, Gusmao declared a state of emergency and took control of the army and police forces. The situation was indeed at crisis levels by late June; more than 30 people had been killed, and people were fleeing their homes. Alkatiri stepped down on June 26, partly as a result of allegations that the Minister of Internal Administration had armed civilians for the conflict (he resigned June 1). He faced pressure from the political opposition that included Catholic Church figures, as well as Gusmao. The new prime minister, Jose Ramos- Horta, was sworn in July 10.

Sources:

Anderson, Tim. "Timor-Leste: The Second Australian Intervention." *Journal of Australian Political Economy* 58 (2006): 62-93.

Nevins, Joseph. "Timor-Leste in 2006: The End of the Post-Independence Honeymoon." *Asian Survey* 47, no. 1 (2007): 162-167.

Simonsen, Sven Gunnar. "The Authoritarian Temptation in East Timor." *Asian Survey* 46, no. 4 (2006): 575-596.

#### **Ecuador 4/13/2005-4/20/2005 – united defections**

Lucio Gutierrez was elected president and took office in January 2003 but soon adopted conservative policies that gradually angered the indigenous movements that had formed the backbone of his campaign. Leftist groups took to the streets, first under the direction of political parties, then becoming more spontaneous. They faced repression by the police and newly-trained Special Forces. Gutierrez also mobilized his supporters. But, on April 20, the Command of the Armed Forces publicly announced it could no longer support him. The opposition parties in Congress then met and declared that Gutierrez had abandoned his duties. Gutierrez resigned and Vice President Castillo assumed the presidential office.

#### Sources:

Pallares, Amalia. "Mass Mobilization and Presidential Removal in Ecuador." *LASA Forum* 37, no. 1 (2006).

Thoresen, Beate. "Rebellion Without a Shot-Peaceful Conflict Management in Ecuador." *Conflict, Security, Development* 9, no. 3 (2009): 361-385.

#### **Egypt 9/30/2000-12/7/2005 - neutral**

These anti-President Hosni Mubarak protests were long lasting. But, they never involved the institutionalized opposition parties, and often met with massive displays of force by the Egyptian security forces. One of the largest demonstrations took place February 21, 2005. In response to this particular incident, Mubarak offered some concessions, but he also cracked down, in particular with arrests of Muslim Brotherhood leaders. More demonstrations occurred on May 25, 2005, the day of a referendum on constitutional reform. Security forces engaged in brutal repression of the protesters. Mubarak then won a fifth term in September, and the opposition, and especially the protest movement, became less active. The opposition was diverse and had supported different presidential candidates rather than presenting a united challenge to Mubarak. Mubarak was fairly tolerant of later protests, but used the police against them on occasion.

#### Sources:

Browsers, Michaëlle. "The Egyptian Movement for Change: Intellectual Antecedents and Generational Conflicts." *Contemporary Islam* 1, no. 1 (2007): 69-88.

Clarke, Killina. "Saying 'Enough': Authoritarianism and Egypt's Kefaya Movement." *Mobilization: An International Journal* 16, no. 4 (2011): 397-416.

Meital, Yoram. "The Struggle Over Political Order in Egypt: The 2005 Elections." *The Middle East Journal* 60, no. 2 (2006): 257-279.

### **Egypt 10/29/2007-2/11/2011 – united defections**

Ongoing protests against President Hosni Mubarak grew in momentum in the wake of other uprisings in the region. Throughout January 2011, Mubarak deployed his security forces to deal with them. While the police did most of the repressing, the military units did not stop them. The military leadership also issued a number of statements calling on the protesters to give up and go home. On February 2, armed pro-government groups unleashed violence on the demonstrators, and the military did not interfere. In the surrounding days, some soldiers in the streets joined the protests. There were also internal military reports around this time about a potential mutiny within the lower ranks. These low level shifts, combined with Mubarak's failure to make sufficient concessions to end the protests, led the generals to shift the full military's loyalty. On February 10, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (a body that convenes in times of national emergencies) announced it was taking control of the situation, thus not cracking down on Mubarak's behalf. Mubarak resigned and left the country the next day. The Council then declared it would temporarily lead the government.

#### Sources:

Ashour, Omar. "Collusions to Crackdown: Islamist-Military Relations in Egypt."

*Brookings Doha Center Analysis Paper* 14 (2015).

Barany, Zoltan. "The Role of the Military." *Journal of Democracy* 22, no. 4 (2011): 24-35.

Bellin, Eva. "Lessons from the Jasmine and Nile Revolutions: Possibilities of Political Transformation in the Middle East?" *Crown Center for Middle East Studies* 50 (2011).

Hilal, Leila. "Charting Transitions in the Middle East: Lessons Learned from Tunisia and Egypt." *Insight Turkey* 14, no. 2 (2012): 1-12.

Lutterbeck, Derek. "Arab Uprisings, Armed Forces, and Civil-Military Relations." *Armed Forces and Society* 39, no. 1 (2013): 28-52.

### **Egypt 6/24/2013-7/3/2013 – united defections**

This period saw large protests against President Mohammed Morsi, but also large protests in support of him. On July 1, the military issued a two-day ultimatum to Morsi, demanding that he call early presidential elections to end the political crisis. The next day, Morsi gave some concessions, but refused to call early elections, or step down. He attempted to form a consensus government, except the opposition would not join. In fact, all of the non-Freedom and Justice Party ministers within the government had resigned after the military's ultimatum. On July 3, Minister of Defense General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, on behalf of the military, overthrew Morsi, disbanded the legislature, and suspended the constitution. He then appointed a new interim president. Prior to the coup, Sisi had met with leaders from a number of organizations to get support, including the Coptic Christian Church, youth groups, and other political parties.

#### Sources:

Borge-Holthoefer, Javier, Walid Magdy, Kareem Darwish, and Ingmar Weber. "Content and Network Dynamics Behind Egyptian Political Polarization on Twitter." *Proceedings*

of the 18<sup>th</sup> Conference on Computer-Supported Cooperative Work and Social Computing. <https://arxiv.org/pdf/1410.3097.pdf>.

Krayem, Hassan. "Five Years After the Arab Spring: What Happened?" *Arab Network for the Study of Democracy Policy Papers* 3 (September 2015).

Martin, Dominic W. "Political Transition in a Post-Arab Spring Middle East: A Comparative Analysis of Tunisia, Egypt, and Yemen." BA thesis, University of Central Florida, 2014.

#### **Egypt 7/4/2013-6/7/2014 - loyal**

Protests in support of President Mohammed Morsi continued after his overthrow by General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in July 2013. The crackdown under the interim government of Adly Mansour was brutal, employing violence and arrests. The most notable incidents were August 2013 massacres at the Rab'a and el Nahda Squares, but the Republican Guards killed over 70 in protests in late July, too. The demonstrators themselves were at times violent; they weren't unarmed at Rab'a, and they used violence when provoked by others during marches. Most of the protests included the Muslim Brotherhood, but others, particularly in January 2014 in commemoration of the revolution, involved students. They were crushed by security forces, with police storming university campuses. Through this period, there were no signs of pro-democracy (or pro-protester) members of the military, or actions by them.

#### Sources:

Ashour, Omar. "Collusion to Crackdown: Islamist-Military Relations in Egypt." *Brookings Doha Center Analysis Paper* 14 (March 2015).

Tadros, Mariz. "Settling after the Revolts? Egypt's Political Settlements and Violent Transition." *Institute of Development Studies Evidence Report* 57 (March 2014).

#### **El Salvador 4/15/1944-5/7/1944 – low level**

On April 2, 1944, the air force and two army regiments launched a military revolt against the regime of General Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez. President Hernandez Martinez was able to put it down with the help of loyal troops, consisting largely of the National Police and National Guard. These events set off a general strike, though. Demonstrations culminated on May 7 when a policeman killed a young boy. The military government did not take action to end the protest movement, in part because of divisions and discontent within the military institution. Junior military officers in particular were unhappy with Martinez's dictatorial rule, though their discontent did not translate into widespread loyalty shifts. Hernandez Martinez resigned on May 9 and was replaced by interim president General Andres I. Menendez, who had been Hernandez Martinez's minister of defense.

#### Sources:

Desilets-Bixler, Nicole Louise. "Security in Transition: Police Reform in El Salvador and South Africa." MA thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2002-03.



Griffith, Kati L. and Leslie C. Gates. "A State's Gendered Response to Political Instability: Gendering Labor Policy in Semiauthoritarian El Salvador, 1944-1972." *Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State, and Society* 9, no. 3 (2002): 248-292.

Kruegler, Christopher and Patricia Parkman. "Identifying Alternatives to Political Violence: An Educational Imperative." *Harvard Educational Review* 55, no. 1 (1985): 109-118.

Lamperti, John. "El Salvador's Holocaust Heroes."  
[https://math.dartmouth.edu/~lamperti/Holocaust\\_Heroes.pdf](https://math.dartmouth.edu/~lamperti/Holocaust_Heroes.pdf).

### **El Salvador 2/21/1977-11/27/1980 – low level**

Mobilization against the military regime developed following the 1977 presidential elections, becoming disruptive and at times violent. Some early demonstrations were met with repression, such as when 50 to 100 protesters were killed on February 28. A group of progressive military officers launched a coup on October 15, 1979, because of General Carlos Humberto Romero's refusal to institute reforms. The resulting military-civilian junta incorporated some opposition leaders, but largely failed to institute reforms. Further, because it proposed reforms more radical than most of the military preferred, conservatives within the military blocked its efforts. A new junta formed in January 1980 with the goal of defeating the leftist opposition with force. In order to accomplish this, the mostly rightist leadership purged progressive officers from the government and the military leadership. Those close to Colonel Adolfo Majano, a key participant in the October 1979 coup, fared especially badly. Yet most of these elements remained loyal to the military regime and institution. When Majano defected in early 1980, he led only a small group that included few officers. The disloyal forces also had few ties to the protest movement. The protest movement peaked in early 1980, in part because of unrelenting repression. Further, opposition in the form of the Farabundo Martin National Liberation Front (FMLN) rebel group had begun a violent campaign.

#### Sources:

Almedia, Paul D. "Opportunity Organizations and Threat-Induced Contention: Protest Waves in Authoritarian Settings." *The American Journal of Sociology* 109, no. 2 (2003): 345-400.

Foran, John. "A Theory of Third World Social Revolutions: Iran, Nicaragua, and El Salvador Compared." *Critical Sociology* 19, no. 2 (1992): 3-27.

LeoGrande, William M. "A Splendid Little War: Drawing the Line in El Salvador." *International Security* 6, no. 1 (1981): 27-52.

Peceny, Mark and William D. Stanley. "Counterinsurgency in El Salvador." *Politics and Society* 38, no. 1 (2010): 67-94.

Petras, James F. and Morris H. Morley. "Supporting Repression: U.S. Policy and the Demise of Human Rights in El Salvador, 1979-1981." In *The Socialist Register 1981*, edited by Ralph Miliband and John Saville, 47-71. London: The Merlin Press, 1981.

### **Estonia 8/24/1987-8/22/1991 – neutral**

The first stages of this anti-Communist regime campaign saw opposition in Estonia (as well as other Baltic nations) expanding their demands and ramping up their dissent. In January 1991, the USSR warned Baltic nations that they must comply with military draft laws. This was followed by an influx of USSR troops. The particularly violent events to come (pro-Soviet paramilitary attacks) were mostly concentrated in Lithuania, and Estonia remained largely calm. Estonia and Russia actually signed an agreement that recognized each other's sovereignty. Protests continued in Estonia until the failed coup in Moscow on August 21. The day before, it was reported that the Soviet army was ready to move into Tallinn, which prompted the Supreme Council to declare independence. (Estonia had been in a transition to independence since March 30.) The coup attempt formalized this declaration. The Soviet military had little involvement in these events, and throughout, the fear of a massive military crackdown was relatively low given the so-called Gorbachev doctrine. In October 1989, the Soviet Union had indicated it would not interfere in the internal affairs of its Warsaw Pact allies.

Sources:

Rossi, Federico M. "The Unintended Consequence of the Struggle for Independence: The Transition to Democracy in the Baltic Countries." *Cosmos Working Papers* 11 (2012). <http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/26184/2012WP11COSMOS.pdf>.

Ten Dam, Caspar. "Separatist Versus Centrist Forces in the USSR, 1988-1991: Explaining the Collapse of the Soviet Internal Empire by a Strategic Alliance Approach."

Ulfelder, Jay. "Baltic Protest in the Gorbachev Era." *The Global Review of Ethnopolitics* 3.3, no. 4 (2004): 23-43.

**Fiji 5/16/1987-6/3/1987 – neutral**

On May 14, while the Commander of the Army and his second in command were away, third in command Lieutenant Colonel Sitiveni Rabuka led a coup against the newly elected National Federation Part-Labor Party Coalition government led by Timoci Bavadra. This coalition was multiracial and Indo-Fijian and threatened the hegemony of the Fijian-dominated Alliance Party. It was rumored that Bavadra would reform the military in ways unacceptable to most officers: reducing its role in internal security and admitting more Indians (the military was more than 90% Fijian at this time). Protests broke out against the coup, and quickly became violent. This led the rest of the military and the Great Council of Chiefs (Fiji's constitutional assembly) to back Rabuka. The anti-coup movement was soon subdued and no part of the military shifted loyalty in response to the protests.

Sources:

Clements, Peter. "Coups and the Fiji Military." *Peacekeeping and International Relations* 30, no. 1-3 (2001).

Ratava, Steven. "The Military Coups in Fiji: Reactive and Transformative Tendencies." 19, no. 1 (2011): 96-120.

#### **Fiji 4/24/2000-5/29/2000 – low level**

In April, indigenous Fijians began protests to call on President Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara to dismiss Prime Minister Mahendra Chaudhry's government. A civilian named George Speight led a coup against Chaudhry on May 19. Immediately, there were suspicions of military complicity, since it was slow to react, by securing parliament or securing the area from Speight's accomplices. It emerged that the coup was in fact supported by members of the Army's Counter Revolutionary Warfare (CRW) unit, a guard that former prime minister Sitiveni Rabuka had established in 1987 as a coup-proofing force. Its personnel were viewed as rogue elements of the military. There were rumors that the military coup leader, Colonel Ilisoni Ligairi, a retired armed officer, was a hired gun. Senior military officers did not support the coup, but also seemed unable to prevent the crisis, and the security situation quickly deteriorated. Prime Minister Chaudhry and his cabinet and colleagues were incarcerated by Speight's forces for almost eight weeks. The commander of the military, Frank Bainimarama, told the president that the constitution did not offer a framework for resolving the crisis, and so he needed to step aside. The military leadership then declared martial law on May 29. Only one military unit – the CRW – shifted loyalty from the regime to the protest movement, by supporting Speight's coup.

#### Sources:

- Alley, Roderic. "The Coup Crisis in Fiji." *Australian Journal of Political Science* 35, no. 3 (2000): 515-521.
- Alley, Roderic. "Fiji's Coups of 1987 and 2000: A Comparison." *Revue Juridique Polynésienne Hors Serie* (2001): 217-234.
- Clements, Peter. "Coups and the Fiji Military." *Peacekeeping and International Relations* 30, no. 1-3 (2001): 7-12.
- Ratuva, Steven. "The Military Coups in Fiji: Reactive and Transformative Tendencies." *Asian Journal of Political Science* 19, no. 1 (2011): 96-120.
- Von Strokirch, Karin. "The Region in Review: International Issues and Events, 2000." *The Contemporary Pacific* 13, no. 2 (2001): 510-528.

#### **Georgia 11/4/2003-11/23/2003 – low level**

The protest movement against President Eduard Shevardnadze was short in duration but intense. Demonstrations started after parliamentary elections on November 2 that were considered unfair. On November 22, the day of the new parliament's opening session, the protesters seized parliament. Shevardnadze had deployed hundreds of soldiers to the streets in advance. The protesters were confident some security forces wouldn't intervene but didn't know how the president's special units would respond. When Shevardnadze declared a state of emergency, the elite military forces refused to comply. Further, many soldiers in the streets laid down their guns. Shevardnadze resigned on November 23, and then senior officers from the military and police defected publicly.

#### Sources:

“How the Rose Revolution Happened.” *BBC News*. May 10, 2005.

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4532539.stm>.

Jakopovich, Dan. “The 2003 ‘Rose Revolution’ in Georgia: A Case Study in High Politics and Rank and File Execution.” *Debate: Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe* 15, no. 2 (2007): 211-220.

Kandelaki, Giorgi. “Georgia’s Rose Revolution: A Participant’s Perspective.” *United States Institute of Peace Special Report* 167 (2006).

<http://dspace.africaportal.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/15104/1/Georgias%20Rose%20Revolution%20A%20Participant's%20Perspective.pdf?1>.

### **Ghana 11/13/2000-12/7/2000 - neutral**

The presidential election was held on December 7, 2000. It followed almost a month of protests, some of which the police dispersed violently. The candidate of the ruling party, the National Democratic Congress, did not win outright, and was forced into a run-off with that of the main opposition party, the New Patriotic Party. The opposition won. Neither round of the election was disputed and the contest ended peacefully. The military was not involved in the protests.

#### Sources:

Ayee, J.R.A. “The 2000 General Elections and Presidential Run-Off in Ghana: An Overview.” *Democratization* 9, no. 2 (2002): 148-174.

Doggett, Gina. “Ghana’s Hopes for Peaceful Transition Shaken by Police Shooting.” *Agence France Presse*. December 4, 2000.

Uzor, Chidi. “Ghana Goes to Polls Today to Elect Rawlings’ Successor.” *Africa News*. December 7, 2000.

### **Greece 5/28/1963-6/16/1963 - neutral**

Protests started in part in response to the May 1963 assassination of leftist politician Gregores Lambrakes by right-wing extremists. Most involved students under the banner of the Democratic Youth Movement. Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis’s rightist government repressed them, at times brutally. Meanwhile, Karamanlis had been pushing constitutional changes that would increase his position’s power. The monarchy disagreed. The military worried that the split between the government and the monarchy would give political space to the leftists. According to some reports, Greek officers actually asked the US Embassy for American support for a (possible) coup – they did not receive it, though. The monarchy forced Karamanlis to resign on June 11. While it indicated it might look to the military for support, such was not needed. A caretaker government took power, led by Panagiotis Pipinelis, until elections in November.

#### Sources:

Asimakoulas, Dimitris. “Translating ‘Self’ and ‘Others’: Waves of Protest under the Greek Junta.” *The Sixties* 2, no. 1 (2009): 25-47.

Draenos, Stan. "United States Foreign Policy and the Liberal Awakening in Greece, 1958-1967." *The Historical Review* 5 (2008).

Kassimeris, Christos. "United States Intervention in Post-War Greek Elections: From Civil War to Dictatorships." *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 20, no. 4 (2009): 679-696.

Psacharopoulos, George and Andreas M. Kazamias. "Student Activism in Greece: A Historical and Empirical Analysis." *Higher Education* 9.2 (1980): 127-138.

### **Greece 2/1/1973-11/17/1974 – fragmented high level**

Dictator Georgios Papadopoulos had seized power through military coup in April 1967. Growing opposition to the military regime and intra-regime conflicts led him to begin transferring power to a civilian government in early 1973. The opposition developed into popular protests involving students during February and March 1973. On May 23, a group of naval officers supported by some politicians and the king (who was at this time in exile) attempted a coup to hasten the junta's end. The coup was frustrated by other security forces, and colonels purged about 400 officers for their involvement or disloyalty to the junta. Papadopoulos officially launched the transition on June 1 by negotiating with Spyros Markezinis of the Progressive Party on the formation of the civilian government. Reform was very limited though, as Papadopoulos soon introduced constitutional amendments which would give him more power, especially over foreign policy. This created tensions between him and Markezinis. After more negotiations, Papadopoulos agreed to hold elections in September. This liberalization increased popular mobilization over the summer. The military became involved after the police failed to control the growing protests. While lower and middle ranking officers were frustrated with the military junta, they also worried about leftists taking power. High ranking officers were also discontent yet resistant to civilian government. Markezinis did not have a good relationship with the military and exercised little control over it at this point. On November 25, Dimitrios Ioannides, a hardliner and head of the military police, led a coup that ousted Papadopoulos. He was unopposed by the rest of the military and re-established full military rule. Ioannides's regime was soon enveloped in crisis, though; he decided to interfere in Cyprus, which threatened war with Turkey in late July. Large sections of the navy and air force disagreed with Ioannides's strategy. This strengthened softliners within the weak military institution. Further, popular opposition to the regime was still high. Later that month, 250 or more officers from the Third Army Corps signed a declaration demanding the regime create a transitional government. The regime and the forces' commanders agreed to do so and met with opposition politicians to start the process.

#### Sources:

Asimakoulas, Dimitris. "Translating 'Self' and 'Others': Waves of Protest Under the Greek Junta." *The Sixties* 2, no. 1 (2009): 25-47.

Barany, Zoltan D. *The Soldier and the Changing State: Building Democratic Armies in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Americas*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012.

Gursoy, Yaprak. "Civilian Support and Military Unity in the Outcome of Turkish and Greek Military Interventions." *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 37, no. 1 (2009): 47-75.

Tzortzis, Ioannis. "Fake or Failed? A Greek Would-Be Reforma Pactada." *Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 12, no. 2 (2012): 315-333.

#### **Guatemala 5/1/1944-7/1/1944** – fragmented high level

Demonstrations against the dictatorship of Jorge Ubico grew throughout May and June. The situation got interesting in late June; first, in response to protests on June 24, the security forces did not intervene. When they got even bigger the next day, the police and army did act, and killed some women. In spite of this event, the military overall began to disobey Ubico's orders. Junior army officers played an especially key role in forcing Ubico to resign on July 1. Senior officers were not yet ready to give up power to civilians. Before leaving office, Ubico chose an ally General Frederico Ponce Vaides to take power with two other generals. Vaides stepped up repression against the opposition.

#### Sources:

Dosal, Paul J. "The Political Economy of Industrialization in Revolutionary Guatemala, 1944- 1954." *Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies* 15, no. 29 (1990): 17-36.

Little, Todd R. "Populism and the Guatemalan Revolution: Politics and Power in Transition, May 1944-March 1945." MA thesis, University of Massachusetts, 1990.

McGehee, Richard V. "Revolution, Democracy, and Sport: The Guatemalan 'Olympics' of 1950." *Olympika* 3 (1994): 49-81.

Trefzger, D.W. "De Guatemala a Guate-Poor? Guatemalan Military Interventionism, 1944- 1970." *Armed Forces and Society* 28, no. 1 (2001): 77-97.

#### **Guinea 1/10/2007-11/17/2010** – united defections

Mobilization against the regime of former military leader Lansana Conte took the form of strikes in 2006 and 2007, often with violent responses from the security forces, resulting in many casualties. In 2008 the situation became tense because of unrest within the security forces. In May, junior army officers led an uprising at a military base that headquartered the army's elite commando parachutist unit. They were angry over pay and promotions. After a few weeks, Conte met with the leader of the mutiny and reached an agreement on concessions. In June, police officers mutinied, but were crushed by army troops. In December, Conte died, and hours after it was announced, the army (in particular, junior officers) took over, putting Captain Moussa Dadis Camara in power. They faced little resistance from more senior officers, and the population generally was supportive after years of Conte's unpopular rule. The junta was supposed to oversee a transition ending in January 2010, but in April 2009, Camara announced he would run for president. This set off demonstrations that were brutally repressed by the security forces. The most notable instance of repression took place on September 28, 2009, and involved Camara's forces as well as some rogue sections within the military. The commander of the Presidential Guards, Lieutenant Aboubacar Diakite, feared he would be blamed for

the violence so he made an assassination attempt on Camara in December. Camara left the country for medical treatment, and the military considered its options. In the end, led by vice president and Minister of Defense General Sekouba Konate, it decided to support civilian rule. This united decision to shift loyalty from the regime was preceded by military factionalism including tensions between Camara's junta and the armed forces over reports that the government had recruited irregular fighters to form a militia. A semi-military transitional government was put in place, and opposition leader Alpha Conde was elected president in November 2010.

Sources:

Arieff, Alexis and Nicolas Cook. "Guinea: Background and Relations with the United States." *Congressional Research Service*. March 22, 2010.

Bah, Mamadou Diouma. "The Military and Politics in Guinea: An Instrumental Explanation of Political Stability." *Armed Forces and Society* 41, no. 1 (2013): 69-95.

Iqbal, Zareen. "Guinea: Breaking the Dictatorship Domino Effect." *International Institute for Justice and Development*. June 27, 2010. <http://iijd.org/news/entry/guinea-breaking-the-dictatorship-domino-effect>.

#### **Guyana 9/16/1990-10/7/1992 - neutral**

Following years of anti-regime protests, the October 1992 presidential elections put Cheddi Jagan of the opposition People's Progress Party (PPP) in power. This followed an election period that saw fears the military would declare martial law to guarantee a ruling party (People's National Congress, or PNC) victory. It didn't, and after, the PNC made no attempt to get military support. The military command at one point indicated it did not want to be involved in politics. Because it is not clear whether the regime planned or wanted to use the military, the military's noninvolvement is best considered neutrality.

Sources:

Griffith, Ivelaw L. "Political Change, Democracy, and Human Rights in Guyana." *Third World Quarterly* 18, no. 2 (1997): 267-285.

Singh, Chaitram. "Changing the Basis of Civilian Control over the Military in Guyana." *Journal of Third World Studies* 14, no. 2 (1997): 113-131.

#### **Haiti 11/27/1985-2/17/1986 – united defections**

Regime opposition first took the form of food riots in fall 1985. In November, students joined in the streets. Troops sent in to guard the demonstrators did not know how to respond and ended up killing a number of them. This ignited other protests, and calls for President Jean-Claude Duvalier ("Baby Doc") to step down and the army to take over – it was likely the only institution able to run the state in Duvalier's absence. While the army did not explicitly support the movement, officers began to distance themselves from Duvalier, concluding he was on his way out, and by January 1986 were not acting against the demonstrations. Yet neither did the army want to take power. According to some reports, it was only following pressure from the US and other Haitian politicians that General Henri Namphy first removed support from Duvalier and then took power in a

new military government. Duvalier fled in February. His father and predecessor, Franqois, had controlled the military by promoting loyalists and removing potential threats, as well as through counterforces (including a paramilitary force, the National Security Volunteers or VSN). Some in the VSN supported Baby Doc to the end, but the military organization was disillusioned with his rule.

Sources:

Mock, Ron. 1989. "Promoting Social Change in Authoritarian Regimes through Active Nonviolence." Paper presented at the Conference on Quaker Studies on Human Betterment, Friends Association of Higher Education, 1989, 91-103.

Nicholls, David. "Haiti: The Rise and Fall of Duvalierism." *Third World Quarterly* 8, no. 4 (1986): 1239-1252.

#### **Haiti 6/29/1987-7/31/1987 – loyal**

Following the overthrow of Baby Doc, General Namphy remained in charge of the transitional government (the National Governing Council, or NGC) and moved only slowly from military rule to democracy. In June 1987, he and others in the NGC tried to take control of the November elections from an independent electoral council. This prompted major protests, which the military repressed throughout June and July. It killed many demonstrators. At no point did any of the military support the protest movement. The NGC eventually backed down from the decrees related to the council, but it also cancelled the upcoming elections. These months of unrest were followed by a series of coups, one of which overthrew the NGC and another that attempted to oust the new rulers. This intra-military discord took place post-campaign and was not in support of the opposition.

Sources:

Buss, Terry F. "Foreign Aid and the Failure of State Building in Haiti under the Duvaliers, Aristide, Preval, and Martelly." *WIDER Working Paper* No. 2013/104 (2013).

Lundahl, Mats. "History as an Obstacle to Change: The Case of Haiti." *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 31, no. 1/2 (1989): 1-21.

Rotberg, Robert I. "Haiti's Past Mortgages its Future." *Foreign Affairs* 67, no. 1 (1988): 93-109.

#### **Haiti 12/10/2003-2/9/2004**

Haiti had no military during this period; it was disbanded in 1995 by President Jean-Bertrand Aristide.

Sources:

Shamsie, Yasmine. "Building 'Low-Intensity' Democracy in Haiti: The Contribution." *Third World Quarterly* 25, no. 6 (2004): 1097-1115.

#### **Haiti 2/28/2005-5/17/2010**



Haiti had no domestic military during this period. The country was militarily occupied by a US- French-Canadian force, then a UN pacification force.

Sources:

Hallward, Peter. "Haiti 2010: Exploiting Disaster." Adapted from *Damming the Flood: Haiti, Aristide, and the Politics of Containment*. Verso, 2008. Reprint, Verso, 2008.

#### **Honduras 6/29/2009-9/28/2009 – loyal**

On June 28, President Manuel Zelaya was arrested by the military, in response to tensions over whether to hold a referendum about adding a question on convening a constituent assembly to the November ballot. Critics viewed the referendum and the question as an attempt by Zelaya to expand executive power, and the judicial branch declared it illegal. Zelaya continued with his referendum plans and ordered the military to help him carry it out. When head of the military General Romeo Vasquez Velasquez refused, Zelaya fired him. The army, navy, and air force commanders resigned in solidarity with Vasquez, and the Supreme Court reinstated him. Then, the Supreme Court issued the warrant for Zelaya's arrest, following a request from the Chief Prosecutor. Instead of turning Zelaya over for trial, though, the military took him to Costa Rica. It then turned power over to a civilian interim government, in line with the constitution. Protests organized by Zelaya's National Resistance Front Against the Coup (FNR) soon began, and brought together trade unions, peasant groups, and leftist popular organizations. They failed to remove the interim government and its president, Roberto Micheletti, however. An anti-Zelaya coalition of traditional political parties, the business sector, and the armed forces held strong. While Zelaya claimed to have support in the lower and middle levels of officers, no divisions emerged. The army, along with the police, also put down the FNR's protests, and were accused of using excessive force in doing so.

Sources:

Ruhl, J. Mark. "Honduras Unravels." *Journal of Democracy* 21, no. 2 (2010): 93-107.  
Taylor-Robinson, Michelle M. and Joseph Daniel Ura. "Public Opinion and Conflict in the Separation of Powers: Understanding the Honduran Coup of 2009." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 25, no. 1 (2013): 105-127.

#### **Hungary 8/19/1989-9/11/1989 – neutral**

Though the start of the protest movement was August 1989, processes of political liberalization had begun long before. This is one reason the military was mostly uninvolved in the challenge to the regime. The military leadership was less than supportive of democratization, but did not want to be involved in politics, either. Also important were indications from Soviet leaders that it preferred peaceful negotiations. As a result, the transition was peaceful, with little violence. Soviet forces were stationed in Hungary during this time, but did not act. The Hungarian security forces were largely passive, though there were known to be reform-minded sections in each organization.

Sources:

Barany, Zoltan D. "Civil-Military Relations in Comparative Perspective: East-Central and Southeastern Europe." *Political Studies* 41, no. 4 (1993): 595-610.

Mares, Miroslav. "The Armed Forces and Political Extremism in the Process of Democratization in East Central Europe." Paper presented at the International Political Science Association World Congress, Madrid, Spain, July 8-12, 2012.

Szabo, Mate. "From a Police State to a Demonstration Democracy: Policing Mass Demonstrations in Hungary Before, During, and After the Regime Change." <https://www.ajk.elte.hu/file/SzaboMate-Police.pdf>.

### **Iceland 10/10/2008-1/26/2009**

Iceland did not have a military during this time. Anti-regime protests there were mostly peaceful but at times involved riot police.

Source:

Boyes, Roger. "Protests Tip of Iceberg as Europe Braces for Chaos." *The Australian*. January 23, 2009.

### **India 6/14/1975-6/26/1975 – neutral**

Popular opposition to Indira Gandhi's government grew in the lead-up to elections on June 11. When the votes were counted on June 12, her party lost, and the same day a high court ruled that she had engaged in corrupt electoral practices in 1971. Instead of appealing the court's decision, Indira informed President Fakhruddin Ali that she was going to declare a state of emergency. The president signed it into law on June 25. This marked the end of the protest movement, but throughout, the military was uninvolved in repression. Most was carried out by the police and internal paramilitary forces such as the Border Security Force and the Central Reserve Police (both headed by senior police forces). The military also refused to act on behalf of the people by opposing the government. The state of emergency gave Indira the constitutional authority to use the army to enforce it. The army had a reputation as professional and competent, especially after its December 1971 victory over Pakistan. One contentious military issue that didn't come to cause problems for Indira was the appointment of General Tapeswar Nath Raina as Army Chief of Staff over other generals in line for the position. Some younger officers likely opposed Indira, but they didn't shift loyalty, either.

Sources:

Kizer, Justin. "Lessons Learned in India: Indira Gandhi Sees Power in Democracy." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of Indiana Political Science Association, Westville, Indiana, March 28, 2008.

Klieman, Aaron S. "Indira's India: Democracy and Crisis Government." *Political Science Quarterly* 96 no. 2 (1981): 241-259.

Kozicki, Richard J. "The Demise of Indian Democracy." *Asian Affairs* 2, no. 6 (1975): 349-362.

Pardesi, Manjeet S. "India and Pakistan: The Origins of Their Different Politico-Military Trajectories." *India Review* 9, no. 1 (2010): 38-67.

Staniland, Paul. "Explaining Civil-Military Relations in Complex Environments: India and Pakistan in Comparative Perspective." *Security Studies* 17, no. 2 (2008): 322-362.

Misra, K.P. "Paramilitary Forces in India." *Armed Forces and Society* 6, no. 3 (1980): 371-388.

#### **India 1/20/1977-3/21/1977 – neutral**

Elections were held in the midst of the state of emergency, on March 16. Indira Gandhi's party, the Indian National Congress, lost. After the results were announced, Indira instructed the president to end the state of emergency and then resigned. According to one report, she was ready to suspend the constitution, cancel the elections, and declare martial law, but some officers refused. However, this was not corroborated by other sources. Thus, the military did not act to support the regime or the protest movement.

#### Sources:

Green, Joselyn C. "Indira Gandhi: India's Destined Leader." MA thesis, SUNY Buffalo, 2013.

Palmer, Norman D. "The Two Elections: A Comparative Analysis." *Asian Survey* 17, no. 7 (1977): 648-666.

#### **Indonesia 10/28/1997-5/21/1998 – fragmented high level**

Protests against President Suharto developed as the financial crisis worsened. Student-led protests grew throughout February and March 1998. Suharto's party, Golkar, had won the 1997 People's Consultative Assembly elections, and in March 1998 Suharto was elected for a seventh term by the legislature. Suharto was a former army general, and the military formed a key base of support for him. However, a rivalry had developed between two generals (both Suharto loyalists) over control of the military: Wiranto and Prabowo Subianto, who was also Suharto's son in law. On May 12, Indonesia's elite combat units, the Kopassus, killed four demonstrating students in Jakarta. This was likely at the order of Prabowo and set off mob violence. In the aftermath, he advocated for more repression of the protests, while Wiranto disagreed. Under Wiranto, the military facilitated a transfer of power from Suharto to his vice president, B.J. Habibie on May 21. Wiranto still supported Suharto and wanted him to leave peacefully, but Suharto had factionalized the military as a way to balance it. In the process, Suharto had increased the standing of Subianto, a relatively junior general. While Wiranto offered Suharto a plan forward, Suharto considered a new military command – until the army chief of staff General Subagyo Hadi Siswoyo refused to lead it. Subagyo accompanied Wiranto when he met with Suharto over stepping down.

#### Sources:

Alagappa, Muthiah. *Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001.

Case, William F. "Revisiting Elites, Transitions, and Founding Elections: An Unexpected Caller from Indonesia." *Democratization* 7, no. 4 (2000): 51-80.

Webber, Douglas. "A Consolidated Patrimonial Democracy? Democratization in Post-Suharto Indonesia." *Democratization* 13, no. 3 (2006): 396-420.

#### **Indonesia 5/21/1999-10/19/1999 – neutral**

Before stepping down, Suharto transferred power to his vice president B. J. Habibie. Habibie came to rely heavily on the military over his term because of his lack of popular support. His government undertook a number of military reforms, to reduce its political participation, but also made concessions to Minister of Defense and Commander of the Armed Forces Wiranto and the leadership, allowing it continued influence. Politics overall were contentious and Habibie as well as other parties looked to the military for support. But the political competition combined with divides in the military made Wiranto and others unwilling to intervene, on the side of Habibie or the opposition. Habibie held parliamentary elections in June 1999. His Golkar party came in second. Then in September, after demonstrations, he was forced to drop a new bill that would have provided the president and military greater latitude for handling unrest. Security forces killed several protesters during these events. Habibie ended up losing backing from Golkar and as a result did not attempt re-election.

#### Sources:

King, Blair Andrew. "Empowering the Presidency: Interests and Perceptions in Indonesia's Constitutional Reforms, 1999-2002." PhD diss., Ohio State University, 2004.

Mietzner, Marcus. "The Politics of Military Reform in Post-Suharto Indonesia: Elite Conflict, Nationalism, and Institutional Resistance." *Policy Studies* 23 (2006).

Slater, Dan. "The Ironies of Instability in Indonesia." *Social Analysis: The International Journal of Social and Cultural Practice* 50, no. 1 (2006): 208-213.

Tornquist, Olle. "Dynamics of Indonesian Democratization." *Third World Quarterly* 21, no. 3 (2000): 383-423.

Webber, Douglas. "A Consolidated Patrimonial Democracy? Democratization in Post-Suharto Indonesia." *Democratization* 13, no. 3 (2006): 396-420.

#### **Iran 11/16/1977-2/11/1979 – fragmented high level**

This anti-Shah Reza Pahlavi protest movement was massive, consisting of students, the intelligentsia, merchants, clergy, laborers, and professionals. The first major involvement of the military was in February 1978, when the regime ordered it to take over Tabriz to restore order. In August and September, the military became further involved when the regime declared martial law in Esfahan and then Tehran, as well as other major cities. Demonstrations continued despite the orders. Earlier, the Shah had appointed General Gholam Ali Oveissi as Tehran's military governor, and now Oveissi ordered tanks downtown and troops to fire. This culminated on September 8, or Black Friday, when troops killed 400 to 500 people. Protests continued, and a small faction of the movement

started using violence. The first sign of disloyalty among the military was November 4, when an army conscript tried to join the demonstrators and was killed by officers. This set off rioting. The Shah responded with some concessions and by dismissing Oveissi. However, the military and especially the rank and file were becoming less and less reliable, and desertion rates were increasing. During rallies on December 10 and 11, the protesters reached out to the military for support. December 11 also saw a dozen upper-ranking officers shot by their own troops as rival military factions faced off. The situation was extremely confused when the Shah left the country on January. Some senior officers remained loyal to him, and even followed him; other officers remained but stopped following the orders of their superiors of other civilians. Religious and opposition leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini came back to Iran from exile on February 1, 1979 and declared a provisional government under Mehdi Bazargan. Then, he called on the protesters to go into the streets and prevent any security forces still loyal to the Shah (especially the Imperial Guards) from staging a coup. More intra-security forces conflict occurred on February 9, inside an air force base. The fighting came to involve other armed groups. Soon after, the Army's Supreme Council recognized the Bazargan government. Finally, on February 11, chief of staff of the armed forces Abbas Gharabaghi announced that the military would remain neutral as the new regime struggled to take control. The military was not cohesive by this point. While in power, the Shah had employed various coup-proofing strategies, including personally controlling military personnel decisions and putting place barriers to communication among military segments.

Sources:

Abrahamian, Ervand. "The Crowd in the Iranian Revolution." *Radical History Review* 105 (2009): 15-38.

Cann, Rebecca and Constantine Danopoulos. "The Military and Politics in a Theocratic State: Iran as a Case Study." *Armed Forces and Society* 24, no. 2 (1997): 269-288.

Edwards, Holli. "Laws of Armed Conflict and Civilian Participation in Intra-State Revolutions: The Iranian Revolution 1979." *Bond University Student Law Review* 4, no. 1 (2016).

Moazami, Behrooz. "The Islamization of the Social Movements and the Revolution, 1963- 1979." *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East* 29, no. 1 (2009): 47-62.

Ritter, Daniel P. "On the Role of Strategy in Nonviolent Revolutionary Social Change: The Case of Iran, 1977-1979." *EUI Working Paper WMP* (2011).

Schahgaldian, Nikola B. *The Iranian Military under the Islamic Republic*. The RAND Corporation, 1987.

**Iran 7/9/1999-7/31/1999 - neutral**

Student protests against President Mohammad Khatami took place in July, leading to a July 9th attack by security forces on a dormitory at Tehran University. Hundreds of students were arrested, and at least one was killed. The attack, however, was against the orders of the interior minister. It also prompted more protests that set off violence

between the protesters, police, and other armed groups. The Basij volunteer paramilitary played a major role and was able to end the unrest, without need to call on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) or the army. The IRGC did threaten to intervene if necessary, and 24 of its commanding officers wrote to Khatami to criticize his failure to recognize the demonstrations as a threat to national security. Khatami then called on the protesters to cooperate with the government and backed a counter rally in support of the regime. At this point, the Iranian military was poor, weak, and disorganized following the war with Iraq. The armed forces overall were divided between the regular military and the IRGC.

Sources:

Abootalebi, Ali. "State-Society Relations and Prospects for Democracy in Iran." *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 5, no. 3 (2001): 20-37.

Amuzegar, Jahangir. "Iran's Future: Civil Society or Civil Unrest?" *Middle East Policy* 7, no. 1 (1999): 86-100.

Golkar, Saeid. "Organization of the Oppressed or Organization for Oppressing: Analyzing the Role of the Basij Militia of Iran." *Politics, Religion, and Ideology* 13, no. 4 (2012): 455-471.

Kurzman, Charles. "Student Protests and the Stability of Gridlock in Khatami's Iran." *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies* 25, no. 1 (2001): 38-47.

#### **Iran 6/12/2009-6/14/2013 – neutral**

Over this period, the Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) gained power, and the regime became increasingly reliant on it for its security. The IRGC had been set up as a parallel force to the military for coup-proofing purposes, but the regime continued to invest in it to prevent popular opposition. This was evident in the IRGC's repression of these demonstrations against President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The Basij, a network of social, professional, and militia groups used to mobilize support for the regime, was also involved in repression. Both forces were brutal and fully committed to regime orders. The IRGC (as well as the military) relied on conscripts, so there were some concerns over the rank and file's loyalty. But, no loyalty shifts occurred. Most officers had been promoted on the basis of their loyalty to the regime.

Sources:

Golkar, Saeid. "The Islamic Republic's Art of Survival." *The Washington Institute for Near East Policy Policy Focus* 125 (2013).

Levitsky, Steven. "The Durability of Revolutionary Regimes." *Journal of Democracy* 24, no. 3 (2013): 5-17.

Ostovar, A. 2013. Iran's Basij: membership in a militant Islamic organization. *The Middle Eastern Journal* 67.3: 345.

Rizvi, Aman. "Un-Globalized Politics: The Primacy of Domestic Factors in the Downfall of Iran's Theocratic Left During Ahmadinejad's Second Term." *Journal of Georgetown University – Qatar Middle Eastern Studies Student Association* 4 (2014).

### **Iraq 3/3/1991-3/28/1991 – low level**

Anti-Saddam Hussein protests by Sunni Arabs occurred in the midst of an uprising by Shiite Arabs and Kurds. For two weeks, both of them seemed on the verge of success; they overthrew various local governments, and put local army garrisons in disarray. At the same time, many in the army were exhausted from war and angry with Saddam over Iraq's very recent defeat. Further, when Saddam announced his withdrawal from the war, he made no agreement on the safety of his retreating forces. His Republican Guard had already safely withdrawn, leading to suspicions that he wanted the enemy forces to wipe out those he suspected of disloyalty. Many soldiers, both Sunni and Shiite, deserted and joined the protesters in the streets. There was also a large anti-Saddam section in the higher levels of the military, in part because of the conflict. These officers were more cautious in their criticism, though, given that in late 1990 Saddam had executed disloyal officers. The deserting soldiers took up arms in revolt against the government, but overall their efforts were spontaneous, with little leadership or organization, and did not spread to Baghdad. The opposition never fully won over the military, either; the limited loyalty shifts were more in the form of disintegration than defection. In the end, the remainder of the army saved Saddam's regime.

#### Sources:

Jabar, Faleh A. "Why the Uprisings Failed." *Middle East Research and Information Project*. <http://www.merip.org/mer/mer176/why-uprisings-failed>.

### **Iraq 2/12/2011-12/2/2011 - loyal**

The climax of this protest movement against the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki seems to have been February 26, when tens of thousands participated in nationwide demonstrations. In response, soldiers shot into the crowds, and the security forces arrested hundreds. Army intelligence units were the main force involved in repressing the protests. After this incident, the protests became more aggressive, though most of the violence was on the part of the security forces.

#### Sources:

McCrummen, Stephanie. "Iraq's Day of Rage Protests Followed by Detentions, Beatings." *Washington Post*. February 25, 2011.

Van Heuvelen, Ben. "Iraq's Nouri al-Maliki: The Man Who Would Be King." *Foreign Policy*. June 13, 2011.

### **Iraq 12/28/2012-9/8/2014 – low level**

These anti-Maliki protests mostly involved Sunnis. The Iraq Security Forces (ISF) first fired on the demonstrators in late January 2013. They continued, including as part of a protest camp at al-Hawijah. The security forces raided this camp in April 2013, which provoked some Sunnis to become more militant. In May 2013, Maliki reshuffled the top command of the security forces, likely to remove from view the individuals that Sunnis blamed for the violence. After months of continued protests, though, Maliki sent in the

army to shut down protest camps in Anbar, and also to secure the area from al Qaeda, which was encroaching. Sunni tribal forces repelled the troops and forced Maliki to withdraw. Many Sunnis did not feel safe under Maliki's security forces, and formed their own instead. Starting in 2006, Maliki had steadily gained power as minister of defense, or the interior, of the state for national security, and the commander in chief of the armed forces. He replaced high ranking military officials with his allies, and created provincial command centers headed by loyal generals. He also integrated Shiite militias into the ISF. There were some instances of military disloyalty. A local army unit helped civilians flee the camp raid in April, and the mostly Kurdish 16<sup>th</sup> brigade of the army refused Maliki's orders to fire on protesters. Maliki dismissed the brigade's commander, which led it to defect to the Kurdistan Regional Government's forces.

Sources:

Jensen, Sterling. "The Fall of Iraq's Anbar Province." *The Middle East Quarterly* 23, no. 1 (2016).

Katzman, K. "Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights." *Current Politics and Economics of the Middle East* 4, no. 3 (2013).

Knights, Michael. "The ISIL's Stand in the Ramadi-Falluja Corridor." *CTC Sentinel* 7, no. 5 (2014).

Laub, Zachary and Jonathan Masters. "The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria." *Council on Foreign Relations*. August 8, 2014.

O'Driscoll, Dylan. "U.S. Policy in Iraq: Searching for the Reverse Gear." *Middle East Policy* 23, no. 1 (2016).

Plebani, Andrea. "Iraq Towards 2014 elections: A Socio-Political Perspective." *ISPI Analysis* 196 (2013).

Rohwerder, Brigitte. *Contemporary Conflict Analysis of Iraq* (Rapid Literature Review). Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, 2014.

Romano, David. "Iraq's Descent into Civil War: A Constitutional Explanation." *The Middle East Journal* 68, no. 4 (2014): 547-566.

Sowell, KH. 2014. "Iraq's Second Sunni Insurgency." *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology* 14.

Snyder, Madeleine. "Post-War Iraq." *Harvard International Review* 35, no. 4 (2014).

### **Japan 5/21/1960-7/15/1960 – united defections**

Protests started when the Nobusuke Kishi government attempted to revise the country's Mutual Security Treaty. They grew over how Kishi handled the situation, including police violence against mostly students who were part of the demonstrations. During one protest on June 15, rightist "hoodlums" attacked the protesters. President Dwight Eisenhower of the United States was scheduled to visit Japan on June 19, so Kishi asked the defense agency chief to deploy the Self Defense Force Troops (the Japanese military) against the movement in advance. The chief refused the request and later said his decision had the support of the rest of the military. Kishi had lost significant support from his party, the Liberal Democratic Party, in the lead-up. The Treaty ended up being reformed, but Kishi resigned on June 23.



Sources:

Berger, Thomas U. "From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan's Culture of Anti-Militarism." *International Security* 17, no. 4 (1993): 119-150.

Fakuda, Kanichi. "The May-June Incident." *Far Eastern Survey* 29, no. 10 (1960): 146-151.

Saruya, Hiroe. "Protests and Democracy in Japan: The Development of Movement Fields and the 1960 Anpo Protests." PhD diss., University of Michigan, 2012.

**Jordan 1/14/2011-1/23/2013** – neutral

These Arab Spring protests followed on others in the region, but here, the armed forces remained loyal. The regime mostly allowed the demonstrations under heavy police presence, and used the security forces (mainly the paramilitary) to clamp down when necessary. It also responded with minor concessions. The regime consisted mostly of East Bank Jordanians, and the same went for the armed forces. There were rumors of discontent among military veterans that disapproved of the regime, and the protests at one point involved loyalty tribes affiliated with the military. Still, no part of the military ever shifted loyalty, or acted in the protests on regime orders.

Sources:

Barany, Zoltan. "Revolt and Resistance in the Arab Kingdoms." *Parameters* 43, no. 2 (2013): 89-101.

El Kurd, Dana. "The Jordanian Military: A Key Regional Ally." *Parameters* 44, no. 3 (2014): 47-55.

Lang, Courtney. "The Influence of Democracy Aid on the Arab Spring Protests: Did Western Democracy Assistance Help Nations Respond Positively to the Protests?" BA honors thesis, Duke University, 2013.

Makara, Michael. "Coup-Proofing, Military Defection, and the Arab Spring." *Democracy and Security* 9, no. 4 (2013): 334-359.

**Kenya 2/18/1990-12/31/1991** – neutral

Pro-democracy protests began in February 1990, and the crackdown against them began in June. The regime used violent repression in July. The demonstrations continued for more than a year, though, and on December 2, 1991, the government announced a change to the constitution that would allow competitive multiparty politics. This occurred in the absence of any military loyalty shifts.

Sources:

Kuria, Gibson Kamau. "Confronting Dictatorship in Kenya." *Journal of Democracy* 2, no. 4 (1991): 115-126.

Riley, Stephen P. "Political Adjustment or Domestic Pressure: Democratic Politics and Political Choice in Africa." *Third World Quarterly* 13, no. 3 (1992): 539-551.

### **Kyrgyzstan 5/1/1990-4/19/1991 – neutral**

Ongoing inter-ethnic violence (including a June 5, 1990 incident where more than 500 were killed) increased the opposition to the Communist regime. In May, the opposition formed the Kyrgyzstan Democratic Movement as an anti-Communist bloc. The protest movement forced parliament to hold new presidential elections in October. The Communist Party's candidate, Absamat Masaliyev lost in an upset to Askar Akayev. He was tasked with navigating the transition to independence, and was re-elected in October 1991.

#### Sources:

*Kyrgyzstan: The Transition to a Market Economy*. World Bank Publications, 1993.  
Melvin, Neil. "Promoting a Stable and Multiethnic Kyrgyzstan: Overcoming the Causes and Legacies of Violence." *Open Society Foundations Occasional Paper Series* 3 (2011).

### **Kyrgyzstan 2/27/2005-3/24/2005 – low level**

Demonstrations began in February but escalated in March. On March 20, President Askar Akayev ordered soldiers to clear protesters from an administrative building in Jalalabad. This resulted in some injuries, with rumors of many more, and the protesters devolved into a violent mob. Some police were sympathetic to the protesters, and when ten thousand of them gathered in the capital on March 21, they were able to break through security force lines to flood the main government offices. Akayev decided against declaring a state of emergency, likely because he couldn't rely on the security apparatus. He then fled the country. Violence was limited because the military and police dissolved rather than use force. These deployed soldiers resisted acting against the protesters and thus shifted loyalty from the regime in this limited instance.

#### Sources:

Beachain, Donnacha O. "Roses and Tulips: Dynamics of Regime Change in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan." *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 25, no. 2-3 (2009).  
McGlinchey, Eric. "Exploring Regime Instability and Ethnic Violence in Kyrgyzstan." *Asia Policy* 12, no. 1 (2011): 79-98.  
Radnitz, Scott. "What Really Happened in Kyrgyzstan?" *Journal of Democracy* 17, no. 2 (2006): 132-146. Way, Lucan. "The Real Causes of the Color Revolutions." *Journal of Democracy* 19, no. 3 (2008): 55-69.

### **Kyrgyzstan 4/6/2010-4/20/2010 – united defections**

After two days of major demonstrations, on April 7, Prime Minister Daniar Usenov declared a nationwide state of emergency. Thousands of protesters gathered anyway, overwhelming the police. They surrounded the presidential offices and demanded Usenov and President Kurmanbek Bakiyev to come out. When the officials refused, the protesters stormed the building. The police opened live fire, but the protesters continued, and occupied other buildings. The police ended up killing 85 and then abandoned their positions. The military defected from Bakiyev to the opposition on April 8, after the release of former Defense Minister Ismail Isakov from prison. Bakiyev left the country in

the days following. Bakiyev was already out of the country at this point, but this sealed his fate. His other security services also gave him little support. An interim government was declared after Bakiyev was overthrown.

Sources:

Cherniavskiy, Stanislav. "The Kyrgyz Revolution of 2010: The Causes and Possible Post-Revolutionary Developments." *Central Asia and the Caucasus* 11, no. 2 (2010).

Cooley, Alexander. "Kyrgyzstan on the Brink." *Current History* 109, no. 729 (2010): 301-307.

Marat, Erica. "Bakiyev, The Security Structures, and the April 7 Violence in Kyrgyzstan." *CACI Analyst*. April 29, 2010.

McGlinchey, Eric. "Exploring Regime Instability and Ethnic Violence in Kyrgyzstan." *Asia Policy* 12, no. 1 (2011): 79-98.

Nichol, Jim. "The April 2010 Coup in Kyrgyzstan and its Aftermath: Context and Implications for U.S. Interests." *Congressional Research Service*, 2010.

#### **Latvia 8/23/1989-8/31/1991 – loyal**

Anti-regime opposition in Latvia developed in late 1989, but in January 1991, the situation became more dramatic. First, on January 14, the plenum of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee issued an ultimatum: it would call on the pro-Soviet Latvian National Salvation Committee (NSC) to take over unless the government resigned and the legislature disbanded. The headquarters of the Baltic Military District supported the NSC takeover, and its Commander in Chief Fyodor Kuzmin called on the government to comply with the Soviet Constitution. Then, Moscow, using Soviet security forces and specifically Black Berets, stepped up its attacks on the Latvian independence movement. On January 20, for example, the Black Berets attacked the Latvian Ministry of the Interior building. The struggle continued, though, only ending with the failed August coup in Moscow. Then Latvia declared its transitional period over and became an independent, non-Communist state.

Sources:

McFaul, Michael. "Political Transitions: Democracy and the Former Soviet Union." *Harvard International Review* 28, no. 1 (2006): 40-45.

Lapidus, Gail Warshofsky. "The Crisis of Perestroika." *Journal of Democracy* 2, no. 2 (1991): 47-53.

Lasas, Ainius. "Bloody Sunday: What Did Gorbachev Know About the January 1991 Events in Vilnius and Riga?" *Journal of Baltic Studies* 38, no. 2 (2007): 179-194.

Lazda, Mara. "Reconsidering Nationalism: The Baltic Case of Latvia in 1989." *International Journal of Politics Culture Sociology* 22 (2009): 517-536.

#### **Lebanon 11/23/2006-5/21/2008 – united defections**

Tensions emerged within Lebanon's coalition government in November 2006. Hizbollah and its allies, which held 6 out of the 24 cabinet seats, resigned over issues related to the

investigation of former prime minister Rafic Hariri's 2005 assassination. The resignations set off a larger political crisis, including the start of anti-government demonstrations by Hizbollah and its supporters. President Emile Lahhoud sided with the opposition, saying that the government had no legitimacy without Shiite representatives. But, Lahhoud's term was ending in November 2007, and the government could not decide on his successor. Meanwhile, two of the largest demonstrations occurred on December 1 and December 10, and a sit-in continued over the next two years. Though there was the potential for communal violence between the Shiites and Sunnis, the protest movement itself remained peaceful. For its part, the army killed a few protesters from Hizbollah in January 2008. Tensions grew in early May 2008, when the government decided to investigate and take control of a wireless communications network operated by Hizbollah. The army remained neutral to avoid supporting the government, and partly because of rumors that a number of Sunni officers were considering resigning in opposition to it. Violence became more likely at this stage as Hizbollah mobilized its supporters and went on an offensive against its opponents. Hizbollah and the army largely stayed separate, though; Hizbollah avoided clashing with it, and the army didn't intervene to end Hizbollah's operations. The army was tired and disorganized after its conflict in Nahr al Bared (although it had won). The political deadlock ended with an agreement on May 5, 2008, that named Lieutenant General Michel Sleiman president. He was a consensus pick because of his perceived neutrality.

Sources:

Hajjar, Sami G. "The Convolved and Diminished Lebanese Democracy." *Democracy and Security* 5, no. 3 (2009): 261-276.

Rowayheb, Marwan George. "Political Change and the Outbreak of Civil War: The Case of Lebanon." *Civil Wars* 13, no. 4 (2011): 414-436.

#### **Lithuania 12/24/1988-9/1/1991 – neutral**

The protests were aimed at the Communist government, but the Lithuanian state was also seeking independence from the Soviet Union. In December 1990, the Soviet Union ordered troops into Lithuania to enforce conscription, following growing resistance to the draft. Protests had been ongoing since late 1988, but escalated in January 1991 when Prime Minister Kazimira Prunskiene raised the prices of food staples. A rally on January 8 forced Prunskiene and her cabinet to resign. The same day, Soviet Defense Minister Dmitry Yazov ordered a special paratroop division to enter Lithuania. On January 10, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev threatened to introduce direct presidential rule in Lithuania. Events developed rapidly. On January 11, the National Salvation Committee (NSC) announced its existence and Soviet troops and KGB units arrived in Lithuania. On January 12-13, the NSC demanded the Lithuanian Supreme Council's resignation and announced direct Soviet presidential rule, with the chief of the Vilnius military garrison as Vilnius's military commander. Soon after, military, interior, and KGB units were deployed to occupy the city's television and radio buildings (Gorbachev's role in this decision is disputed). Soviet soldiers killed 14 and injured 200 protesters who were attempting to defend the buildings. Soviet tanks also moved towards the parliament, but

thousands of protesters blocked them and then erected barricades. The situation then stabilized for a few months. The crucial event was the failed August 18, 1991 coup in Moscow. In Lithuania, putschist military forces also seized communication centers. Tensions rose when Soviet tanks and troops moved towards the Supreme Council buildings. More violence occurred on August 19 when protesters and Soviet soldiers clashed outside the KGB headquarters. The Soviets departed soon, though, and the Supreme Council remained in session.

Sources:

Balaban, Milos. "Armed Forces and the Disintegration of the Soviet Union." *Acta Universitatis Carolinae – Studia Territorialia* 4 (2002): 65-58.

Karklins, Rasma. "Explaining Regime Change in the Soviet Union." *Europe-Asia Studies* 46, no. 1 (1994): 29-45.

Ulfelder, Jay. "Baltic Protest in the Gorbachev Era: Movement Content and Dynamics." *The Global Review of Ethnopolitics* 3, no. 3-4 (2004): 23-43.

#### **Madagascar 5/13/1972-5/19/1972 – united defections**

The anti-President Philibert Tsiranana protests were largely student-led but expanded into a general strike in early 1972. The situation escalated on May 13, when security forces opened fire on demonstrators, leading Tsiranana to declare a state of emergency. This did not end the crisis; on May 18, Tsiranana dissolved the government and handed power to Major General Gabriel Ramanantsoa. Ramanantsoa was a leader in the military, separate from the gendarmerie under Tsiranana's authority and commanded by Colonel Jean Bocchino. The Les Forces Republicaines de Securite (FRS) was an additional security force under the control of the Interior Ministry and designed to protect Tsiranana. During the protests, the army committed against being involved, while the gendarmerie deployed into the streets refused to use violence. The military hierarchy was important here, though lower ranking officers put pressure on them. The FRS remained loyal to Tsiranana and shot into the crowds.

Sources:

"Ethos of Exploitation: Insecurity and Predation in Madagascar." In *Small Arms Survey 2011*. 161-191. <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/A-Yearbook/2011/en/Small-Arms-Survey-2011-Chapter-06-EN.pdf>.

Hauge, Wenche. "Madagascar Between Peace and Conflict – Domestic Capabilities for Peaceful Conflict Management." *Conflict, Security and Development* 11, no. 5 (2011): 509-531.

Kim, Tongfi. "The Effect of Age Structure on the Abrogation of Military Alliances." *International Interactions* 41, no. 2 (2015): 279-308.

#### **Madagascar 6/10/1991-2/10/1993 – united defections**

An opposition group, Forces Vives, began in 1991 to organize strikes and demonstrations across the country. On August 10, a massive group of protesters (between 100,000 and 400,000) marched to the presidential palace of Didier Ratsiraka. The Presidential Guard

(RSEP) sought to disperse them and ended up opening fire on the crowd, killing 10 to 20 people. The RSEP was known to be loyal to the president, and as a result, was resented by the regular army and its officer corps. In response to the violence, the Forces Vives stepped up its opposition and was joined by the National Council of Christian Churches. The military's support of the president also began to wane, according to reports. On October 30, 1991, General Desire Philippe Ramakavelo made a statement on behalf of senior officers, asking that the politicians solve the crisis through dialogue. The next day, Ratsiraka made some concessions, including a new constitution and multiparty elections. He did not resign, instead inviting the opposition to a convention, which resulted in a coalition government and transition process. A new constitution was approved in August 1992, with first round elections in November, and a run-off in February 1993. Albert Zafy was elected. Overall, the military, and particularly the senior leadership, was important in the transfer of the power. Ratsiraka had completely restructured the army after coming to power, to protect himself from it. He promoted loyalist generals and generated divisions and competition within the military.

Sources:

“Ethos of Exploitation: Insecurity and Predation in Madagascar.” In *Small Arms Survey 2011*. 161-191. <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/A-Yearbook/2011/en/Small-Arms-Survey-2011-Chapter-06-EN.pdf>.

Hauge, Wenche. “Madagascar Between Peace and Conflict – Domestic Capabilities for Peaceful Conflict Management.” *Conflict, Security, and Development* 11, no. 5 (2011): 509-531.

“Madagascar Citizens Force Free Elections, 1990-1992.” *Global Nonviolent Action Database*. <https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/madagascar-citizens-force-free-elections-1990-1992>. December 10, 2011.

### **Madagascar 1/28/2002-7/5/2002** – fragmented high level

The protests against President Didier Ratsiraka developed in January after a disputed presidential election in December, where opposition candidate and mayor of Antananarivo Marc Ravalomanana declared himself winner. By February, the protests had led to the resignations of the country's prime minister and some of Ratsiraka's cabinet. However, Ratsiraka also had supporters willing to take to the streets, which generated some clashes with those demonstrating against him. On March 1, Ratsiraka declared martial law and appointed General Raveloarison as governor of Antananarivo. But, Raveloarison did not follow Ratsiraka's orders there. Ravalomanana took this as a sign of Ratsiraka's weakness and named his cabinet. More demonstrations occurred in support of Ravalomanana and the military did not attempt to end them. On March 7, Ravalomanana's allies (namely General Jules Mamizara) took over the ministry of defense. Ratsiraka's defense minister General Marcel Ranjeva recognized Ravalomanana's authority and resigned. Yet as of March 15 the army chief of staff General Ismael Mounibou was still loyal to Ratsiraka. It took a few more months for the rest of the military to move to support Ravalomanana. On June 8, under the leadership of

pro-Ravalomanana officers, the army (as well as the gendarmerie) pledged loyalty to the new government. Ratsiraka finally gave up and left the country in early July.

Sources:

Cornwell, Richard. "Madagascar: First Test for the African Union." *African Security Review* 12, no. 1 (2003): 40-53.

"Madagascar Army Chiefs Replaced." *News 24*. March 15, 2002.

<https://www.news24.com/xArchive/Archive/Madagascar-army-chiefs-replaced-20020314>.

"Madagascar: Presidential Claimant Gains Ground in Madagascar as Threats Loom." *All Africa*. March 10, 2002. <http://allafrica.com/stories/200203110509.html>.

Marcus, Richard R. "Political Change in Madagascar: Populist Democracy or Neopatrimonialism by Another Name?" *Institute for Security Studies Occasional Papers* 89 (2004).

Randrianja, Solofo. "'Be not afraid, only believe': Madagascar 2002." *African Affairs* 102, no. 407 (2003): 309-329.

#### **Madagascar 1/24/2009-3/18/2009** – fragmented high level

This protest movement was aimed at ousting President Marc Ravalomanana. Andry Rajoelina, Ravalomanana's main rival, was mayor of the capital Antananarivo and backed by a group of opposition parties. The protests were violent almost from the beginning, with rioting and looting in late January. On February 3, Ravalomanana removed Rajoelina from his position. On February 7, the presidential guard killed around 30 protesters who were marching near the presidential palace. The defense minister resigned in protest. While some talks took place in mid-February, so did more protests, some of which were suppressed by the security forces. As the military became more involved in violence, divisions developed. On March 8, a unit of paratroopers announced it would no longer take orders from the government, and on March 10, a group of officers forced the resignation of the defense minister over his involvement in repression. The army chief of staff warned the military might take power if the situation did not calm down, and was promptly replaced. But then a pro-Rajoelina officer claimed to assume the post, while a pro-Rajoelina unit deployed tanks to the capital city. They denied they were seeking to oust Ravalomanana by force, but then seized the presidential palace, with no interference from the rest of the military. Other key military leaders had shifted towards Rajoelina over this period, and on March 14, he announced the military was obeying his orders. On March 16, it was reported elements of the presidential guard had defected from the president. These events led Ravalomanana to announce his resignation on March 17. He tried to transfer authority to a navy admiral, though, but he refused to take power. The military overall recognized Rajoelina as president of the transitional government.

Sources:

Hauge, Wenche. "Madagascar Between Peace and Conflict – Domestic Capabilities for Peaceful Conflict Management." *Conflict, Security, and Development* 11, no. 5 (2011): 509-531.

Ploch, Lauren. "Madagascar's 2009 Political Crisis." *Congressional Research Service*, 2009.

### **Madagascar 3/23/2009-1/17/2014 – neutral**

These protests were against the High Transitional Authority government, which repeatedly called and then cancelled elections during this time. Presidential elections were finally held on October 25, with a runoff on December 20. The results were confirmed by an electoral court on January 17, 2014, ending the anti-regime movement. The military did not act and there are no signs the transitional regime asked it to.

#### Sources:

Norris, Pippa, Richard W. Frank, and Ferran Martinez I Coma. "The Year in Elections, 2013." *Electoral Integrity Project*. February 2014.

Razafindrakoto, Mireille, Francois Roubaud, and Jean-Michael Wachsberger. "The Puzzle of Structural Fragility in Madagascar: A Political Economy Approach." January 2015. [http://cega.berkeley.edu/assets/miscellaneous\\_files/79\\_-ABCD\\_A\\_2015\\_-\\_Madagascar\\_Structural\\_Fragility.pdf](http://cega.berkeley.edu/assets/miscellaneous_files/79_-ABCD_A_2015_-_Madagascar_Structural_Fragility.pdf).

### **Malawi 3/15/1992-5/17/1994 – fragmented high level**

Anti-President Hastings Banda protests began in March 1992. At this point, there were reports of junior army officers stationed near the demonstrators (mostly students) offering them encouragement and protecting them from the police. In April, middle- and senior-ranking officers met with Banda to tell him they were neutral and wouldn't be used to repress civilians calling for democracy. Banda announced a referendum on the one-party rule of his Malawi Congress Party (MCP) in October, and the next June it passed. This set the country up for elections in May 1994. In December 1993, though, with protests ongoing, junior military officers forcefully disarmed the paramilitary wing of the ruling party. This was the culmination of long-standing tensions between the military and the Malawi Young Pioneers (MYP) and followed an attack of the MYP on demonstrators. As part of the mutiny, the junior officers also demanded the removal of senior commanders, who were linked to Banda's regime, the MCP, and the MYP. They returned to the barracks to support the transition. In response, Banda retired a top army general. He and the MCP then lost the elections, and the military did not defend the regime. Sources point to the December 1993 conflict as being the key event in the military's response to the anti-regime movement; because it involved junior officers, the shift is best classified as fragmented. Further, it is unclear whether the April 1992 meeting between army and Banda meant senior officers would've refused to support him had junior officers not removed their support and Banda asked.

#### Sources:



Brown, Stephen. “‘Born-Again Politicians Hijacked our Revolution!’: Reassessing Malawi’s Transition to Democracy.” *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 38, no. 3 (2004): 705-722.

Chirambo, Reuben. “‘Operation Bwezani’: The Army, Political Change, and Dr. Banda’s Hegemony in Malawi.” *Nordic Journal of African Studies* 13, no. 2 (2004): 146-163.

Ihonvbere, Julius O. “From Despotism to Democracy: The Rise of Multiparty Politics in Malawi.” *Third World Quarterly* 18, no. 2 (1997): 225-248.

Phiri, Mphatso Jones Boti. “Institutional Challenges to Viable Civil-Military Relations in Malawi.” MA Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2008.

Posner, Daniel N. “Malawi’s New Dawn.” *Journal of Democracy* 6, no. 1 (1995): 131-145.

#### **Malawi 7/20/2011-4/6/2012** – united defections

On July 20, 2011, some anti-President Bingu wa Mutharika demonstrators were killed by the police. This set off a nearly year-long protest movement. In a surprising turn of events, Mutharika suffered a heart attack on April 5, 2012. Joyce Banda was sworn in as his successor, in line with the constitution. Mutharika’s son tried to take power but was opposed by cabinet members and other officials and Army Commander General Henry Odillo. Both Banda and Mutharika reached out to Odillo, seeking his support, with Mutharika urging Odillo and the rest of the military to seize power. Odillo pledged the army’s support to Banda in the end.

#### Sources:

Dionne, Kim Yi and Boniface Dulani. “Constitutional Provisions and Executive Succession: Malawi’s 2012 Transition in Comparative Perspective.” *African Affairs* 112, no. 446 (2013): 111-137.

#### **Malaysia 9/5/1998-9/20/1999** – neutral

These short-lived protests sought to oust Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamed and his government. The police were deployed to repress them, while the military was not involved. Mahathir’s power was never really threatened by the popular opposition.

#### Sources:

Freedman, Amy L. “Economic Crises and Political Change: Indonesia, South Korea, and Malaysia.” *Asian Affairs* 31, no. 4 (2005): 232-249.

Funston, John. “Malaysia’s Tenth Elections: Status Quo, ‘Reformasi’, or Islamization?” *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 22, no. 1 (2000): 23-59.

#### **Maldives 9/20/2003-10/29/2008** – fragmented high level

Protests against the government of President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom developed following a September 2003 prison riot, when guards (also members of the military) opened fire and killed three and injured 17. A state of emergency was declared in response to the resulting unrest, and the military repressed the movement. The protests

continued, though, and included a mass rally that became violent in August 2004. A member of the crowd stabbed a police officer, and other participants set a government building on fire. The security forces forcibly dispersed the protesters. The military and its leadership was divided between support of Maumoon and of the opposition or in particular Mohamed Nasheed, a founder of the Maldivian Democratic Party. Both sides supported democratic government, though. The new constitution of early 2008 confirmed that the military would stay out of domestic politics. Nasheed unseated Gayoom in the second round of the October 2008 presidential election.

Sources:

Zubair, Ahmed. "Challenges to the Consolidation of Democracy: A Case Study of the Maldives." MA thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2013.

#### **Maldives 1/17/2012-2/7/2012 – united defections**

On January 16, President Mohamed Nasheed sent soldiers to arrest the chief judge of the Criminal Court. The judge, and other members of the judiciary, were corrupt and had ties to the former regime. Still, this bold move was opposed internationally and domestically, and protests developed soon after. The Supreme Court declared the military did not have the authority to arrest and detain civilians and ordered it to release the judge, but it refused. On February 6, demonstrations turned into riots between pro- and anti-government groups. Some police mutinied, and when the military was assigned crowd control, some soldiers defected. The defectors numbered less than a hundred, and none were commissioned officers, but the military leadership seemed to have lost some control. On February 7, the military said Nasheed had to go. Nasheed claimed this was at gunpoint, but a commission investigated and decided it was not a coup. Rather, Nasheed resigned after using the security forces for illegal purposes. In another, earlier, instance, Nasheed had ordered the military to detain two parliament members on bribing allegations. This was far outside its mandate. The security forces also violated the rule of law and human rights during the protest movement.

Sources:

Ashraf, Ibrahim. "Civil-Military Challenges for a Consolidating Democracy: The Maldives." MA thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2012.

Musthaq, Fathima. "Tumult in the Maldives." *Journal of Democracy* 25, no. 2 (2014): 164-170.

Zubair, Ahmed. "Challenges to the Consolidation of Democracy: A Case Study of the Maldives." MA Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2013.

#### **Maldives 2/8/2012-11/16/2013 - loyal**

Demonstrations began after President Mohamed Nasheed's February 2012 resignation, demanding the reinstatement of his government. The new president, Mohammed Waheed Hassan, used repression in response; including police violence on February 8. The police remained the key repressive force but at times requested assistance from the military, such as for the demonstrations following the annulled September 2013 elections. Former

president Nasheed won the first round, and Supreme Court annulled it after allegations of vote rigging. The opposition hoped the military would block the annulment, but it refused.

Sources:

Didi, Aminath. "The Maldives in Transition: Human Rights and Voices of Dissent." PhD diss., Curtin University, 2012.

Zubair, Ahmed. "Challenges to the Consolidation of Democracy: A Case Study of the Maldives." MA Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2013.

### **Mali 10/25/1990-3/26/1991 – united defections**

Opposition to President Moussa Traore's regime began in fall 1990 and ramped up in January 1991, following Traore's unpopular decision to sign a ceasefire with Tuareg rebels in the north of the country. Protesters demanded Traore's resignation as well as multiparty politics. From the beginning, Traore responded with repression. As demonstrations continued into March, Traore deployed the military, and soldiers killed hundreds. In a particularly egregious episode, on March 23 soldiers killed five women who had been mourning the victims. The soldiers then chased other protesters into a building and set it on fire, killing 65. Traore still refused to resign. When the opposition launched a new strike on March 25, troops did not use violence. Then, on March 26, it was reported that a group of officers led by Lieutenant Colonel Amadou Toumani Toure had arrested Traore. No part of the military remained loyal to Traore or expressed disagreement with Toure's decision. The military leadership issued an apology to the opposition for the violence and then formed a government of civilian and military reformers. Traore had divided the military and put the Republican Guard directly under his rule. There were tensions between the senior officers and rank and file over pay, and these worsened when the rank and file was deployed as part of the unsuccessful operation against the Tuaregs.

Sources:

Clark, Andrew. "From Military Dictatorship to Democracy: The Democratization Process in Mali." *Journal of Third World Studies* 12, no. 1 (1995): 201-219.

"Mali Human Rights Practices, 1993." *U.S. Department of State*. January 31, 1994. [http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/democracy/1993\\_hrp\\_report/93hrp\\_report\\_africa/Mali.html](http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/democracy/1993_hrp_report/93hrp_report_africa/Mali.html)

Lecocq, Baz and Georg Klute. "Tuareg Separatism in Mali." *International Journal* 68, no. 3 (2013): 424-434.

Lode, Kare. "The Peace Process in Mali." *Security Dialogue* 28, no. 4 (1997): 409-424.

Smith, Zeric Kay. "Mali's Decade of Democracy." *Journal of Democracy* 12, no. 3 (2001): 73- 79.

Turriffin, Jane. "Mali: People Topple Traore." *Review of African Political Economy* 52 (1991): 97-103.

### **Mauritania 1/17/2011-6/20/2014 – loyal**

These protests were against the military regime of General Mohamed Ouid Abdel Aziz and mostly involved youths. In one notable event on October 13, 2011, Aziz was shot and wounded. Rumors spread that it was an assassination attempt by a group of soldiers, but details are difficult to confirm. Aziz agreed to some limited constitutional reforms in March 2012, but otherwise held on to power. He was believed to have the respect of the overall army and used it to repress the protesters.

Sources:

Buehler, Matt. "Continuity Through Co-optation: Rural Politics and Regime Resilience in Morocco and Mauritania." *Mediterranean Politics* 20, no. 3 (2015): 364-385.

Jedou, Ahmed Ould. "Mauritania: Dreaming About the Fall of the Military State." *African Futures*. September 18, 2012. <http://forums.ssrc.org/african-futures/2012/09/18/mauritania-dreaming-about-the-fall-of-the-military-state/>.

Rao, Sumedh. *Conflict Analysis of Mauritania*. Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham, 2014.

#### **Mexico 10/14/1987-7/2/2000 – neutral**

Protests against the domination of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in Mexican politics achieved a number of electoral reforms beginning in 1987. Opposition parties and in particular the National Action Party (PAN) gained political strength through elections, which forced additional concessions by the PRI. In the July 2000 presidential elections, the PRI was defeated by Vicente Fox of the PAN.

Sources:

Schedler, Andreas. "The Democratic Revelation." *Journal of Democracy* 11, no. 4 (2000): 5-19.

#### **Mexico 7/8/2006-9/1/2006 - neutral**

In Mexico's July 2006 presidential elections, Felipe Calderon was declared the winner over Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador by a very slim margin. Obrador's supporters took to the streets of Mexico City to protest the result. After months of demonstrations, the electoral courts noted some irregularities in the vote, but ruled that Calderon was officially the president. Calderon took office in December. At times the protesters clashed with the federal police, but the military was seemingly not involved.

Sources:

Carlsen, Laura. "Mexico's Youth Protest a Return to the Past." *Dissent* 60, no. 1 (2013): 10-15.

Klesner, Joseph L. "The July 2006 Presidential and Congressional Elections in Mexico." *Electoral Studies* 26, no. 4 (2007): 803-808.

"Mexican Citizens Massively Protest Presidential Election Results, 2006." *Global Nonviolent Action Database*. March 3, 2013.

<https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/mexican-citizens-massively-protest-presidential-election-results-2006>.

“Polity IV Country Report 2010: Mexico.” *Systemic Peace*.

<http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/Mexico2010.pdf>.

**Mexico 10/2/2014-5/1/2015 (ongoing) – loyal**

As these protests against governmental corruption continued, President Enrique Peña Nieto mobilized the army to take full control of public security in 32 municipalities. The military and other security forces were involved in repression of protests and more general human rights abuses, including the disappearance and likely massacre of 43 student teachers in September 2014.

Sources:

Darlington, Shasta. “Clashes Erupt in Mexico City Protests Over Missing Students.” *CNN*. Friday, November 1, 2014.

<http://www.cnn.com/2014/11/20/world/americas/mexico-missing-students-protests/index.html>.

Perez, Carlos Antonio Flores. “Between Mutual Suspicion and Fear: Civil-Military Relations in Mexico.” *CMI Working Paper* (2015).

**Moldova 4/7/2009-4/15/2009 – neutral**

Parliamentary elections took place on April 5. The opposition declared them fraudulent, and it along with young demonstrators took to the streets to protest the Communist Party’s eight-year rule. The protest movement was disorganized, though, and made no declarations or written demands. Consequently, the government did not respond. On April 7, the demonstrators stormed past police troops to the parliament building. The police then engaged in some violence and detained hundreds. The president ordered a recount of the vote, but in the end, it didn’t change the election results. The military does not seem to have been involved.

Sources:

Szajkowski, Bogdan. “Social Media Tools and the Arab Revolts.” *Alternative Politics* 3, no. 3 (2011): 420-432.

**Mongolia 12/10/1989-5/10/1990 - neutral**

As one of the first groups organized in opposition to Communist rule in Mongolia, the Mongolian Democratic Union launched protests in early 1990. The ruling Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party was unsure how to respond, but decided against clamping down, especially since the Soviet Union had signaled it wouldn’t support it. The hardliners pushed for the use of force, even though they knew the police and internal security troops likely wouldn’t be sufficient. The Mongolian armed forces didn’t act, and Soviet troops had been removed from Mongolia over 1986 to 1989 as it lessened in geo-strategic importance. The protests strengthened the reformers in the party; General

Secretary Jambyn Batmonkh resigned, and a new general secretary and Central Committee were put in place.

Sources:

Bilskie, Julia S., Hugh M. Arnold. "An Examination of the Political and Economic Transition of Mongolia Since the Collapse of the Soviet Union." *Journal of Third World Studies* 19, no. 2: 205-218.

Chuluunbat, Narantuya. "Why Was Mongolia Successful? Political and Economic Transition in 1990-1996." PhD diss., University of Maryland, College Park, 2013.

Fritz, Verena. "Mongolia: The Rise and Travails of a Deviant Democracy." *Democratization* 15, no. 4 (2008): 766-788.

### **Myanmar 8/19/2007-9/29/2007 - loyal**

Early protests against the military regime were met with mass arrests. The regime mostly used the Swan Arr Shin, a civilians' militia controlled by the Union Solidarity and Development Association (the junta's political party). The militia and other security forces beat a small number of Buddhist monks during a demonstration on September 5. As a result, an All Burma Monks Alliance formed and held demonstrations across the country. The growing protests led the regime to announce a night-time curfew on September 25. When protests continued the next day, soldiers and police opened fire on a large demonstration in Rangoon. Later, they raided a number of monasteries and forcibly detained hundreds of monks. The crackdown ended the protests, which had been in response to the initial repression and spontaneous. There were some reports of tensions within the military, including unconfirmed instances of soldiers who refused shooting orders. Within the upper command, General Shwe Mann (Chief of Staff of the Army, Navy, and Air Force) began chairing the National Security Council meetings over Maung Aye, and there was speculation that this was because Maung Aye didn't approve of using the militia. These rumors are not sufficient for loyalty shifts.

Sources:

Croissant, Aurel. "Why Do Military Regimes Institutionalize? Constitution-Making and Elections as Political Survival Strategy in Myanmar." *Asian Journal of Political Science* 21, no. 2 (2013): 105-125.

Selth, Andrew. "Burma's Saffron Revolution and the Limits of International Influence." *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 62, no. 3 (2008): 281-297.

Skidmore, Monique and Trevor Wilson, eds. *Dictatorship, Disorder, and Decline in Myanmar*. ANU Press, 2008.

### **Nepal 2/18/1990-4/8/1990 – neutral**

In January 1990, the Nepali Congress political party issued a call for the peaceful restoration of democracy. It formed the Movement for Restoration of Democracy by allying with leftist parties and began demonstrating. Some of the subsequent protests included violence by young communists, including on March 30 when a group damaged

property. The police response was brutal, which generated more resistance to the government. At least 50 people were killed by the police, such as on April 6, when thousands of demonstrators broke through barricades to the palace and the security forces opened fire. The government then imposed strict curfews. King Birenda decided to lift the ban on political parties following negotiations with opposition leaders. Throughout, the army remained supportive of the regime but uninvolved.

Sources:

Davis, Carol C. "Decade of Dreams: Democracy and the Birth of Nepal's Engaged Stage." *Asian Theatre Journal* 26, no. 1 (2008): 94-110.

Dhungana, Shiva K. "Security Sector Reform and Peacebuilding in Nepal." *Journal of Peacebuilding and Development* 3.2 (2007): 70-78.

Kantha, Pramod. "Nepal's Protracted Democratization in Terms of Modes of Transition." *Himalaya, the Journal of the Association for Nepal and Himalayan Studies* 28, no. 1-2 (2010): 59-70.

Nickson, Andrew. "Democratization, and the Growth of Communism in Nepal." *The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* 30, no. 3 (1992): 358-386.

#### **Nepal 11/26/2002-4/24/2006 – united defections**

In 2001, King Gyanendra declared a state of emergency and assumed all power in an effort to defeat the Maoist rebels. In late 2002, he dismissed the prime minister, assumed temporary executive authority, and chose a new prime minister. Though there was opposition to these moves throughout, demonstrations really ramped up in April 2006. The police responded with violence. The army, though providing backup, remained uninvolved. The middle-ranking officers sided with the pro-democratic forces. The senior command was less supportive of them. The army overall helped to persuade the king to restore Parliament and to allow the political parties to choose the prime minister. Its leadership had indicated it probably could not continue to protect the palace.

Sources:

Dhungana, Shiva K. "Security Sector Reform and Peacebuilding in Nepal: A Critical Reflection." *Journal of Peacebuilding and Development* 3, no. 2 (2012): 70-78.

Gellner, David N. "Nepal and Bhutan in 2006: A Year of Revolution." *Asian Survey* 47, no. 1 (2007): 80-86.

Moorcraft, Paul. "Revolution in Nepal: Can the Nepalese Army Prevent a Maoist Victory?" *The RUSI Journal* 151, no. 5 (2006): 44-50.

Vaughn, Bruce. "Nepal: Background and U.S. Relations." *CRS Report for Congress* (2006). <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a461402.pdf>.

Wennmann, Achim. "Socio-Economic Inequalities and Peace in Nepal." *The Centre on Conflict, Development, and Peacebuilding CCDP Working Paper*.

#### **Nepal 5/1/2010-6/30/2010 - neutral**

These two months of protests against Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal were met with counterprotests. Nepal had become Prime Minister in June 2009 after a Maoist, Pushpa Kamal Dahl Prachanda, resigned because of his sacking of an army chief. Nepal refused to resign and deployed the riot police, though they did not use violence. Overall, the security forces did not interfere with the protests, and allowed the opposition to peaceably assemble. The violence was limited to clashes between the Maoist demonstrators and youths from the Communist parties that supported Nepal.

Sources:

“Freedom in the World: Nepal.” *FreedomHouse*.

<https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2011/nepal>.

Parajuli, Kalpit. “Civil War Looming Over Nepal as UN Urges Govt to Find a Solution.” *AsiaNews*. May 6, 2010. <http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Civil-war-looming-over-Nepal-as-UN-urges-govt-to-find-a-solution-18341.html>.

Shrestha, Manesh. “Maoists Threaten Strike to Force Out Nepal PM.” *CNN*. May 2, 2010. <http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/asiapcf/05/02/nepal.protests/index.html>.

Tharoor, Ishaan. “After Maoist Protests, Nepal Faces a Murky Future.” *Time*. May 12, 2010. <http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1988455,00.html>.

#### **Nepal 5/30/2012-12/31/2012 - neutral**

Nepal’s Constituent Assembly was tasked with drafting a new constitution, but repeatedly missed its deadline to do so and dissolved on May 27, 2012. This was in part because of growing demonstrations by supporters of the NEFIN and JSC-NIEG. A caretaker government led by the Maoist prime minister Baburam Bhattarai was put in place. Protests continued, with reports of security force use of rubber bullets, but no signs of involvement by the military.

Sources:

Adhikari, Krishna P. and David N. Gellner. “New Identity Politics and the 2012 Collapse of Nepal’s Constituent Assembly: When the Dominant Becomes ‘Other’.” *Modern Asian Studies* 50, no. 6 (2016): 2009-2040.

“Nepal Protests Heighten Tensions Ahead of Election.” *The Guardian*. November 4, 2013. <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2013/nov/04/nepal-protests-heighten-tensions-election>.

#### **Nicaragua 1/23/1978-2/7/1978 – neutral**

This stage of the anti-President Anastasia Somoza Debayle campaign was nonviolent. It was also separate from, and much less organized than, the Marxist rebellion of the Frente Sandinista de Liberacion. The protest movement ended on February 7. On February 10, those participating in the continuing demonstrations started to fight back, especially after they were attacked by regime security forces.

Sources:



Tatar, Bradley. "Emergence of National Identity in Armed Insurrections: A Comparison of Iraq and Nicaragua." *Anthropological Quarterly* 78, no. 1 (2005): 179-195.

#### **Nicaragua 8/25/1978-9/24/1978 - loyal**

This anti-regime movement was closely related to the one earlier in the year, and by this point had come to involve the Sandanistas. In August 1978, the violent rebels of the Sandanistas staged a palace raid and took over 1000 hostages. Some in the National Guard (Nicaragua's military) felt President Somaza had caved in to the Sandinistas, and dozens of the disgruntled troops attempted a coup soon after. The Guard became increasingly violent over this period, killing thousands of civilians as it sought to stem the Sandinistas' gains.

#### Sources:

Cuzan, Alfred G. "Resource Mobilization and Political Opportunity in the Nicaraguan Revolution: The Praxis." *The American Journal of Economics and Sociology* 50, no. 1 (1991): 71-83.

Waldorf, William C. Jr. "Sanctions, Regime Type, and Democratization: Lessons from US- Central American Relations in the 1980s." *Political Science Quarterly* 129, no. 4 (2014-2015).

#### **Niger 2/8/1990-11/27/1992 – loyal**

Protests against the military regime of President and Chief of Staff Colonel Ali Saibou led him to announce a national conference that would transition the country to civilian rule. In November 1990, the government approved a multi-party system and other reforms. It repeatedly postponed the conference, though, leading to protests. The conference eventually took place between July and November 1991 and involved about 1200 delegates. The military refused to attend. In August, Colonel Toumba Boubacar, the Army Chief of Staff, threatened a coup against it because it had agreed to debate crimes committed by the government with the help of the army. Boubacar called this a humiliation. The conference took other major steps: it suspended the constitution, cancelled Saibou's executive powers, and voted to dissolve the government. Meanwhile, the regime stopped paying its soldiers, and in February 1992 a group of them mutinied. This followed other mutinies over the government and military leadership's handling of the Tuareg rebellion. However, none were supportive of the protesters or regime change. A transitional government came into power in July 1991, and a new constitution that provided for multiparty elections was approved by 90 percent of voters in December 1992. The military cooperated with these developments, though it used force against demonstrators on July 17, 1992.

#### Sources:

"Chronology for Tuareg in Niger." *Minorities at Risk Project*, 2004.  
<http://www.refworld.org/docid/469f38c2104.html>.

Elischer, Sebastian. "Contingent Democrats in Action: Organized Labor and Regime Change in the Republic of Niger." *German Institute of Global and Area Studies Working Papers* (2013).

"Niger: Ethnic and Political Conflict Since 1990." In *Encyclopedia of Conflicts Since World War II*, edited by James Ciment. Routledge, 2015.

Zunes, Stephan. "Unarmed Insurrections Against Authoritarian Governments in the Third World." *Third World Quarterly* 15, no. 3 (1994): 403-426.

### **Nigeria 7/5/1993-5/29/1999** – fragmented high level

Protests began when the military regime voided the June 1993 elections. In the ensuing rioting, security forces killed more than 100 demonstrators. The increased pressure from the opposition, as well as parts of the military, led General Ibrahim Babangida to resign from the presidency and the military in August. He transferred power to a civilian-led interim national government headed by Chief Ernest Shonekan, in line with a timeline of political transition. The interim government made little progress, though, which generated more protests. Sani Abacha, the government's Defense Minister, forced Shonekan to resign in November 1993. Abacha had already started to use his position to consolidate power within the military. His strategies followed Babangida's, which politicized and factionalized the military, and personalized politics overall. Abacha shifted top personnel and arrested his opponents, including in March 1995, after his government announced it had foiled a coup attempt. Presidential elections were scheduled for August 1998, with Abacha as the sole candidate. In June 1998, though, Abacha died of a heart attack. This brought about renewed questions of whether the military government should give up power. The ruling military council followed the chain of command and named General Abdulsalami Abubaker rather than an Abacha loyalist as successor. Abubaker announced a democratic transition. Abubaker had once been close to Abacha and his supporters, but distanced himself after Abacha's crackdowns, and from a realization that the military needed change. He faced pressure from the pro-democracy forces as well as retired military elites (led by General Olusegun Abasanjo) who supported a return to civilian rule. Under Abacha generally there was a widening of divisions within the military, between the hardliners and softliners, though the softliners were increasingly marginalized. Abubaker's decision was crucial, but also allowed the military heavy control over the transition.

#### Sources:

Anene, John N. "Military Elites and Democratization: Ghana and Nigeria." *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 28, no. 2 (2000).

Lewis, Peter Michael. "Nigeria: Elections in a Fragile Regime." *Journal of Democracy* 14, no. 3 (2003): 131-144.

Lewis, Peter Michael. "Nigeria: An End to the Permanent Transition?" *Journal of Democracy* 10, no. 1 (1999): 141-156.

Mustapha, Abdul Raufu. "The Nigerian Transition: Third Time Lucky or More of the Same?" *Review of African Political Economy* 26, no. 80 (1999): 277-291.

Obi, Cyril. "Last Card: Can Nigeria Survive Another Political Transition." *African Journal of Political Science* 5, no. 2 (2000): 67-86.

**Pakistan 10/1/1968-3/26/1969** – united defections

Protests against Ayub Khan led to negotiations and concessions from his regime to the mostly student-led movement. The anti-regime campaign further developed in January 1969, when nearly all the opposition groups joined to call for direct elections. The regime employed some repression in response, which led to the death of a Dacca student. The military started patrolling town curfews. On February 21, Ayub announced he would not run in the next election. From the beginning, Ayub's willingness to engage with the protesters rather than declare martial law led to questions over whether the military supported him. In November 1968 the protesters had been joined by Air Marshal Asghar Khan, former Commander in Chief of the Air Force, and General Azam Khan, a former member of Khan's cabinet. On March 25, Khan handed control of the country over to Commander in Chief of the Army General Agha Humahhad Yahya Khan. Though Yahya was a Khan loyalist, he did not want to impose martial law to keep Khan in power, especially because Khan no longer had the support of other army leaders.

Sources:

Sobhan, Rehman. "Pakistan's Political Crisis." *The World Today* 25, no. 5 (1969): 203-211.

Rizvi, Arshad Javed. "Civil-Military Relations: A Comparative Study of Pakistan: From Barracks to Corporate Culture." *International Research Journal of Interdisciplinary and Multidisciplinary Studies* 1, no. 8 (2015): 34-44.

**Pakistan 3/12/1977-7/5/1977** – united defections

In the March 1977 parliamentary elections, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party won a majority of the seats. The opposition immediately claimed fraud, and anti-Bhutto protests began. They soon devolved into armed clashes between the demonstrators (supported by the Pakistan National Alliance party) and PPP-aligned gangs. The police did not interfere. As the unrest continued, Bhutto imposed martial law in three major cities on April 21 and suspended civil liberties nationwide. The military supported him in these efforts. Bhutto and the opposition engaged in some negotiations in late June and early July but failed to reach an agreement. The military, led by General Zia al-Haq, launched a coup against Bhutto on July 5. Then Zia became caretaker ruler and imposed martial law. Though Zia and Bhutto were close (Bhutto had promoted Zia), Zia seized power after other senior military officials said they would do so with or without him. The coup was a collective decision among the Army commanders. Recently, the military had been defeated by India and lost Pakistan. Bhutto had also responded to the opposition by establishing a 20,000 strong guard, the Federal Security Force, as a counterweight to the army.

Sources:

- Klieman, Aaron S. "Confined to the Barracks: Emergencies and the Military in Developing Societies." *Comparative Politics* 12, no. 2 (1980): 143-163.
- Rizvi, Hasan-Askari. "The Paradox of Military Rule in Pakistan." *Asian Survey* 24, no. 5 (1984): 534-555.
- Schofield, Julian. "Appraising the Threat of an Islamist Military Coup in Pakistan." *Defense and Security Analysis* 26, no. 2 (2010): 181-192.
- Syed, Anwar H. "Pakistan in 1977: The 'Prince' is under the Law." *Asian Survey* 18, no. 2 (1978): 117-125.
- Tahir-Kheli, Shirin. "The Military in Contemporary Pakistan." *Armed Forces and Society* 6, no. 4 (1980): 639-653.
- Wilkinson, Steven I. "Democratic Consolidation and Failure: Lessons from Bangladesh and Pakistan." *Democratization* 7, no. 3 (2000): 203-226.
- Weinbaum, M.G. "The March 1977 Elections in Pakistan: Where Everyone Lost." *Asian Survey* 17, no. 1 (1977): 599-618.

#### **Pakistan 1/5/1983-8/28/1983 – loyal**

Though protests against Zia al-Huq began in January they escalated – and became more militant – in August. The army was deployed to take control of some areas. This reduced the protests' momentum, and they ended and Zia's regime survived. The military did not shift loyalty, but there was some discontent in the ranks. Some officers were unhappy with Zia's use of religion to gain support, and the army's loss of prestige. There was a coup attempt against him in early 1983, but it does not seem linked to the protests.

#### Sources:

- Bin Sayeed, Khalid. "Pakistan in 1983: Internal Stresses More Serious than External Problems." *Asian Survey* 24, no. 2 (1984): 219-228.
- Noman, Omar. "Pakistan and General Zia: Era and Legacy." *Third World Quarterly* 11, no. 1 (1989): 28-54.
- Richter, William L. "Pakistan in 1984: Digging In." *Asian Survey* 25, no. 2 (1985): 145-154.
- Rizvi, Hasan-Askari. "The Paradox of Military Rule in Pakistan." *Asian Survey* 24, no. 5 (1984): 534-555.

#### **Pakistan 1/5/1986-8/28/86 – loyal**

The regime of Zia al-Huq lifted martial law in January 1986, allowing space for political opposition. By summer, the opposition parties and other pro-democracy forces were engaging in mass protests. The regime re-imposed political limits and the police responded to the demonstrations with repression. The movement became violent as a result; in mid-August, for example, police killed at least four and injured hundreds when they defied the regime's orders. Protests had failed to gain in size or strength, though, and the military remained loyal to Zia, who was still serving as the army's Chief of Staff.

#### Sources:

Newberg, Paula R. "Pakistan's Troubled Landscape." *World Policy Journal* 4, no. 2 (1987): 313- 331.

Weisman, Steven R. "4 Die in Pakistan in Wide Protests; Bhutto is Jailed." *The New York Times*. August 15, 1986.

### **Pakistan 3/12/2007-8/18/2008 – united defections**

This protest movement began when President Pervez Musharraf sacked Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry on March 9, 2007. He claimed Chaudhry was guilty of corruption, but Chaudhry had challenged Musharraf's ability to be both president and army chief. Protests largely involved members of the legal community and resulted in the Supreme Court's reinstatement of Chaudhry on July 20. Musharraf was reelected by the Electoral College in early October and promised then to give up his military position. He expected the Supreme Court to find him ineligible given that he hadn't yet resigned from the military, so on November 3 he suspended the constitution. He used the ongoing instability between the army and Islamists as pretext. Under emergency rule, he purged the courts and packed them with his loyalists. This increased the opposition and united the two main opposition parties (the Pakistan Peoples Party and the Pakistan Muslim League). On December 15, Musharraf lifted the state of emergency in advance of legislative elections in January 2008. Protests continued over spring and summer 2008, and in early August the PPP and PML-N in parliament moved to start impeachment proceedings against Musharraf. Given the events of the past year, including the December 27 assassination of PPP candidate Benazir Bhutto, the military high command withdrew its support from Musharraf. The new army chief, General Afshaq Kayani, ordered the force to stand aside from politics, in response to pressure from middle-ranking and junior officers. Musharraf resigned August 18. The military also was not involved in repressing the protests.

#### Sources:

Goodson, Larry P. "The 2008 Elections." *Journal of Democracy* 19, no. 4 (2008): 5-15.

Shah, Aqil. "Constraining Consolidation: Military Politics and Democracy in Pakistan (2007- 2013)." *Democratization* 21, no. 6 (2014): 1007-1033.

Synnott, Hilary. "What is Happening in Pakistan?" *Survival* 51, no. 1 (2009): 61-80.

### **Pakistan 2/25/2009-3/15/2009 - neutral**

These protests followed the developments of 2008, when Pervez Musharraf resigned in August and Asif Ali Zardari of the Pakistan People's Party was elected in September. In February 2009, the interim Supreme Court reinstated corruption charges against Nawaz Shari, who had been locked in a dispute with Zardari over Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry's status. Zardari then dismissed the government of Sharif's brother. This, along with Zardari's failure to increase the freedom of the judiciary, led to new protests by the lawyers' movement. Zardari put the military on standby for a mass demonstration planned for March 15. But, Zardari was forced to reinstate the chief justice on March 16. This was largely as a result of pressure from army chief General Afshaq Kayani. He urged Zardari to fix the mess because of growing unrest on the streets and

discontent within the military. At this time, he was working to address the military's demoralization stemming from its unpopular military operations in FATA. Zardari didn't leave power, though, and the military did not shift loyalty from him to the anti-regime protesters.

Sources:

Fair, C. Christine. "Why the Pakistan Army is Here to Stay: Prospects for Civilian Governance." *International Affairs* 87, no. 3 (2011): 571-588.

Shah, Azil. "Constraining Consolidation: Military Politics and Democracy in Pakistan." *Democratization* 21, no. 6 (2014).

Singh, Anita. "Pakistan's Stability/Instability Complex: The Politics and Reverberations of the 2007 November Emergency." *Strategic Studies Quarterly* (2009): 22-48.

### **Pakistan 6/23/2014-12/17/2014 - neutral**

These protests demanded that Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif resign. At their height (on for example August 15), they numbered 30,000, and brought together the main opposition parties. Throughout, it was suspected that they had the tacit support of the military. The army and Sharif had a long history; it seized power from Sharif in 1999, and in recent years Sharif had allowed legal efforts against Musharraf on charges of treason. Sharif also pursued control over national security policies, a traditional domain of the military. Some violence occurred in late August, when the paramilitary Frontier Corps and police killed at least three demonstrators. Soon after, on August 29, the army announced it would facilitate a resolution to the crisis. It said it was taking this role at the request of the government, but Sharif denied being involved. An army spokesman also issued a social media message in early September that called for patience from all actors. The army did not shift loyalty, though. The protests lost some support as they continued despite Sharif showing a willingness to negotiate with opposition parties and to consider reforms.

Sources:

Katoch, Dhruv C. "Pakistan: Crisis of Legitimacy." *Centre for Land Warfare Studies Journal* (2014).

Kronstadt, K. Alan and Samir Kumar. "Pakistan Political Unrest: In Brief." *Congressional Research Service* (2014).

Yamin, Saira. "Pakistan: National Security Dilemmas and Transition to Democracy." *Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs* 2, no. 1 (2015): 1-26.

### **Panama 6/9/1987-12/20/1989 – low level**

The anti-Noriega movement began in June 1987, when the Panamanian Defense Force's (PDF) former second in command (Diaz Herrera) accused him of corruption, electoral fraud, and murder. Herrera was likely partly motivated by the fact that Noriega had not promoted him according to standard personnel practices. The PDF killed and injured protesters on July 10, 1987. But, reports of dissent within the officer ranks emerged throughout 1988 and 1989. This set off more opposition to Noriega, culminating in a

failed coup attempt against him on October 3, 1989. It was led by Major Moises Giroldi (chief of security at the PDF headquarters in Panama City) and seriously undermined the military's integrity and commitment to Noriega. Noriega was rapidly losing power, and had to annul September elections when it was clear the government's candidate was going to lose. The United States had increased economic sanctions against the country during this period, and Noriega decided to declare war in response and on December 15, 1989. The George Bush administration ordered troops to Panama; Noriega hid but eventually surrendered in January.

Sources:

Priestley, George. "Panama: Obstacles to Democracy and Sovereignty." *Radical History Review* 48 (1990): 88-110.

Robinson, Linda. "Dwindling Options in Panama." *Foreign Affairs* 68, no. 5 (1989): 187-205.

#### **Peru 7/26/2000-11/17/2000 – low level**

Alberto Fujimori was a political outsider when he was elected president in 1990. He gained a lot of popular support by getting a grip on the country's economic and security crises, and was reelected in 1995. His pursuit of a third term generated opposition, though, and this increased with allegations of fraud in the spring 2000 elections. Protests developed in late July to disrupt his inauguration. The police and army troops were put on standby, but did not have to act. The situation settled until information came out about the corruption of Fujimori and his government. Then, demonstrators began to call on Fujimori to resign. Fujimori relied on the military for his power and used the national intelligence agency to control the military's senior ranks. The only loyalty shifts were low level; on October 29, a military garrison in the southern region of Peru staged a rebellion against Fujimori and the military leadership. This was led by Army Lieutenant Ollanta Humala and involved around 100 soldiers. There were concerns the shift would set off a broader rebellion, especially when Humala broadcast a "Manifesto to the Peruvian People." But the rest of the military remained loyal, and two small demonstrations held in support of the rebellion were dispersed by police with tear gas. The rebellion itself fizzled. In mid-November, though, a video was released that showed an advisor of Fujimori, Vladimiro Montesinos, toasting military officers for their assistance in the election. Opposition parties in Congress were ready to remove Fujimori when he resigned.

Sources:

Aguayo, Julio Javier. "The Legislature Strikes Back in Peru: The Role of Congress in the Demise of Fujimori in 2000." University of Florida, 2004.

Crabtree, John. "The Collapse of Fujimorismo: Authoritarianism and its Limits." *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 20, no. 3 (2001): 287-303.

Poole, Deborah and Gerardo Renique. "Popular Movements, the Legacy of the Left, and the Fall of Fujimori." *Socialism and Democracy* 14, no. 2: 53-74; 2000.

Taylor, Lewis. "Alberto Fujimori's Peripeteia: From 'Re-Eleccion' to Regime Collapse."

*European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies* (2001): 3-24.

**Philippines 6/28/1983-2/25/1986** – fragmented high level

Protests against President Ferdinand Marcos had been ongoing for a month or two when Benigno Aquino Jr., a longtime political opponent of Marcos, returned to the Philippines and was killed almost immediately. The resulting protests in support of Aquino were massive. They were also violent; on September 21, marines deployed against the demonstrators fired on them, killing 11. Protests continued throughout 1984, in part in response to May parliamentary elections. Over this period, Marcos began to lose military support, especially from his Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile. There was a growing rivalry between Enrile (and vice chief of staff of the armed forces Lieutenant General Fidel Ramos) and Ver, who had risen in the ranks only because of his personal loyalty to Marcos. Ramos had the support of junior officers, and over 1984 Enrile joined the Reform the Armed Forces (RAM) movement with the goal of organizing low level and middle ranking officers against Marcos's regime. In 1985, some within RAM talked about but did not follow through with assassinating Marcos, while the opposition parties unsuccessfully attempted to impeach him. Marcos announced that November that presidential elections would be held early, in 1986. This set off campaigning by Corazon Aquino that included large rallies. When Parliament declared Marcos the winner on February 15, Corazon's supporters staged another the next day. On February 22, Enrile and Ramos with hundreds of soldiers barricaded themselves in the Ministry of Defense. RAM had been planning a coup but was thwarted. They asked Ramos for his help, and together staged the mutiny. Marcos sent loyal troops to attack the rebels, but thousands of civilians from the protest movement responded to a Catholic Cardinal's call to protect them. Enrile and Ramos then gave a press conference where they resigned and declared their support for Corazon. Marcos announced a state of emergency on February 24, but by this point most of the military had joined the mutiny and civilian politicians were siding with Corazon. Marcos had the support of some troops, but he left the country.

Sources:

Lee, Terence. "The Armed Forces and Transitions from Authoritarian Rule."

*Comparative Political Studies* 42, no. 5 (2009): 640-669.

Montiel, Cristina Jayme. "Social Representations of Democratic Transition: Was the Philippine People Power a Non-Violent Power Shift or Military Coup?" *Asian Journal of Social Psychology* 13, no. 3 (2010): 173-184.

Overholt, William H. "The Rise and Fall of Ferdinand Marcos." *Asian Survey* 26, no. 11 (1986): 1137-1163.

Schock, Kurt. "People Power and Political Opportunities: Social Movement Mobilization and Outcomes in the Philippines and Burma." *Social Problems* 46, no. 3 (1999): 355-375.

**Philippines 1/16/2001-1/20/2001** – united defections

This crisis began when House minority members brought impeachment proceedings against President Joseph Estrada. The Senate heard the case, and given Estrada's supporters there, was likely to acquit him. But, his supporters went further by attempting



to keep evidence sealed. This set off massive demonstrations. Within days, Chief of Staff General Angelo Reyes visited Estrada to inform him that the military no longer supported him. Reyes declared Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo the rightful president. According to reports, Reyes did this knowing members of the rank and file and low level officers were planning to desert and join the demonstrators. Retired generals also urged Reyes to shift loyalty. While some feared Reyes would launch a coup or install a military government, the military's divisions into pro- and anti-Estrada groups would have made such intervention difficult. However, there appears to be no instances of conflict between these groups over Reyes's decision.

Sources:

Lande, Carl H. "The Return of 'People Power' in the Philippines." *Journal of Democracy* 12, no. 2 (2001): 88-102.

Reid, Ben. "The Philippine Democratic Uprising and the Contradictions of Neoliberalism: EDSA II." *Third World Quarterly* 22, no. 5 (2001): 777-793.

#### **Philippines 4/16/2001-5/1/2001 - loyal**

This protest movement was termed EDSA III, following the Philippines' two previous People Power Revolutions. It sought to reinstate Joseph Estrada, after Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was declared president as a result of the January 2001 demonstrations. The military came together with the police to crush the protests. Intra-military dissent existed, and emerged in later mutinies, but did not affect the military's response to this movement. For the upper ranks, Arroyo rewarded those generals who had named her president by giving them senior civilian positions post-retirement.

Sources:

Chambers, Paul. "A Precarious Path: The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in the Philippines." *Asian Security* 8, no. 2 (2012): 138-163.

#### **Poland 6/25/1956-8/1/1956 – low level**

The anti-Communist regime protests occurred largely in Poznan and were especially violent in late June, when fighting between the demonstrators and security forces left at least 73 dead and hundreds seriously wounded. The politburo approved Marshal of Poland and Defense Minister Konstantin Rokossovsky's recommendation to use force. While a few Polish officers tried to refuse using force, Soviet commanders dominated the Polish military and remained loyal. The other security forces also followed orders. There were no Soviet troops in Poland during this period, and First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Nikita Khrushchev decided not to send Soviet troops to address the crisis. A reformist in the Communist Party, Wladyslaw Gomulka, was elected First Secretary of the Communist Party in Poland in October.

Sources:

Andelman, David A. "Contempt and Crisis in Poland." *International Security* 6, no. 3 (1981- 1982): 90-103.

Cox, Terry. "1956: Discoveries, Legacies, and Memory." *Europe-Asia Studies* 58, no. 8 (2006): iii-xvi.

Kramer, Mark. "The Soviet Union and the Onset of the Crises in Poland and Hungary." *Hungarian Studies* 20, no. 1 (2006): 11-19.

Kemp-Welch, Tony. "Dethroning Stalin: Poland 1956 and its Legacy." *Europe-Asia Studies* 58, no. 8 (2006): 1261-1284.

### **Poland 1/31/1968-3/25/1968 – loyal**

The main event in these anti-Communist regime protests was a student rebellion in March. The regime declared it was led by Zionists, and used the ZOMO (Zmotoryzowane Odwoły Milicji Obywatelskiej) militia units as well as police to repress the demonstrations. In early March First Secretary Władysław Gomułka, Chief of Staff Wojciech Jaruzelski, and others were out of the country, and rumors spread about coup attempts and troop defections. None of them were substantiated, however. The mostly student protesters also failed to gain much outside support. While the military did not directly respond to the movement, the leadership gave statements of loyalty to Gomułka.

#### Sources:

Kersten, Krystyna. "The Mass Protests in People's Poland – A Continuous Process or Single Events?" *Acta Polonica Historica* 83 (2001).

Stola, Dariusz. "Anti-Zionism as a Multipurpose Policy Instrument: The Anti-Zionist Campaign in Poland, 1967-1968." *Journal of Israeli History* 25, no. 1 (2006): 175-201.

"The Struggle in the Polish Leadership and the Revolt of the Apparatus." *Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report* 0038769 (September 5, 1969).

### **Poland 12/13/1970-12/20/1970 – low level**

This short period of anti-regime activity saw violent clashes between the protesters and the police and military. 44 people were killed, and hundreds injured. December 17, or "Bloody Thursday" was especially violent. Internal security troops had been deployed on December 14, and were joined by military units on December 15. First Secretary Władysław Gomułka authorized military force when Deputy Defense Minister General Grzegorz Korczyński and Deputy Interior Minister Franciszek Szlachcic reported the situation hadn't stabilized. There were concerns with the troops' reliability and effectiveness, though. The first troops used against the demonstrations, the marines or Blue Berets, were withdrawn when the division commander Edward Weiner refused to order them to use force. Gomułka had a heart attack on December 18 and was replaced by Edward Gierek on December 20. Gierek took a less hardline approach to the opposition and tensions eased. There is some debate about the Soviets' role in the protests; they might not have been willing to send Gomułka military support.

#### Sources:

Fajfer, Luba. "The Polish Military and the Crisis of 1970." *Communist and post-Communist Studies* 26, no. 2 (1993): 205-225.

Holtsmark, Sven G. "Challenge and Retreat: The Erosion of Soviet Power in Poland 1970-1989." *Forsvarsstudier* 2 (1991).

Nelson, Gail H. "US Strategic Early Warning: A Case Study in Poland (1980-1981)." *The US Army Europe Intelligence Estimate* (2010).

[https://www.afio.com/publications/NELSON\\_Gail\\_US\\_Strategic\\_Early\\_Warning\\_Poland.pdf](https://www.afio.com/publications/NELSON_Gail_US_Strategic_Early_Warning_Poland.pdf).

#### **Poland 6/24/1976-6/30/1976 – neutral**

The Polish army did not respond to these protests against the Communist regime. Police forces were deployed, but the army was not involved, and the crisis resolved. Polish United Workers' Party leader Edward Gierek agreed to dismiss Prime Minister Piotr Jaroszewicz and did not go forward with a plan to increase prices. The regime remained in power, though, and did not need to call on the military to act against the demonstrators.

#### Sources:

Barany, Zoltan D. "East European Armed Forces in Transition and Beyond." *East European Quarterly* 26, no. 1 (1992).

Bernhard, Michael. "The Strikes of 1976 in Poland." *Eastern European Politics and Societies* 1, no. 3 (1987): 363-393.

Moreton, Edwina. "The Soviet Union and Poland's Struggle for Self-Control." *International Security* 7, no. 1 (1982): 86-104.

#### **Poland 7/1/1980-6/18/1989 – neutral**

The military was largely involved in this protest movement and its overthrow of the Communist regime. This is partly because the regime voluntarily surrendered its power in a gradual process, and never asked the military to support it against the protesters. It considered doing so but for one thing the Soviet Union was unlikely to support a crackdown. The armed forces themselves underwent reform towards the end of the campaign and as part of the transition.

#### Sources:

Barany, Zoltan D. "Civil-Military Relations in Comparative Perspective: East-Central and Southeastern Europe." *Political Studies* 41, no. 4 (1993): 594-610.

Kramer, Mark. "The Dynamics of 1989: Reassessing a Momentous Year." *Journal of Cold War Studies* 15, no. 4 (2013): 148-152.

Przeworski, Adam. "The 'East' Becomes the 'South'? The 'Autumn of the People' and the Future of Eastern Europe." *PS: Political Science and Politics* 24, no. 1 (1991): 20-24.

#### **Portugal 4/9/1973-4/25/1974– fragmented high level**

The ruling party, the National Union, swept the legislative elections of October 1973. This result, alongside anti-Estada Novo regime protests that had been going on since April, convinced moderate General Antonio de Spínola to join a group of left-wing military officers in the Armed Forces Movement (MFA). They believed a coup was the

only way to end the decades-long colonial war in Africa. The MFA and Spínola connected with the civilian opposition, including Ala Liberal, an organization of regime politicians who wanted democratization. It had become steadily more pro-democracy and anti-regime when it became clear President of the Council of Ministers Marcello Caetano would not allow reform. This put Ala Liberal on the side of the protest movement. In response to military discontent, Caetano resigned a number of military officers in March 1974, including Spínola. On April 25, the MFA, a group of young, low- to middle-ranking officers led by Major Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho overthrew the regime. People went out into the streets to celebrate, leading to the surrender of the secret police on April 26. The National Salvation Junta under Spínola took power. The junior officers defected and were responsible for the regime's fall, but most of the senior officers such as Kaulza de Arriaga remained loyal. The MFA may have been planning for the coup prior to the protests, but the protests ensured its pro-democratic end. The regime had been civilian-led but heavily military-involved. Caetano, who replaced Antonio de Oliveira Salazar in 1968 after Salazar's almost 50 years in power, was unable to secure full military support. In July 1973, for example, he implemented a law that provided privileges to conscript officers. This generated criticism from academy officers, and it was eventually revoked.

Sources:

Accomero, Guya. "Contentious Politics and Student Dissent in the Twilight of the Portuguese Dictatorship: Analysis of a Protest Cycle." *Democratization* 20, no. 6 (2013): 1036-1055.

Bender, Gerald. "Portugal and Her Colonies Join the Twentieth Century: Causes and Initial Implications of the Military Coup." *Ufahamu: A Journal of African Studies* (1972).

Fernandes, Tiago. "Authoritarian Regimes and Pro-Democracy Semi-Oppositions: The End of the Portuguese Dictatorship (1968-1974) in Comparative Perspective." *Democratization* 14, no. 4 (2007): 686-705.

Garcia, Oscar Jose Martin. "The End of the Carnival: The UK and the Carnation Revolution in Portugal." *Contemporary British History* 29, no. 2 (2015): 199-221.

Hamann, Kerstin and Paul Christopher Manuel. "Regime Changes and Civil Society in Twentieth-Century Portugal." *South European Society and Politics* 4, no. 1 (1999): 71-96. Hammond, J.L. "Portugal: Two Steps Forward, One Step Back." *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 10, no. 1 (1982).

Osuna, Jose Javier Olivas. "The Deep Roots of the Carnation Revolution: 150 Years of Military Interventionism in Portugal." *Portuguese Journal of Social Science* 13, no. 2 (2014): 215-231.

**Romania 11/15/1987-12/25/1989** – fragmented high level

The protests against Nicolae Ceausescu started around the time of his reelection as leader of the Romanian Communist Party in November 1987. He thought he could survive them, and did for the next two years as they spread across the country. The security forces (especially the Securitate) were brutal in their suppression of them, resulting in hundreds of deaths. The military first became involved in December 1989, when on

December 17 it joined the other forces and opened fire on demonstrators. In the days following, though (particularly December 19), army units resisted direct intervention. The movement staged a general strike on December 20 and the army did not intervene at all. Importantly, the rank and file had started to refuse their superiors' orders and join demonstrations. Soon after, the army began to withdraw to its barracks. Army Major Viorel Oancea claimed he was removing soldiers from the streets to maintain the army's integrity, but by this point mid-level officers were mostly acting independently. On December 22, Oancea became the first officer in Timisoara to publicly support the protesters. The army with other forces repressed demonstrators in Bucharest through December 22, but soon also fragmented. Military officers withdrew their units from guarding the Central Command building, which allowed protesters to occupy it. The military's highest command was unable to launch a retake of the building. The Securitate attempted a counter-revolution, but gave up when the newly installed National Salvation Front decided to execute Ceausescu. Over this period, the Soviet Union did not have troops in Romania, and the Romanian military did not depend on Soviet support. Ceausescu was known to be distrustful of the military, and used the Securitate in place of it and as a counterforce. He also froze all military promotions in 1989.

Sources:

Hall, Richard Andrew. "Theories of Collective Action and Revolution: Evidence from the Romanian Transition of December 1989." *Europe-Asia Studies* 52, no. 6 (2000): 1069-1093.

Kuran, Timur. "Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989." *World Politics* 44, no. 1 (1991): 7-48.

Watts, L.L. "Reform and Crisis in Romanian Civil-Military relations 1989-1999. *Armed Forces and Society* 27, no. 4 (2001): 597-622.

### **Russia 3/3/2007-12/14/2008 – neutral**

Protesters sought to oust Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, and staged some of the largest demonstrations ever against Putin despite such gatherings being illegal. The regime used riot police and OMON (special police) forces to repress the anti-Putin movement, and they ended with no military loyalty shifts.

Sources:

Harding, Luke. "Protesters Turn on Putin." *The Guardian*. April 14, 2007.

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/apr/15/russia.chess>.

"Political Unrest in Russia." *GlobalSecurity.org*.

<https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/political-unrest.htm>.

### **Russia 1/19/2010-5/1/2015 (ongoing) – neutral**

Anti-Vladimir Putin protests re-developed and continued over this period, which included allegedly fraudulent legislative elections in December 2011 and Putin's presidential inauguration in May 2012. They were characterized by large-scale arrests, and some violence, such as early May 2012, when clashes between the police and protesters

resulted in injuries for 80. The regime also made use of the Interior Ministry's elite Dzerzhinsky division, but not the military.

Sources:

Clover, Charles. "Protesters Defy Troops on Moscow Streets." *Financial Times*.

December 6, 2011. "Dissecting Russia's Winter of Protest, Five Years On." *Open Democracy*. December 5, 2016. <https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/editors-of-opendemocracy-russia/dissecting-russia-s-winter-of-protest-five-years-on>.

Elder, Miriam. "Russian Police and Troops Clash with Protesters in Moscow." *The Guardian*. December 6, 2011. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/dec/06/russian-police-troops-moscow-protest>.

Parfitt, Tom. "Vladimir Putin Inauguration Shows How Popularity Has Crumbled." *The Telegraph*. May 7, 2012. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/vladimir-putin/9250729/Vladimir-Putin-inauguration-shows-how-popularity-has-crumbled.html>.

### **Senegal 3/16/2000-4/1/2000** – united defections

This protest movement was against President Abdou Diouf and his attempt to secure the presidency for another term. He ended up conceding defeat to opposition leader Abdoulaye Wade after the second round of elections. It is likely the military played a role in this decision; reportedly, senior officers told Diouf they would not back his attempts to stay in power, and when interviewed later mid-level officers said the military would not have supported him.

Sources:

"When Military Leaders Do the Right Thing." *Africa Center for Strategic Studies*. October 28, 2015. <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/military-leaders-right-thing-three-lessons-ethical-leadership-africa/>.

Villalon, Leonardo A. "Senegal: Assessing Risks to Stability." *Center for Strategic and International Studies* (2011).

### **Serbia 11/17/1996-10/5/2000** – united defections

There was evidence of the potential for military disloyalty already in 1996, at the start of anti-President Slobodan Milosevic protests. The Army Chief of Staff Pavkovic sided with Milosevic at this point but after the disputed 2000 elections declared the military would respect the electorate's decision. The movement had attempted to reach out to the military, but never clearly communicated. The special paramilitary units also cooperated with the opposition. In a well-known event on October 4, the police responded to strikers at the Kolubara coal mine but ignored orders to use force against them. Milosevic then gave up power. Milosevic had reorganized the military's top ranks in ways favorable to him, but it maintained some autonomy. The growing power of the police and paramilitary forces was a source of military discontent, though.

Sources:

Binnendijk, Anika Locke. "Power and Persuasion: Nonviolent Strategies to Influence State Security Forces in Serbia and Ukraine." *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 39, no. 3 (2006): 411-429.

Thompson, Mark R. "Stolen Elections: The Case of the Serbian October." *Journal of Democracy* 15, no. 4 (2004): 159-172.

Vladisavljevic, Neojša. "Competitive Authoritarianism and Popular Protest: Evidence From Serbia under Milosevic." *International Political Science Review* 37, no. 1 (2016): 36-50.

### **Slovakia 11/16/1989-6/6/1992 - neutral**

The police and military police repressed protests throughout 1989, and in particular on November 17. On November 21, the prime minister announced the regime wouldn't use force to disperse the demonstrations, but would protect the socialist system. Over this period, though the army was mostly uninvolved, the People's Militia reportedly refused to take action. Further, in December, the new Defense Minister Vacek announced the army supported democratization and wouldn't repress demonstrators or stage a coup. Later that month, the party disbanded the militia. While some within the party supported more repression, the regime rejected it, and opted for a political rather than military solution. It was clear the Soviet Union would not intervene, but the Czechoslovak state had its own military. The military remained passive, as the regime realized the rapidly shifting events meant it probably couldn't make a difference. Protests continued to achieve the split of Czechoslovakia into the Czech Republic and Slovakia.

#### Sources:

Barany, Zoltan D. "Civil-Military Relations in Comparative Perspective: East-Central and Southeastern Europe." *Political Studies* 41, no. 4 (1993): 594-610.

Bunce, Valerie. "Subversive Institutions: The End of the Soviet State in Comparative Perspective." *Post-Soviet Affairs* 14, no. 4 (1998): 323-354.

Glenn, J.K. "Competing Challengers and Contested Outcomes to State Breakdown: The Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia." *Social Forces* 78, no. 1 (1999): 187-211.

Mares, Miroslav. "The Armed Forces and Political Extremism in the Process of Democratization in East Central Europe." Paper presented at the International Political Science Association Congress, Madrid, July 8-12, 2012.

### **Slovenia 5/8/1989-4/8/1990 – neutral**

These anti-communist government protests were accompanied by a broader effort at Slovenian independence. In September 1989, the Slovenian parliament passed various amendments that asserted its sovereignty. For example, only it could declare a state of emergency, and it had authority over the presence of Yugoslav military forces and command over the Slovenian military forces, or the Territorial Defense (TD). The Yugoslav military leadership wanted to disband the TD, and tensions over the TD's future became particularly serious in April 1990 during the transition to the first freely-elected, non-Communist government. These processes followed the parliament's

December 1989 adoption of laws that legalize political pluralism. The TD was not involved in the protests or the decision to move closer to democracy.

Sources:

Bebler, Anton. "Civil-Military Relations and Democratic Control of the Armed Forces in Slovenia." In *Sodobno Vojastvo in Druzba*, edited by Anton Bebler, 87-100.

Derdzinski, Joseph Leo. "Civil Military Relations in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Civil Military Relations in Slovenia." MA thesis, University of Texas, Austin, 1998.

Ramet, Sabrina Petra. "Slovenia's Road to Democracy." *Europe-Asia Studies* 45, no. 5 (1993): 869-886.

### **South Korea 3/16/1960-4/28/1960 – united defections**

Protests followed President Syngman Rhee's re-election on March 15, 1960. They became incredibly violent in mid-April, and on April 19, 186 people were killed, and hundreds injured. The regime declared martial law and the 15<sup>th</sup> Division of the South Korean Army took control of Seoul, with other units in other cities. Military commanders believed putting an end to the protests would require a massive use of force, but it never happened. Instead, the military refused to carry out shoot to kill orders. On April 26, despite the ban on demonstrations, a small group of protesters came out. By later that day, hundreds of thousands of people were in the streets demanding Rhee's resignation and also engaging in the destruction of property. Rhee worried the protests would continue the next day and so resigned on April 27. The US government was involved because at this time General Carter B. Magruder and the American Army Command in Korea had operational control of the South Korean forces. It urged an end to the unrest, and allowed army tanks but not live ammunition in the enforcement of martial law.

Sources:

Hart-Landsberg, Martin. "South Korea: The 'Miracle' Rejected." *Critical Sociology* 15, no. 3 (1988): 29-51.

Hwang, In Soo. "Syngman Rhee's Authoritarian Rule and the Dispute with the US." *Korea Observer* 32, no. 4 (2001): 603-626.

Kim, Quee-Young. "Disjunctive Justice and Revolutionary Movements: The 4.19 Upheaval and the Fall of the Syngman Rhee regime in South Korea." *Journal of Developing Societies* 6, no. 1 (1990): 56-70.

Kim, Quee-Young. "From Protest to Change of Regime: The 4-19 Revolt and the Fall of the Regime in South Korea." *Social Forces* 74, no. 4 (1996): 1179-1208.

### **South Korea 10/17/1979-5/27/1980 - loyal**

The government of President Park Chung Hee offered some reforms as political opposition grew throughout 1979. However, regime hardliners prevented meaningful change, and were increasingly harsh towards popular shows of discontent. On October 17, 1979, five students were killed as they demonstrated in Pusan. The government



declared martial law for the region in response. On October 26, the director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency, Kim Chae Kyu, assassinated Park. Kim had disagreed with the regime's use of force on October 17 and feared he and other regime softliners were losing influence. Kim also believed he had the support of the military, but the Army Chief of Staff and Martial Law Commander General Chung Song- Hwa refused to seize power on his behalf. The emboldened regime hardliners implemented martial law for the country. In December, Major General Chun Doo Hwan, the commander of the Defense Security Command who had been close to Park, initiated a purge of military reformists. This included Chung, who had refused Kim but wanted to remain neutral. There were reports that Chung had also prevented the promotions of Chun's faction to the upper ranks. Some within the factions actually fought in Seoul on December 12. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Choi Kyu Hah was named interim president, and began a process of liberalization. In April 1980, the protest movement staged massive demonstrations, leading to clashes between them and military troops in early May. This only strengthened the opposition, and at the urging of the military Choi extended martial law, giving the military direct control of the country. The protests ended on May 27, when the military entered Kwangju, a key site of the demonstrations, and killed at least 200. Chun ruled for the next six years. No parts of the military shifted loyalty to the protesters, though it was divided prior to Chun's purge.

Sources:

Burton, M.G. "South Korea's Elite Settlement and Democratic Consolidation." *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 25, no. 1 (1997): 1-24.

Choel, Kim Yong. "The Shadow of the Gwangju Uprising in the Democratization of Korean Politics." *New Political Science* 25, no. 2 (2003): 225-240.

Fowler, James. "The United States and South Korean Democratization." *Political Science Quarterly* 114, no. 2 (1999): 265-288.

Stueck, William. "Democratization in Korea: The United States Role, 1980 and 1987." *International Journal of Korean Studies* 2 (1998): 1-26.

Yun, Seongyi. "Democratization in South Korea: Social Movements and Their Political Opportunity Structures." *Asian Perspective* 21, no. 3: 145-171.

### **South Korea 2/4/1986-6/29/1987 – fragmented high level**

The protest movement first demanded a constitution with direct elections. The regime started dialogue, but the demonstrations continued, and their demands became more radical. Reformers within the military hoped to reach a compromise before the radicals within the opposition overthrew the regime. The reformists persuaded the hardliners that repression wouldn't succeed; this made the difference when President Chun Doo-hwan, a hardliner former army general, mobilized the military to crack down on June 19, 1987. On June 26, General Roh Tae-woo, the presidential candidate of the ruling party, broke with Chun to announce direct presidential elections. Chun likely expected Roh to win and went along with Roh's announcement because it kept the military intact. However, the army had also become less reliable during this period, because younger generals and colonels were concerned about being ordered to repress the demonstrators. The US also

pressured the military against using force and into talks with the opposition. Roh won the free and fair elections on December 16, 1987.

Sources:

Fowler, James. "The United States and South Korean Democratization." *Political Science Quarterly* 114, no. 2 (1999): 265-288.

Lee, Junhan. "Political Protest and Democratization in South Korea." *Democratization* 7, no. 3 (2000): 181-202.

Stueck, William. "Democratization in Korea: The US role, 1980 and 1987." *International Journal of Korean Studies* 2, no. 1 (1998).

### **South Korea 2/25/1988-12/1/1992 - neutral**

President Roh Tae-woo made gradual reforms while in power. These included restructuring the military leadership by replacing the soldiers who had been close to former president and general Chun Doo-hwan. He also reduced the power of the National Intelligence Service. In the 1992 presidential elections, all the candidates were civilians, for the first time in almost 30 years. The military was not involved in the election or surrounding protests, and the ruling party candidate, Kim Young-sam, won.

Sources:

Kim, Yong Cheol. "Political Leadership and Civilian Supremacy in Third Wave Democracies: Comparing South Korea and Indonesia." *Pacific Affairs* 79, no. 2 (2006): 247-268.

### **South Vietnam 11/22/1964-1/27/1965 – fragmented high level**

These anti-regime and Prime Minister Tran Van Huong protests were largely comprised of students and Buddhists, while other Buddhists were using more militant means. Huong deployed troops against the demonstrations, and on November 27 declared a state of emergency. This brought some order to the situation, but Huong was also losing support in his cabinet and in the military. Those against him were cooperating with Tri Quang. On December 19, Khanh and a group of young generals known as the Young Turks asked the High National Council to retire military officers that had been in the service more than 25 years, believing them sympathetic to the militant Buddhists. When the Council refused, the Young Turks dissolved it. Although unclear at first, Huong supported the Young Turks's move as a way to get more power himself, and this was their intent. On January 6, the military turned power over to a new civilian government led by Huong. This prompted new demonstrations led by Khanh and Tri Quang. By mid-January they had escalated to demand Huong's removal. Huong used troops against the protesters, but troops in the areas controlled by Khanh and (his principal co-conspirator) General Nguyen Chanh Thi refused to act. Khanh and the Buddhists had agreed at this time that the Buddhists would support Khanh if he and the military took control of the government from Huong. Khanh ousted Huong on January 27, with support from General Thi and Air Marshal Ky. The Armed Forces Council put Khanh at the head of the state.

Sources:

Moyar, Mark. "Political Monks: The Militant Buddhist Movements During the Vietnam War." *Modern Asian Studies* 38, no. 4 (2004): 749-784.

Smyth, Edward Albert. "The Effect of War on the South Vietnamese Economy." MA thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 1970.

### **South Vietnam 3/12/1966-6/23/1966 – low level**

This movement followed from the earlier one and pitted the Buddhists (as well as other opposition, including students) led by Tri Quang against the South Vietnamese government of General Nguyen Cao Ky and General Nguyen Van Theiu. The situation reached crisis levels when the movement claimed it controlled the military in Quang Nam Province. This followed Ky's March 1966 dismissal of Lieutenant General Nguyen Chanh Thi, a Buddhist commander of the I Corps (the most northern region of South Vietnam), for supposed Buddhist support. The opposition formed the Military-Civilian Struggle Committee to support Thi and spread demonstrations against the government. Beginning in April, some soldiers and even senior officers joined the demonstrations, and eventually most of I Corps was out of the government's control. As the country's Premier, Ky launched operations throughout April and May to retake the region. The movement collapsed after this use of force by the rest of the South Vietnamese military, at times assisted by American troops.

Sources:

Moyar, Mark. "Political Monks: The Militant Buddhist Movement During the Vietnam War." *Modern Asian Studies* 38, no. 4 (2004): 749-784.

Sullivan, Patricia. "S. Vietnamese General Nguyen Chanh Thi." *Washington Post*. June 27, 2007. "The 1966 Buddhist Crisis in South Vietnam." *History Net*. May 12, 2006. <http://www.historynet.com/the-1966-buddhist-crisis-in-south-vietnam.htm>.

### **Sri Lanka 7/15/2001-9/2/2001 – loyal**

This protest movement was aimed at President Chandrika Kumaratunga's suspension of parliament and proposed referendum on constitutional reforms. The police and Presidential Security Division cracked down on the demonstrators, particularly on July 19, killing two and wounding about a hundred. In response, Kumaratunga banned processions until the referendum results were released. Military troops deployed to Colombo to assist the police and remained loyal. During this time, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam suicide bombers attacked the country's airport. Kumaratunga postponed the referendum because of the instability, but remained in power.

Sources:

"Amnesty Condemns Police Killings, Ban on Demonstrations." *TamilNet*. July 20, 2001. <http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=6174>.

Ferdinando, Shamindra. "Year of Political Turmoil and Treachery." *The Island*. November 6, 2012. [http://www.island.lk/index.php?page\\_cat=article-details&page=article-details&code\\_title=65453](http://www.island.lk/index.php?page_cat=article-details&page=article-details&code_title=65453).

"Massive Opposition Protest in Colombo." *TamilNet*. July 19, 2001. <http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=6171>.

### **Sudan 3/26/1985-4/7/1985** – united defections

Protests developed while President Gaafar Nimeiri was out of the country. In the beginning, the police arrested many demonstrators, and killed a few. As they continued into early April, there were signs the police had begun to support them. For example, an outlawed police officers' association distributed leaflets that indicated they were prepared to help bring down the regime. Soon senior military officers met with Vice President Omar Mohammed El Tayeb to insist the troops shouldn't be used as back ups to the police unless the protests became violent. The rank and file's loyalty couldn't be guaranteed. On April 6, the Commander in Chief of the Air Force, General Abdel Rahman Swar al Dahab, took control of the country as head of the Transitional Military Council. The army leadership had planned to support the regime and police, but the field commanders refused. It was they and junior and non-commissioned officers that pressed the leadership to withdraw troops from demonstrations, takeover the government, and announce a return to democracy. There were concerns about clashes between the military and the General Security Organization, which had favored a crackdown on protesters, but these didn't occur.

#### Sources:

Abdelkarim, Abbas, et al. "From Popular Protest to Military Take-Over: An Analytical Chronology of Recent Events in Sudan." *Review of African Political Economy* 33 (1985): 82-89.

De Waal, Alex. "Making Sense of the Protests in Khartoum." *African Futures*. October 11, 2013. <http://forums.ssrc.org/african-futures/2013/10/11/making-sense-of-the-protests-in-khartoum/>.

El-Affendi, Abdelwahab. "Revolutionary Anatomy: The Lessons of the Sudanese Revolutions of October 1964 and April 1985." *Contemporary Arab Affairs* 5, no. 2 (2012): 292-306.

Salih, Kamal Osman. "The Sudan, 1985-9: The Facing Democracy." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 28, no. 2 (1990): 199-224.

### **Sudan 1/30/2011-10/6/2013** - neutral

Over the course of these anti-Omar al-Bashar protests, the police and ruling-party linked security forces often responded with violence. The latter units were responsible for 200 demonstrators' deaths in September 2013, for example. The military itself was not involved, and there were no loyalty shifts, despite known military discontent with the regime. The military was concurrently engaged in conflict with the Sudan People's Liberation Army, part of the Sudan Revolutionary Forces. The protest movement did not

coordinate with the rebels. Yet, the protesters were at times overshadowed by their violence. Eventually, the movement fizzled out.

Sources:

Berridge, W.J. "50 Years On: Remembering Sudan's October Revolution." *African Arguments*. October 20, 2014. <http://africanarguments.org/2014/10/20/50-years-on-remembering-sudans-october-revolution-by-willow-berridge/>.

de Waal, Alex. "Making Sense of the Protests in Khartoum." *African Futures*. October 11, 2013. <http://forums.ssrc.org/african-futures/2013/10/11/making-sense-of-the-protests-in-khartoum/>.

de Waal, Alex. "Sudan's Elusive Democratization: Civil Mobilization, Provincial Rebellion, and Chameleon Dictatorships." *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 31, no. 2 (2013): 213-234.

Mbaku, John Mukum, Temesgen Deressa, and Bryce Campbell. "Will the al-Bashir Regime in Sudan Survive Recent Pressures?" *Brookings*. November 1, 2013. <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2013/11/01/will-the-al-bashir-regime-in-sudan-survive-recent-pressures/>.

#### **Suriname 12/19/1983-1/18/1984 - neutral**

Thousands of striking workers demanded an end to the regime of President Desi Bouterse, who had come to power in early 1980 through a military coup. Bouterse dismissed his prime minister, Errol Alibux, but did not hand power over to civilian democrats. There is very little information on the military's involvement, but no signs of loyalty shifts.

Sources:

Blum, William. "Killing Hope: US Military and CIA Interventions Since World War II." Zed Books, 2003.

Singh, Chaitram. "Re-Democratization in Guyana and Suriname: Critical Comparisons." *European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies* 84 (2008): 71-85.

#### **Syria 3/15/2011-10/31/2011 – low level**

When anti-regime protests started in March 2011, President Bashar al-Assad immediately responded with violence, deploying the army and its tanks. On June 4, some security forces fired at a funeral demonstration. The mourners set fire to the building on which the forces were posted, killing eight personnel. They also seized weapons from a police station. This event saw the first notable loyalty shifts, when some soldiers posted with their army units refused to fire on civilians. More followed after the secret police and intelligence officers accompanying the army executed the soldiers for their disobedience. Overall, most loyalty shifts took the form of desertions by low-ranking Sunni conscripts. They were disorganized and had problems coordinating with a disorganized opposition. Generally when soldiers left they did not join the unarmed protesters but either sought asylum abroad or joined the Free Syrian Army (FSA), which officially formed July 29 under the leadership of Colonel Riyad al-Assad. The FSA began fighting government

forces in late September. Loyalty shifts never extended beyond the non- Alawites, and were very limited in the upper ranks. Most of the army was composed of conscripts that served 18 months, leaving career military officers appointed according to their regime loyalty with most of the power. The regime rotated senior officers often, and used the most loyal divisions and forces (including the Republican Guard) for repression. This prevented regular conscripts from sympathizing with the protesters.

Sources:

Allansson, Marie, et al. "The First Year of the Arab Spring." In *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute SIPRI Yearbook*. Stockholm, Sweden: 2012.

Barany, Zoltan. "Comparing the Arab Revolts: The Role of the Military." *Journal of Democracy* 22, no. 4 (2011): 24-35.

Heydemann, Steven. "Syria and the Future of Authoritarianism." *Journal of Democracy* 24, no. 4 (2013): 59-73.

Holliday, Joseph. "The Struggle for Syria in 2011." *Middle East Security Report 2* (2011). [http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Struggle\\_For\\_Syria.pdf](http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Struggle_For_Syria.pdf).

Nepstad, Sharon Erickson. "Nonviolent Resistance in the Arab Spring: The Crucial Role of Military-Opposition Alliances." *Swiss Political Science Review* 17, no. 4 (2011): 485-491. Parsons, William and William Taylor. *Arbiters of Social Unrest: Military Responses to the Arab Spring*. West Point, NY: United States Military Academy, 2011.

Slim, Randa. "Meet Syria's Opposition." *Assyrian International News Agency*. November 2, 2011. <http://www.aina.org/news/20111102190752.pdf>.

#### **Taiwan 12/10/1979-11/16/1985 – neutral**

The Kuomintang (KMT) government of Chiang Ching-Kuo was intolerant of basically any political opposition, and reacted to the initial anti-regime demonstrations in 1979 with repression. On December 10, for example, the police cracked down and injured more than 40 and arrested others. This led the protest movement to engage more forcefully in electoral politics, alongside demonstrations. In late 1985, Chiang (who had inherited the presidency from his father) announced a political transition and stated that neither his family nor the military should take over. He recognized that the KMT's continued rule required reforms. As part of the transition, Chiang transferred power to his vice president, Lee Teng Hui. The military did not play any role in the protest movement or transition.

Sources:

Chi, Chang Tieh. "Chiang Chang-Kuo and the Democratization of Taiwan." *China Change*. June 3, 2013. <https://chinachange.org/2013/06/03/chiang-chang-kuo-and-the-democratization-of-taiwan-2/>.

Eberstadt, Nicholas, "Taiwan and South Korea: The 'Democratization' of Outlier States." *World Affairs* 155, no. 2 (1992): 80-89.

Gilley, Bruce. "Taiwan's Democratic Transition: A Model for China?" In *Political Change in China: Comparisons with Taiwan*, edited by Bruce Gilley. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2008.

So, Alvin Y. "Democratization in East Asia in the Late 1980s: Taiwan Breakthrough, Hong Kong Frustration." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 28, no. 2 (1993): 61-80.

**Tanzania 5/1/1992-11/23/1995 - neutral**

These protests pressed for democratic reforms and followed a December 1991 commission report that recommended President Ali Hassan Mwinyi adopt a multiparty system. The following years were to be a transition period, with the country's first freely democratic presidential elections scheduled for 1995. The ruling party (Chama Cha Mapinduzi) tightly controlled the process, but Mwinyi chose to stand down before the elections. The military was uninvolved.

Sources:

Ahluwalia, P Al and Abebe Zegeye. "Multiparty Democracy in Tanzania." *African Security Review* 10, no. 3 (2001): 34-47.

Baker, Bruce. "The Class of 1990: How Have the Autocratic Leaders of Sub-Saharan Africa Fared Under Democratization?" *Third World Quarterly* 19, no. 1 (1998): 115-127.

**Thailand 10/6/1973-11/13/1973 – fragmented high level**

Thailand had been under martial law since a November 1971 coup. The military rulers and high command were disunited, however; Prime Minister General Thanom Kittikachorn and Deputy Prime Minister Praphas Charusathien were grooming Colonel Narong Kittikachorn (son of Thanom and son in law of Praphas) for the office of prime minister after their retirements. Other officers were upset by this, and especially younger generations. When anti-regime protests broke out on October 6, the military responded with many arrests. The protests continued, and in early October the king met with the movement's leaders and announced a new constitution would be in place by October 1974. The opposition was skeptical and staged new demonstrations. On October 14, 66 students demonstrating outside the palace were killed by army troops. The government gave up power that night, though Thanom remained Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. A caretaker government appointed civilian Sanya Thammasakdi as prime minister, but the protest movement was not satisfied. The embattled military leadership tried to discredit it by connecting it to the communists who were concurrently launching a rebellion. The movement's leaders consequently asked the rebels to end their challenge, but at the same time were dividing over whether or not to use violence. Thanom, Prapat, Narong met with General Kris Sivara (who on October 1 had been appointed the Army Commander in Chief to replace the retiring Prapat) and ordered him to deploy more army units to Bangkok to use against the ongoing protests. Kris refused, and other army commanders as well as the leaders of the Air Force, Navy, and Border Patrol Police expressed they would not use force and supported the new government. Prapass and Narong left for Taiwan.

Sources:

Darling, Frank C. "Thailand in 1976: Another Defeat for Constitutional Democracy." *Asian Survey* 17, no. 2 (1977): 116-132.

Heinze, Ruth-Inge. "Ten Days in October – Students vs the Military: An Account of the Student Uprising in Thailand." *Asian Survey* 14, no. 6 (1974): 491-508.

Neher, Clark D. "Stability and Instability in Contemporary Thailand." *Asian Survey* 15, no. 12 (1975): 1097-1113.

Race, Jeffrey. "Thailand 1973: 'We Certainly Have Been Ravaged by Something...'" *Asian Survey* 14, no. 2 (1974): 192-203.

#### **Thailand 4/16/1992-6/30/1992 – loyal**

The military regime of General Suchinda Kraprayoon held elections in March 1992. Afterwards, Suchinda took the position of prime minister, even though he had said he wouldn't. Protests followed, including demonstrations on May 17 that involved rioting. The military acted with force against them. Over this period, rumors swirled that the ongoing conflict would prompt Suchinda's rivals to act against him. The king intervened on May 20 and forced Suchinda to resign, hoping to end the violence. The military, its reputation tarnished because of the violence, backed down as well. An interim civilian prime minister was installed.

#### Sources:

Chambers, Paul. "Thailand on the Brink: Resurgent Military, Eroded Democracy." *Asian Survey* 50, no. 5 (2010): 835-858.

Hirschfield, John. "Thai Politics." *Culture Mandala: The Bulletin of the Centre for East-West Cultural and Economic Studies* 1.1 (1994).

<http://epublications.bond.edu.au/cm/vol1/iss1/10>.

Suchit Bunbongkan, S. "Thailand's Successful Reforms." *Journal of Democracy* 10.4 (1999): 54-68.

Wright, Joseph J. "Thailand's Return to Democracy." *Current History* 91, no. 569 (1992): 418- 423.

#### **Thailand 2/9/2005-9/19/2006 – fragmented high level**

This protest movement was aimed at Thaksin Shinawatra's government. There had been tensions between the military and his government from its start. First, the military disagreed with the government's strategy for the insurgency in the South. Second, Thaksin's promotion policies tended to favor his classmates and allies over other candidates. They also challenged the influence of General Prem Tinsulanonda. Prem had been prime minister until 1988, and then became president of the King's Privy Council (advisory body). Consequently, the military was divided into pro- and anti-Thaksin factions. During the demonstrations, Thaksin sought to declare a state of emergency, but Army Commander General Sonthi Boonyaratglin (an ally of Prem) responded there was no need because they were peaceful and lawful. Meanwhile, Sonthi made moves to transfer pro-Thaksin middle-ranking officers away from the demonstrations, to prevent them from intervening in support. In the end, the army seized power from Thaksin on



September 19, 2006. As justification, it said the government had planned to crack down on the protesters the following day.

Sources:

Chambers, Paul. "Where Agency Meets Structure: Understanding Civil-Military Relations in Contemporary Thailand." *Asian Journal of Political Science* 19, no. 3 (2011): 290-304. Connors, Michael K. "Thailand – Four Elections and a Coup." *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 62, no. 4 (2008): 478-496.

Ockey, James. "Thailand in 2006: Retreat to Military Rule." *Asian Survey* 47, no. 1 (2007): 133- 140.

Thitinan Pongsudhirak, T. "Thailand Since the Coup." *Journal of Democracy* 19, no. 4 (2008): 140-153.

### **Thailand 6/9/2007-8/15/2007 - neutral**

Following the 2006 coup, protesters called for Prem Tinsulononda's resignation as President of the Privy Council (believing him responsible for the coup), and an end to the military-backed Council for Democratic Reform government. They also responded to the May 2007 ban on former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra's Thai Rak Thai Party. The government and its security forces arrested many protesters. At the same time, the People's Alliance for Democracy, an anti-Thaksin movement, called on the government to take a harder stance on the protesters. The government organized a national referendum on a draft of a new constitution (the 1997 one had been abrogated after the 2006 coup). The referendum was held on August 19, 2007, and the constitution was approved. The king signed it into law on August 24. The protests ended around this period, not having achieved their overall goals.

Sources:

Connors, Michael K. and Kevin Hewison. "Introduction: Thailand and the 'Good Coup'." *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 38, no. 1 (2008): 1-10.

Connors, Michael K. "Thailand - Four Elections and a Coup." *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 62, no. 4 (2008): 478-496.

"Descent into Chaos: Thailand's 2010 Red Shirt Protests and the Government Crackdown." *Human Rights Watch*. May 3, 2011.

<https://www.hrw.org/report/2011/05/03/descent-chaos/thailands-2010-red-shirt-protests-and-government-crackdown>.

### **Thailand 5/25/2008-12/3/2008 – fragmented high level**

The People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) began daily protests calling for the Samak Sundaravej (of the People Power Party, or PPP) government to step down in late May 2008. They became more disruptive as time went on, with PAD demonstrators, some armed, attacking a government television broadcasting station in Bangkok in August. Leading up to this, PAD had been training its own security guards, and Thaksin supporters formed the United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship of Thailand with armed units. Violence broke out. In response, the government declared a state of

emergency. The military mostly refused to act to restore order. This strengthened perceptions that PAD was backed by elites including General Prem Tinsulonanda, Privy Council president. Prem's faction did support the protesters, but others in the military, such as Major-General Kattiya Sawadiphol, supported Thaksin. These divisions meant the military was reluctant to become involved in the crisis, especially following the 2006 coup. On September 9, the Constitutional Court disqualified Samak as prime minister because of conflicts of interest. Parliament moved to inaugurate a new PPP-government, led by Somchai Wongsawat, spouse of Thaksin's younger sister. This change did not satisfy PAD, which wanted all Thaksin influence gone from government. It continued protests through October. At this stage, the government deployed the police, resulting in the deaths of two and injuries to over 400. Army Commander Anupong Paochinda was publicly critical of Somchai over the violence. On November 23, PAD attempted to seize parliament, the Finance Ministry, and an airport, and neither the police nor military acted. In early December, the courts found PPP guilty of buying votes in the 2007 election and disbanded it, leading Somchai to resign and ending the protests. Throughout this case, the military and particularly the army dominated by Anupong and Prem resisted supporting the government, refusing to intervene to end the unrest.

Sources:

Chambers, Paul. "Military 'Shadows' in Thailand Since the 2006 Coup." *Asian Affairs* 40, no. 2 (2013): 67-82.

Chambers, Paul. "Thailand on the Brink: Resurgent Military, Eroded Democracy." *Asian Survey* 50, no. 5 (2010): 835-858.

Connors, Michael K. "Thailand: Four Elections and a Coup." *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 62, no. 4 (2008): 478-496.

Forsyth, Tim. "Thailand's Red Shirt Protests: Popular Movement or Dangerous Street Theatre?" *Social Movement Studies* 9, no. 4 (2010): 461-467.

Ockey, James. "Thailand in 2008: Democracy and Street Politics." *Southeast Asian Affairs* (2009): 315-333.

Thompson, MR. "People Power Sours: Uncivil Society in Thailand and the Philippines." *Current History* 107, no. 712 (2008): 381.

**Thailand 12/28/2008-5/19/2010** – low level

Opposition soon developed to the government of Abhisit Vejjajiva of the Democrat Party put in place on December 17, 2008. It organized into a protest movement called the United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD), also known as the Red Shirts. The security forces responded to the demonstrations with force, but they continued and intensified in April 2010. Discontent within the lower ranks of the military had also developed, though, as the anti-Thaksin faction had become dominant in the upper ranks. In a 2009 reshuffle, for example, officers close to the Queen's Guard faction led by General Anupong Paochinda and his heir General Prayuth Chanocha took leadership positions. Some lower ranks became unwilling to act against the protesters. On April 10, a demonstration resulted in hundreds of casualties, including some soldiers who were believed attacked by soldiers aligned with pro-Thaksin junior officers. As the protests

continued over the next month, however, the military leadership was able to unite the institution for an operation to end the movement. This occurred as the UDD was splitting on whether to negotiate and compromise with Abhisit. On May 19, troops killed 91. The Democrat Party was anti-Thaksin and its position in the coalition government came about in part through the help of senior army officers.

Sources:

Chambers, Paul. "Thailand on the Brink: Resurgent Military, Eroded Democracy." *Asian Survey* 50, no. 5 (2010): 835-858.

Chambers, Paul. "Where Agency Meets Structure: Understanding Civil-Military Relations in Contemporary Thailand." *Asian Journal of Political Science* 19, no. 3 (2011): 290-304.

Forsyth, Tim. "Thailand's Red Shirt Protests: Popular Movement or Dangerous Street Theatre?" *Social Movement Studies* 9, no. 4 (2010): 461-467.

#### **Thailand 10/31/2013-5/7/2014 – united defections**

These protests organized by the People's Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC), against Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra, were motivated in part by a proposed amnesty bill that would have absolved corruption charges against Yingluck's brother, Thaksin. On December 7, 2013, after pressure from military leaders, including Prem Tinsulanonda, Yingluck dissolved Congress and called for new elections. Protests continued, though, and the military was unwilling to actively support Yingluck. On December 22, for example, General Prayut Chanocha refused to order troops against the hundreds of thousands of demonstrators on the streets, and announced the military was neutral. The demonstrations became more violent in January 2014, when the PDRC launched an effort to shutdown Bangkok. The government declared a 60-day state of emergency soon after. Elections were held in February but declared invalid by the Constitutional Court. The Court then ousted Yingluck on May 7. Protests went on for two weeks until the army, led by Prayut, launched a coup. At first he declared martial law, but when the politicians and protest leaders failed to come to an agreement, he announced the coup, and became prime minister. The coup was endorsed by King Bhumibol. There was likely collaboration among the PDRC, the military, and the Privy Council. At lower levels, there were reports of armed soldiers providing protection to some of the protests.

Sources:

Chachavalpongpun, Pavin. "The Politics of International Sanctions: The 2014 Coup in Thailand." *Journal of International Affairs* 68, no. 1 (2014).

Chambers, Paul and Napisa Waltoolkiat. "The Resilience of Monarchized Military in Thailand." *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 46, no. 3 (2016).

Gromping, Max. "'Echo Chambers' Partisan Facebook Groups During the 2014 Thai Election." *Asia Pacific Media Educator* 24, no. 1 (2014): 39-59.

Kongkirati, Prajak. "Thailand's Failed 2014 Election: The Anti-Election Movement, Violence, and Democratic Breakdown." *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 46, no. 3 (2016): 467-485.

McCargo, Duncan. "Thailand in 2014: The Trouble with Magic Swords." In *Southeast Asian Affairs 2015*, edited by Daljit Singh, 337-358. ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 2015.  
McCargo, Duncan and Naruemon Thabchumpon. "Wreck/Conciliation? The Politics of Truth Commissions in Thailand." *Journal of East Asian Studies* 14, no. 3 (2014): 377-404.

**Thailand 5/23/2014-5/1/2015 (ongoing) – loyal**

The country remained under martial law after General Prayut Chanocha's coup, but protests developed against him and the new military regime. In response, the military cracked down brutally, arresting and prosecuting hundreds. It maintained a massive presence at any show of regime opposition. Reports detailed ongoing military factionalism, but no part of the military shifted loyalty from the regime to the protesters.

Sources:

"A Coup Ordained? Thailand's Prospects for Stability." *International Crisis Group Asia Report* 263 (December 3, 2014).

"Anti-Government Protesters Arrested in Thailand on First Anniversary of Military Takeover." *ABC*. May 22, 2015. <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-05-22/anti-government-protestors-on-anniversary-of-thai-military-coup/6491538>.

"Flash Protests Jar Thailand as Coup Leaders Tighten Grip." *NBC News*. May 26, 2014. <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/asia/flash-protests-jar-thailand-coup-leaders-tighten-grip-n114526>.

Sripokangkul, Siwach. "'Forgetting,' 'Returning to Ironic Happiness,' and 'Threatening and Hunting': Reconciliation Process of 2014 Post-Coup Government in Thailand." *Asian Social Science* 11, no. 15 (2015).

**Togo 6/6/1991-6/12/1991 – low level**

These anti-President Gnassingbe Eyadema protests were short-lasting and gained limited support from the military. Eyadema had used the military to secure his regime, and in particular elite units within the army headed by his close associates. Further, most of the army was composed of Eyadema's Kabyle ethnic group – while the protests were largely divided along ethnic lines, or the Kabyles of the north against the Ewes of the south. The marine commandos were the only section of the military under the command of southerners, and they refused to repress the demonstrators. Otherwise, the officers who had expressed support for democracy had already been expelled from the army. Eyadema agreed to a national conference but held on to power.

Sources:

Gyimah-Boadi, Emmanuel. "Civil Society in Africa." *Journal of Democracy* 7, no. 2 (1996): 118-132.

Heilbrunn, John R. "Social Origins of National Conferences in Benin and Togo." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 31, no. 2 (1993): 277.

Morency-Laflamme, Julien. "Weathering the Storm: State Repression and Opposition Division in Togo." Paper presented at the European Consortium for Political Research

General Conference, Montreal, Canada, August 26-29, 2015.

**Togo 2/12/2005-2/25/2005** - loyal

On February 5, 2005, President Gnassingbe Eyadema suffered a heart attack. His son, Faure, could not succeed him according to the constitution. However, the high military command, led by General Zakari Nandja, swore allegiance to Faure. While a small military clique was responsible for the decision, there were no signs any in the military disagreed. Protests attempted to prevent Faure from taking power and a continuation of the regime but were unsuccessful.

Sources:

Banjo, Adewale. "The Politics of Succession Crises in West Africa." *International Journal of World Peace* 25, no. 2 (2008): 33-55.

Mac-Ogoner, C.U., Paul Eke, and Ngboawaji D. Nte. "The Challenge of Globalization and Democratization to the AU." *International Journal of Human Sciences* 6, no. 1 (2009): 759-774.

**Togo 6/12/2012-5/23/2013** - loyal

Opposition to Faure Gnassingbe developed in April 2012, when several political parties and other groups united in a political coalition called the Save Togo Collective (CST). It launched protests in June 2012, focused mostly on elections and the use of excessive force by security forces. The demonstrators were subject to arrest and some violence, with at least one person killed. The government remained in power, though made some senior personnel changes which may have indicated tensions within the ruling coalition. The security forces as a whole were loyal; this included the military, security services, and pro-Eyadema militias, all of which were dominated by the Kabye ethnic group (the same as the Gnassingbe family). The army leadership was also personally linked to the Gnassingbes. Though there were reported to be rivalries within the military ranks, and a coup attempt in 2009, these did not translate into any loyalty shifts.

Sources:

Tobolka, Radim. "Togo: Legislative Elections of July 2013." *Electoral Studies* 35 (2014): 389- 394.

Kohnert, Dirk. "Donor's Double Talk Undermines African Agency: Comparative Study of Civic Agency in Burkina Faso and Togo." Paper presented at the APAD 2015 International Conference, Cotonou, Benin, November 17-20, 2015.

Kohnert, Dirk. "Togo: Recent Political and Economic Development." *MPRA Paper* no. 63411 (2015). <https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/63411/>.

**Tonga 5/26/2005-11/17/2006** - loyal

Protests against the government of Prime Minister Feleti Sevele became violent in November 2006. The small Tonga military assisted the police in controlling the situation. Australia readied some defense personnel to deploy if needed, but King George Tupou V

did not request assistance. Rather, the government conceded to protesters' demands for salary increases, and promised additional reforms.

Sources:

Singh, Shailendra and Som Prakash. "Politics, Democracy, and the Media: Case Studies in Fiji, Tonga, and the Solomon Islands." *Pacific Journalism Review* 12, no. 2 (2006).

Ungerer, Carl. "Issues in Australian Foreign Policy." *The Australian Journal of Politics and History* 53, no. 2 (2007): 267-280.

#### **Tunisia 12/17/2010-1/23/2011 – united defections**

Protests began in December 2010 and were quickly too large for the police and other security forces to handle. President Ben Ali sent out his elite Presidential Guard and armed gangs of thugs, and also ordered the army to deploy troops in support. The army first followed Ali's directions, and focused mostly on protecting infrastructure. Soldiers began to talk to the demonstrators and in some cases join them. The Army Chief of Staff General Rachid Ammar reportedly ordered his men not to shoot the protesters, and warned the police not to either. During this period Ben Ali made a number of concessions, but to no avail. When he attempted to declare martial law on January 13, 2011, Ammar refused. Ben Ali tried to fire Ammar for subordination, but the next day fled the country. After, the military fought the Presidential Guard and state militias for control of the situation. The military had resented being put under the Presidential Guard's orders in responding to the demonstrations. Ben Ali had personally controlled military appointments rather than look to senior military officials.

Sources:

Barany, Zoltan. "The Role of the Military." *Journal of Democracy* 22, no. 4 (2011).

Lutterbeck, Derek. "Arab Uprisings and Armed Forces: Between Openness and Resistance." *DCAF SSR Paper 2* (2011).

Nepstad, Sharon Erickson. "Nonviolent Resistance in the Arab Spring: The Critical Role of Military-Opposition Alliances." *Swiss Political Science Review* 17, no. 4 (2011): 485-491. Tanriverdi, Nebahat. "Background of the Tunisian Revolution." *Alternative Politics* 3, no. 3 (2011): 547-570.

#### **Tunisia 10/12/2013-12/14/2013 – neutral**

Protests led in large part by the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT) and the National Salvation Front groups ended after the ruling Ennahda party agreed to join the Quartet's national dialogue. Then, the parties accepted a caretaker government of technocrats to govern until the 2014 elections. The military was not involved in these events.

Sources:

Boubekur, Amel. "The Politics of Protest in Tunisia." *SWP Comments* 13 (2015).

Grewel, Sharan. "A Quiet Revolution: The Tunisian Military After Ben Ali." *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*. February 24, 2016.

<http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/02/24/quiet-revolution-tunisian-military-after-ben-ali-pub-62780>.

**Tunisia 8/26/2013-1/26/2014 – neutral**

Tensions were high in summer 2013, especially following the July assassination of a leader of the Popular Front political alliance. The Popular Front joined with two other political party groups, Union for Tunisia and Nidda Tounes, to form the National Salvation Front. Together, they opposed Ennahda, the governing party. The anti-Ennahda campaign grew in August and came to demand the Constituent Assembly's dissolution, the replacement of the Troika (or alliance) government, and the removal of Ennahda-appointed officials. The National Dialogue Quartet, a group of four civil society organizations, oversaw negotiations, which resulted in the naming of Mehdi Jomaa as prime minister in December. He presided over the government until the 2014 elections. During the protests, the police engaged in repression. There were rumors that the opposition appealed to some military generals to attempt a coup, but the military never acted. President Moncef Marzougui also reshuffled some of the army leadership as a precaution.

Sources:

Abba, Sadeeqe, Mukhtar Imam, and Mohamed M. Wader. "Arab Uprisings and the Outstanding Return to Democracy: Tunisia as a Model." *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Invention* 4, no. 8 (2015): 1-11.

Boubekeur, Amel. "Islamists, Secularists, and Old Regime Elites in Tunisia: Bargained Competition." *Mediterranean Politics* 21, no. 1 (2016): 107-127.

Chamkhi, Tarek. "Ennahda as a Neo-Islamist Party in Power." Paper presented at "An Arab Exception? The Role of Civil Society in Tunisia's Democratic Transition" Symposium, Melbourne, Australia, July 25, 2015.

**Turkey 12/26/2013-5/1/2015 (ongoing) – neutral**

Protests against the government of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan were met with riot police armed with water cannons and tear gas. The unrest followed the December 2013 arrests of a number of politicians and business people allegedly involved in corrupt activities. Erdogan denounced the unrests, saying they were politically motivated, and in the process brought criticism upon himself. However, his Justice and Development Party won two elections in March, and in August, Erdogan was directly elected president. Erdogan set out on a mission to purge the state of those he considered disloyal.

Sources:

"Freedom in the World 2014: Turkey." *Freedom House*.

<https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2014/turkey>.

"Turkish Police Tear Gas Protesters on Taksim Anniversary." *BBC*. May 31, 2014.

<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-27649472>.

**Uganda 3/9/2011-8/7/2013 - loyal**

The first crackdown against the anti-Yoweri Museveni protest movement took place in April and May 2011. Together, the police and army were responsible for hundreds of casualties. The protests continued, though having lost momentum. The only other notable event involving the military was in January 2013, when Museveni, the defense minister, and the chief of defense forces threatened an army coup if the parliament continued to challenge the president.

Sources:

Kagoro, Jude. "Competitive Authoritarianism in Uganda: The Not So Hidden Hand of the Military." In *Democratization and Competitive Authoritarianism in Africa*, edited by Matthijs Bogaards and Sebastian Elischer, 155-172. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2016.

Thurston, Alex. "As 2012 Closes, What Legacy for an 'African Spring'?" *Footnote*. October 29, 2012. <http://footnote.co/as-2012-closes-what-legacy-for-an-african-spring/>.

**Ukraine 12/15/2000-12/26/2004** – fragmented high level

After nearly four years of popular opposition to the regime, Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich was elected president in a runoff on November 21, 2004. The results were immediately disputed and on November 22 opposition candidate Victor Yushchenko declared himself president and asked the security forces to support him and the protest movement. This created confusion within the rank and file, and fragmentation of the military and other forces as the demonstrations continued and grew. There was a breakdown in command and control, and many rank and file and middle to upper-middle ranks of officers defected. They did not stop the protesters from accessing central Kiev. Security force units that might have obeyed repression orders decided against acting because other units were likely to refuse. Some regime members urged outgoing president Yanukovich-ally Leonid Kuchma to use violent repression against the protesters, but he realized he did not have the support of the security forces. On November 25, Defense Minister Oleksandr Kuzmek announced the army would not fire on the protesters. Generals from other forces made similar statements, and even the Interior Ministry said it would defend the people over the regime. On December 1, the parliament passed a non-confidence vote against Yanukovich, but neither he nor Kuchma recognized it. Shortly after, on December 3, the Supreme Court invalidated the election results and called for a revote of the run-off on December 26. Yushchenko won. Overall, the military defections were disorganized, with various units rather than the united military organization shifting loyalty.

Sources:

Binnendijk, Anika Locke. "Power and Persuasion: Nonviolent Strategies to Influence State Security Services in Serbia and Ukraine." *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 39, no. 3 (2006): 411-429.

D'Anieri, Paul. "Explaining the Success and Failure of Post-Communist Revolutions." *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 39, no. 3 (2006): 331-350.



Karatnycky, Adrian. "Ukraine's Orange Revolution." *Foreign Affairs* 84, no. 2 (2005).  
Pion-Berlin, David, Diego Esparza, and Kevin Grisham. "Staying Quartered: Civilian Uprisings and Military Obedience in the 21st Century." *Comparative Political Studies* 47, no. 2 (2014): 230-259.

Kuzio, Taras. "From Kuchma to Yushchenko: Ukraine's 2004 Presidential Elections and the Orange Revolution." *Problems of Post-Communism* 52, no. 2 (2005): 29-44.

Kuzio, Taras. "State-Led Revolution in Ukraine's 2004 Elections and Orange Revolution." *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 43, no. 4 (2010): 383-395.

#### **Ukraine 11/21/2013-2/23/2014** – fragmented high level

Protests against President Victor Yanukovich began in late November 2013, and his government almost immediately sent its special police units (the Berkut) to end them. The Berkut used extreme violence, which set off a cycle of escalation. More radical segments of the protesters formed self-defense units and engaged in battles with the Berkut. On February 20, 2014, during a particularly violent episode, the Berkut killed dozens of protesters. The parliament then voted to remove Yanukovich. The army also refused to attack the people – following some confusion and intra-force disagreements. Yanukovich fired the Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces, Volodymyr Zamana, around February 19, likely because he did not want to use force. Soon after, the new Chief, Yuriv Ilyin, and Minister of Defense Pavlo Lebedyev prepared to deploy the military. On February 21, following the Berkut's violence, the Armed Forces' Deputy Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Yuri Dumansky resigned to protest any military involvement. The opposition soon announced the military was supporting it. The Berkut, though, remained loyal to Yanukovich. After his ouster, the new government dismantled the force.

#### Sources:

Anderson, Kevin B. 2014. "Ukraine: Democratic Aspirations and Inter-Imperialist Rivalry." *New Politics* 15, no. 1 (2014): 65-70.

Khmelko, Irino. "An Anatomy of Mass Protests: The Orange Revolution and Euromaydan Compared." *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 47, no. 2 (2014): 227-236.

Granholm, Niklas, Johannes Malminen, and Gudrun Persson, eds. *A Rude Awakening: Ramifications of Russian Aggression Towards Ukraine*. FOI, 2014.

McFaul, Michael. "Faulty Powers: Who Started the Ukraine Crisis." *Foreign Affairs* 93, no. 6 (2014): 167-178.

#### **Uruguay 1/18/1984-3/1/1985** – neutral

Amid ongoing protests, the military regime and opposition political parties negotiated a transfer of power. They broke off once but started again in May 1984. In August, the participants reached the Club Naval agreement, which stipulated elections for November. The protest movement's demonstrations and strikes were crucial in pressuring the military to give up power, and to make more concessions during negotiations. The

military was largely united over this period, with the general staff making most of the decisions, and no signs of disagreement over them – within the regime, or between the regime and military institution.

Sources:

Finch, Henry. “Democratization in Uruguay.” *Third World Quarterly* 7, no. 3 (1985): 495-609.

Collier, Ruth Berins and James Mahoney. “Adding Collective Actors to Collective Outcomes.” *Comparative Politics* 29, no. 3 (1997): 285-303.

#### **Venezuela 1/11/1958-1/23/1958 – united defections**

President Marcos Perez Jimenez was overthrown on January 23, ending military rule in Venezuela. He had been losing military and civilian support throughout 1957, and the military opposition developed into two factions: higher ranking officers close to the government that tried to pressure Jimenez into reforms, and lower ranking officers who organized into a dissident group. The younger officers were particularly upset by Jimenez’s corruption and reliance on loyalists within the civilian ministry. He also created Seguridad Nacional, a counterforce that increased police power over the military. On January 1st, the dissidents launched a coup attempt that failed but triggered a crisis within Jimenez’s cabinet. On January 9, Jimenez’s ministers forced him to resign. But a few days later, on January 13, Jimenez appointed himself Minister of Defense in an attempt to stay in power. The opposition (specifically Junta Patriotica, an umbrella organization for the political parties) launched a general strike to force Jimenez out. The military had decided that in the interests of the military organization Jimenez needed to leave and it refused to end the strike. Jimenez resigned, and pressure for democratization forced the new military junta to gradually transition.

Sources:

Karl, Terry Lynn. “Petroleum and Political Pacts: The Transition to Democracy in Venezuela.” *Latin American Research Review* 22, no. 1 (1987): 63-94.

#### **Venezuela 4/11/2002-4/14/2002 – fragmented high level**

During anti-President Hugo Chavez protests on April 11, 2002, the National Guard fatally shot a demonstrator. Senior military officers held Chavez responsible, and asked for his resignation. The commander of the army, General Vasquez Velasco, in particular, stated he would not suppress anti-government demonstrations, and others followed his lead. Chavez was ousted by these high ranking officers, but the military overall was divided in how to respond (despite most being anti-repression). Events rapidly shifted, and a transitional government led by businessman Pedro Carmono took power, unconstitutionally. Carmono lost support almost immediately, by grabbing power against pro-democracy civil society groups and appointing officers besides those who had helped him take over. Anti-coup and pro-Chavez protests developed, and soon pro-Chavez army officers such as General Raul Baduel returned Chavez to the presidency. Those who staged the coup withdrew their support from the transitional government, understanding

they would have to fight the pro-Chavez officers to defend it, and observing the growing popular resistance to Carmona. They remained dissatisfied with Chavez's personal involvement in military promotions, however. Overall the military responded to the anti-coup protest movement with high level shifts that were disunited and disorganized.

Sources:

Barracca, Steven. "Military Coups in the Post-Cold War Era: Pakistan, Ecuador, and Venezuela." *Third World Quarterly* 28, no. 1 (2007): 137-154.

Pion-Berlin, David. "Democratization, Social Crisis, and the Impact of Military Domestic Roles in Latin America." *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 33, no. 1 (2005): 5-26.

Sylvia, Ronald D. and Constantine P. Danopoulos. "The Chavez Phenomenon: Political Change in Venezuela." *Third World Quarterly* 24, no. 1 (2003): 63-76.

### **Venezuela 2/14/2014-5/1/2015 (ongoing) - loyal**

After elections in late December 2013, part of the opposition began to carry out protests against what it alleged were irregularities. At first the government of President Nicolas Maduro deployed the National Guard and police against the demonstrators, and then it started to arm pro-government civilians. In January 2015, as the protests continued, Minister of Defense Vladimir Padrino Lopez authorized the military to use deadly force against the opposition. Maduro came to power after Hugo Chavez's death in April 2013 and followed his reliance on the military.

Sources:

Corrales, Javier. "Autocratic Legalism in Venezuela." *Journal of Democracy* 26, no. 2 (2015).

Ellis, R. Evan. "The Approaching Implosion of Venezuela and Strategic Implications for the United States." *Strategic Studies Institute*. July 10, 2015.

<http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/index.cfm/articles/the-approaching-implosion-of-venezuela/2015/07/10>

Hawkins, Kirk A. "Responding to Radical Populism: Chavismo in Venezuela." *Democratization* 23, no. 2 (2016).

Hidalgo, Manuel. "The 2015 Parliamentary Elections in Venezuela." *Electoral Studies* (2016).

### **Yemen 1/16/2011-2/27/2012 – united defections**

The first military loyalty shifts occurred on March 18, 2011, when pro-government snipers fired on anti-President Ali Abdulla Saleh demonstrators, killing around 50. The army, under Sheikh Sadiq al-Ahmar, and its powerful First Armored Division, commanded by General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, defected from Saleh. Mohsen declared that the army supported the protest movement, and it remained united under his command. His decision prompted some defections by officers and rank and file from the other security forces, like the Republican Guards. Some joined a recently formed group called the Armed Forces Supporting the Peaceful Revolution. The divide between

defectors and loyalists in the armed forces led to conflict in May. Violence broke out on May 23 between the First Armored Division and the Republican Guards, as well as tribal fighters. On June 3, the presidential palace was hit by a bomb, injuring Saleh. He left for Saudi Arabia and Vice President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Al-Hadi took over officially, though Saleh's son Summer 2011 saw more violent conflict and more loyalty shifts from Saleh's forces. He had created a number of institutional rivals to the military, including the Republican Guards, paramilitary units, and tribal reserves. He also promoted loyal kin to positions of control in these organizations. Importantly, the army and specifically the First Armored Division commanders were not personally tied to Saleh (and their united shift was key to Saleh's removal from power). After a number of attempts at negotiations for a transition, Saleh agreed in August to hold elections in the next few months. Saleh returned to Yemen in late September, but left for Saudi Arabia and then the United States in November. During these travels he signed onto an agreement brokered by the Gulf Cooperation Council where Hadi took full power until elections in February. Hadi won these elections.

Sources:

Alley, April Longley. "Assessing (In)security After the Arab Spring: The Case of Yemen." *PS: Political Science and Politics* 46, no. 4 (2013): 721-726.

Knights, Michael. "The Military Role in Yemen's Protests: Civil-Military Relations in the Tribal Republic." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 36, no. 2 (2013): 261-288.

Makara, Michael. "Coup-Proofing, Military Defection, and the Arab Spring." *Democracy and Security* 9, no. 4 (2013): 334-359.

Thiel, Tobias. 2012. "After the Arab Spring: Power Shift in the Middle East?" In *IDEAS Reports – Special Reports*, edited by Nicholas Kitchen. London: London School of Economics, 2012.

#### **Yugoslavia 6/3/1968-7/2/1968 – neutral**

Students organized into a protest movement sought to overthrow the Communist regime of President Josip Broz Tito. Tito repressed the movement, especially the more radical factions, using internal security forces. The protests died down without the state pursuing a military response.

Sources:

Klimke, Martin, Jacco Pekelder, and Joachim Scharloth, eds. *Between Prague Spring and French May*. Berghahn Books, 2011.

Zabic, Sarah D. "Praxis, Student Protest, and Purposive Social Action: The Humanist Marxist Critique of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia." MA thesis, Kent State University, 2010.

#### **Zambia 6/30/1990-10/31/1991 – neutral**

Opposition had been growing during the election campaign between the ruling United National Independence Party and the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy. The

Kenneth Kaunda government deployed paramilitary forces to maintain order during. Protests developed at the end of June because of an increase in the prices of food staples. The government used force, and killed 27. On June 30, a few junior officers led by Lieutenant Lichembe launched a coup. Thousands of demonstrators celebrated the end of the regime, but the rest of the military put down the attempt by the small faction. Kaunda remained committed to the referendum scheduled for October 17. During the subsequent general elections, the military remained in the barracks and did not interfere with the transition. The military and party were deeply integrated; the party had organs in the military, and army promotions were made on the basis of party loyalty. Another key force was the Department of Military Intelligence.

Sources:

Andreassen, Bard-Anders, Gisela Geisler, and Arne Tostensen. "Setting a Standard for Africa? Lessons from the 1991 Zambian Elections." *Chr. Michelsen Institute Report 5* (1992).

Habasonda, Lee M. "The Military, Civil Society, and Democracy in Zambia." *African Security Review* 11, no. 2 (2002): 6-16.

Lindemann, Stefan. "Civilian Control of the Military in Tanzania and Zambia: Explaining Persistent Exceptionalism." *Crisis States Research Center Working Paper 80* (2010).

#### **Zambia 5/28/2001-12/27/2001 – neutral**

The ruling Movement for Multi-Party Democracy campaigned for a change to the constitution to allow Frederick Chiluba a third term, after voting him as their nominee in the upcoming presidential election. These moves were very unpopular. Chiluba conceded when he did not get parliamentary support for the constitutional amendment. The military was neutral during the process, remaining on the sidelines. Sources report some in the military wanted Chiluba out but they were sure Chiluba would leave through constitutional means. Chiluba's vice president Levy Mwanawasa was elected president in December 2001.

Sources:

Haatobolo, Godfrey Haamweela Nachitumbi. "Civil Control of the Military in Zambia." PhD diss., University of Zambia, 2008.

Venter, Denis. "Democracy and Multiparty Politics in Africa: Recent Elections in Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Lesotho." *Eastern Africa Social Science Research Review* 19, no. 1 (2003): 1-39.

## APPENDIX B: CODEBOOK FOR UPDATED AND EXPANDED GWF

What follows is a portion of Jonathan Pinckney's (2016) codebook, which he generously shared with me. I further updated and expanded the data for cases in my dataset he did not include.

### Pinckney's Codebook

For countries coded as democracies by GWF my first source to check was the V-Dem Polyarchy score. If the score had remained more or less the same as in 2010 (less than a 0.2 decline), I simply coded a democratic regime as continuing through 2015. If there had been a decline in the Polyarchy score I then checked the Freedom House reports on the country to ascertain the reasons for the declining score. This was typically enough to determine whether a democratic breakdown (as defined by the GWF codebook) had occurred. I attempted to follow GWF's coding rules as closely as possible.

For authoritarian regimes I checked the Archigos dataset to determine whether there had been an irregular leader entry or exit from 2010-2015. If no irregular leader change had occurred I simply coded the regime as continuing through 2015. If Archigos did code an irregular leadership change I checked the Archigos case narratives and other secondary sources to determine the nature of the change.

Honduras: Coded as democratic regime continuing despite coup in 2009 – coupmakers did not fundamentally change regime rules, democratic elections (according to GWF rules) held in 2010 and 2014.

Thailand: I code the democratic regime as ending in 2014 with the military coup that overthrew Yingluck Shinawatra, and a military regime in 2015.

Yemen: I code the Saleh regime as ending on 23 November with Saleh's signing the GCC power-transfer agreement. The following Hadi regime I code as provisional because Hadi was elected in an unopposed election with a mandate to orchestrate a transition to democracy. I code this regime as ending in 2014 with the Houthi takeover of Sana'a and subsequent breakout of civil war across Yemen.

Egypt: I code the "Egypt 52-NA" regime as ending with Mubarak's resignation on Feb 11th, 2011. I code the following regime as "provisional." While it was led by the military, it explicitly took power as a temporary measure to lead up to democratic elections, and then did in fact allow the elections to occur in 2012 when Mohammed Morsi was elected. I code Morsi's regime as democratic because his election was widely considered to be free and fair. I code the beginning of a new regime with the coup that overthrew Morsi in 2013, and the subsequent regime under Abdel-fatah al-Sisi as Military-Personalistic.

Iraq: GWF code Iraq as transitioning from foreign occupation to autocracy in the beginning of 2011. I code the subsequent regime as party-personal, reflecting the domination both by Shi'a political parties and specifically by Nouri al-Maliki.

Turkey: I strongly considered Turkey as moving to a personalistic regime during this period. However, Freedom House reports that the 2015 election, while certainly contentious, was relatively free and fair. It is certainly possible, indeed likely, that the Erdogan regime's crackdown on opposition following the 2016 attempted coup mark Turkey's move away from democracy, but it does not appear that this transition occurred prior to 2016.

Tunisia: I code the Ben Ali as ending with Ben Ali's flight from Tunisia on January 14th, 2011. I code the following regime as provisional, first under Fouad Mebazaa and then under the National Constituent Assembly, which was tasked with running the government until a constitution could be written and democratic elections held. I code this regime as continuing until the presidential and parliamentary elections in the fall of 2014, when I code Tunisia as becoming a democracy.

Madagascar: GWF code the regime of Andry Rajoelina beginning in 2009 as personalistic. Rajoelina maintained that his regime was transitional, and did in fact allow another candidate to take power in 2014. Thus, I considered coding the regime as provisional. However, by a strict reading of GWF's coding rules, provisional governments are only those charged with conducting elections as "part of a transition to democracy," and thus coding the Rajoelina regime as autocratic is closer to their rules. I code the regime as failing with the assumption of power by democratically-elected president Rajaonarimampianina in January 2014.

Burundi: GWF code Burundi as a democracy beginning with the election of 2005. I code this democratic regime as ending in 2010 because of the widespread electoral fraud and intimidation of the opposition that characterized the May-July 2010 elections. This follows GWF's coding rules of an authoritarian regime starting when a leader assumes power through an election that is not free and fair (GWF Codebook page 6). I code the following regime as a party-personal regime.

Burkina Faso: I code the Compaore regime in Burkina Faso as ending in October 2014 with Compaore's ouster in the 2014 Lwili Revolution. I code the following regime under interim president Michel Kafando as provisional – the regime was explicitly set up to prepare for democratic elections, which did in fact take place in late 2015. Late 2015 marks the beginning of a democratic regime. There was an attempted coup in late 2015, but the coup failed to ultimately unseat Kafando.

Ukraine: This is the only place where I directly diverge from a coding by GWF. They code Ukraine as democratic from its independence from the Soviet Union in 1992. However, by their coding rules autocratic regimes start when an executive achieves power through undemocratic means, i.e. elections that are not reasonably competitive.

According to experts, the 1999 election of Leonid Kuchma was very far from free and fair, and Kuchma subsequently significantly changed the rules for choosing leaders and policies, centralizing presidential power. Thus I code Ukraine as autocratic from 1999 to 2004, when the Orange Revolution defeated Kuchma's successor. I code Ukraine as democratic subsequently. V-Dem shows a precipitous decline in Ukraine's polyarchy score following the Euromaidan protests and ouster of President Yanukovich. I decided to code a regime failure event in 2014, considering the dramatic change in rules for choosing leaders and policies that took place in the aftermath of the Euromaidan protests. However, because Yanukovich's ouster and a free and fair executive election both took place in 2014, the country-years show up as a continuous democratic period.

### Kingma Neu's Coding

Bahrain 2011-2015 (2010): monarchy

From Archigos, al-Khalifa's entry into power was regular, and he was still leader. Al-Khalifa was the son of Bahrain's previous leader. From Polity, Bahrain was a nondemocracy.

Chile 1931 (1930): military

From Archigos, the leader was Ibanez, a military general. From Polity, Chile was a nondemocracy.

Other sources: Chile was a military dictatorship, following military intervention against the oligarchy.

Haring, Clarence H. "The Chilean Revolution of 1931." *The Hispanic American Historical Review* 13, no. 2 (1933): 197-203.

Vidal, Hernan. "The Gravitation of Narratives of National Identity on Human Rights: The Case of Chile." *Hispanic Issues On Line* 5, no. 1 (2009).

Djibouti 2011 (2010): party

From Archigos, Guelleh's entry into power was regular, and he was still leader. From Polity, Djibouti was a nondemocracy.

Other sources: The first president of Djibouti turned it into a one-party state in 1981. Guelleh succeeded him (Gradstein p. 25).

Gradstein, Mark. "Dictatorship, Transitions, and Development." *Monaster Center for Economic Research Discussion Paper* 11 (2011).

Guatemala 1944 (1943): personalist

From Archigos, Ubico's entry into power was regular, but his exit was irregular. From Polity, Guatemala was a nondemocracy.

Other sources: Guatemala was military dictatorship, but Ubico exercised personal control over the military institution (Gleijeses p. 15). The dictatorship was highly personalist (Grieb p. 524). Gleijeses, Piero. *Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992.



Grieb, Kenneth J. "The Guatemalan Military and the Revolution of 1944." *The Americas* 32, no. 4 (1976): 524-543.

Guyana 1990-1992 (1989): single-party

From Archigos, Hoyte's entry into and exit from power were regular. From Polity, Guyana was a nondemocracy.

Other sources: Hoyte was part of the ruling People's National Congress Party and appointed ruler. Under Hoyte, though, the party was not as powerful as previously (Griffith p. 269). Yet – it remained the "dominant political force" (Griffith 1991).

Griffith, Ivelaw L. "The Military and the Politics of Change in Guyana." *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 33, no. 2 (1991).

Griffith, Ivelaw L. "Political Change, Democracy, and Human Rights in Guyana." *Third World Quarterly* 18, no. 2 (1997): 267-275.

East Timor 2006 (2005): democratic

From Polity, East Timor was a democracy.

Fiji 1987 (1986): democratic

From Archigos, Mara's entry into and exit from power were regular. From Polity, Fiji was a democracy.

Fiji 2000 (1999): democratic

From Archigos, Rabuka's entry into and exit from power were regular. From Polity, Fiji was a democracy.

Maldives 2003-2008 (2002): personalist

From Archigos, Gayoom's entry into and exit from power were regular. He was elected president. From Polity, Maldives was a nondemocracy. From VDem, there are no mentions of a political party or the military.

Other sources: Gayoom had absolute power (Bonofer p. 438).

Bonofer, Jacob Ashik. "The Challenges of Democracy in Maldives." *IJSAS* 3, no. 2 (2010): 433- 449.

Maldives 2012 (2011): democratic

From Archigos, Nasheed's entry into and exit from power were regular. From Polity, Maldives was a nondemocracy. FreedomHouse classified it as "Partly Free", and specifically, an "electoral democracy".

Maldives 2012-2013 (2011)

See above.

Suriname 1983-1984 (1982): military

From Archigos, Bouterse's entry into power was irregular and he was still leader. From Polity, Suriname was a nondemocracy. From VDem, Suriname's head of state was appointed by the military.

Other sources: The military didn't rule directly but exercised authority over the mostly civilian government (Singh p. 71). Bouterse sought to personally control the military, was this was not complete by 1983 (p. 80).

Singh, Chaitram. "Re-Democratization in Guyana and Suriname." *European Review of Latin America and Caribbean Studies* 84 (2008): 71-85.

Tonga 2005-2006 (2004): monarchy

Not in Archigos. From Polity, Tonga was a nondemocracy. Based on FreedomHouse, it was a monarchy.

## APPENDIX C: CHAPTER THREE

### Additional, Unreported Tests

Table 1. Correlation between *defections* and the *defect\_sec* variable from MEC

	<i>defections</i>	<i>defect_sec</i>
<i>defections</i>	1	
<i>defect_sec</i>	0.4957	1

Table 2. Summary statistics of EffectiveNumber across regime types

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Personalist	34	1.768491	0.6585462	1	3.614155
Party	31	1.994791	0.5003857	1	3.070187
Military	17	1.89134	0.6372488	1	3.149361

Note: This shows that institutional coup-proofing is not exclusive to personalist regimes.

Table 3. Models of defections and other measures of ICP: non-transformed EffectiveNumber, its squared term, and a measure of deviation from two armed organizations

EffectiveNumber	-0.3460	
	(1.1720)	
EffNumSQ	0.1370	
	(0.2710)	
ENdev		0.2570
		(0.3370)
Constant	-0.3370	-0.567**
	(1.2040)	(0.2090)
Observations	94	94
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.01	0.004
AIC	123.975	122.72
BIC	131.605	127.806

Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001

Table 4. Models of types of loyalty shifts and other measures of ICP

Low Level				
EffectiveNumber	-1.8330	(2.9440)		
EffNumSQ	0.4730	(0.6770)		
ENdev			0.2590	(0.9260)
Constant	0.2600	(2.9560)	-1.470**	(0.5700)
Fragmented				
EffectiveNumber	-1.9450	(2.1540)		
EffNumSQ	0.5020	(0.4810)		
ENdev			0.7250	(0.6260)
Constant	0.6240	(2.2920)	-1.446***	(0.4140)
United				
EffectiveNumber	0.6150	(3.4000)		
EffNumSQ	0.0390	(0.7930)		
ENdev			0.1540	(0.9480)
Constant	-2.6810	(3.4360)	-1.345*	(0.5500)
Observations	94		94	
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.013		0.004	
AIC	240.989		237.125	
BIC	263.879		252.385	

Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001

Table 5. Model of variable for institutionalized opposition (presence of an opposition political party) and defections

Opposition	-0.0140
	(0.2420)
Constant	-0.448*
	(0.1960)
Observations	111
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.00
AIC	143.876
BIC	149.295

Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001

Table 6. Model of variable for institutionalized opposition (presence of an opposition political party) and types of loyalty shifts

	Low Level	Fragmented	United
Opposition	-0.4900 (0.5060)	-0.4390 (0.5070)	0.2720 (0.5190)
Constant	-1.061** (0.3380)	-0.860* (0.3760)	-1.466** (0.4540)
Observations	111		
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.007		
AIC	277.239		
BIC	293.496		

Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001

Table 7. Model of variable for voluntarily recruited military and defections

Recruit	-0.2480 (0.3010)
Constant	-0.398* (0.1850)
Observations	82
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.006
AIC	105.808
BIC	110.621

Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001

Table 8. Model of variable for voluntarily recruited military and types of loyalty shifts

	Low Level	Fragmented	United
Recruit	-0.7790 (0.7310)	-0.4510 (0.6020)	-0.8280 (0.8560)
Constant	-0.956** (0.3300)	-0.773* (0.3310)	-1.312** (0.4590)
Observations	82		
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.01		
AIC	206.641		
BIC	221.081		

Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001

On page 83 of Chapter Three, I report that the interaction between nonviolence and size is not significant for defections. I show this below.

Table 9. Model of protester characteristics and defections

Size	-0.8990	(2.8260)
Nonviolence	-1.0530	(1.9920)
NV x Size	0.6800	(2.9240)
Dem Level	0.2240	(1.2040)
Incumbent	0.769**	(0.2600)
GDP per capita	0.2850	(0.1890)
Soldier Quality	-0.660**	(0.2220)
Coup	1.422*	(0.5720)
Constant	-2.2370	(2.7950)
Observations	94	
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.209	
AIC	113.329	
BIC	136.219	

Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001

Prior to the 3-way interaction between size, PCP, and ICP in Table 10 of Chapter Three, I calculated 2-way interactions between combinations of the coup-proofing variables (ICP and PCP) and those related to the protest movement (size and nonviolence). They are displayed below.

Table 10. Models of protester characteristics and defections, conditional on ICP

Size	-16.1070	(9.8550)	0.0930	(1.2080)
ICP	-5.5170	(4.8910)	9.992***	(2.4050)
Size x ICP	12.2800	(7.5330)		
Nonviolence	-0.4670	(0.3430)		
PCP	1.210**	(0.4200)	1.396**	(0.4560)
Dem Level	1.1230	(1.4770)	0.5460	(1.5810)
Incumbent	1.015**	(0.3350)	1.206***	(0.3210)
GDP per capita	0.857**	(0.2950)	0.980**	(0.3190)
Soldier Quality	-1.274**	(0.4100)	-1.403***	(0.4100)
Coup	2.034**	(0.6840)	1.790**	(0.6680)
Nonviolence			11.225***	(3.2280)
Nonviolence x ICP			-8.388***	(2.3230)
Constant	2.3730	(6.8770)	-19.91***	(4.8480)
Observations	90		90	
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.33		0.38	
AIC	99.701		93.903	
BIC	127.199		121.4	

Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001

Table 11. Models of protester characteristics and defections, conditional on PCP

Size	0.1250	(1.6810)	0.1350	(1.2220)
ICP	2.405**	(0.7740)	2.398**	(0.7460)
PCP	1.1470	(1.6240)	1.0230	(0.6740)
Size x PCP	0.0540	(2.3540)		
Nonviolence	-0.4650	(0.3270)		
Dem Level	0.5940	(1.4390)	0.6620	(1.4080)
Incumbent	0.953**	(0.3260)	0.952**	(0.3250)
GDP per capita	0.775**	(0.2860)	0.763*	(0.2980)
Soldier Quality	-1.176**	(0.3780)	-1.165**	(0.3850)
Coup	1.784**	(0.6200)	1.771**	(0.6150)
Nonviolence			-0.5480	(0.4540)
Nonviolence x PCP			0.2110	(0.6000)
Constant	-7.611**	(2.9540)	-7.556**	(2.8510)
Observations	90		90	
Pseudo R-squared	0.311		0.312	
AIC	101.865		101.785	
BIC	129.363		129.283	

Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001



In Table 10 of the main text, I interact PCP and ICP with size. In Table 12 below, I interact PCP and ICP with nonviolence.

Table 12. Models of nonviolence and defections, conditional on coup-proofing

Size	-0.1870	(1.2690)
Nonviolence	10.411*	(4.7340)
ICP	8.523**	(3.2150)
PCP	-9.6770	(8.0730)
Nonviolence x ICP x PCP	-6.6500	(5.8410)
Nonviolence x ICP	-7.737*	(3.2830)
Nonviolence x PCP	8.8870	(8.2770)
PCP x ICP	8.1200	(5.6650)
Dem Level	0.0750	(1.6390)
Incumbent	1.126***	(0.3220)
GDP per capita	0.911**	(0.3120)
Soldier Quality	-1.312***	(0.3950)
Coup	1.676*	(0.6580)
Constant	-17.170**	(5.8440)
Observations	90	
Pseudo R-squared	0.392	
AIC	98.442	
BIC	133.439	

Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001

On page 94 of Chapter Three, I note an absence of results for the interaction between ICP and loss. I report this in Table 13 below.

Table 13. Model of loss by coup-proofed militaries (ICP) and loyalty shift types

	Low Level	Fragmented	United
Loss	29.829*	15.878**	5.0500
	(12.4770)	(5.6320)	(5.0640)
PCP	1.984*	2.956**	2.178*
	(0.8200)	(0.9110)	(0.9060)
Loss x ICP	-23.646*	-11.994**	-3.4800
	(10.2240)	(3.9630)	(3.4140)
ICP	4.2010	7.349***	5.965**
	(2.3400)	(2.1630)	(1.8310)
Dem Level	-4.611*	-1.8010	1.3000
	(2.3520)	(5.0060)	(3.7150)
Incumbent	0.2520	2.198*	1.245*
	(0.4410)	(0.9260)	(0.5330)
GDP per capita	0.0980	2.030*	0.5780
	(0.4140)	(0.7910)	(0.5100)
Soldier Quality	0.0570	-2.567*	-1.4410
	(0.7310)	(1.0130)	(0.8510)
Coup	1.5260	4.509**	1.3580
	(1.4580)	(1.4820)	(1.3570)
Constant	-10.1460	-23.500*	-12.624*
	(6.1380)	(9.1280)	(5.2900)
Observations	94		
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.278		
AIC	223.129		
BIC	299.428		

Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001

In Tables 14-16, I display the results for the individual probit regressions I summarize in footnote 192 of Chapter Three.

Table 14. Tests of H5a-b for low level shifts, controlling for protester characteristics

Size	4.336**	(1.6050)
Nonviolence	-0.3970	(0.3850)
ICP	0.4380	(0.8690)
PCP	0.7270	(0.4190)
Dem Level	-2.2710	(1.3140)
Incumbent	-0.0680	(0.0980)
GDP per capita	-0.1860	(0.2040)
Soldier Quality	0.3620	(0.2920)
Coup	0.3860	(0.4740)
Constant	-5.519*	(2.5710)
Observations	90	
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.17	
AIC	78.674	
BIC	103.672	

Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001

Table 15. Tests of H5a-b for fragmented high level shifts, controlling for protester characteristics

Size	-0.1250	(1.3650)
Nonviolence	-0.3580	(0.3140)
ICP	1.5510	(0.8600)
PCP	1.082**	(0.3990)
Dem Level	-0.3050	(1.9340)
Incumbent	1.012*	(0.4390)
GDP per capita	1.089**	(0.3490)
Soldier Quality	-1.226**	(0.4340)
Coup	2.274**	(0.7280)
Constant	-9.255*	(3.7600)
Observations	90	
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.33	
AIC	78.407	
BIC	103.405	

Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001

Table 16. Tests of H5a-b for united defections, controlling for protester characteristics

Size	0.0250	(1.5700)
Nonviolence	-0.4290	(0.3360)
ICP	1.729*	(0.7520)
PCP	0.4570	(0.3780)
Dem Level	0.9760	(1.4910)
Incumbent	0.366*	(0.1650)
GDP per capita	-0.0410	(0.1860)
Soldier Quality	-0.3730	(0.2920)
Coup	-0.0170	(0.6110)
Constant	-3.0030	(2.5900)
Observations	90	
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.173	
AIC	84.369	
BIC	109.367	

Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001

Tables 17-19 show the results for the interactions of other combinations of coup-proofing and protest movement variables besides size and ICP as reported in Table 17 of Chapter Three. The interaction between nonviolence and ICP is significant on all loyalty shift types, but in the opposite direction than expected. The interaction between size and PCP is significant on fragmented high level shifts, but the marginal effects at the variables' substantively meaningful values are not significant.

Table 17. Model of interaction between nonviolence and ICP, on loyalty shift types

	Low Level	Fragmented	United
Size	10.859** (3.4470)	3.662 (2.7080)	3.517 (3.9670)
Nonviolence	13.228 (6.9650)	19.322* (9.7450)	28.131*** (8.2910)
ICP	11.751** (4.4320)	19.370** (6.9440)	24.512*** (6.0920)
PCP	3.384** (1.0610)	4.043*** (1.2190)	3.241* (1.2980)
NV x ICP	-10.138* (4.9620)	-14.769* (6.8470)	-20.66*** (5.7370)
Dem Level	-4.869 (2.8480)	-2.475 (5.5050)	1.461 (5.4220)
Incumbent	0.481 (0.3540)	2.549* (1.1180)	1.992*** (0.5670)
GDP per capita	0.299 (0.5570)	2.592** (0.9730)	1.137 (0.6140)
Soldier Quality	-0.441 (0.7920)	-3.152* (1.3080)	-2.280* (0.9940)
Coup	1.434 (1.0810)	5.099** (1.9060)	1.647 (1.9990)
Constant	-26.915** (9.9420)	-43.978*** (12.7770)	-43.89*** (10.9040)
Observations	90		
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.354		
AIC	206.85		
BIC	289.344		

Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001

Table 18. Model of interaction between size and PCP, on loyalty shift types

	Low Level	Fragmented	United
Size	6.984*	0.6090	3.5690
	(3.4270)	(3.2060)	(5.8030)
Nonviolence	-0.9560	-1.0800	-0.9290
	(0.8500)	(0.8260)	(0.8750)
ICP	2.5940	4.738*	5.645**
	(1.9450)	(1.8580)	(1.9960)
PCP	-4.2070	-3.0690	1.2140
	(4.6730)	(2.9020)	(5.8780)
Size x PCP	11.0590	10.487*	2.7850
	(6.7850)	(4.7090)	(8.5390)
Dem Level	-5.0780	-2.4630	1.0570
	(3.0180)	(4.8010)	(4.9020)
Incumbent	0.1970	2.130*	1.312*
	(0.2620)	(1.0130)	(0.5980)
GDP per capita	0.2420	2.216*	0.7880
	(0.5090)	(0.9170)	(0.6280)
Soldier Quality	-0.3070	-2.701*	-1.7450
	(0.7350)	(1.1940)	(0.9690)
Coup	1.7080	4.970**	1.6370
	(0.9590)	(1.7430)	(1.5100)
Constant	-9.5790	-19.028*	-13.4510
	(6.7640)	(7.9870)	(7.1430)
Observations	90		
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.317		
AIC	215.111		
BIC	297.605		

Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001

Table 19. Model of interaction between nonviolence and PCP, on loyalty shift types

	Low Level	Fragmented	United
Size	10.395** (3.3330)	3.659 (2.6240)	3.012 (3.7920)
Nonviolence	-0.369 (1.1930)	-0.995 (0.9100)	-1.285 (1.2900)
ICP	3.068 (1.8620)	5.581** (2.1310)	5.516** (1.7540)
PCP	3.831* (1.7840)	3.770* (1.5850)	2.248 (1.7140)
NV x PCP	-1.053 (1.8410)	-0.249 (1.4680)	0.48 (1.5950)
Dem Level	-4.946 (2.9160)	-2.729 (4.5800)	1.341 (4.7410)
Incumbent	0.12 (0.2840)	2.110* (0.9990)	1.252* (0.5590)
GDP per capita	0.19 (0.4760)	2.240* (0.9090)	0.66 (0.5720)
Soldier Quality	-0.231 (0.6930)	-2.737* (1.2010)	-1.611 (0.8950)
Coup	1.616 (0.9010)	4.957** (1.6760)	1.466 (1.5060)
Constant	-12.890* (6.2720)	-22.097* (8.7020)	-12.353* (5.8120)
Observations	90		
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.309		
AIC	216.829		
BIC	299.323		


Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001



I interact size and ICP in Table 17 of Chapter Three. The interaction term on low level shifts is negative and statistically significant. I summarize what that means substantively in the text, and show the marginal effects in Figure 1 below. Few are significant, but the predicted probability of low level shifts increases to .75 with large protests and no counterforces.

Figure 1. Marginal effects of ICP and size on low level shifts



### All Reported Tests Without Controls

Table 20. Models of coup-proofing and defections

	H1-H1a		Interaction	
ICP	0.9220	(0.5930)	-0.1720	(0.6890)
PCP	0.596*	(0.2780)	-2.6410	(1.6820)
PCP x ICP			2.390*	(1.1990)
Constant	-1.954*	(0.8890)	-0.4080	(1.0140)
Observations	96		96	
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.044		0.07	
AIC	121.456		120.293	
BIC	129.149		130.55	

Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001

Table 21. Models of other regime types and defections

	H1b	
Party Regime	-0.5810	(0.3280)
Mil Regime	0.1030	(0.3450)
ICP	0.7460	(0.6130)
Constant	-1.3400	(0.8880)
Observations	96	
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.043	
AIC	123.593	
BIC	133.851	

Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001

Table 22. Models of protester characteristics and defections, controlling for and conditional on coup-proofing

	H2		Interaction	
Size	0.9690	(1.1180)	-7.4070	(8.5870)
Nonviolence	-0.1280	(0.2760)	-0.1610	(0.2810)
PCP	0.657*	(0.3030)	-4.2100	(10.7860)
ICP	0.6480	(0.6170)	-4.2930	(3.9930)
Size x PCP x ICP			-1.1350	(11.9370)
Size x ICP			5.8270	(6.0730)
Size x PCP			2.6990	(16.0740)
PCP x ICP			2.9970	(8.0480)
Constant	-2.1140	(1.3250)	5.0030	(5.7630)
Observations	92		92	
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.048		0.076	
AIC	121.873		126.62	
BIC	134.482		149.316	

Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001

Table 23. Models of loss and defections, controlling for and conditional on coup-proofing

	Loss		Interaction	
Loss	0.2000	(0.4460)	2.3910	(2.6620)
ICP	0.9200	(0.5800)	0.0300	(0.8530)
PCP	0.592*	(0.2780)	-2.4330	(1.9660)
Loss x ICP x PCP			2.8340	(3.1530)
Loss x ICP			-2.1330	(1.7870)
Loss x PCP			-2.3580	(4.5950)
ICP x PCP			2.1510	(1.4160)
Constant	-1.970*	(0.8730)	-0.6620	(1.2290)
Observations	96		96	
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.046		0.09	
AIC	123.253		125.949	
BIC	133.511		146.464	

Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001

Table 24. Models of ongoing conflict and defections

Conflict	0.1260	(0.2620)		
Viol Campaign			0.4670	(0.2510)
Constant	-0.528***	(0.1590)	-0.615***	(0.1570)
Observations	109		112	
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.002		0.022	
AIC	139.086		141.531	
BIC	144.469		146.968	

Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001

Table 25. Models of coup-proofing and loyalty shift types

	Low Level		Fragmented		United	
PCP	1.0590	(0.6600)	0.8440	(0.6340)	1.716**	(0.6140)
ICP	0.8830	(1.6220)	0.7800	(1.3330)	2.938*	(1.2910)
Constant	-2.9600	(2.4230)	-2.4560	(1.9950)	-6.116**	(2.0190)
Observations	96					
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.045					
AIC	236.25					
BIC	259.329					

Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001

Table 26. Model of loss by coup-proofed militaries and loyalty shift types

	Low Level	Fragmented	United
Loss	0.4130 (1.2410)	0.0050 (1.2590)	- 13.331*** (0.9950)
PCP	0.9320 (0.6520)	0.6940 (0.6780)	1.347* (0.6640)
Loss x PCP	14.466*** (1.6020)	14.693*** (1.7310)	28.610*** (1.2960)
ICP	0.9100 (1.5950)	0.7950 (1.3460)	2.916* (1.3730)
Constant	-3.0470 (2.3270)	-2.4790 (2.0120)	-5.977** (2.1030)
Observations	96		
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.069		
AIC	242.848		
BIC	281.313		

Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001

Table 27. Model of protester characteristics and loyalty shift types, controlling for coup-proofing

	Low Level	Fragmented	United
Size	9.741** (3.0910)	4.0850 (2.6730)	2.9730 (3.0250)
Nonviolence	-0.8320 (0.7940)	-0.2810 (0.6410)	-0.5290 (0.5970)
ICP	1.6150 (1.6230)	0.5640 (1.4740)	2.816* (1.4350)
PCP	2.174** (0.7210)	1.2700 (0.7320)	2.074** (0.6520)
Constant	-10.58*** (2.9680)	-4.7250 (3.4950)	-7.576* (3.3050)
Observations	92		
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.104		
AIC	227.819		
BIC	265.646		

Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001

Table 28. Model of protester characteristics and loyalty shift types, conditional on ICP

	Low Level	Fragmented	United
Size	48.438* (18.9150)	9.3560 (15.8370)	-15.1150 (18.3620)
Nonviolence	-0.8100 (0.7860)	-0.2820 (0.6400)	-0.6550 (0.6290)
ICP	21.797* (9.0780)	3.1680 (7.4510)	-5.7040 (8.6790)
PCP	2.403*** (0.7120)	1.3080 (0.7550)	1.987** (0.6790)
Size x ICP	-27.843* (13.1110)	-3.8470 (11.1150)	13.0040 (13.2690)
Constant	-38.896** (13.5620)	-8.3020 (10.9490)	4.3350 (12.0510)
Observations	92		
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.123		
AIC	229.682		
BIC	275.074		

Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001

### All Reported Tests Including Democracies

Table 29. Models of coup-proofing and defections

	H1-H1a	Interaction
ICP	1.498** (0.5500)	1.0940 (0.6940)
PCP	0.4720 (0.2710)	-0.9720 (1.3760)
Dem Level	0.8870 (0.9370)	0.9070 (0.9310)
Incumbent	0.1880 (0.1190)	0.1760 (0.1200)
GDP per capita	0.2410 (0.1750)	0.2500 (0.1740)
Soldier Quality	-0.643** (0.2120)	-0.653** (0.2100)
Coup	0.2840 (0.3740)	0.2450 (0.3570)
PCP x ICP		1.0730 (1.0210)
Constant	-0.5150 (1.5080)	0.1610 (1.6850)
Observations	128	128
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.111	0.116
AIC	163.524	164.669
BIC	186.34	190.337

Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001



Table 30. Models of other regime types and defections

	H1b
Party Regime	-0.977** (0.3600)
Military Regime	-0.3620 (0.3910)
ICP	1.532** (0.5420)
Dem Level	0.1580 (0.9680)
Incumbent	0.2440 (0.1360)
GDP per capita	0.2610 (0.1790)
Soldier Quality	-0.646** (0.2330)
Coup	0.3010 (0.3540)
Constant	-0.4470 (1.6100)
Observations	128
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.147
AIC	159.552
BIC	185.221

Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001

Table 31. Models of protester characteristics and defections, with coup-proofing

	H2	Interaction
Size	1.7770 (1.0900)	-9.9010 (8.6150)
Nonviolence	-0.479* (0.2420)	-0.508* (0.2490)
PCP	0.5610 (0.3050)	2.1880 (8.1440)
ICP	1.254* (0.5750)	-4.5630 (4.1000)
Dem Level	1.0800 (0.9170)	1.1960 (0.9230)
Incumbent	0.1940 (0.1180)	0.1760 (0.1210)
GDP per capita	0.2040 (0.1850)	0.2770 (0.1850)
Soldier Quality	-0.696** (0.2300)	-0.721** (0.2320)
Coup	0.3590 (0.3840)	0.4380 (0.3790)
Size x PCP x ICP		5.5840 (9.1740)
Size x ICP		8.2500 (5.9960)
Size x PCP		-5.3810 (12.6760)
PCP x ICP		-2.1970 (5.8470)
Constant	-0.3960 (1.6960)	7.6160 (6.0240)
Observations	121	121
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.155	0.182
AIC	153.962	157.803
BIC	181.92	196.944

Standard errors in parentheses, \* p<.05, \*\*

p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001

Table 32. Models of loss and defections, controlling for and conditional on coup-proofing

	Loss	Interaction
Loss	0.3350 (0.3890)	-0.2330 (2.3540)
ICP	1.458** (0.5480)	1.0260 (0.7950)
PCP	0.4610 (0.2700)	-0.8660 (1.5770)
Dem Level	0.9390 (0.9440)	0.9440 (0.9310)
Incumbent	0.1980 (0.1250)	0.1800 (0.1230)
GDP per capita	0.2300 (0.1740)	0.2450 (0.1830)
Soldier Quality	-0.635** (0.2110)	-0.641** (0.2140)
Coup	0.2910 (0.3670)	0.2670 (0.3560)
Loss x ICP x PCP		2.1980 (3.3270)
Loss x ICP		0.2750 (1.6170)
Loss x PCP		-2.1000 (4.5200)
ICP x PCP		0.9480 (1.1810)
Constant	-0.5690 (1.5440)	0.1330 (1.8010)
Observations	128	128
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.115	0.125
AIC	164.828	171.321
BIC	190.496	208.397

Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001

Table 33. Models of ongoing conflict and defections

Conflict	0.2500 (0.2660)	
Dem Level	0.9100 (0.7700)	0.9100 (0.7650)
Incumbent	0.1770 (0.1010)	0.1720 (0.1010)
GDP per capita	0.0870 (0.1370)	0.0780 (0.1340)
Soldier Quality	-0.362** (0.1340)	-0.363** (0.1310)
Coup	0.1990 (0.3090)	0.2050 (0.2920)
Viol Campaign		0.2900 (0.2240)
Constant	0.4150 (1.3000)	0.5150 (1.2980)
Observations	139	139
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.065	0.068
AIC	183.718	183.333
BIC	204.259	203.874

Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001

Table 34. Models of coup-proofing and loyalty shift types

	Low Level	Fragmented	United
PCP	1.449* (0.6600)	1.478* (0.6420)	0.9710 (0.5770)
ICP	0.8870 (1.4560)	4.205** (1.3340)	2.3620 (1.2870)
Dem Level	-1.1480 (2.1180)	3.6460 (1.9050)	0.7920 (1.7420)
Incumbent	0.1590 (0.1680)	1.272** (0.4490)	0.1830 (0.2340)
GDP per capita	0.2800 (0.3280)	1.505** (0.5370)	-0.1420 (0.3660)
Soldier Quality	-0.0130 (0.6100)	-2.126*** (0.5780)	-0.4540 (0.4950)
Coup	1.3600 (0.7670)	2.249* (0.9030)	0.2100 (1.0690)
Constant	-6.2410 (4.1960)	-11.699* (5.5150)	-1.3250 (2.6920)
Observations	128		
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.144		
AIC	310.515		
BIC	378.963		

Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001

Table 35. Model of loss by coup-proofed militaries and loyalty shift types

	Low Level	Fragmented	United
Loss	0.1900 (0.9840)	-0.3740 (1.1050)	0.6710 (0.9670)
PCP	1.289* (0.6430)	1.418* (0.6790)	0.7610 (0.6300)
Loss x PCP	13.963*** (1.4110)	13.570*** (1.5040)	14.145*** (1.2010)
ICP	0.8210 (1.4530)	4.194** (1.3470)	1.9600 (1.3110)
Dem Level	-0.9040 (2.0800)	3.6620 (1.9040)	1.0360 (1.7390)
Incumbent	0.1630 (0.1720)	1.272** (0.4490)	0.1930 (0.2420)
GDP per capita	0.2250 (0.3290)	1.513** (0.5580)	-0.1890 (0.3540)
Soldier Quality	0.0220 (0.6160)	-2.136*** (0.6020)	-0.4130 (0.5020)
Coup	1.3810 (0.7390)	2.271* (0.9000)	0.2940 (1.0270)
Constant	-6.1700 (4.1620)	-11.649* (5.4000)	-1.0010 (2.7650)
Observations	128		
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.159		
AIC	317.904		
BIC	403.465		

Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001

Table 36. Model of protester characteristics and loyalty shift types, controlling for coup-proofing

	Low Level	Fragmented	United
Size	6.856* (3.2620)	4.7150 (2.5590)	4.2510 (2.4980)
Nonviolence	-0.8110 (0.7170)	-0.7140 (0.6230)	-1.222* (0.5370)
ICP	1.2910 (1.4720)	4.066** (1.4060)	1.9780 (1.4080)
PCP	2.053** (0.7450)	1.804** (0.6530)	1.2960 (0.6770)
Dem Level	-0.2820 (2.1380)	3.9270 (2.0170)	1.1800 (1.8470)
Incumbent	0.1100 (0.1400)	1.201* (0.5000)	0.2110 (0.2320)
GDP per capita	0.1130 (0.3760)	1.389* (0.5590)	-0.1810 (0.3960)
Soldier Quality	-0.1660 (0.5990)	-2.202*** (0.6640)	-0.6810 (0.5880)
Coup	0.8050 (0.7360)	2.171* (1.0450)	0.2570 (1.0090)
Constant	-8.2030 (4.9120)	-12.075* (5.4240)	-0.8550 (3.1730)
Observations	121		
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.193		
AIC	296.109		
BIC	379.982		

Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001

Table 37. Model of protester characteristics and loyalty shift types, conditional on ICP

	Low Level	Fragmented	United
Size	15.6650 (19.2070)	-16.5380 (12.3320)	-13.1990 (14.9680)
Nonviolence	-0.7250 (0.7540)	-0.7080 (0.6270)	-1.200* (0.5430)
ICP	5.8300 (9.9110)	-6.0790 (5.8600)	-6.1890 (6.5730)
PCP	2.005** (0.7310)	1.845** (0.6730)	1.3050 (0.6880)
Size x ICP	-6.3510 (14.4450)	15.7870 (9.0150)	12.9500 (10.5780)
Dem Level	-0.2610 (2.1500)	4.402* (1.9960)	1.3420 (1.8990)
Incumbent	0.0940 (0.1380)	1.247* (0.4960)	0.2050 (0.2410)
GDP per capita	0.0520 (0.3910)	1.495* (0.5850)	-0.1360 (0.3990)
Soldier Quality	-0.1620 (0.5900)	-2.260*** (0.6860)	-0.6840 (0.6010)
Coup	0.6320 (0.7390)	2.472* (1.0170)	0.3040 (1.0480)
Constant	-14.0000 (12.1500)	0.6860 (9.3180)	9.7820 (9.2650)
Observations	121		
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.204		
AIC	298.893		
BIC	391.154		

Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001



## APPENDIX D: QCA

### Summary Statistics for Independent Variables

Table 1. Full dataset

Variable	0	1	Total
PCP	68	35	103
NV	31	72	103
OPP	43	57	100
LOSS	92	11	103
VIOL	71	32	103

Table 2. Reduced dataset

Variable	0	1	Total
PCP	34	24	58
NV	18	40	58
OPP	21	36	57
LOSS	51	7	58
VIOL	37	21	58

### Summary Statistics for Dependent Variables

Table 3. Full dataset

Variable	0	1	Total
Defections	69	34	103
Low Level	89	14	103
Fragmented	85	18	103
United	87	16	103

Table 4. Reduced dataset

Variable	0	1	Total
Defections	43	15	58
Low Level	50	8	58
Fragmented	63	8	71
United	48	10	58

(Note: There are more observations for Fragmented because I do not drop cases that have experienced coups when testing it as an outcome.)

## Summary Statistics for ICP and SIZE, Calibrated for Different Outcomes

Table 5. Defections outcome, full dataset

Variable	0	1	Total
ICP	57	39	96
SIZE	61	38	99

Table 6. Defections outcome, reduced dataset

Variable	0	1	Total
ICP	31	24	55
SIZE	40	17	57

Table 7. Low level outcome, full dataset

Variable	0	1	Mean	Std Dev	Min	Max	Total
ICP			0.48370	0.30227	0	1	96
SIZE	44	55					99

Table 8. Low level outcome, reduced dataset

Variable	0	1	Mean	Std Dev	Min	Max	Total
ICP			0.51245	0.27448	0	1	55
SIZE	28	29					57

Table 9. Fragmented outcome, full dataset

Variable	0	1	Total
ICP	70	26	96
SIZE	44	55	99

Table 10. Fragmented outcome, reduced dataset

Variable	0	1	Total
COUP	58	10	68
ICP	45	20	65
PCP	42	27	69
LOSS	61	8	69
SIZE	33	35	68
NV	22	47	69
VIOL	44	25	69
OPP	21	46	67

Table 11. United defections outcome, full dataset

Variable	0	1	Total
ICP	70	26	96
SIZE	61	38	99

Table 12. United defections outcome, reduced dataset

Variable	0	1	Total
ICP	41	14	55
SIZE	40	17	57

## APPENDIX E: CHAPTER FIVE

### Additional Summary Statistics

Table 1 includes summary statistics of the determinants of *type shift* included in Tables 7 and 8 of Chapter Five.

Table 1. Summary statistics of additional independent variables

Variable	N	Mean	Std Dev	Min	Max
ICP	89	1.385059	0.2129828	1	1.901093
Size	89	0.6628707	0.1195083	0.3780322	0.9207059
	0	1			
PCP	57	32			
Coup	74	15			

### Robustness Checks with Other Measures of Democracy

Table 2. *type shift* and democratization measured as *dempost5*

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Neutral	0.3450 (0.3590)	-0.3500 (0.4090)	-0.3270 (0.3770)
Low Level	0.4150 (0.4490)	0.1070 (0.6950)	0.0940 (0.5420)
Fragmented	1.365** (0.4500)	1.0430 (0.8400)	0.8690 (0.5380)
United	0.6380 (0.3720)	0.4070 (0.6250)	0.1590 (0.4870)
Dem Level (Polity)	0.085** (0.0310)	0.1140 (0.0590)	0.105* (0.0440)
Success		0.979* (0.4260)	1.149** (0.3650)
GDP per capita		-0.0950 (0.3940)	0.3720 (0.2690)
Trade		-0.0040 (0.0070)	
Fuel Exports		-0.0010	

		(0.0120)	
Area		-0.3040	-0.0170
		(0.1620)	(0.1370)
Cold War		1.234*	0.9260
		(0.5770)	(0.5310)
Asia		1.805*	1.563*
		(0.8270)	(0.6080)
Americas		2.682**	2.156**
		(1.0010)	(0.7130)
Africa		-0.6080	0.3480
		(0.9300)	(0.6670)
Europe		1.0420	1.1560
		(1.2230)	(0.7840)
FSU		-0.8980	-0.0670
		(1.0420)	(0.7280)
Constant	-0.3100	3.0480	-4.5680
	(0.3330)	(3.9000)	(2.7830)
Observations	110	67	101
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.0997	0.3517	0.3318
AIC	147.676	93.432	123.228
BIC	163.879	130.911	162.455

Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001

Table 3. *type shift* and democratization (measured as *dempost5*), with determinants of *type shift*

	Model 1		Model 2	
Neutral	0.0940	(0.4360)	0.2040	(0.3750)
Low Level	0.1930	(0.6660)	-0.0930	(0.6090)
Fragmented	0.6100	(0.5610)	1.342*	(0.5350)
United	-0.0350	(0.5820)	0.7210	(0.5160)
Dem Level (Polity)	0.135***	(0.0380)	0.127**	(0.0410)
ICP	0.8140	(0.9790)	0.7170	(0.9740)
PCP	1.331*	(0.5700)	1.0920	(0.5580)
Size	-0.1600	(1.5300)	0.7430	(1.4950)
Coup	-0.4820	(0.4240)	-0.5250	(0.4190)
Success	1.430***	(0.3340)		
GDP per capita	0.539*	(0.2610)	0.3720	(0.2180)
Area	0.0020	(0.1860)	0.0160	(0.1620)
Cold War	0.4620	(0.4490)	0.5390	(0.4160)
Asia	1.811*	(0.7810)	1.760*	(0.7440)
Americas	2.707**	(0.9830)	2.943***	(0.8840)
Africa	0.2620	(0.7770)	0.2950	(0.7230)
Europe	1.6870	(0.9300)	1.874*	(0.8210)
FSU	-0.8290	(0.7970)	-0.2980	(0.8210)
Constant	-7.2970	(3.8250)	-6.2090	(3.6080)
Observations	89		89	
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.426		0.3363	
AIC	108.81		117.879	
BIC	156.094		162.675	

Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001

Table 4. Second stage model, instrument and democratization (*dempost5*)

	Model 1		Model 2	
Pr(Fragmented)	-0.4720	(0.5760)	0.1420	(0.5800)
Success	1.223***	(0.3180)		
Area	-0.0380	(0.1460)	-0.0010	(0.1460)
Cold War	0.4470	(0.4130)	0.4590	(0.3520)
Asia	0.9050	(0.6210)	0.8800	(0.5850)
Americas	1.3830	(0.7480)	1.715*	(0.7190)
Africa	-0.3590	(0.6160)	0.0650	(0.5860)
Europe	0.9910	(0.8070)	1.2920	(0.7340)
FSU	-0.2090	(0.6740)	0.2190	(0.7140)
Constant	-0.8410	(2.0830)	-0.9340	(2.1290)
Observations	88		88	
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.2294		0.1122	
AIC	113.973		126.261	
BIC	138.747		148.557	

Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001

Table 5. type shift and democratization measured as V-Dempost5

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Neutral	0.129* (0.0520)	-0.0520 (0.0720)	0.0120 (0.0530)
Low Level	-0.0310 (0.0700)	-0.0600 (0.1130)	-0.0620 (0.0710)
Fragmented	0.194* (0.0780)	0.0150 (0.0960)	0.0590 (0.0800)
United	0.1280 (0.0700)	-0.0170 (0.0940)	0.0290 (0.0660)
Dem Level (V-Dem)	0.3330 (0.1870)	-0.0550 (0.3050)	-0.0160 (0.2170)
Success		0.219** (0.0770)	0.179** (0.0570)
GDP per capita		0.1010 (0.0520)	0.098** (0.0320)
Trade		-0.0010 (0.0010)	
Fuel Exports		0.0000 (0.0020)	
Area		-0.0200 (0.0240)	-0.0070 (0.0130)
Cold War		0.201* (0.0970)	0.180** (0.0640)
Asia		0.1570 (0.1370)	0.217* (0.1000)
Americas		0.3040 (0.1640)	0.342** (0.1020)
Africa		0.1010 (0.1530)	0.1980 (0.0990)
Europe		0.0660 (0.1860)	0.227* (0.1090)
FSU		0.0260 (0.1540)	0.1210 (0.1020)
Constant	0.274***	-0.3490	-0.6180



	(0.0700)	(0.4930)	(0.3410)
Observations	97	56	88
R <sup>2</sup>	0.148	0.493	0.52
AIC	-7.217	-6.972	-36.655
BIC	8.231	27.459	0.505

Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001

Table 6. *type shift* and democratization (*V-Dempost5*), with determinants of *type shift*

	Model 1		Model 2	
Neutral	0.0300	(0.0500)	0.0630	(0.0540)
Low Level	-0.0420	(0.0820)	-0.0620	(0.0910)
Fragmented	0.0180	(0.0690)	0.1190	(0.0810)
United	0.0010	(0.0830)	0.0870	(0.0900)
Dem Level (V-Dem)	0.1840	(0.1820)	0.2250	(0.2060)
ICP	0.0250	(0.0920)	0.0040	(0.1040)
PCP	0.0960	(0.0510)	0.0980	(0.0540)
Size	0.1140	(0.1980)	0.2420	(0.2160)
Coup	-0.0520	(0.0540)	-0.0670	(0.0510)
Success	0.172***	(0.0470)		
GDP per capita	0.091**	(0.0320)	0.085*	(0.0340)
Area	-0.0070	(0.0200)	0.0010	(0.0210)
Cold War	0.1000	(0.0590)	0.1170	(0.0670)
Asia	-0.0850	(0.1020)	-0.1320	(0.0990)
Americas	0.0770	(0.1000)	0.0880	(0.1020)
Africa	-0.1400	(0.0990)	-0.1560	(0.0980)
FSU	-0.260*	(0.1020)	-0.258*	(0.1260)
MENA	-0.297*	(0.1120)	-0.368**	(0.1130)
Constant	-0.3700	(0.4150)	-0.4140	(0.4300)
Observations	76		76	
R <sup>2</sup>	0.61		0.534	
AIC	-40.001		-28.376	
BIC	4.283		13.577	

Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001

Table 7. Second stage model, instrument and democratization (*V-Dempost5*)

	Model 1		Model 2	
Pr(Fragmented)	-0.0160	(0.0640)	0.0700	(0.0810)
Success	0.202***	(0.0490)		
Area	-0.0070	(0.0250)	0.0050	(0.0280)
Cold War	0.1080	(0.0560)	0.1150	(0.0620)
Asia	0.0940	(0.0740)	0.0350	(0.0870)
Americas	0.307**	(0.1000)	0.321**	(0.1140)
Africa	0.0150	(0.0520)	0.0370	(0.0750)
Europe	0.338***	(0.0850)	0.345***	(0.0920)
MENA	-0.0420	(0.0880)	-0.1280	(0.1070)
Constant	0.2710	(0.3040)	0.2380	(0.3560)
Observations	76		76	
R <sup>2</sup>	0.487		0.347	
AIC	-35.07		-18.783	
BIC	-11.763		2.194	

Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001

Table 8. *type shift* and democratization measured as *V-Demchange5*

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Neutral	0.118*	-0.1070	0.0150
	(0.0530)	(0.0660)	(0.0590)
Low Level	-0.0060	-0.0560	-0.0390
	(0.0690)	(0.1050)	(0.0660)
Fragmented	0.211**	0.0520	0.0970
	(0.0760)	(0.0950)	(0.0830)
United	0.0860	-0.0270	0.0140
	(0.0750)	(0.0870)	(0.0730)
Dem Level (V-Dem)	-0.479**	-0.841**	-0.775***
	(0.1770)	(0.2610)	(0.2210)
Success		0.178*	0.157*
		(0.0670)	(0.0600)
GDP per capita		0.095*	0.096***

		(0.0420)	(0.0260)
Trade		0.0000	
		(0.0010)	
Fuel Exports		-0.0010	
		(0.0010)	
Area		0.0000	-0.0080
		(0.0200)	(0.0130)
Cold War		0.188*	0.154*
		(0.0880)	(0.0670)
Asia		0.1100	0.213*
		(0.1240)	(0.0910)
Americas		0.2610	0.335**
		(0.1470)	(0.1100)
Africa		0.0620	0.1550
		(0.1400)	(0.1010)
Europe		0.0820	0.2140
		(0.1620)	(0.1160)
FSU		-0.0130	0.1140
		(0.1440)	(0.1040)
Constant	0.228**	-0.5790	-0.6160
	(0.0670)	(0.4230)	(0.3110)
Observations	97	56	88
R-squared	0.175	0.607	0.535
AIC	-7.179	-15.38	-33.247
BIC	8.27	19.051	3.913

Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001

Table 9. *type shift* and democratization (measured as *V-Demchange5*), with determinants of *type shift*

	Model 1		Model 2	
Neutral	0.0160	(0.0510)	0.0480	(0.0510)
Low Level	-0.0020	(0.0740)	-0.0220	(0.0820)
Fragmented	0.0410	(0.0740)	0.1390	(0.0830)
United	-0.0010	(0.0850)	0.0830	(0.0890)
Dem Level (V-Dem)	-0.673***	(0.1780)	-0.634**	(0.1990)
ICP	-0.0170	(0.1070)	-0.0370	(0.1170)
PCP	0.0720	(0.0530)	0.0740	(0.0550)
Size	0.0360	(0.1850)	0.1600	(0.2060)
Coup	0.0080	(0.0460)	-0.0060	(0.0510)
Success	0.167***	(0.0470)		
GDP per capita	0.092***	(0.0250)	0.086**	(0.0290)
Area	-0.0080	(0.0190)	0.0000	(0.0200)
Cold War	0.0920	(0.0580)	0.1090	(0.0640)
Asia	-0.0970	(0.0850)	-0.1420	(0.0880)
Americas	0.0220	(0.0940)	0.0320	(0.0960)
Africa	-0.190*	(0.0900)	-0.206*	(0.0890)
FSU	-0.265**	(0.0950)	-0.264*	(0.1160)
MENA	-0.302*	(0.1150)	-0.371**	(0.1150)
Constant	-0.2760	(0.4070)	-0.3190	(0.4300)
Observations	76		76	
R <sup>2</sup>	0.651		0.585	
AIC	-41.594		-30.444	
BIC	2.69		11.509	

Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001

Table 10. Second stage model, instrument and democratization (*V-Demchange5*)

	Model 1		Model 2	
Pr(Fragmented)	0.1020	(0.0650)	0.177*	(0.0780)
Success	0.175**	(0.0510)		
Area	-0.0030	(0.0210)	0.0070	(0.0240)
Cold War	0.0070	(0.0570)	0.0140	(0.0580)
Asia	0.0980	(0.0570)	0.0480	(0.0710)
Americas	0.296**	(0.0920)	0.308**	(0.1010)
Africa	-0.0190	(0.0470)	0.0000	(0.0650)
Europe	0.359***	(0.0780)	0.365***	(0.0820)
MENA	-0.0030	(0.0830)	-0.0780	(0.1000)
Constant	0.0260	(0.2660)	-0.0030	(0.3100)
Observations	76		76	
R <sup>2</sup>	0.53		0.433	
AIC	-36.148		-23.943	
BIC	-12.841		-2.966	

Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001

### Reported Tests with Democratic Cases Included

Table 11. *type shift* and democratization measured as *politypost5*

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Neutral	1.6060 (1.1430)	0.7320 (1.2320)	0.9440 (1.1340)
Low Level	0.2570 (1.8610)	-0.2830 (1.9470)	-1.0120 (1.5680)
Fragmented	4.911*** (1.4090)	2.9400 (1.7830)	3.100* (1.5190)
United	0.9560 (1.5310)	-1.6320 (2.1920)	-0.5990 (1.8320)
Dem Level (Polity)	0.408*** (0.0820)	0.1810 (0.1310)	0.305** (0.0940)
Success		1.8700 (1.1740)	2.699* (1.1170)
GDP per capita		-0.4810 (0.5850)	0.4950 (0.5790)
Trade		0.0010 (0.0160)	
Fuel Exports		-0.0060 (0.0260)	
Area		-0.3720 (0.3830)	-0.4560 (0.3390)
Cold War		1.8620 (1.6360)	1.9280 (1.3110)
Asia		3.312* (1.4720)	0.5750 (2.0510)
Americas		6.145** (2.2090)	1.9850 (2.2600)
Europe		4.2900 (2.5890)	
FSU		2.0590 (1.9620)	-1.1530 (2.2850)
MENA		1.2630	-3.3650

		(2.7690)	(2.6520)
Africa			-1.5580
			(2.1790)
Constant	1.7080	6.5410	2.2730
	(0.9520)	(7.3790)	(7.3140)
Observations	146	100	137
R <sup>2</sup>	0.236	0.305	0.376
AIC	908.286	607.703	833.151
BIC	926.188	651.991	876.95

Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001

Table 12. *type shift* and democratization measured as *politychange5*

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Neutral	1.6060	0.7320	0.9440
	(1.1430)	(1.2320)	(1.1340)
Low Level	0.2570	-0.2830	-1.0120
	(1.8610)	(1.9470)	(1.5680)
Fragmented	4.911***	2.9400	3.100*
	(1.4090)	(1.7830)	(1.5190)
United	0.9560	-1.6320	-0.5990
	(1.5310)	(2.1920)	(1.8320)
Dem Level (Polity)	-0.592***	-0.819***	-0.695***
	(0.0820)	(0.1310)	(0.0940)
Success		1.8700	2.699*
		(1.1740)	(1.1170)
GDP per capita		-0.4810	0.4950
		(0.5850)	(0.5790)
Trade		0.0010	
		(0.0160)	
Fuel Exports		-0.0060	
		(0.0260)	
Area		-0.3720	-0.4560
		(0.3830)	(0.3390)
Cold War		1.8620	1.9280

		(1.6360)	(1.3110)
Asia		3.312*	0.5750
		(1.4720)	(2.0510)
Americas		6.145**	1.9850
		(2.2090)	(2.2600)
Europe		4.2900	
		(2.5890)	
FSU		2.0590	-1.1530
		(1.9620)	(2.2850)
MENA		1.2630	-3.3650
		(2.7690)	(2.6520)
Africa			-1.5580
			(2.1790)
Constant	1.7080	6.5410	2.2730
	(0.9520)	(7.3790)	(7.3140)
Observations	146	100	137
R <sup>2</sup>	0.382	0.606	0.529
AIC	908.286	607.703	833.151
BIC	926.188	651.991	876.95

Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001



Table 13. *type shift* and democratization, with determinants of *type shift*

	Model 1		Model 2	
Neutral	1.5470	(1.3440)	1.5470	(1.3440)
Low Level	-1.4130	(1.7220)	-1.4130	(1.7220)
Fragmented	2.2210	(1.4650)	2.2210	(1.4650)
United	-1.5930	(2.0870)	-1.5930	(2.0870)
Dem Level (Polity)	0.316**	(0.1090)	-0.684***	(0.1090)
ICP	-0.4570	(2.3130)	-0.4570	(2.3130)
PCP	2.1250	(1.1490)	2.1250	(1.1490)
Size	2.6730	(4.9600)	2.6730	(4.9600)
Coup	0.9160	(1.2890)	0.9160	(1.2890)
Success	2.937**	(1.0050)	2.937**	(1.0050)
GDP per capita	0.2330	(0.6050)	0.2330	(0.6050)
Area	-0.3040	(0.4920)	-0.3040	(0.4920)
Cold War	1.2550	(1.4450)	1.2550	(1.4450)
Asia	-2.3900	(1.6950)	-2.3900	(1.6950)
Americas	-0.3250	(2.5510)	-0.3250	(2.5510)
Africa	-5.088*	(2.0430)	-5.088*	(2.0430)
FSU	-4.589*	(2.1600)	-4.589*	(2.1600)
MENA	-5.847*	(2.5500)	-5.847*	(2.5500)
Constant	3.8760	(10.0070)	3.8760	(10.0070)
Observations	120		120	
R <sup>2</sup>	0.397		0.601	
AIC	728.135		728.135	
BIC	781.097		781.097	

Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001

Table 14. *type shift* and democratization, with determinants of *type shift* and no success

	Model 1		Model 2	
Neutral	2.1130	(1.3350)	2.1130	(1.3350)
Low Level	-0.9410	(1.7110)	-0.9410	(1.7110)
Fragmented	4.124**	(1.3490)	4.124**	(1.3490)
United	0.4950	(1.8680)	0.4950	(1.8680)
Dem Level (Polity)	0.305**	(0.1110)	-0.695***	(0.1110)
ICP	-0.7150	(2.4040)	-0.7150	(2.4040)
PCP	1.7220	(1.1450)	1.7220	(1.1450)
Size	3.5720	(5.2120)	3.5720	(5.2120)
Coup	0.6250	(1.2810)	0.6250	(1.2810)
GDP per capita	0.1160	(0.6350)	0.1160	(0.6350)
Area	-0.3560	(0.5230)	-0.3560	(0.5230)
Cold War	1.5530	(1.6030)	1.5530	(1.6030)
Asia	-2.8890	(1.6900)	-2.8890	(1.6900)
Americas	-0.2880	(2.6520)	-0.2880	(2.6520)
Africa	-5.459**	(2.0000)	-5.459**	(2.0000)
FSU	-4.874*	(2.3660)	-4.874*	(2.3660)
MENA	-6.787*	(2.6330)	-6.787*	(2.6330)
Constant	6.2890	(10.1590)	6.2890	(10.1590)
Observations	120		120	
R-squared	0.354		0.573	
AIC	734.341		734.341	
BIC	784.516		784.516	

Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001

Table 15. Second stage model, instrument and democratization (*politychange5*)

	Model 1		Model 2	
Pr(Fragmented)	9.586***	(2.4040)	10.376***	(2.4400)
Success	2.3870	(1.2250)		
Area	-0.0620	(0.4150)	-0.0980	(0.4440)
Cold War	-0.7630	(1.4710)	-0.6350	(1.5570)
Asia	-4.912**	(1.5820)	-5.141**	(1.7770)
Americas	-2.8070	(2.4310)	-2.4810	(2.5760)
Africa	-5.133*	(1.9680)	-5.047*	(2.1770)
FSU	-7.371***	(2.0500)	-7.573**	(2.4070)
MENA	-7.522***	(2.0490)	-8.067***	(2.2850)
Constant	7.7090	(5.4250)	9.4660	(5.6640)
Observations	118		118	
R <sup>2</sup>	0.31		0.283	
AIC	764.956		767.52	
BIC	792.663		792.456	

Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001